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In its Constitution, postcolonial India acknowledges the caste-based practice of “untouchability” as a 
social and historical wrong, and seeks to redress the effects of this wrong through compensatory 
discrimination.  Dalits are recognized by the state as having suffered the effects of untouchability, and 
thus as eligible for statutory protections and remedial measures, on the condition that they profess no 
religion “different from the Hindu religion” (a condition later expanded to include Sikhism and Buddhism 
as well).  The present work charts the career of the idea underlying this condition of recognition – the 
idea that the “untouchable,” insofar as she has not converted to Islam, Christianity, or another “world 
religion,” must be Hindu – and its consequences, from the late nineteenth century to the present.  
Historically and ethnographically grounded in the community life of the sanitation labor castes – those 
Dalits castes that perform the vast majority of South Asia’s sanitation work – in the north Indian city of 
Lucknow, the study tracks the idea from its ruptive colonial beginnings to its propagation by Hindu 
nationalists, induction into mainstream nationalism and installation in the edifice of postcolonial law.  
This is also an account of the everyday effects of postcolonial India’s regime of recognition in the 
present: what it confers, what it transforms, what hides in its shadows.  
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Note on Orthography 
With the non-specialist in mind, I have elected not to burden with diacritics the caste names and 
occupational titles with which the following text is teeming.  In deference to specialists, I do provide the 
technical rendering of such names and titles once: in a glossary at the end of Chapter I, or, for names not 
in the glossary, upon their first appearance. 
Again for ease of comprehension, I use conventional English spellings for Sanskrit, Urdu, Persian and 
Hindi words that have wide circulation in secondary literature: shudra rather than śudra, pir rather than 
pīr, and so on.  For less common terms – dharmaśāstra, jhāṛū – I use diacritics.   
The transliteration system that I employ, with slight modifications, is that found in John Platts’ A 
















Introduction: The Politics of Pahchān 
 
 Allow me to begin with the census.  Not with the census as a reservoir of factual data about the 
size or development indicators of the population with which this dissertation is concerned, though these 
things certainly matter.  Nor with the census as a technology of colonial governance responsible for the 
reification or calcification of previously fluid categories of social difference – though this, too, is relevant.  
I would like to begin with the census as a series of unusual conversations in a Dalit bastī of the north 
Indian city of Lucknow on a soggy February morning in 2011: a sequence of interactions between two 
census enumerators and the people they enumerated, a brief irruption of state officiality into the 
weekday routines of a neighborhood called Lal Colony (Red Colony) by its inhabitants and Sweeper 
Colony by its more prosperous neighbors.  The decennial census, after all, is for most people precisely 
this – once every ten years, a five minute conversation at the door with a local schoolteacher or 
government clerk wielding pencil, clipboard, and forms. 
   I would like to begin with what may seem an overly long account of this grey February morning 
because it exemplifies the central problematic of this study: the politics of knowledge, concealment, 
recognition and naming on the terrain of Dalit religious subjectivity, and the haunting of the present by 
the past of these politics.  It introduces the protagonists of our story: the sanitation labor castes and the 
state.  The latter, moreover, it introduces both in its remote and proximate guises: as a distant power 
responsible for determining the categorical schema according to which political goods and services will 
be distributed, and as local bureaucrat, government school teacher or politician enmeshed in parochial 
power structures.  The February morning also suggests the importance of modes of signification – of 
communicative practice itself – as a theater in which the politics of Dalit religion are waged. 
3 
 
 It happened that I arrived in Lucknow, the site at which I was to conduct my doctoral research 
and the capital of Uttar Pradesh (UP), the most populous state in India, two days into the 
implementation of the 2011 census.  This was a vast undertaking: from the 9th to the 28th of February, 
for the fifteenth time since the first decennial census in 1871-72, every person residing in India – 
approximately one sixth of all people in the world – was to be counted, named, and known.  In my 
research design I did not anticipate being present for this monumental exercise; arriving when I did, 
though, participation in it presented a felicitous opportunity.  Perhaps no modern institution figures as 
centrally in discussions of the historical development of caste and religious community – the two master 
tropes of the sociology of South Asia, the conjunction of which my research explores – than the census 
(Cohn 1987; Barrier 1981; Kaviraj 1992; Appadurai 1993; Dirks 2001; Gottschalk 2013).  Moreover, the 
sanitation labor castes hold a place of distinction in the annals of the Indian Census.  They feature in the 
decennial reports as a destabilizing force, as the source of “a great deal of confusion” (Gait 1902:435), as 
an unruly “ethnological problem” (Griswold 1934) that defied, in more ways and to a greater extent 
than other groups, categorization under the religious taxonomy of the colonial state.  As a census 
commissioner in 1901 famously put it, they constituted “the chief disturbing element in the return of 
religion” (Rose 1902:113).  I counted myself extremely fortunate, then, when the Census Director of 
Uttar Pradesh generously granted me permission to accompany census enumerators on their rounds, to 
observe the local face of the state as it assayed Dalit neighborhoods and interrogated the descendants 
of the storied troublers of the colonial epistemic order.  It was not that I expected to witness any of the 
old categorical chafing in 2011 – six decades of consistent government policy and a century of reformist 
efforts had, I was fairly confident from the literature and personal experience, secured assent from all 
parties that the sanitation labor castes, excepting admirers of Ambedkar who had converted to 
Buddhism, were Hindus.  Nonetheless, I thought, it would be valuable to observe firsthand how people 
talk about caste and religion in the encounters that cumulatively produce the demographic facts with 
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which we are all too familiar, and to see what an ethnographic approach to the analysis of a 
phenomenon that looms so large in historical accounts might yield. 
 Shankar,1 the enumerator I had arranged to accompany on this damp February morning, held a 
position as a clerk in a zonal office of Lucknow’s Nagar Nigam (Municipal Authority), from which he was 
soon to retire.  On account of his poor vision Shankar brought along his sharp-eyed 22-year-old son 
Narayan, an aspiring wildlife photographer studying mass communication, to assist him in conducting 
interviews and to record the answers on the census forms.  This was Narayan’s first experience with the 
census, while his father, who knew the neighborhood well, had worked in previous ones.  I met the pair 
at nine and stood at their side as they steadily worked their way through two lanes of the Dalit bastī , 
breaking only to take shelter from occasional bursts of cold rain.  When we disbanded in the afternoon 
the father and son had surveyed twenty six homes; in the days before this they had already covered 
about a hundred homes, and they would return again the next day. 
 Though the bastī was known as a “sweeper” colony and a large majority of its residents did 
indeed belong to the sanitation labor castes, a few families belonged to other castes.  Such was one of 
the first homes Shankar and Narayan surveyed, a two-storey brick structure partitioned into small 
apartments at the gate of which the enumerators interviewed a thirty-year-old woman and her elderly 
mother-in-law while geese noisily snapped up water from a nearby puddle.  
 “What is your caste?” asked Narayan, having come to column eight of the census form. 
                                                          
1 In accordance with the guidelines of the research ethics body (Institutional Review Board) that approved my 
research proposal, I have used pseudonyms to protect the identity of my “subjects,” with the exception of “public 
figures” and those of my interlocutors who insisted that I use their real names in the writing up of my findings and 
for whom this usage presents no likelihood of risk to them.  The late Lalta Prasad and Govind Prasad (see Chapters 
II and V) are in the latter category: they wanted to be named.  Other living or recently deceased persons whose 
real names appear in the following chapters were or are “public figures”: Achhe Lal Balmiki and Narain Din Balmiki 
were both Members of Parliament, Kanhaiya Lal Balmiki was a Member of the UP Legislative Assembly, and Dinesh 
Sharma is, at the time of writing, the mayor of Lucknow.  Everyone else’s names have been changed.  The 
pseudonyms I have chosen scrupulously reflect the “Hindu” or “Muslim” resonances of the actual names they 
represent, a point of great importance for Chapter V.   
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 After a pause, the woman replied sotto voce, “Jaisawar.” 
 “Jaisawar!” Shankar repeated loudly, at which the woman’s expression hardened.  He then 
instructed his son, “They come under S.C. [Scheduled Caste].” 
 When Narayan came to the question of occupation, the woman answered that she worked in a 
private hospital. 
 “As a nurse?” the young man asked. 
 “No.” 
 Shankar intervened, tapping his son’s census form: “Sanitation.  Sanitation.  [Safāī.  Safāī.]” 
 “What sanitation?” the woman glared at him.  “Sanitation is what the supervisor does.”  
 “Bed changing, then,” countered Shankar, “that sort of thing.” 
 To this she quietly conceded. 
 At the adjacent brick apartment the enumerators interviewed a woman who gave Gautam as 
her surname.  When she had gone inside to check on her mother-in-law’s year of birth, Narayan asked 
his father, “What does Gautam come under?”  In a stage whisper – Shankar had a somewhat theatrical 
manner of speaking – he replied, “Chamar!  S.C.”  When the woman returned, Narayan skipped columns 
seven and eight – that is, he asked neither her caste nor her religion.  Instead, he and his father filled 
them out later, on their own – Caste: Scheduled Caste (Chamar), Religion: Hindu.  As the duo explained 
to me later in the day, when Shankar knew [the verb was jānnā] a person’s caste, there was no need to 
ask the caste question, and when the caste came under S.C., there was no need to ask religion.  This 
method, of course, contravened rules laid out in the Instruction Manual for Enumerators, according to 
which the enumerator must ask each interviewee, “What is your caste” and “What is your religion” (in 
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Hindi, “āp kī jāti kyā hai” and “āp kā dharm kyā hai”).  In practice, though, Shankar and Narayan’s policy 
of inferring the caste and religion of Dalit interviewees was the norm among enumerators I observed at 
work in Lucknow, Benares and Mirzapur.  That increasing numbers of Chamars in UP have converted to 
Buddhism and that the surname Gautam – a name of the Buddha – is preferred by many Chamars 
precisely on account of its Buddhist resonances, was not a consideration for the enumerators: each 
Gautam they encountered was recorded as Hindu, without the question having been asked. 
 Further along the lane, at another cluster of small brick apartments we found a group of women 
and men sitting around the open gate, watching young children play.  As we approached, one of the 
elderly women in the group, observing us, called out, “Pandit ji has come!” (panditjī ā gaye).  Not certain 
I had heard her correctly – and unaware of Shankar’s caste – I discreetly asked Shankar what the woman 
had said. 
 He replied with his usual cheerful loudness, “She said, ‘Pandit ji has come!’  Because we are 
brahmins.” 
 “Brahmins,” Narayan confirmed. 
 “Brahmins by caste,” Shankar added. 
 By this time we were standing before the elderly woman whose utterance had provoked this 
reiterative dialogue.  A long silence followed, during which Shankar’s words seemed to hang suspended 
in the air and the group of women and men gazed at us inscrutably.  Finally one of the men, his hennaed 
hair betraying white roots, brought some red plastic chairs to the gate, had us sit, and began to field 
Narayan’s questions.  Surname?  Balmiki.  Hearing this Narayan marked dashes under the columns for 
caste and religion – to be filled in later as “S.C.” and “Hindu” – and proceeded to other questions.  After 
finishing with this man’s family, Narayan asked about the inhabitants of the ground floor apartment and 
found himself addressing a man in his thirties wearing a towel and teeshirt.  This man, Rajesh, worked as 
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a telecommunications technician in a government company.  After his family’s form was complete – 
again with everyone marked Hindu though the question had not been posed – another neighbor 
stepped forward to answer questions, while Rajesh lingered to observe. 
 Narayan asked the neighbor, “And what work do you do in the municipality?” 
 The man did not reply. 
 “Sanitation worker [safāī karamchārī],” said Shankar, speaking for the man and gesturing at his 
son to fill in the space accordingly.  
 “Wait,” said Rajesh, the telecommunications technician.  “You all never asked me what work I 
do.” 
 “I put you down as ‘worker’ [karamchārī],” said Narayan. 
 “It’s not as though all of us are sanitation workers,” Rajesh continued.  “We also have big 
positions.  We have officers.” 
 “Only in a few houses,” Narayan retorted. 
 “But this is discrimination [yeh to bhed-bhāv hai].  I’m not a sanitation worker.” 
 “I wrote ‘worker.’  ‘Worker’ is alright.” 
 “‘Worker’ is totally misleading.  Even big officers are ‘workers.’  Also,” here Rajesh pointed at the 
column where Narayan had written surnames, “That should be Valmiki, not Balmiki.” 
 “Yes, yes, I’ll fix it,” Narayan replied with unconcealed irritation.  But he changed nothing – 
neither the spelling nor the designation of type of labor. 
 Behind this row of brick apartments ran a narrow dirt lane along which stood a line of jhoṁpṛīs – 
improvised, usually one- or two-room dwellings of brick, mud, thatch, plastic and other materials.  
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Behind the jhoṁpṛīs lay the tracks of the small gauge railroad from Lucknow to Bara Banki.  In a home 
on this lane we were met at the door by a woman in a brown salwar-qamiz who looked the three of us 
over and asked, “What’s this about?  What’s this for?”   
 Ignoring her, Narayan said, “Head of household?”  The woman eyed him coolly and disappeared 
inside.  A silver-bearded man wearing a pink teeshirt and a lungi perforated here and there by cigarette 
burns emerged.  From his threshold he answered the enumerators’ questions.  He worked as a sweeper 
in a private hospital; his children did whatever work they could find, in sanitation or anything else.   
“Caste?” 
After a substantial pause, he said, “Balmiki.” 
Narayan came to the religion column, and this time chose to ask.  “You’re Hindu, aren’t you [Āp 
Hindu haiṅ, na]?”  This, too, was a deviation from the Enumerator’s Instruction Manual, which advised 
against leading questions. 
A long silence ensued.  The hospital sweeper idly observed children playing in the lane while 
Narayan looked to his father and Shankar began to fidget.  Finally the man said, “Yes, Hindu.”  Visibly 
perturbed by the man’s hesitation, Shankar pursued the matter, “You’re not, for instance, Lal Begi, are 
you?  Because, you know, there are Lal Begis who are Muslim.”   
“You mean the Dilliwals,” the man replied.  He then delivered a meandering discourse on the 
essential interchangeability of the terms Lal Begi, Balmiki, Dilliwal, 583, and other names by which his 
caste is known.  He neither affirmed nor repudiated the allegation of Muslim-ness.   
Shankar reiterated his contention that some Lal Begis are Muslim, and again probed whether 
the man was Lal Begi.  His interlocutor said nothing and watched Shankar and Narayan impassively.  
Narayan wrote “Hindu” in column seven of the form and quickly wrapped up the interview. 
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A few doors down we came to a one-room brick structure before which plastic tarps had been 
stretched to shelter an otherwise open cooking area from the rain.  Stooped beneath this was a woman 
in a green sweater, stirring a kettle full of a spicy boiling liquid.  She stood up, greeted us and asked, 
“What will we get out of this?” 
“This is the census,” said Narayan. 
“You people are the future of India!” Shankar added.  
When Narayan came to the caste question she answered “Balmiki.”  Narayan proceeded to 
column seven, religion, and again decided to ask.  “Your religion is Hindu [dharm Hindu hī hai]?” 
“No.”  She spoke quietly but distinctly.  I was startled by her response but tried not to indicate it.  
Narayan and Shankar gave no apparent reaction.  Nobody spoke.  The contents of the kettle bubbled 
and steamed.   
After an interval, Narayan repeated the question with slightly different wording, “You’re Hindu 
[Hindu haiṅ]?” 
“Yes.”  
Shankar turned to me as though to explain the necessity of the question, “Some people do 
convert [kuchh log dharmparivartan karte haiṅ].” 
What was going on here?  The woman offered no explanation for her volte-face; nor did her 
face, voice, or comportment suggest that her attention had drifted, that she had initially misunderstood 
the question, or that she had spoken in haste or error.  She had delivered both replies in the same calm 
and steady tone.  And what of Narayan – why had he ignored her initial response? 
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We came, eventually, to one of the bastī’s small provisions shops, where Shankar greeted the 
shopkeeper with an effusive “Trivedi ji!” to which the shopkeeper warmly replied “Sharma ji!” and the 
two men embraced.  Trivedi closed his shop and insisted on taking us home, an apartment upstairs from 
two Balmiki families in another row of two-storey brick structures.  His was the only brahmin household 
(and one of very few non-Dalit families) in the bastī; it was also, I realized after we sat down in the 
apartment and Trivedi’s wife served us chai and savory snacks, the only home in the bastī at which the 
enumerator father and son had been welcomed inside and offered refreshment.  It was here, out of 
earshot of neighbors and passersby, that Shankar and Narayan elaborated on their methodology of 
inferring caste from surname, and religion from caste – at least most of the time.  Narayan explained, 
for instance, that since he knows that Trivedis are brahmins and Hindus, he need not ask the 
shopkeeper’s caste or religion.  But what of surnames that have been adopted by more than one caste, I 
asked.  There are, for example, non-brahmins who take the surname Sharma.  This topic brought smiles 
to the enumerator father and son and to our hosts, and they named several “Backward Castes” that 
adopt brahmin surnames.  Such affectations, Shankar assured me, do not escape his notice or lead him 
to misidentify “backwards” as brahmins.  
 “I catch them [Maiṅ pakaṛ letā huṅ],” said Shankar. 
 Narayan added, “Papa knows [pāpā jānte haiṅ].” 
 “I have lived here many years,” his father continued, evidently savoring the discussion.  “I catch 
them.” 
 
The Politics of Pahchān 
 Papa knows. 
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 This dissertation takes as one of its central concerns the politics of knowledge; more particularly, 
the politics of the kind of knowledge to which Narayan here refers, sociological knowledge instrumental 
to the functioning of the postcolonial state.  What Shankar knows becomes, through its inscription on 
the census form and entry into databases of the Ministry for Home Affairs, demographic facts; facts on 
the basis of which state policy is created, debated and implemented; facts that determine the allocation 
of government resources; facts published and republished in textbooks, newspapers, websites, 
government statements, NGO reports, and a host of other nodes of official discourse; facts that hold 
aloft the canopy of commonsense that shelters and makes possible the public sphere.  But if the 
enumerator’s knowledge produces effects through the operations of the state, its grounds are not 
purely governmental.  What enables Shankar to “catch” would-be caste imposters is not only his being a 
government servant, but his experience – “I have lived here many years” – inflected by his location in an 
older social order, with its older ontological assumptions.  
 There is another father figure – not a Lucknow census enumerator but the father of the nation, 
not “papa” but “Bapu” – whose fusion of brahminical and governmental ways of knowing has cast a long 
shadow over sanitation labor caste lives, and thus features prominently in this dissertation’s narrative.  
Like Shankar, Gandhi knows, and his assertions of knowledge bespeak a distinctive social ontology.  “I 
know infinitely more than you do what Harijans are,” Gandhi (1934b) says to his educated 
“untouchable” critics in 1934, referring to their caste fellows by his preferred name Harijan or “children 
of Hari,” Hari being a Vaishnava Hindu name for god.  “[I know] where they live,” he continues, “what 
their number is and to what condition they have been reduced […] I know their abject position.”  As we 
will consider in detail in chapter IV, Gandhi’s knowledge claims regarding “untouchables” generally and 
the sanitation labor castes specifically weld together an enumerative, panoptic, governmental 
imagination with a decidedly brahminical social ontology of “the Bhangi” and his sacred duties.  The 
figure wrought by this powerful alliance of knowledge practices, institutionally nurtured by the Indian 
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National Congress and affiliated bodies and chiseled into law by one of independent India’s first 
presidential acts (the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order of 1950), has proven profoundly 
consequential for Dalit life. 
 Yet as the above account of census operations suggests, the knowledge claims of a Gandhi or a 
Lucknow enumerator, with whatever certitude expressed, reveal their own anxious instability in the 
encounter with the silence and surreption, or at times open refusal, of those they purport to represent.  
The religious and labor coordinates of the residents of Lal Colony – their invariable “identities” as Hindus 
and sanitation workers – are obtained over a chorus of silences, ellipses, evasions and reversals.  At 
times the knowledge that the enumerator inscribes onto the ledger of the state involves the active 
dismissal of challenges from the enumerated – like that of the woman who changes hospital bed sheets 
or the man who works as a telecommunications technician, both of whom protested in vain that they 
were not sanitation workers.  Gandhi, too, accomplished his representations of the sanitation labor 
castes to no small extent by this method: talking over, suppressing dialogue in favor of monological 
assertion.  More often, though, the demographic facticity of the Hindu-ness of the sanitation labor 
castes rests on questions not asked, or questions answered in the ambiguous affirmative, or in 
circumlocutions.  Behind the assuredness of “papa knows” is the doubt in Shankar’s voice, the 
perturbation in his manner as he interrogated the silver-bearded man who neither endorsed nor refuted 
the charge of crypto-Muslim identity.  The politics of knowledge that I seek to track in this dissertation 
includes knowledge claims made about the sanitation labor castes as well as the tactics deployed by the 
latter when they conform to, contradict, parry and parody these claims. 
 This dance of claim and counterclaim, naming and dissembling might be seen as a variety of 
what is often called identity politics: the modern domain of contestation in which social groups of 
various sorts assert their difference from other groups and stake claims, paradigmatically for recognition 
and redress of wrongs, from the state or civil society.  Dalit politics are often discussed as precisely that.  
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This contestatory domain is by no means irrelevant to this study, but I do not think it helpful to frame 
the inquiry in the terms of identity politics.  As an analytical term, “identity,” however carefully we try to 
qualify it, cannot escape its grounding in a concept of “absolute and essential sameness” (OED), of 
identicality, whether across time, across persons, or both.  Many have noted the difficulty in reconciling 
a concept of stable and enduring self-sameness with the manifest internal diversity and instability of 
social groups over history (Brubaker and Cooper 2000).  Moreover, the modern concept of identity 
draws upon a notion, associated with Herder, of authenticity as endogenous, unique to each group or 
nation, and to which members of the group must be true.  As Charles Taylor (1994) points out, this idea 
of authenticity requires a monological model of social formation, one in which groups derive their traits 
and character from within, rather than dialogically in relation with other groups.  A moment’s reflection 
will affirm that such a model is untenable. 
 One solution to the conceptual pitfalls of identity politics is to shift the emphasis onto precisely 
the dialogical and intersubjective aspects of the phenomenon and to call it, as many have, the politics of 
recognition.  This is a felicitous move that brings us closer to our object of inquiry.  In a debate over how 
the politics of recognition actually operate, Nancy Fraser (1997a; 1997b) and Judith Butler (1997) make 
clear that no hard distinction can be sustained between collective demands for economic redistribution, 
which imply that the demanding group has the nature of a class (in the Marxian sense) with shared 
interests, and demands for recognition, which imply a group defined more by cultural criteria.  In fact, 
they contend, group struggles for justice generally involve both kinds of demands at once; recognition 
brings redistribution in its wake and vice versa.  To observe this is to puncture the notion, often implicit, 
that identitarian movements or what gets called “identity politics” are unserious, that the demand for 
recognition is separable from protests against exploitation or injustice, that the latter represents a true 
locus of conflict, and the former, false.  Thus attempts to shunt “race” or “ethnicity” into one or another 
of these paradigms for mobilization are misleading; as Butler (1997:270) points out, paraphrasing Paul 
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Gilroy and Stuart Hall, “race may be one modality in which class is lived.”  Much the same may be said of 
indigeneity; as Elizabeth Povinelli’s (2002) study of Australian multiculturalism makes vivid, the politics 
of state recognition of indigenous Australians has a great deal to do with the distribution of capital (and 
the distribution of violence) historically, in the present and in the legally anticipated future. 
This state of affairs obtains in the Indian context as well: caste, among many other things, is 
assuredly a modality in which class is lived.  The postcolonial Indian state acknowledges this in its 
primary apparatus for addressing caste inequality; the reservation for Dalits of posts in government 
employment, educational institutions and so on is eminently a redistributive measure.  Nonetheless, 
public debate over Dalit politics often rests precisely on the distinction between class-based 
(redistributive) demands, generally seen as legitimate if restricted to the poor, and caste-based 
(recognitive) demands for the acknowledgement of wrong done, which are frequently begrudged.  The 
discrediting of Dalit claims as “merely cultural” requires the rhetorical separation of these actually 
alloyed demands.  Herein lies some of the appeal, for me as for several other observers of the politics of 
recognition, of Hegel’s (1977) grim parable of the master and the bondsman.  In the Hegelian account, 
the struggle for recognition is not falsely extracted from the brute conditions of social and material 
inequality in which it occurs.  Recognition, in this tale, is not a matter of the bruised or gratified feelings 
of well-fed citizens, but is a life and death struggle at the heart of the human condition.  
But to say that the subject of this dissertation is the politics of recognition will not suffice.  Partly 
this is because some of the key historical arguments I will make pertain to a period before the rise of the 
politics of recognition as it is usually understood, or at least before it came to impact subaltern groups in 
colonial India.  That is, the characterizations of self and other made by Lal Begis in the late nineteenth 
century followed compulsions different from those animated by such concepts as minority, human 
rights, or separate or joint electorates (see Chapter III).  But even after these elements came into play, 
the framework is less than ideal for our purposes.  There is a spectrum of scholarly opinion on the 
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modernity of South Asia’s social forms; one pole of this spectrum would comprehend all of the primary 
axes of contemporary social conflict in India – caste, communalism, antagonism between adivasis 
(indigenous peoples) and non-adivasis – as essentially governmental in origin and essentially identical in 
their operative logics.2  Dalit politics, in this view, can be nothing other than the politics of identity or 
recognition as produced by governmentality everywhere; it is an Indian variant of a global theme that 
follows a predictable, lamentable script; it stands to contribute little new to our understanding of the 
social world.  Yet as Michel de Certeau (1984) notes in his critique of Foucault, such a perspective too 
readily concedes the success of the totalizing ambitions of the fathers of the modern state and 
overstates the reach of normative institutions and organizing discourses – as though the panopticon 
actually did comprehend everything.  One problem with such a view is that it misses important ways in 
which the state is not only a universal but also a local category and operates in part as a local actor; 
governmentality takes distinctive forms and invokes distinctive logics in Sukarno’s Indonesia, Indira’s 
India, and Reagan’s United States.3  Another problem is that explanations of this sort fail to account for 
much of what goes on in the everyday negotiation of personhood and group belonging.  Beneath the 
apparently pervasive “monotheism,” as Certeau (1984:xv, 48) would have it, of the coherent body of 
disciplinary state practices central to modern subject formation, roils a teeming “polytheism” of 
“scattered practices,” subaltern “tactics,” acts and even patterns of “antidiscipline” that rarely congeal 
into enduring discursive formations yet nonetheless permeate actual social relations.  The February 
morning I spent accompanying Shankar and Narayan on their enumerators’ rounds rippled with hints of 
such fugitive procedures; more will come in the chapters ahead.  As my account of Lucknow census 
operations is intended to suggest, my interests in this dissertation lie not only with the distinctive 
knowledge practices of the Indian state and the ways its subjects come to conform to governmental 
                                                          
2 A succinct formulation of the argument can be found in Dipesh Chakrabarty’s (2002) essay “Governmental Roots 
of Modern Ethnicity.”  
3 Some of the divergent paths taken by modern governmentalities are well illustrated in the work of James Siegel, 
particularly 1998; 2006. 
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categories, but also with subaltern practices that fall into the interstices – or better, the blind spots – of 
Foucauldian analyses. 
Insofar as the politics of recognition may call to mind hard versions of the modernity-of-
caste/race/ethnicity argument rehearsed above – insofar as the term evokes an already-mapped 
theoretical terrain whose coordinates are those of governmentality – I will for the most part eschew it 
here, notwithstanding its descriptive power and admitted proximity to our object of inquiry.  
Fortunately, the north Indian vernacular presents us with a better means to describe our phenomenon: 
an everyday term used to refer to the identity-recognition dialectic, yet whose conceptual moorings, 
free from the pitfalls of “identity” and unencumbered by the legacy of “recognition,” enable us to think 
afresh what it is we are describing.  This is the concept of pahchān.  In official discourse, pahchān 
denotes “identity” in the modern governmental sense – a pahchān patra, for instance, is a legal identity 
card.  Pahchān is also, among some Hindi speakers whose first language is English, acquiring the 
meaning of an inwardly derived individual or collective selfhood; but I should emphasize that this import 
from English is a recent development that remains far from widespread.  In the bastīs of Lucknow, for 
example, I have never heard pahchān used in this way.   
The primary meaning of pahchān is intimately linked to its verbal form pahchānnā.  Significantly 
a transitive verb, pahchānnā means to know, discern, recognize, or distinguish.  At once this shifts our 
conceptual frame from ideas of static self-sameness to a scene of dynamic intersubjectivity.  Where 
identity implies an enduring ontological condition, pahchān evokes a moment in a dialogical 
engagement between selves and others, a moment that favors the other, the identifier, the knower.  At 
this point we have traversed the distance between identity and recognition; to stop here would be to 
provide a synonym for recognition that happens, felicitously, to be used for “identity” as well – a helpful 
term, perhaps, but one that performs no new analytical labor.   
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But pahchān does more than this.  Without attempting anything like an exhaustive exposition 
on the concept, I want here to simply make two swift points.  One is that pahchān and caste (jāti) have a 
long and intertwined history.  In South Asia, that is, social knowledge has always been caste knowledge; 
jātis have long been among the primary categories by which persons are recognized; literally, jāti has 
always been pahchān-ed.  One sees this registered as far back as popular vernacular poetry of the early 
modern period.  Consider, for instance, the oft-repeated Punjabi couplet of Bullhe Shah (c. 1680-1758): 
Chal Bullhe chal ūthe chalie jitthe sāre annhe 
 Na koī sāḍī zāt pahchāne na koī sānūṅ manne4 
O Bullah, let’s go where only the blind live. 
 There no one would care for [know, recognize] your caste; 
 There no one would hold us in esteem.5 
 
The second point is that the conceptual grounds of pahchān are semiotic.  Consider a 
nineteenth century dictionary entry for the word: “knowledge, acquaintance, ascertainment, 
recognition, experience, discrimination, discernment; distinguishing mark, characteristic; indication, 
token, sign” (Platts 2000 [1884]:284).  Indeed, the Sanskrit root from which pahchān derives, chihn, 
means precisely sign.6  The implications of anchoring an understanding of the identity-recognition 
dialectic in a theory of signs are considerable. 
An example may help to clarify both points.  Omprakash Valmiki, whose autobiographical 
writing, fiction and criticism have decisively shaped the field of Dalit literature, writes in his short story 
“Andhaṛ” (“Dust Storm”) of a young man of the sanitation labor castes who works in his father’s piggery 
(raising swine being another “traditional occupation” of many of these castes).  With his father and 
                                                          
4 I am grateful to Sudipta Kaviraj for directing me to this verse.  In the absence of a critical edition of Bullhe Shah’s 
work, I give here the version provided by Nazir Ahmad (2008:18), which corresponds closely with that published in 
other modern editions and that of popular memory.  There are slight differences, however, and in Faqir 
Muhammad Faqir’s (1960:372) edition it is not zāt (caste) but qadar (respect, standing, esteem) that is the object 
of the verb pahchāne in this verse.  Pahchān appears in a number of Bullhe Shah’s verses.   
5 The translation is that of Puri and Shangari ( 1986:457). 
6 Chihn: “a mark, spot, stamp, sign, characteristic, symptom” (Monier-Williams 2004:399). 
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brothers, the protagonist rises at four o’clock each morning and performs the labor of seizing and killing 
pigs, burning off their hair, and cleaning and butchering their carcasses – work that leaves an olfactory 
trace on the body of the worker.  The story explains: 
The moment he got free, he would bathe with a very thorough scrub down.  Despite this 
the smell of pig flesh did not leave his body.  This smell became his pahchān.  In school 
nobody wanted to sit next to him (Valmiki 2000:88). 
 
A smell – manifestly external in its origin and indifferent to the protagonist’s view of himself – becomes 
his pahchān.  This passage anticipates the theme of Chapter II, the relationship of odors and other 
sensuous signs to the caste order.  For our present purposes, what this passage makes clear is that 
pahchān denotes something very different from the deeply held self-descriptions of individuals or 
subaltern collectives, from the enduring intrinsic properties of persons or groups, or from authenticity.  
The protagonist does not discover pahchān within himself; nor does he alone decide what his pahchān 
will be – on the contrary, his vigorous, soapy efforts to suppress this incipient pahchān fail.  Rather, it is 
his classmates, in their collective reaction to the protagonist, who determine his pahchān.  They know, 
recognize, and identify him by a sign – a faint whiff of pig flesh – which, in brahminical social ontology, 
can only mean that he belongs to an “untouchable” community, as only “untouchables” rear and 
butcher swine.  Pahchān, then, is a “distinguishing mark,” a sign by which a person or group is 
recognized by others. 
 But – and this is a point of extreme importance – signs are not the objects to which they refer.  
Signs suggest, point to, and represent essences, natures, or ontic objects, but they are not themselves 
those essences, natures or ontic objects.  Signs mediate.  And like all mediators, go-betweens or 
middlemen, they are a slippery and unreliable bunch.  The most famous sign – the word – is notorious 
for the arbitrariness with which it represents objects in human communication.  Thus, what pahchān 
does as a concept, unlike either “identity” or even “recognition,” is to foreground the semiotic and 
therefore mediated and relatively arbitrary nature of the phenomenon, its vulnerability to manipulation.  
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Within the conceptual field of recognition, the assertion “I recognize that object” could and sometimes 
does mean “I directly apprehend the essence or true nature of that object.”  Within the conceptual field 
of pahchān, this is not the case.  Rather, the assertion “I pahchān that object” implies – again, on 
account of the concept’s rootedness in chihn, sign – “I recognize that sign of an object,” or “I recognize 
that this is how that object is usually represented.”  With pahchān the sign stands between the knower 
and the object ostensibly known; what links knowledge to ontic status is not a stone bridge but a 
network of untrustworthy ferrymen.   
 Omprakash Valmiki’s story bears this out.  The protagonist, as a youth, performs very well in 
school, earning higher marks than all of his classmates; nonetheless it is not his academic achievement 
but the smell of his father’s piggery that becomes his pahchān.  In his youth, that is, he takes up the 
semiotic game of the identity-recognition dialectic, a contest fought on a profoundly unequal field, and 
loses.  But the story continues.  Determined not to be defined by stigmatized Dalit labor in his 
adulthood, he obtains a scholarship at a university far from home where he conceals his caste origins 
and severs ties to virtually all of his family and community.  “Passing” as middle class and privileged 
caste, he earns a doctorate and eventually becomes a scientist of some renown.  Ultimately, it is the title 
of his position at a prestigious government research institute that becomes his pahchān (Valmiki 
2000:85–95).  That is to say, after enormous effort that leaves him alienated and plagued by guilt, he 
wrests control of the signs by which he is recognized – or, better, he develops an aptitude for the 
manipulation of those signs that is greater than the capacity for discernment of the people among 
whom he lives and works.  While the victory is both Pyrrhic and provisional – for the scientist, like other 
Dalits who “pass,” daily faces the possibility that his social origins may somehow be betrayed – he 
nonetheless wins it.  As this and virtually any tale of “passing” demonstrates, signs are unreliable guides 
to the objects they purport to represent.   
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The pedestrian concept of pahchān acknowledges as much.  It does not pretend to ultimate 
knowledge, but admits its mediatedness, its corruptibility.  Nor does not aspire to permanence, but is 
satisfied to be contingent, to be the unstable front in a never-ending series of skirmishes: assertions, 
counter-assertions, feints, dodges, the granting and withholding of recognition.  It is a little more than a 
century of such skirmishes that this dissertation seeks to illuminate.  My subject is indeed the politics of 
knowledge, identity politics, and the politics of recognition.  But more accurately than any of these, it is 
the politics of pahchān. 
 
The Sheriff’s Hand 
 Before outlining the central argument of the thesis and introducing in more detail the sanitation 
labor castes, allow me to briefly lay out the theoretical assumptions underlying the study.  It will be 
apparent from the preceding discussion that I find the analysis of social phenomena to be well served by 
attention to the operations of signs, which I understand to be the fundamental units of communication 
broadly conceived, and semiosis, the proliferative, yeasty, historically traceable transmission of signs.  In 
this respect I follow the theory of signs – capacious in scope yet scrupulously precise – expounded by 
the mathematician and philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce.  It will also be apparent that I view semiosis 
as an eminently political domain, as an arena in which individuals and groups negotiate power, as a 
theater – indeed the theater – of ideological conflict.  In this I follow the philosopher of language 
Valentin Vološinov, who maintains that “The domain of ideology coincides with the domain of signs.  
They equate with one another […] The reality of ideological phenomena is the objective reality of social 
signs.  The laws of this reality are the laws of semiotic communication” 7 (1973:10, 13). 
                                                          
7 Vološinov (or perhaps his translators) uses the term “semiotic communication” here to emphasize the point; but 
strictly speaking the term is redundant, since in this view all communication is semiotic – there is no 
communication without signs. 
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 So long as an expansive view of signs – as including not only words, flags and gestures but also 
thoughts, music, and public executions – is admitted, there should be no difficulty in acknowledging the 
semiotic locus of the conflicts and contracts with which studies of social life concern themselves.  Yet 
while few would deny that a public execution operates as a social sign, the full implications of its sign-
nature, and of the breadth of the terrain of semiosis, are very often missed.  There has long been a 
scholarly tendency, perhaps traceable to Ferdinand de Saussure’s influential delineation of the field of 
linguistics (a subset of what he called semiology and Peirce called semeiotics: the study of signs), of 
analyzing human communication as though it were a domain sequestered from power – as though it 
were apolitical.  Even Foucault, whose entire oeuvre stresses the pervasiveness of relations of power, 
considers the semiotic sphere to be relatively separable from “power relations,” making possible the 
statement: “Whether or not they pass through systems of communication, power relations have a 
specific nature” (1982:788).  If the perspective that I espouse is correct, there is no question of power 
relations not passing through systems of communication.  Through what other medium would they 
move, if not signs? 
 An example from Peirce may assist in reorienting our habits of thought.  In a discussion of 
“secondness” – a category with which this dissertation will not explicitly engage – Peirce provides the 
following hypothetical illustration of a moment of human communication, a sign. 
A court may issue injunctions and judgments against me and I not care a snap of my 
finger for them.  I may think them idle vapor.  But when I feel the sheriff’s hand on my 
shoulder, I shall begin to have a sense of actuality (Peirce 1958:bk. 1, Ch. 1). 
 
The injunctions and judgments issued by the court are, of course, obvious instances of signs through 
which the state communicates, signs charged with power.  Less acknowledged – given the usual 
emphasis on linguistic signs, and the (false) analytical sequestration of language from operations of 
power – are signs like that of the sheriff’s hand on my shoulder.  This is a non-verbal, tactile sign that 
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communicates no less effectively – indeed, more effectively, as Peirce’s anecdote would have it – than 
the king’s decree or the bureaucrat’s order.  If the example draws attention to the vast, underexplored 
domain non-verbal signs – sensuous signs as I will call them in chapter II – it also exposes how signs of 
every sort are precisely the medium of power relations.  The sheriff’s hand conveys not only warmth and 
pressure to the nerves in my shoulder, but the might of the law.  But the hand need not belong to an 
agent of the state.  Power courses through tactile signs of all sorts: a punch in the face, a molester’s 
grope, a pious handout, a healer’s laying on of hands – even a refusal to touch.  Visual signs like school 
uniforms or graffiti, aural signs like national anthems or jazz: once the actual scope of semiotic activity is 
taken into account, it becomes difficult to see how the notion of communication as a zone shielded from 
politics came to enjoy the currency it has. 
 This study deals with a variety of signs.  Dalit politics and struggles over the religious pahchān of 
the sanitation labor castes have constellated around things as diverse as names, shrines, cooking 
vessels, meat, sex, modes of public comportment, and ways of signifying the sacred.  To apprehend all of 
these as signs is to enable a unitary analysis of phenomena often partitioned along the lines of 
intellectual divisions of labor.  It is also, I hope, to inaugurate a new front for critical engagement with 
caste and religion in South Asia.  If prevailing theories portray caste as either perduring civilizational 
episteme (Dumont 1980), a mode of kingly politics monstrously transformed by colonial 
governmentality (Dirks 2001), or vote bank politics that cynically invoke bygone social forms, none of 
these does justice to Dalit history and the texture of Dalit experience in the present; to the visceral, 
passional persistence of caste in an age when few openly espouse caste ideology; to the furtive 
continuance of subaltern forms of life that slip between and around brahminical and governmental 
categories and the states of mind they encourage.  To rethink caste as a semiotic system, to consider the 
politics of religion in terms of traffic in signs, is to draw closer to the stuff of everyday life – to hands on 
shoulders, smells in nostrils, names on the lips of aunts, brothers and employers – that gives substance 
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to social abstractions like caste and religious community.  It is also, I think, to enable insights that 
regnant modes of analysis have not yielded. 
 
Hinduization and its Shadows 
Without giving the plot away entirely, let me quickly sketch the central argument of the 
dissertation.  It is an attempt to explain why the woman in the green sweater first told the enumerators 
that she was not Hindu, and then, when asked again, that she was.  Or why the man with the silver 
beard and the cigarette-stained lungi took such a long time to reply to the question of religious identity, 
and then artfully evaded the allegation that Lal Begis are Muslim.  Or, equally, why this man’s long 
pauses provoked the seasoned enumerator, why they incited such a query as “You’re not, for instance, 
Lal Begi are you?” 
Based on ethnographic evidence from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, I 
contend that the sanitation labor castes in that period understood themselves as neither Muslim nor 
Hindu but as members of an autonomous religious community centered on Lal Beg, a prophet 
[paighambar] cast in an Islamicate mold yet revered only by these castes.  Moreover a broad range of 
Hindus and Muslims acknowledged the religious alterity of the Lal Begis, as they were called – Hindu 
census enumerators in the colonial period, for instance, often refused to record the sanitation labor 
castes as their co-religionists.  The colonial administrative decision to classify “untouchables” as Hindus 
by default contradicted prevailing sociological commonsense. 
All of this began to change as the politics of numbers – of majorities and minorities in 
representative bodies, of separate electorates and the logic of “enumerated communities” (Kaviraj 
1992) – took hold, and as the missionary critique of Hindu society for its treatment of “untouchables” 
became a political impediment for Indian nationalism, in the early decades of the twentieth century.  I 
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argue that the career of the idea that the sanitation labor castes are and always have been Hindu in the 
religious sense of the word was, in reaction to these two developments, launched by the Hindu 
reformist organization the Arya Samaj in the 1920s and bolstered by the Congress in the 1930s – the 
latter with the decisive leadership of Gandhi and the mediation of his organization the Harijan Sevak 
Sangh (in its members’ own rendering, “Servants of Untouchables Society”).  I discern two strategies in 
the efforts of these individuals and organizations, at the all-India level, to reconceive the boundaries of 
Hindu society: monological nomination – labeling “untouchables” as Hindus without having consulted 
them, an assertion of the “lordly right of giving names” (Nietzsche 1989:26) that invokes brahminical 
and colonial authority – and dialogical persuasion in a communalist mode.  The latter meant inclusive 
overtures to the sanitation labor castes – including solidary efforts to eradicate untouchability practices 
– contingent on the sanitation labor castes’ repudiation of Muslims and the Islamicate Lal Begi tradition. 
Seizing on the institutional space opened up for “untouchables” by the Arya Samaj and the 
Congress, a subset of the sanitation labor castes took up – and in the taking up, altered – the 
Hinduization project.  Oral histories of the struggle over the religious pahchān of the sanitation labor 
castes in Lucknow from the late 1940s onward make clear that once the Congress’s nominative strategy 
achieved the status of law – in the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order of 1950 – apparent signs of 
Hinduization, like the wholesale refashioning of names, swiftly followed.  Having a caste title like Lal 
Begi, or a Muslim-sounding personal name like many Lal Begis previously had, disqualified applicants for 
government loans and scholarships intended for those historically wronged by untouchability in 
independent India; to be recognized by the state as a member of a Scheduled Caste, one had to profess 
to be Hindu.  The surname Balmiki gained currency, and with it a genealogy linking the sanitation labor 
castes to Rishi Valmiki, author of the ancient Sanskrit epic Ramayana.  The public performance of the 
community’s affiliation with the Hindu poet-sage won state patronage; in statuary, temples, annual 
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festivals and government holidays, Valmiki became the symbol of the postcolonial state’s recognition of 
the sanitation labor castes – as Hindus. 
More controversial were transformations in ritual, in sexual norms, in the food, drink and 
equipment of nuptials and death ceremonies that the advocates of Hinduization championed, and 
eventually, to a great extent, achieved.  Crucial to the success of the leaders of the newly named Balmiki 
community was their deployment of the second strategy for inclusion in the nation, the one bequeathed 
them by the Arya Samaj: anti-untouchability activism featuring Muslim antagonists.  To this approach 
Congress regimes in Uttar Pradesh in the 1950s and 1960s proved amenable. 
Yet this is not only a tale of people coming to inhabit the categorical niches allotted them by a 
postcolonial state that suspends its commitment to secularism with respect to a fifth of its population.  
Part of what I am tracking is a process of this sort – what Ian Hacking (1985) calls “dynamic nominalism” 
or simply “making up people” – and it is indeed my argument that the now commonsense category of 
the Hindu Balmiki, the person of the sanitation labor castes who identifies herself and is identified by 
others as a Hindu by religion, is a modern invention.  But, as I have discussed already, accounts that rely 
wholly on the explanatory power of the governmentally produced subject tend to be ethnographically 
thin.  There is more to the politics of sanitation labor caste pahchān – more to its history and its present 
– than such accounts are equipped to address.  Officially dead, the old caste prophet Lal Beg lives on – in 
disguise, in shadows, sometimes in the inner chambers of the very leaders who advocated his 
abandonment.  Habits of silence and gesture, old ways of signifying the sacred and relating with Muslims 
persist alongside the ascendant identitarian modes.  Without question, the Hinduization of the 
sanitation labor castes under the sign of Valmiki has wrought far-reaching transformations in the 
structure of Indian society and in the texture of Dalit lives.  Yet among the sanitation labor castes the 
subaltern tradition of secrecy, dissimulation and “passing” – of tactical semiotic manipulation – remains 
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alive, and in its vitality raises doubts about the nature of this apparent triumph of Hindu nationalism and 
its conformity to a universal narrative of governmentally generated identity. 
  
The Sanitation Labor Castes 
 Who are the sanitation labor castes?  The reader will already have sensed that the protagonists 
of this dissertation are known by a welter of names.  Lal Begi, Balmiki, and Bhangi are merely the 
beginning; sanitation labor caste nomenclature, a web of intersecting caste names, religious titles and 
occupational designations whose denotations have shifted over time and differ between regions, 
requires nothing short of a glossary.  This I will provide in a moment.  First, though, it must be remarked 
that the complexity of nomenclature in the domain of untouchability itself warrants analysis.  The 
multiplicity of names is partly a straightforward reflection of caste difference (we are speaking of several 
distinct castes, a caste “cluster”) and regional variation.  But the instability of nomenclature over time 
speaks to an ongoing historical struggle over names (or name-signs) and the intended consequences of 
their use (“interpretants” in Peircian terms).  Following Ambedkar, I would argue that the nominative 
variability in this sphere indexes the degree to which naming is a modality of power in caste society.  
Consider the following passage from Ambedkar’s essay “Away from the Hindus”:  
The name ‘Untouchable’ is a bad name.  It repels, forbids, and stinks.  The social attitude 
of the Hindu towards the Untouchable is determined by the very name ‘Untouchable’.  
There is a fixed attitude towards ‘Untouchables’ which is determined by the stink which 
is imbedded in the name ‘Untouchable’.  People have no mind to go into the individual 
merits of each Untouchable no matter how meritorious he is.  All untouchables realize 
this [and thus make efforts to change their caste names…] 
[T]he Bhangis call themselves Balmikis.  All of them if away from their localities would 
call themselves Christians… they give themselves other names which may be likened to 
the process of undergoing protective discolouration. […] 
The name matters and matters a great deal.  For, the name can make a revolution in the 
status of the Untouchables.  But the name must be the name of a community outside 
Hinduism and beyond its power of spoliation and degradation.  Such name can be the 
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property of the Untouchable only if they undergo religious conversion.  A conversion by 
change of name within Hinduism is a clandestine conversion which can be of no avail 
(Ambedkar 1989:419–420). 
 
Smells “imbedded” in names: olfactory signs entwined with verbal signs, the latter in this case bearing 
the former, conveying meaning and eliciting intrepretants (repulsion, “forbid[ding]”) conjointly.  This is 
an extraordinary suggestion as to how caste operates semiotically, one that anticipates the argument I 
will adumbrate in Chapter II and which undergirds the entire study.  Ambedkar’s assessment of the 
move to adopt Balmiki as “undergoing protective discolouration” and as a “clandestine conversion” 
likewise foreshadows the narrative to come – in Chapter III we will see that the sanitation labor castes 
have been likened to “chameleons” since the colonial period, and subsequent chapters chart precisely 
“a conversion by change of name” – though it is not only a change of name – among these castes over 
the middle decades of the twentieth century.  For present purposes what is important here is that 
Ambedkar points us to the name-sign as a crucial locus of caste conflict, an object of struggle that 
contains potential seeds of “revolution” but which can also lead to dead ends.  This is very much the sign 
as Vološinov analyzes it – sign as “an arena of class struggle.”  “The ruling class strives to impart a 
supraclass, eternal character to the ideological sign [here the name “Untouchable” or “Bhangi”], to 
extinguish or drive inward the struggle between social value judgments which occurs in it, to make the 
sign uniaccentual” (Vološinov 1973:23).  The sanitation labor castes, for their part, seek to imbue these 
signs with different “accents” – to defang or discredit them by exposing their historically contingent and 
politically motivated character, or to invest them with oppositional content (e.g., Bhangi as “breaker,” 
insurrectionist)8 – or to escape hated name-signs altogether by taking refuge in new ones.  Several of 
the names in the catalog to follow began at least in part as attempts to assert the dignity of the 
sanitation labor castes.  But in the unequal contest over the interpretation of signs, brahminical society 
has widely succeeded in denying the new signs their intended interpretation, or at least in confining the 
                                                          
8 This is a move made by Bhagwan Das (1981a) and Dev Kumar (2004), among others. 
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new interpretation to very delimited circles.  The “stink… imbedded in the [old] name” has been 
reintroduced, by dominant usage, in the new.  The struggle continues.  
 There are thus no neutral terms.  There are no caste labels devoid of political content.  In recent 
decades scholars of untouchability have generally dealt with this impasse by using whatever self-
descriptions their interlocutors use; I will do the same.  But it should be clear that this procedure does 
not distill a neutral category for social science; it is not a solution.  It is an act of taking sides in a fraught 
and shifting political field.   
By “sanitation labor castes” I mean to denote those castes, all of which are Dalit, that perform 
the great majority of sanitation work in contemporary South Asia.  The term is a translation of safāī 
kāmgār jātiyāṅ (safāī – cleaning, cleanliness, sanitation; kāmgār – worker, laborer; jātiyāṅ – castes), a 
self-designation used by ordinary people, by Hindi writers who take up the topic, and by a number of 
non-governmental organizations whose members belong to these castes and which work for social and 
political unity among themselves.  Two objections to the term immediately present themselves: first, in 
what could be seen as a tacit endorsement or unwitting reproduction of brahminical social ideology, it 
reifies the contingent link between a people and an occupation; second, it posits a unity to what are in 
fact fragmented groups.  Both are valid criticisms.  It is the case that some of the sanitation labor castes 
entered this domain of labor relatively recently – Dhanuks, for instance, appear to have taken up 
sweeping and scavenging between the 1870s and the 1940s (Ibbetson 1970:266–296; Searle-Chatterjee 
1981:26–30).  The most populous and widespread of the sanitation labor castes, though – Chuhras and 
Doms – have been associated with these forms of work for far longer, as attested to by their own oral 
traditions as well as by Al Biruni’s eleventh century chronicle Tārikh al-Hind, which describes Doms 
removing filth from villages.  A related concern is that for all of the sanitation labor castes, sanitation 
work is only one of several occupations in which the community has traditionally engaged, others 
notably including drumming and other processional music performance, basket weaving, swine rearing, 
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manure manufacture and distribution, and agricultural labor.  As Ramnarayan Rawat (2011) argues with 
reference to Chamars and leatherwork, to identify a group primarily by reference to its stigmatized 
“traditional occupation” can be empirically misleading insofar as only a minority of said group may 
actually engage in such forms of labor; more perniciously, it can reproduce brahminical stereotypes.  I 
agree.  However, the sanitation labor castes differ from the Chamars on this front: sweeping and the 
removal of human and animal waste historically played a larger role in the economy of the sanitation 
labor castes, and engaged more of its labor more of the time (women’s and men’s), than leatherwork 
did in the economy of the overwhelmingly agriculturalist Chamars.  Moreover, whereas the past century 
has witnessed an increasing decoupling of caste and “traditional occupation” for a great many 
communities, for the sanitation labor castes the bond has grown tighter.  This is not to say that there is 
not a great deal of occupational diversification among upwardly mobile members of these castes – there 
is.  But for the majority, the range of occupational possibility has effectively narrowed in the past 
century: on the one hand synthetic fertilizers and mass produced baskets have rendered two major 
“traditional occupations” virtually obsolete, while on the other, the demand for municipal and private 
sanitation labor has expanded enormously with mass urbanization.  Sanitation has become by far the 
largest sector in which these castes are employed.  Like members of the community who deploy it for 
this reason, I use the term sanitation labor castes to acknowledge the extraordinary degree to which this 
domain of work colors and impinges on people’s lives in these communities, and on community life as a 
whole.  But I certainly do not wish to breathe life into a stereotype or ratify as natural or essential the 
link between these people and this work. 
As for the second objection to the term – that it suggests unity where there is none – I must 
insist on a medial position.  It is true that there is a certain aspirational quality to the use of the term in 
the context of non-governmental organizations: present-day Balmikis, Dhanuks, Helas and others want 
to forge a united front for concerted action, but often deplore, in gatherings intended to strategize such 
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action, that the de facto situation is one of disunity.  I was sometimes told that “we are like the bristles 
of the broom: dispersed” (the broom of reference being the laggā jhāṛū, a long-handled broom whose 
stiff, dried date-palm bristles splay out at the end – not at all like the tight fasces into which bristles are 
bundled in an American broom).  But the simile works both ways, for the bristles of the laggā jhāṛū 
conjoin at one end – they constitute a bundle before they are dispersed.  The shared “we” in the remark 
further suggests the state of relations.  Oral traditions of the sanitation labor castes recorded in the 
nineteenth century emphasize shared origins: a story with many versions tells of sons of a common 
progenitor who, forced to flee a wrathful king, took to different routes and hiding places, each of which 
resulted in a caste name (Helas descend from the brother who floated [helnā] down the river, Dhanuks 
from the brother who hid under a pile of paddy [dhān], Bansphors from the brother who hid in a 
bamboo [bāṅs] grove etc.).  Members of these castes rarely intermarry (though intermarriage between 
two sanitation labor castes remains far more common than intermarriage between a sanitation labor 
caste and a non-sanitation labor caste, Dalit or otherwise), and see each other as distinct, separate 
castes (jātiyāṅ).  But they also recognize each other as part of a larger collective (samāj, samuday) that 
shares a great deal in common and, as I said, aspires to unified action.  In the ethnographic literature, 
this collective has been described as the “Dom group” (Briggs 1953; Guha 2009) or more often simply as 
“the sweeper castes” or “the scavenger castes” (see, e.g., Ibbetson 1970; Temple 1884; Gait 1902; 
Searle-Chatterjee 1981). 
I am wary of census statistics for reasons that should already be clear.  Nonetheless, to give 
some very preliminary sense of scale, in the colonial period (after 1931 data disaggregated by specific 
castes are not available), the population of the north Indian sanitation labor castes was somewhat 
above four million persons.9  
                                                          
9 The number 4,142,224 is the sum of the all-India totals for Bhangi, Chuhra, Halalkhor, Dom, Lal Begi, Bansphor, 
Dhanuk, Mazhabi, and Mehtar, in the 1901 census, in which these were all enumerated separately (there are some 
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 Without further ado, here is a brief glossary of the sanitation labor caste names that will be 
encountered in this dissertation.  It will be most helpful, I think, to treat separately caste names, 
occupational titles, religious titles, and Lucknow/Awadh-specific designations, though admittedly there 
is some overlap between the four in ordinary usage, as I will indicate. 
 
Caste names: 
Bhangi (Bhaṅgī) – Much of the confusion surrounding the sanitation labor castes results from the 
conflation of this term’s two distinct referents: one is a specific caste – the Chuhra.  In Gujarat, 
Rajasthan, parts of Uttar Pradesh and central India, the Chuhra caste has long been identified by the 
name Bhangi, whereas in Punjab (in Pakistan and India) and other parts of UP the name Chuhra has 
predominated.  Reflecting this regional difference, the colonial censuses enumerated Chuhras (but not 
Bhangis) in Punjab and Bhangis (but not Chuhras) in most other provinces, leading some later observers 
to imagine that the two were separate castes (e.g., Griswold 1934).  But the two are identical; they are 
two names for the same vast endogamous unit, field of belonging, and imagined and internally governed 
community – the same caste (jāti).  For more on the Chuhra/Bhangi caste, see the following entry.   
The other referent of Bhangi blurs the specific caste designation sketched above with the 
occupational category of sanitation worker; Bhangi in this sense refers to the sanitation labor castes as a 
whole, as well as to any sanitation worker, irrespective of caste.  In this usage, to wield a broom or clean 
a latrine is to be a Bhangi.  Gandhi used the term this way (see Chapter IV) and this usage remains 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
exceptions; for example, Lal Begis were enumerated as a subset of Bhangis in UP, so I have excluded that number, 
while including Lal Begis enumerated in Bengal, where they overlapped with no other category).  This remains a 
very conservative estimate, since it excludes hundreds of thousands of Chuhra converts to Christianity (see 
Chapter III), and probably several regional sanitation labor castes and alternative names by which the above-
mentioned castes were returned (Risley 1902).  
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prevalent among privileged castes, who generally take little cognizance of distinctions among Dalits, let 
alone between sanitation labor castes.  
In both cases, the term Bhangi is widely experienced as a virulent term of abuse, a word charged 
with violence and caste contempt.  Virtually every member of the sanitation labor castes who interacted 
or corresponded with Gandhi objected to his use of the term.  Law now regards its deployment as a 
form of hate speech,10 though this has scarcely hampered its prevalence in everyday life.  Anti-caste 
radicals among the sanitation labor castes have sought to harness and rechannel the word’s power, 
notably by plotting its etymology (from the Sanskrit root bhañj, to break, shatter, split, defeat, thwart) 
not into a tale of defeat (the “broken ones”) or occupational specialization (“splitters” of bamboo, 
basket-weavers), but into a narrative of revolt against brahminical domination (“breakers” of Aryan 
armies, “thwarters” of brahminical order) (Das 1981a; Kumar 2004).   
Chuhra (Chūhṛā) – This is by far the most populous and transregional sanitation labor caste in South 
Asia.  The Chuhra (or Bhangi, see previous entry) “heartland” – the region in which the caste figures 
prominently not only in the urban but in the rural economy and fabric of life, and has done so for 
generations – encompasses all of Punjab (in Pakistan and India), the Delhi region, parts of Rajasthan and 
all of western and central UP.  Awadh – the region around Lucknow that is the setting of our study – is 
the easternmost swath of this heartland.  In colonial UP, the caste constituted roughly one percent of 
the overall population; in Punjab, a little more than six percent, and in some districts (notably Amritsar) 
the proportion rose to twelve percent.  During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as municipal 
and military sanitation labor markets expanded, members of the caste migrated in large numbers to 
cities and cantonments across most of the subcontinent, from Karachi to Calcutta to Pune and 
Hyderabad in the Deccan (Campbell 1885; Streefland 1979), where they settled while still retaining 
networks of marriage and communication with the heartland. 
                                                          
10 See the Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocity) Act, 1989, 3(1)(x). 
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 It was overwhelmingly among the Chuhra/Bhangi caste that the cult of Lal Beg thrived, though 
there is evidence that other sanitation labor castes participated to smaller degrees.  The caste and the 
religious community were coextensive to such an extent that in dictionaries and literature of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the terms Chuhra and Bhangi were treated as synonyms of Lal 
Begi (Fallon 1879:303; Dihlavi 1898:165; Kipling 1887; 1901:chap. 6). 
 If less familiar across the subcontinent than its correlate Bhangi, the term Chuhra, too, operates 
in everyday speech as a conveyor of derision and contempt, as is memorably demonstrated in 
Omprakash Valmiki’s autobiographical and other writings.  “Chuhra-Chamar” – a term that conjoins this 
caste with another populous and transregional Dalit caste – enjoys currency among privileged castes as 
a generic term of abuse for any person of “low” birth.   
In Chuhra oral traditions transcribed in the nineteenth century, the community remembers itself 
as being none other than the Chandal (Chānḍāla), the brahminical discursive tradition’s paradigmatic 
“untouchable” and archetype of alterity, a figure loathed and feared.  The etymology of Chuhra is 
uncertain; some derive it from chūrā – “powder, filings, sawdust, bruised grain… a fragment” (Platts 
2000:450) – which in turn derives from the Sanskrit root chūrṇ – “to reduce to powder or flour, 
pulverize, grind, pound, crush, bruise” (Monier-Williams 2004:401). 
Dhanuk (Dhānuk) – Derived from dhanuṣ, “bow” – thus “bowman,” hunter, etc. – Dhanuk is the name of 
a regional caste that late colonial ethnography portrays as having tribal origins, a caste whose traditional 
occupations included cotton carding, drumming, processional musicianship, basket-weaving, and, by the 
end of the nineteenth century, sweeping and scavenging.  Dhanuks are settled in greatest concentration 
in central and western UP – notably the Kanpur region – but also in Punjab.  In the colonial period 
Dhanuks revered Lal Beg along with the Chuhras in some regions (Ibbetson 1970:296).  In the twentieth 
century, Dhanuks have organized politically and religiously around the figure of Supach Sudarshan, a 
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virtual double of Valmiki in narrative and iconographic representation.  Almost all sanitation workers in 
Lucknow belong either to the Chuhra or Dhanuk castes. 
Hela (Helā) – Hela is the name of another regional sanitation labor caste, like the Dhanuk and the 
Chuhra in many respects (traditional occupations among the Hela also include basket-weaving and 
processional musicianship, but also, unlike the others, winnowing basket [sūp] manufacture), but based 
in southern and eastern UP, with large population concentrations in the Allahabad and Benares regions.  
Narain Din “Balmiki,” one of the first Members of Parliament from the sanitation labor castes, belonged 
to this community, and will feature prominently in the narrative of Chapter V.  Etymologies of Hela are 
speculative. 
Dom (Ḍom) – In his eleventh century Tārikh al-Hind, Al Biruni notes that Doms are one of four groups 
(including also the Chandal) “occupied with dirty work, like the cleansing of villages” and who also “play 
on the lute and sing” (Bīrūnī 1983:101–02).  In addition to these paradigmatic sanitation labor caste 
occupations, death work – the handling of human corpses, grave-digging, cremation labor – is specially 
associated with Doms.  The Dom heartland begins where the Chuhra heartland ends: Doms live in 
highest concentration in eastern UP, Bihar, and Bengal; though in smaller clusters the caste is present in 




Khakrob (Khākrob) – Derived from khāk (“dust”) and rob (a form of ruftan, “to sweep”), Khakrob in 
Persian denotes both “sweeper” and “broom” (Steingass 2000:440–41, 581, 591).  In the Mughal and 
British periods Khakrob designated sweepers as an occupational category.  In most of South Asia the 
term has fallen out of circulation over the course of the twentieth century, but in Pakistan’s Northwest 
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Frontier Province it continues to be used, and is regarded, in contradistinction to Chuhra (which also 
circulates there), as a relatively respectful term.11  
Halalkhor (Ḥalālkhor) – A compound of the Arabic ḥalāl (“lawful”) and the Persian suffix –khor (“one 
who eats”), Halalkhor means “one who earns his bread honestly/lawfully.”  This, at least, appears to be 
the meaning the Mughal emperor Akbar intended when he popularized the name in the late sixteenth 
century, as Abu’l Fazl (1927:147) reports in his chapter in the Ā’īn-i Akbarī on the administration of royal 
stables (in which the “khakrob”/“halalkhor” were employed).  An alternative meaning – “one for whom 
all food is lawful,” or simply “people who eat anything” – has competed with the more dignified 
denotation ever since.  Throughout the Mughal and British periods Halalkhor denoted sanitation 
workers as an occupational category, irrespective of caste or religion.  In much of the subcontinent it fell 
out of use in the twentieth century (partly due to Gandhi’s promotion of Bhangi in its place), though in 
parts of UP, Bihar and Bengal it continued to be used 1. as a synonym for Hela, and 2. to refer 
specifically to a Muslim sanitation labor caste also known as Sekra.12   
Mehtar – Another exemplary case of the verbal sign as an “index of social changes” and “arena of class 
struggle” (Vološinov 1973:19, 23) is Mehtar.  A nineteenth century Persian dictionary entry for Mehtar 
suggests its historical trajectory: “Greater; elder; prince, lord, chief, governor; a sweeper, a menial who 
removes filth; a groom” (Steingass 2000:1352).  At least until Akbar’s period, Mehtar remained an 
honorific title for members of the Mughal retinue13; but by the nineteenth century, it applied only to 
subalterns – “sweepers, inn-keepers, shoe-makers, butchers, &c.” (Platts 2000:1099).  By the turn of the 
                                                          
11 I am grateful to Dr. Salman Bangash of University of Peshawar for this detail.  In his autobiographical reflections, 
Bhagwan Das (2004, and personal communication, 2010) helps date the departure of Khakrob from the caste 
lexicon – at least in Shimla and its environs – to the first quarter of the twentieth century. 
12 As part of my doctoral project I conducted extensive research with this community – Muslim Halalkhors – in the 
Benares region of eastern UP.  I have had to set aside the findings of this portion of my fieldwork for the purposes 
of the dissertation, but the history and present engagements of Muslim Halalkhors will be at the center of a future 
project already underway.  
13 See, e.g., Abu’l Fazl’s Akbar Nāma (1977:452). 
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twentieth century the name was firmly anchored to sanitation workers, as it remains today; people are 
generally startled to learn that Mehtar once meant “prince.”  Nonetheless, its comparatively benign 
connotations made it a preferred self-designation through much of the twentieth century; most of 
Gandhi’s interlocutors from the sanitation labor castes, for example, pressed him to use “Mehtar” in 
place of “Bhangi” (see Chapter IV). 
Jamadar (Jam‘dār, Jamādār14) – The most recent epithet to undergo aspraśyīkaraṇ 
(“untouchabilization,” “becoming untouchable” [Shyamlal 1997]), Jamadar meant, in the nineteenth 
century, “The head of any body of men; a native officer of the army so called; an officer of police, 
customs, or excise” (Platts 2000:388).  As late as 1899, in his Urdu classic Umrāo Jān Adā, Mirza Hadi 
Ruswa could describe his heroine’s father as a Jamadar without suggesting a mean station in life.  Over 
the first half of the twentieth century, though, the term came increasingly to attach to supervisors in 
urban sanitation departments, and, ultimately, to the sanitation workers themselves.  As we will see in 
Chapter VI, Jamadar circulates in Lucknow today as a synonym for Mehtar or “sweeper.” 
 
Religious titles 
Lal Begi (Lāl Begī) – Meaning “follower or disciple of Lal Beg,” Lal Begi is the name by which many of the 
sanitation labor castes, above all those of the Chuhra/Bhangi caste, referred to themselves and were 
referred to by others in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Chapter III sketches the 
contours of the cult of Lal Beg; this prophet’s name itself means something like “Red Lord” (Lal – red, 
ruby, dear; Beg – lord, sir, master).  Because many among the Chuhra/Bhangi caste identified 
themselves as Lal Begi in the colonial censuses, and because census policies regarding such 
identifications were inconsistent, the term Lal Begi has an official career not only as a designation of 
                                                          
14 Jam‘dār reflects Urdu pronunciation, which retains the Arabic ‘ain, whereas Jamādār reflects the Hindi, which in 
practice converts the ‘ain into a long “a.” 
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“sect” or “religion” – an understanding close to that of the community itself – but also as a designation 
of “caste,” as though Lal Begis were an endogamous group apart from the Chuhras/Bhangis, which they 
are not.  When the British drew up the first “Schedule” of castes known to suffer the effects of 
untouchability in 1935 (bringing into being the “Scheduled Castes”), they included Lal Begi as well as 
Chuhra and Bhangi (and for that matter Halalkhor and Mehtar), rendering a religious community a caste 
– at least in governmental discourse.  This is less a case of a sect ossifying into a caste – a much-
discussed phenomenon of South Asian history for which the Virashaiva or Lingayat example is often 
considered paradigmatic – than of a caste, on account of its religious life and its members’ efforts to 
name themselves, acquiring multiple names in the eyes of the colonial “ethnographic state” (Dirks 
2001).  
Balmiki (Bālmīki) or Valmiki (Vālmīki) – Balmiki (or its variant, Valmiki) is, today, the preeminent term of 
self-description in circulation among the Chuhra/Bhangi caste, and to a lesser extent among other 
sanitation labor castes.  Concomitantly, it is the appellation by which people not belonging to the 
sanitation labor castes refer to the sanitation labor castes in a non-derogatory manner; unlike Chuhra or 
Bhangi, Balmiki is not considered a term of abuse.  As Chapters IV and V demonstrate in some detail, 
from the 1920s onward (the late 1940s onward in Lucknow), Balmiki gradually replaced Lal Begi as a 
religiously-grounded title for these castes, following the premise that these castes descended from the 
disciples of Rishi Valmiki, or indeed from the brahmin poet-sage himself, and were therefore Hindu in a 
transhistorical sense.  Because Balmiki has become the symbolic currency with which the state and the 
sanitation labor castes transact business, members of sanitation labor castes other than the 
Chuhra/Bhangi (Helas, Dhanuks, Doms, etc.) not infrequently make use of the title in official contexts 
(such as applying for a scholarship or a loan), even when they do not generally identify themselves as 
Balmiki and resist the idea of organizing politically under the banner of Balmiki.  The resistance is partly 
due to resentment, among these castes, of the political “arrival” of their more populous brothers – 
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however compromised such “arrival” may be (see Chapter VI).  But it is also due in part to the Hindu 
nationalist politics embedded in the term Balmiki itself.  Ambedkarites among the Dhanuks and Helas, 
for instance, are wary of the ease with which the genealogical link with Valmiki can be assimilated to 
Hindutva agendas.   
 
Names specific to Lucknow/Awadh 
Panch Sau Tirasi (Pāñch Sau Tirāsī) – Panch Sau Tirasi is a number: Five Hundred Eighty-Three.  The 583 
are a regional clan (the usual word is the Arabic qabīla: “tribe; clan; family” [Platts 2000:788]) or unit of 
self-governance (panchāyat) of the Chuhra caste in Awadh.  There are other such regional clans in 
central UP, most of which also have numerical designations: the Hazara (Thousand) of Mahmoudabad, 
the Bāra Ghar (Twelve Houses) of Sitapur, the Baīsī (22) and the Nau Sau Nawāsī (989).  The 583, 
however, constitute by far the largest clan in Awadh; their traditional territory stretches between the 
Gomti and the Ghaghra rivers and from Sitapur in the northwest to Faizabad in the southeast: the better 
part of six administrative districts.  At the geographical center of this territory stands Dewa Sharif, a 
complex of Sufi shrines in Bara Banki district where the 583, until quite recently, convened meetings of 
the panchayat or caste council.  The clan is organized into patrilineages, each of which must be prepared 
to supply men to perform prescribed functions at panchayat meetings when necessary: the chaudhury 
adjudicates, the nāyab deputizes, the pyāda serves summons, the khūnī pyāda enforces summons, and 
so on.  The 583 trace the origins of this institution to one Jumma Mehtarani, a shrewd and sagacious 
(dimāghdār, chatur) ancestress whose strategic dealings with her royal employers won the caste 
concrete benefits in land, patronage and protection.  Some say she came from Iran or accompanied 
Babur’s Mughal army; others place her centuries later, as a contemporary and accomplice of Begum 
Hazrat Mahal, the queen of Awadh known for sponsoring the insurgents against the British in the great 
39 
 
rebellion of 1857.  Other than their unique foremother, what sets the 583 apart from their caste fellows 
in other regions is occupational and dietary: the 583, unlike the Chuhra caste elsewhere, rear and trade 
mules, donkeys and horses (a trade dominated by Dhobis and Kumhars – Dalit castes not associated 
with sanitation labor – in other parts of UP), and do not rear or sell swine.  Nor do they eat pig flesh, 
whereas in many parts of north India the consumption of pork is central to Chuhra ritual life.  Like their 
caste fellows across north India, the 583 formerly identified themselves as Lal Begi, and now as Balmiki, 
a story I will tell in detail in Chapter V. 
Dilliwal (Dillīwāl) – Lastly, the Dilliwal (“persons of Delhi”) of Lucknow are a subgroup within the Chuhra 
caste of Awadh who have long considered themselves to be “pakkā” (in this case, unambiguous or 
proper) Shi’i Muslims.  The central implication of the name notwithstanding, the Dilliwal are said to have 
been the employees of the famously Shi’i nawabi court in Faizabad and Lucknow (1722-1856); they were 
urbanized when the 583 remained predominantly rural.  My most elderly interlocutors among the 583 
recall their grandparents saying that there was a time when the Dilliwal and the 583 intermarried; and it 
is certainly the case that the Dilliwal helped the 583 obtain jobs in the early waves of 583 urbanization in 
the early twentieth century.  Relations remain neighborly – in one bastī  Dilliwals and the 583 still live 
side by side and exchange food and hospitality – but in community religious life the two have gone their 
separate ways.  
 
Structure of the Thesis 
 It remains to give the reader some sense of what is to come. 
 The dissertation is divided into three parts.  I begin and end with ethnography of the present – 
accounts of sanitation workers’ rounds, religious life, and the everyday politics of pahchān in the bastīs 
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of Lucknow.  The middle section turns to the archive and to oral histories to reconstruct how this 
present came to be what it is. 
 Part 1 consists of this chapter and the next.  If this chapter introduces the major themes and 
arguments of the dissertation, Chapter II sets the stage in a different way.  It deals with the 
sensuousness of caste: the sights and sounds by which social structure is communicated, the smells that 
inscribe untouchability into the spatial logic of the city.  Here I assemble elements of an embodied 
theory of caste, of caste as a semiotic order conveyed through fingertips and nostrils as much as through 
sentences and censuses.  If much of the dissertation addresses sanitation labor caste history in terms of 
caste and religion, Chapter II foregrounds sanitation labor, attempting to give some sense of how this 
category of work shapes experience. 
 Part 2 consists of chapters III, IV, and V.  It is in this section that I develop the historical argument 
sketched above: that the Hindu-ness of the sanitation labor castes, far from being a transhistorical social 
fact, is the outcome of a twentieth-century Hindu majoritarian project inaugurated by the Arya Samaj, 
advanced by the Congress, and strategically engaged by the sanitation labor castes themselves.  The 
narrative is chronological.  Chapter III considers the period, roughly 1880-1920, before Arya Samaj 
overtures to the sanitation labor castes began.  It examines late colonial accounts of the cult of Lal Beg 
for evidence of how the sanitation labor castes represented themselves, and how others perceived 
them, in terms of religious community in this period.  Chapter IV tracks the efforts of the Arya Samaj in 
the 1920s, and the Congress Party and its affiliate the Harijan Sevak Sangh in the 1930s, to bring the 
sanitation labor castes into the Hindu fold.  The pan-Indian scope of the historical narrative thus far 
narrows in Chapter V, which follows the Hinduization project to Lucknow from the late 1940s onward.  
Here the local struggle over the community’s pahchān – conflicts over names, shrines, relations with 
Muslims, wedding fare – is explored in detail. 
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 Part 3 – Chapters VI, VII and the Conclusion – draws this history back to the present.  Chapter VI 
is an account of Valmiki Jayanti – the birth anniversary of Rishi Valmiki – in Lucknow that brings into 
relief the contemporary role of the state in patronizing the new pahchān as well as the limits of the 
effects of state recognition.  Chapter VII juxtaposes Valmiki Jayanti with an ethnographic account of 
another annual caste rite – the feast of Lal Beg.  Here, attending to patterns of silence and gesture as 
well as utterance, I argue that the politics of pahchān are transforming even ways of signifying the 
sacred.  The Conclusion returns by a back passage to the semiotic game of evasion and dissimulation 






The Smell of Caste 
 
و گ و �ب ہاں ربن ہے �ب ہ ��یسا � �ن �دم د�ی�بی ب�اۓل : �ہ �  �ب
��یس : ��ز و سا و و آرزوزابب ت�ب  و درد و داغ و �ب�
Gabriel: Ancient friend, how is the world of color and smell? 




Sweeping and Semiosis 
 The first time that I heard caste, or rather became aware that I was perceiving caste by ear 
alone, I was sitting in a Sufi shrine in the old city of Lucknow.  It was evening, just after the final call to 
prayer, and at the end of a day of interviews I had come to the dargah to take notes, relax, and listen to 
some musicians perform qawwali.  While the musicians were setting up, I took a seat on a low ledge in 
the relatively uncrowded rear part of the shrine and began writing in my notebook.  The sounds of the 
dargah wafted around me: prayers being uttered, vendors hawking plastic toys and kitchen utensils, the 
sizzle of fat dripping on embers at the kabob-wala’s stall, a thousand quiet conversations, the honking 
and feathery bustle of a family of geese to my left, the steady roar of a diesel generator somewhere 
nearby.  Into this soundscape, of which I was minimally aware and which I had not objectified as such, 
gradually entered the scraping rasp of a stiff-bristled broom sweeping marble, first faintly and then quite 
close, right behind me.  I had already stood up and taken two steps forward – with perhaps more 
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alacrity than the mere mechanics of removing my person from the path of the broom required – before I 
formed any conscious idea of my action or its stimulus.  Now safely at a remove, I turned, saw that there 
was indeed a woman applying a stiff-bristled broom to the dargah floor, and realized that I had just 
enacted one of the many quotidian dramas of untouchability.  I had, to overstate only slightly, leapt out 
of the way of a sweeper, prompted by nothing but the sound of her approach. 
 The skirr, scrape or scrattling generated when the dispersed end of a bundle of split dried fronds 
of the coconut palm is drawn across hard surfaces is, I would argue, an aural sign of caste.  It is one of 
the distinctive sounds of untouchability.  Not every broom creates this sound.  There is, for instance, the 
whispery, almost inaudible susurration of indoor sweeping with the phūl jhāṛū, the short-handled broom 
made from the soft fibers of tiger grass (Thysanolaena maxima), a mass-produced commodity that 
dominates the urban market for domestic cleaning supplies.  Though the phūl jhāṛū is ordinarily wielded 
by members of the servant class, it need not necessarily index menial status, for there are some 
shopkeepers who sweep their own shops with it, and householders who clean their own floors, without 
thereby accruing stigma.  One can buy a phūl jhāṛū at a market and carry it home without dread of being 
seen with it. 
 Not so the heavy, long-handled, stiff-bristled broom of the municipal street sweeper.  This 
broom, used for outdoor sweeping, is not a commodity; it is neither bought nor sold.  No factory 
produces the laggā jhāṛū, as it is called; rather, it is manufactured by the very people – the only people – 
who use it, professional sweepers, a class for whom the correlation of caste and occupation has not 
unraveled under the conditions of postcolonial modernity, but rather has grown tighter.  The laggā 
jhāṛū indexes “sweeper” as surely as smoke indexes fire.  Since “sweeper” is, notionally as well as 
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empirically, a subset of “Dalit,” the characteristic rasp of the laggā jhāṛū on pavement and similarly hard 
surfaces sends a signal of unambiguous social import: a Dalit is near.15 
 What transpired in the dargah, semiotically speaking?  To employ Peirce’s triadic scheme, the 
skirr of bristles on marble was (1) a sign, or representamen, that represented (2) an object, whose 
content I wish to bracket for the moment, to (3) an interpretant: the action by which I interpreted the 
sign.  Item (3) can be further disaggregated into (a) emotional, (b) energetic, and (c) logical 
interpretants, such that I (a) felt a vague sensation of alarm, (b) stood up and took two steps forward, 
and (c) thought to myself simultaneously “Good thing those dirty bristles didn’t touch me,” and, perhaps 
less ingenuously, “Well, one mustn’t obstruct the way of someone hard at work, after all.”  My behavior 
– in this case, most obviously, my energetic interpretant of springing forward – then became a sign in its 
own right, inviting or inciting those around me to interpret my move, whether by getting out of the way 
of the sweeper themselves, or turning and staring at her, or ignoring us both, or some other act.  
Semiosis keeps tumbling ahead.  Fortunately, nobody but the geese seemed to notice my movement, 
and geese don’t observe untouchability, even in its subtle forms. 
 Consider another non-discursive sign – I will address doubts raised by this term shortly – that 
invites us to enact caste.  Shortly after I began fieldwork, medical and pharmaceutical students in 
Lucknow staged a demonstration whose centerpiece – the image reproduced in the newspapers the 
next day – was a tableau vivant in which the students, some clad in white lab coats, held brooms in their 
hands and pretended to sweep the ground.  This was not an innovation; medical students in Delhi had 
staged just such a tableau at India Gate in 2003 in a protest against caste-based reservations in 
university admissions.  Anti-reservations activists had adopted the model at medical campuses all over 
India in the subsequent years, especially in 2006; engineering students took it up as well.  The 
                                                          
15 There is a third kind of broom, stiff-bristled like the laggā jhāṛū but lacking a handle and thus gripped at the 
gathered end of the bristles, that produces a similar sound without necessarily indexing Dalit presence.  This kind 
of broom is used in domestic cleaning, like the phūl jhāṛū, but for wet surfaces. 
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photograph in the Lucknow papers was a variation on what was by then a circulating visual trope, a sign 
with a history.  But what gave this form of protest its semiotic potency? 
Importantly, the broom-wielding student tableau requires neither slogans nor banners nor any 
kind of text.  Exegesis is superfluous.  The message is contained in the juxtaposition of the student – 
often signified by a lab coat – and the broom.  The unthinkability of this pairing says everything: the 
world is upside-down, the meritorious are being punished, the unmeritorious are trespassing.  The 
tableau invites its interpreter – any person who glances at the photograph in the newspaper – to feel 
sympathy for the students, to wince at the thought of those smooth skilled hands in contact with that 
rude conveyor of impurities, to say to a neighbor “Would you want a jhāṛū-wālā to perform your 
surgery?”  It asks us to assent to the students’ mapping of merit onto lab coats and meritlessness onto 
the broom; it asks us to participate in cosmopolitan caste contempt. 
 To return to our bracketed question: what does the jhāṛū signify?  What is the object 
represented sonically by the scrape of dried coconut fronds and visually by brooms in a photograph?  Of 
the three irreducible correlates of Peirce’s theory of signs, the object is the most elusive, because least 
available for objective observation.  Saussure’s signified is more stable: we all know what is meant when 
someone utters the word “horse,” do we not?  But Peirce’s object is truer to life, for it takes into 
account the contingency of signification, the subjectivity of the interpreter, and the fact that the 
meaning of symbols (signs whose grounds of signification are convention) changes over time.  The 
object a sign represents must be inferred by considering not only the nature of the sign but also the 
range of interpretants it elicits, and the history of its interpretation.  I submit that the dominant 
meaning the jhāṛū, especially the laggā- jhāṛū, has accrued in South Asia – the object this aural and optic 
sign is prevailingly taken to represent – is the abject, that which comes from us but cannot be owned, 
proximity to which triggers the disgust reflex, that visceral horror of contact that is only partially 
apprehended by the concept-term “untouchability.”  
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There is a long history of representing this disturbing (distressing, disgusting) object by means of 
non-discursive signs.  The dharmśāstra insists that it is “the duty of the candala… to make himself 
visually and audibly known by wearing, for instance, a leather thong and beating a cymbal” (Aktor 
2010:46).  We know from travelers and ethnographers that the broadcasting of untouchability through 
sound and sight was not merely a brahminical fantasy but, in some places until the twentieth century, 
actual social practice.  These “classic” features of untouchability tend to be discussed today as 
archaisms, tropes of the inequity of a long-buried ancien regime.  And the days are indeed gone when 
sweepers had to announce their arrival in a bazaar with a distinctive cry, when untouchables were 
recognized by the pots (hāṁṛī) that hung from their necks to catch polluting spittle.  But the encoding of 
the social order in the sensory surround, the imbuing of non-discursive, sensuous signs with the content 
of hierarchy, disgust, and abjection, is still very much with us.  Manu’s wretched Chandala, dressed in 
the garments of the dead and beating a cymbal, no longer exists (if, as some have questioned, he ever 
did).  Manu’s semiotic logic, however, is to be found on the front page of our newspapers.  
 This chapter is about the sensuousness of caste; it is concerned with the tactility and visuality of 
hierarchy, with the sounds, tastes, and especially smells through which social structure is communicated 
and rendered a fact of the body as well as the mind.  I mean to identify ways in which the senses are 
enrolled in the project of social differentiation; ways in which caste inhabits the human sensorium, 
calibrating our organs of perception according to social location; ways in which the sensory surround 
itself is wrought into a sign of the naturalness, permanence, and inevitability of the caste order.  
Ultimately such an enquiry may help explain how, even where its ideological premises have been 
cognitively abandoned, caste continues to exert the force that it does in everyday social life – why, 
whatever our stance on its propositional content, caste continues to grip us.  To explore the sensory 
aspects of social life is to get at what William Connolly calls “visceral modes of appraisal” with which we 
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assess and engage the world, the “evaluative dispositions outside the purview of consciousness that 
inform or constitute much of our political discourse” (Connolly 1999; Hirschkind 2006:9). 
 From Weber to Dumont, the study of caste was long dominated by – and in many circles 
continues to be – ideology as explanation.  Weber’s emphasis on the comprehensive theodicy of karma, 
and Dumont’s on the “system of ideas and values,” are representative of a scholarly tradition that 
comprehends Indian society primarily by reference to ideology.  I would maintain that this tradition is 
not altogether misguided in its choice of emphasis: ideology matters, it matters a great deal.  From the 
vantage point of the present enquiry, the problem with many of these accounts is not their truck with 
systems of values, but rather their restricted understanding of such systems as cerebral phenomena, 
and therefore of caste as essentially a “state of mind” (Dumont 1980:34).  The narratives that result, 
while elegant and arguably intellectually faithful to their object, are bloodless and deodorized.  While 
they helpfully isolate the tenets of caste ideology and illuminate its structural logic, they fail to recognize 
that its habitat is human flesh and its medium is sensory perception. 
 Yet even in the most avowedly intellectualist accounts, in the “purely structural universe” that 
Dumont charts in Homo Hierarchicus, the sensuousness of caste cannot be entirely excised.  “In 
Tinnevelly,” Dumont (1980:82) tells us, “I saw the marks of blows on the back of an Untouchable, blows 
which he had received for having crossed the village of a martial caste (the Maravar) wearing sandals.”  
Here the tactile and visual signs of hierarchy, the welts by which the dominant inscribe their social 
theory on the flesh of the subjugated, expose the poverty of a disembodied theory of ideology.  What is 
a caste beating if not the transmission of ideology?  Ideology is conveyed through signs, and while the 
assertions and arguments of texts and verbal discourse are among these signs, they are not the only or 
even the principle means by which most people learn systems of values.  Rather, as is hinted at by the 
irrepressibility of scar tissue even in Dumont’s largely incorporeal account, it is our fingertips, nostrils, 
eardrums and pores that are our primary receptors of ideology; we know the truth of homo hierarchicus 
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in our bodies long before we hear it formulated as an argument; the welts on the untouchable’s back, 
more than the śloka from Manu, is the everyday habitat of brahminical social values. 
 Other influential approaches to caste likewise neglect its sensorial aspects.  The transactionalists 
and substance theorists come close to acknowledging caste’s embeddedness in the senses, but the 
appeal of the synoptic diagram – the matrix of food transactions, for example – keeps pulling their 
analyses away from the tactility of parched grain and the aroma of cooked rice to an algorithm in the sky 
(e.g., Marriott 1960, 1990).  The contributions for which M.N. Srinivas (1987) is best known are also 
largely stripped of the sensory, though there are ripples of the sensation of menace, a certain tensing of 
muscles, in some of his descriptions of the dominant caste in Rampura.  The Foucauldians, for their part, 
are sensualists of another sort, sensualists of the archive, whose embrace of the “gray, meticulous, and 
patiently documentary” art of genealogy (Foucault 1984:76) has helped explain the strong odor of 
colonial ink hovering about our object, even as it takes us further away from the clamorous sensory 
surround of lived caste (Appadurai 1993, Dirks 2001). 
 This chapter, then, seeks to direct our attention to a class of data that is as underexplored as it is 
vital to the career of caste.  Agreeing with William Miller that for “an account of class, rank, or social 
hierarchy” to be thick it must be “accompanied by an account of the passions and sentiments that 
sustain it,” I seek to begin a conversation on the role of the senses in structuring the passional life of 
caste.   
We began this discussion with the jhāṛū, the broom, as a sensuous thing, a thing whose visual 
and aural properties operate as signs pregnant with social content.  It bears pointing out that the broom 
is also a tactile sign.  When you are a municipal street sweeper, you have thick calluses on both of your 
hands.  These calluses are physiological interpretants of the tactile sign of your laggā jhāṛū, or rather, of 
your deploying it for six to ten hours of every day of the week but Sunday.  Your considerable shoulder 
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and upper arm strength, and your back pain, are likewise interpretants of the broom-sign, though 
perhaps less directly attributable to its tactility as such.  All of these interpretants are, in turn, signs: your 
calluses communicate to others when you shake or hold their hands, for instance (think of Rhett Butler 
discovering the lie in Scarlett O’Hara’s tale of leisure when he feels the calluses on her hands – a 
moment of tactile semiosis that advances the plot of Gone with the Wind); they also communicate to 
you, reminding you of the ways your labor structures your body. 
The broom, then, is a sign that signifies every time it is heard, seen, and handled; it routinely 
engages three of the five senses.  (One could, of course, sniff or lick a broom, but we are interested here 
in what actually occurs, rather than what hypothetically might.)  Since all of this signification takes place 
without recourse to discourse, we might sensibly describe the broom as a sensuous sign, and its mode 
of signification as sensuous semiosis.  By calling it thus I do not mean to suggest that discursive signs, by 
contrast, are devoid of sensory properties, which would be to fall again into the division of mind and 
body, disembodied ideology and non-ideological scar tissue, that a semiotic analysis should know better 
than to reproduce.  The printed or uttered word, of course, is perceived by the eye or ear, and is 
therefore sensuous; fonts, calligraphic styles and tones of voice engage us sensorially (Messick 1993).  
All semiosis, in this sense, is sensuous.  But there is a difference between a statement and a symphony, 
between a proposition and a punch in the face.  Discursive signs are the medium of our conscious 
thought; their functioning has been much discussed.  By speaking of sensuous semiosis I simply want to 
draw attention to the comparatively neglected domain of signs whose discursive content is not explicit. 
What the broom teaches us is that social order – in this case caste – is communicated, enacted 
and reproduced in part by the operations of sensuous semiosis.  This is the first of three fundamental 
theoretical points that this chapter seeks to advance.  We hear untouchability, we see it, we feel it; the 
aural, visual and tactile signs of abjection move our bodies, inciting interpretants already charged with 
the momentum of habit, even when we might consciously reject the logical or moral premises of caste.  
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Vološinov (1973:10) reminds us that the domain of ideology and the domain of signs equate with one 
another; where there are signs, ideology is present.  The rasp of the laggā jhāṛū makes us aware that 
Vološinov’s insight extends into the soundscape and the sensory surround generally; that ideology lives 
in the sound of the roads being swept every morning, in the softness or callousness of our hands, in the 
smooth red welts that rise from the flesh of our Tinnevelly neighbor’s back. 
 
The Reddleman 
For perhaps a clearer example of what I am trying to describe, let us turn to that perceptive 
semiotician and observer of hierarchical man, Thomas Hardy.  The Return of the Native, published in 
1878, opens with an old man traversing a road through the profound desolation of Egdon Heath, alone.  
Ahead he spots a vehicle heading in the same direction he is walking, and he gains on it. 
When he drew nearer he perceived it to be a spring van, ordinary in shape, but singular 
in colour, this being a lurid red.  The driver walked beside it; and, like his van, he was 
completely red.  One dye of that tincture covered his clothes, the cap upon his head, his 
boots, his face, and his hands.  He was not temporarily overlaid with the colour; it 
permeated him. 
The old man knew the meaning of this.  The traveler with the cart was a reddleman – a 
person whose vocation it was to supply farmers with redding for their sheep (Hardy 
1967 [1878]:16).  
 
Redding (also reddle, ruddle) is red ochre, a pigment derived from hematite that is extracted 
from the earth and used to mark sheep.  The dye is notorious for its capacity to spread and for 
its lastingness; we learn later in the novel that it takes almost a year to remove the stain from 
the skin of a reddleman who has renounced his occupation, while his clothes and most 
possessions can never be unstained.  The reddleman, in the mid-nineteenth century rural 
English context in which the novel is set, holds a low position in society: families of pedigree rule 
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him out as a potential marriage partner for their daughters; peasants keep their distance and 
use him to scare their children. 
 When the old man overtakes the reddleman, he observes the latter’s fine figure, 
dignified comportment, and handsome face – or rather, his face “so near to handsome that 
nobody would have contradicted an assertion that it really was so in its natural colour.”  Noting 
all this, the old man thinks to himself, “Why should such a promising being as this have hidden 
his prepossessing exterior by adopting that singular occupation?” (ibid.) 
 In this encounter, and indeed in virtually all of the episodes of the novel in which the 
reddleman plays a part, we find an exemplary, almost ideal-type illustration of the sensuously 
semiotic nature of social hierarchy.  To observers, the primary tool of the reddleman’s trade 
literally marks him as an object of contempt.  By sight alone, his redness non-discursively 
broadcasts to the world his social location.16  But it is more than this: with the reddleman, as 
with the sweeper, the sign of stigma overwhelms its bearer, rendering him first and foremost a 
conveyor of dreadful significance, and only secondarily – if at all – a fellow human.  Like the old 
man, all the characters who meet the reddleman in The Return of the Native see him initially as 
a representative of his stigmatized profession, as a token of a degraded social type.  They 
address him as “reddleman.”  Only later, when beholding him up close, do some characters take 
cognizance of his other features – his figure, “near to handsome” looks, his honest dealings – 
and begin to regard him qua person rather than qua red(dle) man.  It is only then that they 
discover that he has a name, Diggory Venn, and that he is capable of love. 
                                                          
16 Thus passages like this, when Eustacia, the heroine, is out on a nocturnal walk through the heath: “She was 
about half a mile from her residence when she beheld a sinister redness arising from a ravine a little way in 




 Diggory’s reddle, the sweeper’s laggā jhāṛū: these are not only sensuous signs, but 
sensuous signs by which deeply hierarchical social systems reproduce themselves.  The terrible 
potency of these particular signs – their capacity to override other, objectively apparent signs of 
the shared humanity of bearers of brooms, possessors of reddle, and non-stigmatized others – 
speaks to the disturbing nature of their object: the foundation of disgust, the boundary of the 
social, the abject. 
 
Dog Day Afternoon 
 I did not set out to study the role of the senses in the reproduction of social order.  I certainly 
had no intention of making odors or the faculty of smell into objects of enquiry.  The project that I 
proposed and intended to carry out was something else entirely, the religious history of a Dalit caste.  In 
the course of fieldwork, however, the senses asserted themselves.  Smell in particular.  I went ahead 
with my original project but began to pay heed to the ways in which sensory facts conditioned the lives 
of the people whose history I was trying to document.  Indeed, I would have had to have been obtuse – 
or rather, anosmic, the olfactory equivalent of blind or deaf – to have continued to ignore the signs. 
 The municipal corporation of Lucknow – as indeed that of many an Indian city – divides the 
animals that die on its territory into three classes, each of which is disposed of by a different category of 
worker.  Small animals – crows, rats, snakes, and other birds, rodents, and reptiles – are the 
responsibility of municipal street sweepers, who deposit them in rubbish depots along with the rest of 
the refuse that they remove from public space.  Large animals – cows and buffaloes – are the purview of 
two independent contractors, both Chamars, one who handles everything north of the Gomti and one 
the south, whose efficient private networks of caste fellows evacuate the carcasses to flaying grounds 
where they are skinned.  Medium-sized animals – overwhelmingly dogs and cats – fall to a special class 
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of sanitation worker called the Jallād.  Hindi and Urdu speakers will recognize this as the common word 
for “executioner” or “hangman,” and indeed, the Jallād in the Mughal period was a caste that served 
precisely this function – an old Jallād neighborhood in Lucknow lies on the sar kaṭā nālā, the severed-
head canal.  At the same time, the caste of Jallāds also maintained an on-again off-again, sometimes-
fission sometimes-fusion, relationship with the Chuhra/Bhangi caste, and thereby a foothold in the 
latter’s urban labor niche, sanitation.  The Jallād today is both a caste name and a municipal job title – a 
pad.  In Lucknow, every person who holds the pad, without exception, belongs to the caste.  I mention 
all this not to demonstrate that the postcolonial municipal corporation has taken over the function of 
the landlord in the old jajmānī system – maintaining a caste-based division of labor – but because it is 
the backdrop to what I am about to describe, a day on the beat with a Jallād. 
 It was a relatively quiet day at the control room of the Lucknow Nagar Nigam (municipal 
corporation).  I was there to get a better sense of how the different spheres of municipal sanitation 
worked in practice, and to better get to know the Jallāds, whose Balmiki cousins I had been spending a 
great deal of time with.  By nine o’clock the essential staff for the morning shift were all present: the 
clerk, three drivers, and four Jallāds.  The clerk, Anup, a nattily dressed, eighteen year old brahmin who 
inherited the post from his recently deceased father and was studying for a Bachelors in Commerce, sat 
before a telephone, register and work order booklet at a wooden desk at the center of the otherwise 
unfurnished square room, receiving calls from denizens of Lucknow and noting in the register their 
complaints: what kind of animal, what municipal zone, what precise location, and whether or not it was 
a VIP situation.  The drivers and Jallāds and I stood around the giant desk, leaned against the wall, 
wandered in and out.  Anwar, one of the Jallāds, was clearly ill and spent the morning slumped in a back 
corner of the room, where we periodically brought him biscuits and chai. 
 The morning’s excitement, such as it was, derived from a simmering conflict between Idu, one of 
the Jallāds, and Anup, the clerk.  Idu, a large man with a stray eye and freshly hennaed, bright orange 
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hair, wanted to set out on his rounds sooner than later, but Anup insisted on waiting for more 
complaints to come in so that more animals could be cleared in a single trip.  The list of complaints had 
grown from nineteen left over from the previous day to nearly thirty.  Several times Idu casually took 
the phone receiver out of its cradle and set it to one side.  When Anup noticed this – or rather noticed 
that I noticed – he would replace it, at which point invariably the phone began to ring again with more 
complaints.  Once Anup picked up the ringing phone and Idu, leaning bulkily over the desk, put his hand 
on Anup’s, made him set the receiver aside, and repeated for the fifteenth time, “Banā do.”  Make it.  
That is, write out a work order.   
“Tum leke banā do (You make it)!” Anup replied, pushing the register and work order booklet to 
Idu, “Jo marzī likho, bhejo (Write whatever you want, send [the Jallāds on their rounds])!”  Everyone 
laughed.  Idu makes no secret of his illiteracy; when I asked on another occasion about his education he 
declared himself “aṅgūṭhā chhāp” – thumbprint – the often jocular shorthand for those who sign their 
work registers and salary checks with an inked thumb.  Idu picked up the register and booklet and 
started issuing mock orders with a pretty convincing imitation of a superior officer’s bark, eliciting more 
laughter.  Then he threw the paperwork back in front of Anup and leaned unsmilingly over the desk 
again as though to intimidate the delicate youth.  Their face-off made for a striking tableau, the older 
man’s flame orange hair matching the glimmering saffron tilak on the young man’s forehead.  Giving up, 
Anup started writing out work orders, sliding carbon paper between the white and pink copies, 
appending to the details of the complaint the names of Idu and the driver Rajinder, and his own 
signature.  All the while Idu encouraged the young clerk, saying “Banāo, banāo, yahāṅ se jaegī barāt 
(Make it, make it, the wedding procession sets out from here).” 
With a fistful of work orders, Idu and Rajinder set off to clear Lucknow’s municipal zones one 
and five of carcasses.  It was another hour before Anup handed a stack of orders to the team that had 
agreed to let me accompany them for the day: Bachhanu, Idu’s taciturn colleague and caste-fellow, and 
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the driver Vijay Bajpayi.  The three of us crammed into the cab of a diminutive municipal truck parked 
across the street from the Nagar Nigam and headed across the Gomti to tackle zones three and four.  
The first job took almost an hour to find; the complainant, one Sushila Yadav, was by her own admission 
a village woman (gāoṅ kī) unable to clearly identify her location in the semi-developed outskirts of the 
city.  We finally stopped the truck on a dirt side-road that seemed to fit the description provided.  The 
smell of animal death quickly confirmed that we were at the right place.  Sushila met us on the road and 
led us – though we could have discerned the path just as easily by following our noses – to a vacant lot 
bound by low brick walls in which small piles of rubbish and rubble lay atop grass, in the middle of which 
lay a large dog carcass, stiff and visited by flies. 
“Arre yeh to private ho gayā,” said Vijay, explaining to Sushila that since the carcass was on 
privately owned land she would have to arrange for its removal by private means – municipal workers 
were employed to maintain public property.  She said that the dog had actually died on the public road 
but villainous neighbors had subsequently thrown it onto this plot opposite her house, with the result 
that her home was pervaded by the stench, making the place unlivable.  Vijay reiterated that carcasses 
on private property are private concerns, and the conversation stalled. 
Sushila turned to Bachhanu, who had thus far said nothing, and asked, “Kitnā lenge (How 
much)?”  He held up one finger.  “Ek sau (a hundred)?”  There was outrage in her voice, but after some 
hesitation she agreed.  Using the polite register, Bachhanu requested from her a disposable sack (byorā).  
While she fetched it and a hundred rupee note from her house, he wrapped his red cotton gamchā over 
his face such that only his eyes showed, and located a piece of twine and a foot-long stick lying amid the 
rubbish on the grass nearby.  With these tools and the empty flour sack Sushila handed him, Bachhanu 
clambered over the brick wall and approached the carcass.   
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Now this was early May, the temperature was a little over a hundred degrees Fahrenheit (forty 
degrees Celsius), and the dog had been dead for more than a day.  Where Sushila and Vijay and I stood 
the odor of putrefaction exerted considerable force.  Sushila’s claim that her home had been rendered 
unlivable was no empty hyperbole; on the contrary, it condensed in a few words what scholars of 
olfaction have spent whole monographs trying to convey – that the social consequences of smells are 
real, that olfactory information can, in certain contexts, intervene in social life as powerfully as, say, 
incest.  But if it was difficult for the three of us to mask, with a minimal performance of everyday 
sociability, our physiological and social responses to the overwhelming olfactory facts of the situation, 
we were still probably three meters away from the source.  Bachhanu did not have the luxury to keep 
even this distance; he operated in the zone of the highest concentration of methane, hydrogen sulfide 
and ammonia released by biodegradation, at the fountainhead of the chemical and social signs 
irradiating in every direction.  
Deftly fashioning a slip knot with the twine and slipping it over a stiff front leg, Bachhanu used 
the stick to lift the leg into position and then slide the knot into place without having to touch the leg 
with his hands.  Using the twine he then pulled the carcass head first into the open flour sack, until 
enough of its bulk was inside that he could lift the sack and shake the rest in.  All this he managed to do 
in a few seconds, unruffled by the cloud of flies, keeping to a minimum unmediated manual contact with 
the carcass.  He drew the top of the sack together and dragged it over the wall, past us (Vijay was 
soliciting Sushila’s signature on the work order at this point, using my pen) and toward the truck.  Two 
women and a man sitting on a stoop along the way groaned about the stench as he passed and the man 
spat.  Bachhanu heaved the sack into the bed of the truck, unraveled the gamchā from his face, 
expectorated a heavy jet of red pān juice onto the road, and asked me, “Āp ke yahāṅ kām kaise hota hai 
(How do they do it where you come from)?” 
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The second job took an equally long time to find.  Worse, Anup had only recorded the first few 
digits of the complainant’s phone number, so we had no way to confirm the location locally.  It was 
supposed to be on the road in front of a mosque in Rajiv Nagar, but we visited three mosques in the 
neighborhood and none had a dead dog in front.  At the third, though, a neighbor complained of a 
terrible odor the night before and we eventually spotted a bloated carcass in a nearby field, where 
someone had apparently dragged it.  Since it wasn’t clear whether the land was public or private 
Bachhanu wanted to leave it but Vijay overruled him.  Bachhanu again foraged in a roadside pile of 
rubbish and located a makeshift rope (a polypropylene packaging strap) and a byorā (this time an 
emptied concrete sack), but in this instance the carcass was too big for the byorā, so he secured the 
carcass’s front and rear limbs with two separate slipknots and used these to heave it into the truck bed, 
next to the first carcass.  He had neither gloves nor means to wash his hands.  We piled back into the 
truck and drove on. 
As the midday sun blazed on we picked up carcasses at major intersections and little-known cul-
de-sacs, in front of shopping malls and primary schools.  They piled up in the truck bed, hot and jostling.  
The smell pervaded the cab where we sat, of course, but also extended well beyond.  Our vehicle 
became a mobile beacon of olfactory horror.  At our approach pedestrians’ faces underwent sudden 
contortions of revulsion and panic – the latter because the source of the revolting smell, in the crush of 
Lucknow’s heavily-trafficked streets, was not immediately apparent.  Once our battered municipal truck 
was visually identified, the panic dissipated, but the revulsion remained. 
When we were stuck at a jammed intersection and the stench of our cargo was particularly 
strong, Bachhanu broke his usual silence to say, “Arre, kuttā mar gayā, ab ham ko bhī mār ḍālegā.”  The 
dog died, now it’s going to kill us too. 
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We stopped twice at a bridge over the Kukreil – a turbid, slow-moving tributary of the Gomti – 
for Bachhanu to unload our cargo.  Depending on the municipal zone or the mood of the driver or Jallād, 
carcasses in Lucknow are either deposited with the rest of the city’s refuse at rubbish depots, or else 
thrown into watercourses.  In zones three and four the Kukreil is the usual recipient, and so it was on 
this day.  After hurling several bloody sacks over the edge of the bridge, Bachhanu said that he really 
wished they could get one of those kinds of trucks, the lever-operated ones, the ones that tilt 
automatically. 
We also stopped twice to replenish Bachhanu’s supply of pān.  He takes his pān with strong 
tobacco and more than double the standard lump of chunā (slaked lime, calcium hydroxide).  Chunā, 
also used in whitewashing, numbs.  In quantity it can also cause skin irritation, ulcers, and chemical 
burns.  Bachhanu took pān at regular intervals throughout the day; he always had a mouthful when 
handling a carcass, and spat once it was loaded. 
At the hottest point in the afternoon we arrived at a low brick house with a corrugated tin roof 
whose young Muslim owner, who had called in the complaint, did something I had never seen on the 
beat with sanitation workers – he offered Bachhanu drinking water, a chilled bottled from his house.  
Bachhanu accepted but hesitated before opening it, looking at the complainant.  When the latter 
continued to smile hospitably Bachhanu opened the bottle and drained almost all of it, pouring part into 
his hand to drink and splashing the rest on his face.  I drank the remainder and returned it to our host 
with thanks. 
The carcass in front of this man’s house was in the stage of decomposition known as active 
decay, when internal organs are exposed and tissues begin to liquefy.  Bachhanu lifted the front right 
paw with the stick and secured the slipknot as usual; but this time, his initial tug did not pull the carcass 
toward the sack but simply rent the decomposed flesh of the leg.  This produced an expulsion of gas so 
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potent that the complainant, standing some distance away, shuddered, and I, standing quite close, 
involuntarily retched.  Bachhanu abandoned that leg and eventually managed to get most of the carcass 
into the bag by means of another slipknot on another limb, but not before a pool of liquefied tissue 
formed on the road and immediately drew a swarm of flies.  The complainant politely concealed his 
chagrin at the quantity of malodorous organic matter still remaining on the road, thanked Bachhanu, 
and quietly asked his son to fetch some water.  We left. 
 
The Hierarchical Smellscape 
  At this point you may wish to accuse me of several things.  I am fetishizing the repulsive.  This is 
not ethnography but pornography, an exploitative genre.  The gratuitous description of disgusting smells 
and substances in my account signals something ethically dubious about the project: a roundabout 
reinscription, perhaps, of the rule of colonial difference, a variation on the old orientalist theme of dirty 
India.  Or a different kind of representational violence, one that confines Bachhanu to the theater of 
stigmatized labor, breathing new life into venerable caste stereotypes, reifying the pernicious 
conceptual link between Dalits and filth, Dalits and death. 
These concerns are justly raised.  Let me suspend any defense, though, in order first to probe 
whether they are in fact the root of the disquiet my account may have provoked.  Or whether, perhaps, 
our eagerness to turn the discussion away from the materiality of reeking and leaking carcasses and 
toward the more familiar terrain of orientalism, fetishization, and the politics of representation, should 
itself give us pause.  Why is it that the domain of the disgusting is so swiftly abandoned as a narrative 
subject, let alone a site of analysis?  As Miller (1997:5) points out, it is “socially and psychically very 
difficult for civilized people to talk about disgusting things without having the excuse of either 
childhood, adolescence, or transgressive joking.”  Yet as Michael Thompson observes in his Rubbish 
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Theory (1979:4), what goes on in those “certain regions of social life” that we routinely exempt from 
scrutiny is “crucial for any understanding of society.”  The fact that our sense of propriety is threatened 
by too much talk of dog carcasses, that the dignity of scholarship is achieved by the occlusion of urine, 
feces and revolting smells, should indicate that our disgust may be serving a social function here, a 
policing function, a regulation of boundaries.  Our instincts tell us that it is neither proper nor good to 
continue discussing the stink of expelled things: a little bit is okay, maybe, for ethnographic color, but 
this cannot constitute the actual object of enquiry.  The disgust reflex in this way diverts us from a 
consideration of our own entanglements in unequal and exploitative systems of filth production and 
removal.  It facilitates the usual decorous silence on what the late Govind Prasad, one of my most poetic 
interlocutors, used to call the division of those who shit and those who clean shit.  It helps us maintain a 
blindness (or, rather, anosmia) to the politics of smell itself, long before the question of the discursive 
representation of smell arises. 
Among the senses, smell is often associated with ephemerality.  Certainly anthropological and 
historical studies of olfaction – in which practices related to wine and perfume loom large – stress this 
quality, especially in contradistinction to the imagined stability of what is seen and heard.  Visions 
remain when we close our eyes, voices continue to ring in our heads, but smells elude us in the absence 
of an imminent odorant.  A whiff of cologne here, a cloud of cigarette smoke there, the short-lived 
redolence of roses: in the ordinary course of things, the stinks and aromas that populate our 
smellscapes come and go with such vaporous inconstancy that they sometimes serve literature as icons 
of impermanence, or of border-escaping transgression (Classen 1994; Drobnick 2006; Gell 2006; 
McHugh 2012).  But this insight into the “nature” of smell is in fact premised on a particular mode of 
being in the world – that of a mobile subject who traverses freely between olfactory spaces, whose ideal 
type in South Asia is perhaps the anonymous pedestrian making her way through a bazaar, catching 
inhalations of incense, ghee, tobacco, sandalwood, leather, sweat, and jalebīs.   
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This mode of smelling in the world, which we might call olfactory window shopping, or osmic 
flânerie, or an olfactive variant on the activity known in Lucknow as ganjing (Ahmad 1997), may well be 
a human universal, but it is by no means the only or primary way in which people experience the 
smellscape.  To shift our imagined subject from the mobile pedestrian to the laborer at work – as I have 
tried to do here – should make this abundantly clear.  When Bachhanu goes to work each day he enters 
an olfactory environment that most members of society encounter only occasionally, and from which 
they can and do remove themselves swiftly.  Bachhanu and his colleagues, however, once they leave the 
sensory refuge of the Control Room to begin their rounds, remain plunged in this environment the 
entire working day, every working day.  For Bachhanu and his colleagues, the smell of putrefaction is 
neither elusive nor ephemeral, as it would be for the osmic flâneur.  On the contrary, it is permanent, 
relentless, unavoidable.  It is a certainty to which one perpetually returns.  It assaults the sensorium 
from the first job of the day to the last, enveloping and pervading the space of the truck, intensifying 
and de-intensifying, but always making itself felt.  In its constancy, the odor that dominates Jallād work 
life suggests neither impermanence nor the transgression of borders, but their opposite: a permanent 
and inescapable order. 
To attend to the particularity of the sensory conditions in which Bachhanu and his colleagues 
labor is to recognize that the sensory surround is itself hierarchically stratified.  This, the second point 
that I want to make in this chapter, is perhaps obvious.  Yet it contradicts the widely held assumption 
that the sounds and tastes and smells of life are phenomena that transcend social distinction, that since 
we all know the sound of birds chirping and the smell of automobile exhaust, the sensory surround must 
be an essentially democratic domain, equally available to all.  The example of the pedestrian in the 
bazaar certainly lends credence to the latter view, for that all-smelling pedestrian – at least in the 
contemporary period and in cities, where exclusionary norms in many public spaces have been 
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dramatically curtailed – can be virtually anyone, even a Jallād or street sweeper.  And indeed, much of 
the sensory surround is like that: available to most everyone, much of the time. 
But certain sensory signs are disproportionately directed at certain categories of people.  Those 
who experience or study environmental racism know this well – the racialized landscape of American 
landfills and waste treatment facilities gives ample testimony to the unequal distribution of malodor in 
the United States.  Likewise the history of aural torture used at the prison in Guantanamo Bay is a clear 
example of the targeting of specific groups for assault by sonic signs.  In South Asia, some domains of 
the smellscape are sharply partitioned into zones of olfactory privilege and disprivilege, zones whose 
correspondence with caste divisions is undeniable.  As with many social phenomena in South Asia, this 
correspondence is far less pronounced in the experience of the large majority of ‘touchable’ castes – 
Dumont’s “muddle in the middle” (Dirks 2001: 97) – and only comes into clear relief at the extremes of 
the social order.  To a considerable degree, the occupation of pujārī at Hindu temples remains a 
preserve of brahmins.  While the smellscape of temples varies a great deal, certain aromas theoretically 
– and often in practice – do predominate, and these are smells invested with high social value of a 
traditional kind: incense, marigolds, ghee.17  The brahmin pujārī’s workplace is often, thus, permeated 
with the olfactory affirmation of social value.    
At the other extreme, consider sanitation workers as a whole.  Bachhanu and his colleagues 
inhale the stench of putrefaction every day.  Other sanitation workers contend with other olfactory 
signs: for street sweepers it is primarily the complex smell of rubbish, for sewer-men and drain cleaners 
it is that of sewage and other liquid waste, for manual scavengers it is that of human excrement.  Death, 
detritus, and dung: in a word, what suffuses the workplace of sanitation laborers is the smell of human 
abjection – that which emerges from the self but is cast off and disavowed (Kristeva 1982). 
                                                          
17 These are clearly to be distinguished from smells pregnant with high social value of a late capitalist kind, i.e., 
non-smells, zero smell, the deodorized olfactory neutrality of the corporate office or hotel lobby. 
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Here I must emphasize an empirical point.  Insofar as I am arguing that the partitioning of the 
sensory surround into zones of privilege and disprivilege has to do not only with class but with caste, it 
must be understood that the category of sanitation worker – safāī karamchārī – remains very much a 
caste category, buttressed by class but by no means reducible to it.  As I have mentioned, every 
employee of the Lucknow municipal corporation who holds the position of Jallād is, by caste, Jallād.  Of 
the 4,631 street sweepers officially employed by the municipality (as of April 2012), there are no more 
than about three dozen non-Dalits, and of the near-total Dalit majority, again well over 95% belong to 
two castes – Balmiki and Dhanuk – the two sanitation labor castes that live in the region (see Chapter I).  
The percentage is roughly the same for sewer-men, drain cleaners, manual scavengers, and the 
enormous numbers of sweepers employed by the city’s universities, hospitals, train stations, airport, 
businesses, and institutions of every sort.  To be sure, the partial privatization of sanitation labor since 
2005 has introduced some Backward Caste and Forward Caste names onto the payroll.  For example, 
Kāryadāyī Sansthā, a private company with a contract to clean thirteen of Lucknow’s municipal wards, 
employs 395 safāī karamchārīs who are Backward Caste.  However, as street sweepers, sanitary 
supervisors, a union leader, the health department chief clerk and even the additional municipal 
commissioner admitted to me in interviews, these 395 employees simply do no cleaning.  They draw a 
salary from Kāryadāyī Sansthā but do not carry brooms or report to work.  The company is generally 
acknowledged to be a fraud sustained by bribery; this state of affairs has been exposed in media 
reports, but to no effect.  Those sections of the city for which the company’s Backward Caste employees 
are responsible remain unswept except when a political figure visits, at which point the municipal 
corporation assigns its regular employees to clean the neglected area (extra work without extra pay).18 
                                                          
18 The situation in Benares and smaller municipalities that I visited in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar is similar: 
everywhere the proportion of Dalits in the sanitation workforce is well above 90%, and the small minority of 
Forward Caste and Backward Caste employees are either employees only on paper (drawing a salary without 
working) or are often given “in-house” jobs in the municipality that involve no sweeping – serving chai, dusting 
office interiors, etc.  In Qannauj in 2002, Dalit sanitation workers organized a strike to protest the fact that a 
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Sanitation labor is thus one domain of South Asian political economy in which the decoupling of 
caste and occupation that has been a notable feature of postcolonial modernity in other domains simply 
has not occurred.  By no means are all or even most members of the sanitation labor castes engaged in 
sanitation labor – they are present in all spheres of the economy, even if in relatively small numbers – 
but virtually all sanitation workers do belong to the sanitation labor castes.  It is neither incorrect nor 
anachronistic, then, to maintain that olfactory signs of human abjection continue to be directed 
overwhelmingly at Dalits, and in particular the sanitation labor castes, in India today. 
These signs bear not only social, but also chemical and biological significance.  Peirce, whose 
work in the ‘hard’ sciences informed his philosophy, insisted on an expansive view of semiosis – the 
consequential transmission of signs – that included not only human communication but also the 
operations of biochemistry.  He maintained that there are signs that, while apparently lacking an 
utterer, nonetheless convey significance and incite interpretation.  Chemical reactions of various sorts 
fall into this class of signs, as do “symptoms of disease” (Peirce 1998:404). 
Such an understanding of semiosis helps comprehend the kind of olfactory signs with which we 
are here concerned.  To return to Sushila Yadav’s perceptive statement: when she complained that the 
smell of animal death had rendered her home unlivable, she spoke a truth that obtains not only on the 
social plane.  The distinctiveness of the smellscape in which Bachhanu and his colleagues labor derives in 
part from putrescine and cadaverine, chemical compounds released by animal decay that are, in fact, 
toxic in large doses (Lewis 1998).  Jallāds, manual scavengers, drain cleaners and sewer workers all 
inhale disproportionate quantities of hydrogen sulfide, a broad-spectrum poison generated by both 
carcasses and feces.  At low levels hydrogen sulfide can cause loss of appetite, poor memory, fluid in the 
lungs, and shortness of breath; at high levels it is extremely lethal.  This olfactory sign is the primary 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
number of Backward Caste and Forward Caste “employees” never picked up a broom.  Under pressure to report 
for work, the latter chose to give up their employment rather than perform sanitation labor (interviews with N.R. 
Balmiki and Jagdeesh Prasad Balmiki of Uttar Pradesh Safāī Mazdūr Sangh). 
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cause of death of sewer workers in India, who die at a rate more than five times that of other urban 
Indians between the ages of 15 and 59 (Anand 2007).  Methane, another chemical compound produced 
by feces and decay, displaces oxygen in enclosed spaces such as sewers and buildings adjacent to 
landfills or rubbish depots, leading to nausea, vomiting, respiratory collapse, and death.  
These are olfactory signs that both announce recent dying and incite future dying.  In Peircian 
terms, they are representamen whose object is death – putrescine, for example, indexically informs its 
perceiver that an animal has expired – and whose interpretant, also, is ultimately death.  Whether the 
sudden demise by asphyxiation of sewer-men and drain cleaners, or the slow poisoning of the body by 
chronic exposure to low levels of toxins, the symptoms (qua interpretants) of these silent and invisible 
signs bring into relief the stakes involved in the politics of smell.   
 
Techniques of the Perceiving Body 
If the Dalit sanitation worker and the anonymous mobile pedestrian experience two distinct, if 
overlapping, sensory worlds – if they are breathing, in effect, different air – they also develop divergent 
techniques for engaging the hierarchical smellscape.  One technique we have already encountered in 
Bachhanu’s regimen of tobacco pān with oversize doses of numbing chunā.  The consumption of large 
quantities of pān and other aromatics and intoxicants on the job is both extremely common and 
explicitly theorized as a means of combating the toxic olfactory environments of sanitation labor.  
Neelam explained the virtues of pān to me one morning when she was teaching me sweeping 
technique on the road that she cleans in Nirala Nagar.  With one year remaining before retirement, 
Neelam had worked since the death of her first husband in the 1970s both as a municipal street 
sweeper and a manual scavenger cleaning non-flush toilets in private homes.  After completing a stretch 
of the road, Neelam and I leaned the broom against a tree and joined Haliman, Neelam’s friend and 
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colleague who sweeps an adjacent area, for a pān break.  From the folds of her sāṛī Neelam extracted a 
small, brightly colored tin in which were stuffed a number of tobacco pān she had prepared before 
dawn.  We each took one and tongued them into the sides of our mouths.  I asked if it helped with the 
smell. 
“Inhalation stops,” she explained.  “Say there’s a dead dog.  There often are.  Now we take pān.   
Sweeping all the way, we get the job done.  And if we had nothing [like pān], then we couldn’t have 
stopped our breath.  It’s like this.”19 
Haliman added, “Gandagī nahīṅ lagtī.”  The filth doesn’t stick. 
“Everyone eats it,” Neelam continued.  “I don’t like gutkhā, but pān is good.  In both kinds of 
work [manual scavenging and street sweeping] I take it.” 
For Neelam and Haliman, chewing pān creates a kind of osmic blockade in which good air is 
retained inside while filth is prevented from entering the nose and mouth.  Gutkhā, a stronger tobacco-
based oral stimulant than pān, does similar work, but Neelam, partly as a result of her eldest son’s 
campaign to stop her from using any tobacco products, repudiates it.  Other sanitation workers use 
more powerful substances.  Lal Prasad, a young Jallād whom I accompanied on his rounds one day in 
April, chain smokes biṛis and cigarettes, the harsher the tobacco the better, creating around himself an 
olfactory field that functions somewhat like a controlled burn, competing – if never quite successfully – 
with the far more powerful smell of death.  He also takes a six rupee ball of bhāng (a preparation from 
cannabis) each day.   
The most institutionalized practice of this sort attends the annual cleaning of the city’s drains 
(nāle, singular nālā) about a month before the monsoon season begins.  The drains, which flow partly 
                                                          
19 Sāṅs ruk jātī hai.  Jaise marā kuttā paṛā hai.  Askar [aksar] paṛe rahte haiṅ.  Sāṅs rok lete.  Nikal gaye, jhāṛū 
lagāte hue.  Aur kuchh nahīṅ hotā to nahīṅ rok pātī.  Yeh hai. 
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above ground and partly through concrete and masonry culverts, relieve the city of most of its liquid 
waste (though Lucknow also has some underground sewer lines), and must be unclogged and desilted 
before the torrential rains of the monsoon so that the city will not be flooded with sewage.  Labor 
contractors supply the municipal corporation with temporary, daily wage workers for the three weeks or 
so that it takes to complete this work.  The crew I observed in a relatively plush neighborhood north of 
the Gomti consisted of four young Balmiki men, two below the age of twenty, wearing lungīs, teeshirts 
and sandals (one was barefoot), and using a hāḍā (a plow-like scooping implement), pāñchā (a kind of 
rake) and gainṭhī (pickaxe) to remove solids from the waist-deep, grey and viscous flow in which they 
stood.  They extracted a great quantity of fallen tree leaves, styrofoam plates besmeared with wedding 
fare (jūṭhan), a bottle with a medical label (this was just downstream from Vivekananda Hospital), candy 
wrappers, drinking straws, swollen soiled baby diapers, polythene bags full of household rubbish, gutkhā 
packets, feces, liquor bottles, ripped upholstery and seat covers, iced coffee cups, a moldy orange, 
broken chappals, used condoms, and soaked bags of food.  Brown-grey aggregates of semi-solid sewage 
clung to the sides of the drain, and on these insect colonies thrived.  Here and there the nālā bubbled 
slowly, and after about five minutes, even standing in the open air on the bank, I began to feel light-
headed from the fumes.  
Before entering the drains, the laborers are provided by their contractor packets of country 
liquor which they consume on the spot.  This is standard practice, openly acknowledged by all parties 
involved.  In some cases women laborers are provided pān as a substitute; but with men, cheap and 
extremely potent spirits are the norm.  The sanitary supervisor standing with me on the bank repeated 
the rationale I had, by this time, heard many times from contractors, supervisors and laborers.  “Baghair 
piye andar jā hī nahīṅ saktā koī.”  No one can enter it [the drain] without drinking.  The country liquor is 
“for facing all of that” (us chīz ko face karne ke liye), “for fighting it” (laṛne ke liye).  The olfactory and 
tactile conditions of this work cannot be endured sober.  One has to be drugged, stoned, chemically 
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desensitized, to take the plunge into the city’s liquid waste.  This is all the more so when the laborers are 
sent into the culverts, where the stench is stronger, the concentration of gas more toxic, navigation 
more difficult, and where a warranted claustrophobia arises as an added handicap. 
These techniques of the body (Mauss 1973), whether the mechanism is understood as blocking, 
numbing or combating, all involve the ingestion of aromatic and/or intoxicating substances in 
anticipation of the sensorial violence that accompanies sanitation labor.  These may be contrasted to 
the technique, par excellence, of the mobile pedestrian, who so frequently marks the fleeting encounter 
with the smells of death, filth or feces by lifting a handkerchief to the mouth and nose and crossing to 
the other side of the road.  This act of the passerby, which a sweeper sees countless times during the 
course of a work shift, implies a different relationship to the odoriferous world than that of the 
sanitation worker.  The one engages the smellscape armed with a filter (handkerchief, dupaṭṭa) and 
mobility, the capacity to remove oneself from odorants.  The other is stripped of mobility as a 
precondition of employment, and finds filters (Bachhanu’s gamchā, for instance) necessary but far from 
sufficient.  Instead, the sanitation worker fights death-smell with tobacco, dung-smell with liquor, 
gandagī with gutkhā, hydrogen sulfide with calcium hydroxide.  As a habit of perception, the combative 
mode developed in the caste-specific domain of sanitation labor could scarcely be further from the 
retractive mode that prevails on the streets of Lucknow. 
It is tempting to view the latter as a brahminical way of smelling the world.  Certainly canonical 
brahminical texts invite such an interpretation.  As James McHugh points out in his treatise on classical 
Indic theories of smell, the dharmaśāstra tradition holds that there are categories of things in the world 
that should not be smelt, at least by a twice-born male.  To inhale odors produced by this category of 
things constitutes sin (pāp).  According to the Manusmriti, for example, for a twice-born man to smell 
liquor is to commit a sin that causes exclusion from caste, a sin no more or less serious than making a 
brahmin cry.  Commentators on Manu enumerate other sin-generating odorants: onions, human 
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excrement, forbidden meat (McHugh 2012:26–27).  This state of affairs, unsurprisingly, rules out the 
possibility of the normative subject of brahminical tradition cleaning a latrine or visiting a liquor shop.  
But it goes further, urging, if only implicitly, the necessity of his evasive mobility, his ability to remove 
himself from sources of evil fumes.  The Bhagavad Gita (2:58) deploys the metaphor of a turtle 
withdrawing its limbs into its shell to recommend something similar: the retracting of the senses 
(including smell) from objects of sense perception (including odorants). 
At the same time, covering the face with a handkerchief and crossing to the other side of the 
road is a behavior too widespread to attribute to brahminical ideologies of perception alone.  It follows 
as easily from the miasmatic theory of disease that undergirded so much of the sanitation movement of 
nineteenth century Europe (Corbin 1986), or for that matter – at least insofar as the handkerchief is 
intended as a filter for dust circulated by sweeping, and not for bad smells generally – from the current 
understanding of asthma triggers. 
In contrasting the combative and retractive modes of engaging the smellscape, my intention is 
not to define the latter as ineluctably elitist, even though it is difficult to see how it could be made 
generally available in conditions of structural equality without a mechanization of sanitation labor very 
remote from that which obtains in Lucknow today.  Nor is my intention to celebrate the former – the 
combative mode – as a kind of unheralded weapon of the weak, morally superior to the fastidiousness 
of the handkerchief-wielding passerby purely by virtue of its association with subaltern agents.  My 
point, rather – the third that this chapter seeks to advance – is that these divergent habits of olfaction, 
anchored in a fundamentally caste-based division of labor, engender divergent consequences.  
Breathing through a filter every day gives you a different experience of the world, and a different pair of 
lungs, than chain smoking biṛis to fight off the putrescine.  Virtually all of the substances with which 
sanitation workers combat their olfactory environment are addictive, and their habitual use generates 
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social and biochemical signs – like oral cancer – that are at least as destructive as those the substances 
sought to counteract.   
 
Inhale/Exhale 
 “Would you mind saying that again, what you were just telling me, about how you used to get 
around the village at night when there was no electricity?” 
 I was talking with Govind Prasad, born in 1926, about his childhood in a village just north of 
Lucknow.  We were sitting with his nephew, a lawyer, in their home in Babu Ganj on a cold December 
afternoon.  Govind Prasad had just said something that, with an almost audible click, crystallized a whole 
slew of vague and disparate impressions from my first months of fieldwork into a clear idea – and my 
audio recorder was off.  I switched it back on. 
 “Well, when you get to the Ahir ṭolā (cowherds’ quarter), cow dung exhales its odor.” 
 “Cow dung exhales its odor.” 
 “Come on, brother!  Gives off fragrance, emits stench, stinks, however you want to say it – 
exhales odor.” 
 “Yes, yes, yes.” 
 “You get to the Dhobi ṭolā (washermans’ quarter), the smell of rehu and donkey’s dung 
emanates.  Reeks.” 
 “Rehu?  What’s rehu?” 
 “Rehu was a kind of soap from that time period.” 
 “Ah, okay.  Got it.” 
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 “Understand?  There was no soap then.  People washed things with rehu.  Anyway.  You get to 
the Mehtar ṭolā (sweepers’ quarter), you come this way, then filth [mailā] exhales its odor.”  
 Govind Prasad’s nephew chimed in, “Shit.  He means shit.” 
 The old man continued.  “It does stink, does it not?  Okay.  You get to the Chamar ṭolā, so you 
realize that this is the Chamar part of the village.  Now your own home, that person’s home, wherever 
you want to go, you’ve figured out the path.  And this was how it was with all of us, the laboring folk, 
who were kept apart from the village.  Who were not to be touched.” 
 In his youth, before electricity came to rural Awadh, Govind Prasad was able to navigate through 
the darkness of his village at night using only his sense of smell.  In the subordinate caste and 
“untouchable” section, segregated from the “main” village, each ṭolā had a distinctive olfactory 
signature linked with the traditional occupation of the caste that resided there.  The Ahir quarter was 
redolent with bovine scents, the Dhobi ṭolā smelled of soap and damp cloth, and from the Chamar 
quarter wafted the odor of curing animal hides (though this odorant is only implicit in the conversation 
above, Govind Prasad specified it in his earlier statement, when my recorder was off).  Different castes 
also kept different animals.  Cow dung (gobar) and donkey dung (līd) – whose lexical differentiation in 
Hindi is no accident – produce distinctive smells that further differentiated the smellscape along caste 
lines. 
 The characteristic odor of his own ṭolā was the dung of yet another animal, the human, denoted 
by yet other scatological lexemes: euphemistically mailā, “filth, dirt,” or unambiguously – as his nephew 
would have it – ṭaṭṭī, “shit.”  In the village economy of the first half of the twentieth century Govind 
Prasad’s caste played several roles – they performed as musicians on ritual occasions, raised donkeys 
and mules, hired out these animals at construction sites and brick kilns, worked as agricultural laborers, 
swept public areas of the village, swept the homes and cleaned the latrines of several categories of 
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landlords, processed the human and animal dung they collected to manufacture manure, and supplied 
this manure to cultivators.  It was thus fertilizer composting that generated the characteristic smell, in 
Govind Prasad’s account, of the Mehtar ṭolā.  Animal and human feces were combined, stored, and 
treated in large, uncovered basins usually located just behind each home. 
 The neat correspondence between smells and castes in Govind Prasad’s village is something we 
might expect to encounter in the ideal cosmologies of the brahminical tradition.  And indeed one finds 
the mapping of osmic typologies onto social geographies in a broad range of Sanskrit literature.  Thus 
Satyavati, great grandmother of the Pandavas in the Mahabharata, reeks of fish when she is known as 
the daughter of the king of the fishermen, but becomes superlatively fragrant as she crosses over to the 
status of queen of a kshatriya dynasty (Schulman 2006; McHugh 2012).  Thus Pūtanā, “Stinky,” both 
names and describes the demoness who tries to poison baby Krishna in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa (ibid.).  
Thus, in a sixteenth century treatise on elephants, we learn that godly (deva-type) and brahmin-like 
elephants profuse the aroma of lotus, sandalwood, honey and milk, while demonic (rākṣas-type) and 
shudra-like elephants stink of donkeys, crabs, bones, urine and excrement (McHugh 2012:82–85). 
 The ascribed correlation between stenches and categories of person is not, of course, peculiarly 
brahminical or South Asian.  The anthropological literature on the social life of smell abounds in 
examples of these “osmologies” (Classen 1994).  The pastoralists among the Dassanetch of Ethiopia 
literally hold their noses when they visit their degraded kinsmen who catch fish for a livelihood, whom 
they refer to as den fedudukha (“stinking”) (Almagor 1987).  The dominant caste among the Kapsiki/Higi 
of western Africa insist that the blacksmiths (rerhe) with whom they do not marry and whose presence 
they consider polluting, give off a foul odor.  Thus the saying, “our noses turn away from a rerhe” (von 
Beek 1992).  George Orwell maintains that “the lower classes smell” while some white American 
novelists, for their part, posit the existence of a “Negro smell” and wax eloquent on its properties 
(Orwell 1958; Faulkner 1948; Roth 1970). 
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 But Govind Prasad was not speaking of literary representation.  What he described was no 
theoretical village of brahminical imagination, but his own, embodied, sensory experience.  In the 
sensory wraparound of the village of his youth, caste ideology was always already embedded.  Even in 
the absence of its discursive elaboration, caste staked its truth claims on the pores and nostrils of 
Govind Prasad and all of his sensing neighbors.  
 Much has changed since Govind Prasad’s childhood to alter the smellscape of rural Awadh.  
Perhaps most decisively, industrially produced urea has widely displaced manure as the fertilizer of 
choice in the region, the collection and storage of human feces has all but disappeared with the gradual 
implementation of the Employment of Manual Scavengers and Dry Latrines Construction 
(Prohibition) Act of 1993,20 and the sanitation labor castes have abandoned the village for the city at a 
far higher rate than the agricultural castes.  The Mehtar ṭolā, which is anyway now largely depopulated, 
no longer exhales the odor of mailā.   
In the city the kind of mapping of the olfactory onto the social that Govind Prasad described in 
his village tends to take on a more diffuse character, caste specificity effaced into class generality.  But 
certain correlations of caste and smell persist.  I failed to notice this in my initial months of research in 
Lucknow.  Then one day when I was visiting Benares, some 300 kilometers to the east, I was having a 
conversation with a man about my age who was sweeping a main road near Assi Ghat.  He invited me to 
his home. 
“Come in the afternoon, after I finish duty and bathe.” 
 “Okay, where do you live?” 
                                                          
20 This is different from saying that manual scavenging has all but disappeared.  The practice of cleaning dry 
latrines – removing the feces – continues.  What is no longer in evidence is the retaining of the feces thus removed 
for mixing with animal manure to manufacture fertilizer. 
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“Go up this street and walk about five minutes.  On the left after the lane next to a big yellow 
koṭhī there is a rubbish depot.  Behind that is a public toilet.  My house is between the depot and the 
toilet.” 
While my new acquaintance intended no dramatic effect in giving the coordinates of his home 
in this fashion – on the contrary, as I discovered a few hours later when I went to visit him, his directions 
could not have been more straightforward, accurate, and easy to follow – I was nonetheless startled by 
the extreme degree of spatial abjection implied in such an address.  But later that day, as he and I sat 
together drinking black tea and inhaling the fumes of the municipal garbage depot and the concrete 
śauchālay (public toilet) between which his one-room brick home was situated, I realized that I had been 
here before.  Not literally in this bastī (my host’s was one of five such homes, all inhabited by his caste 
fellows) but in dozens of others like it in Lucknow and smaller towns in UP and Bihar, clusters of 
sanitation laborers’ quarters attached to precisely these two features of urban infrastructure.  It dawned 
on me how many of the smaller bastīs I had visited literally abutted either toilets or rubbish depots or 
both. 
After this I began to notice how frequently, when I asked how to find someone’s home in the 
city, the infrastructure of waste figured into the directions.  I do not mean to suggest that this is the only 
or even the dominant residential configuration in Lucknow or Benares, but it is a significant one, one 
that obtains not in the largest bastīs but in many of the smaller ones in which a large minority of the 
urban sanitation labor castes now live.  When I incorporated questions about housing into my 
interviews, it gradually became clear that three patterns accounted for this configuration.  In a number 
of cases, municipal planners decided to build public latrines where sanitation workers already lived.  
Other cases featured the reverse – when the municipality erected toilets or designated rubbish depots, 
it simultaneously made available adjacent plots for its regular sanitation employees to build upon.  In 
the third pattern, members of sanitation labor castes illegally squatted on the fringes of recently 
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constructed latrines or designated depots – places where they would not face violent housing 
discrimination – and the municipality eventually formalized their possession.  
The olfactory signs of stigmatized labor are thus confined neither to the village (as in Govind 
Prasad’s account) nor to the urban workplace (as my description of Bachhanu’s work day emphasized), 
but waft all too often into the urban home as well.  I think of Kanita in seventh grade who sat studiously 
doing her homework while her grandmother told me, at their home near Lucknow’s Char Bagh, about 
cleaning the privies of the British before Independence.  We talked together for several hours that day 
over chai and biscuits and eventually a goat curry, while the strong odor of urine rolled in from the 
public latrine across the alley from their front door.  This was the smell to which Kanita studied each 
day, the olfactory accompaniment of every meal, glass of water, conversation, and sunset. 
This aspect of the sensorial conditions of the bastīs in which the sanitation labor castes live was 
highlighted at a meeting organized by union leaders and social activists within the community in 
Benares.  Advertised as Swacchkār Prernā Divas (Sanitation Workers’ Inspiration Day), the meeting was 
held in Bharatendu Bhavan, an auditorium named after a man who, in the late nineteenth century, 
lampooned British educational reform as potentially leading to something as outrageous as sweeper 
women (Mehtarānī) attending school (Dalmia 2010:258–60).  In the course of the meeting, M.L. Singh, a 
prominent civil servant from the Balmiki community, delivered a speech that won a great deal of 
spontaneous applause.  He exhorted the audience to educate their daughters and sons and decried the 
ways in which bastī life compromised the younger generation’s ability to study and compete with their 
privileged caste peers.  The chaotic bustle (chahal-pahal) and deafening racket of all-night religious 
festivals, especially during exam time, constituted a major distraction.  Above all, though, there was voh 
bū.  That smell.  Singh did not specify the odor – there was no need – but made very clear that it vitiated 
the atmosphere required for a student to succeed academically.  To create conditions in which the 
community’s children could properly study – to clear a space free of that smell – Singh had opened a 
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hostel near his home village and arranged scholarships for sanitation labor caste children to attend 
school there.  
Here was an implicit theory of the social work that the hierarchical smellscape (and indeed the 
unevenness of the sensory surround more broadly) performs.  The routine assault by olfactory signs of 
abjection produces distracting and disabling effects.  In concert with sonic, visual and tactile signs of 
disorder, smells anchored in the untouchable swath of the division of labor impair thought.  The 
relatively deodorized, quiet, sensorially neutral conditions that privileged caste students take for 
granted, by contrast, are conducive to study. 
One of the most thoughtful meditations on the social character of smell is an essay by the 
anthropologist Alfred Gell.  Reflecting on the semiotic work that perfume does, Gell sketches an 
operation more complex than indexical signification as usually understood.  
Perfumes, in their disembodiedness and typicality serve as the vehicles for symbolic 
awareness of an ideal order: the “perfume state” is a state in which perfume becomes 
for the wearer (and for others under its spell) much less a sign of good fortune or 
happiness or the sweet life, than a condition for that life.  That is to say that the context 
has permeated the sign, and has become so inseparable from it, that what might be – 
from the standpoint of one outside the system – an “association” endowed with only 
contingent significance, has acquired in the light of “perfumed consciousness” the force 
of something inscribed in the fabric of the world (Gell 2006:408). 
   
Like Gell’s perfume, the olfactory signs with which this chapter is concerned are permeated by 
the context in which they are found – here, the context of the stigmatized labor of sanitation 
work.  So enduringly fused are the naturally occurring odors of human abjection with the 
concrete experience of the division of labor that these smells – whether encountered in the 
workplace or at home – signify much more than the material facts of expiration and excretion 
that they manifestly index.  They signify, at the same time, an underlying order of things, a 
perduring condition, “something inscribed in the fabric of the world.”   
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They are able to signify thus partly by dint of the peculiar nature of olfactory signs.  This 
may be demonstrated by comparing them to verbal signs.  Caste names – verbal signs that, like 
the signs with which this chapter is concerned, convey caste ideology – signify, as words do, 
primarily on the grounds of convention; they are, in Peircian terms, symbols.  Being 
conventional and thus arbitrary, they are subject to the same modes of critique and subversive 
reappropriation as other symbols.  You call me Black, I say Black Power, Black is Beautiful.  You 
call me Bhangi, I say yes, maiṅ Bhangī hūṅ, and inform you – as Bhagwan Das (1981a) famously 
did – that the name means Breaker, as in Breaker of brahminical rites, anti-caste insurgent.  
Smells, on the other hand, are not so readily deconstructed and repurposed.  Their significance 
is partly a matter of convention, to be sure, but partly something else entirely.  Putrescine and 
cadaverine signify death not merely because our ancestors told us so.  The fact that inhaling 
methane in quantity makes us light-headed is no consequence of a social construction.  Odors 
instruct the body, the sensorium, the self, in ways that we scarcely understand.   
Olfactory signs signify simultaneously through all three of Peirce’s channels: the 
symbolic aspect of smell is inextricably tied to its indexical aspect, which is in turn ensnared in 
its iconic aspect.  For example, the stench of dog carcasses in a municipal truck indexes animal 
death, symbolizes the Jallād or even the abstract concept of Dalit labor (convention having 
taught us whose job it is to remove the dead), and iconically re-presents our sense memory of 
every redolent death we have known (the visual metaphor embedded in the term “icon” is of 
course unfortunate here; the relevant principle being likeness, a smell’s iconicity would be its 
likeness with the same or very similar smells already experienced by the interpreter, just as a 
statue’s iconicity with its original presumes the interpreter’s experience of the original, or other 
representations of it).  Now, as may very well happen if the carcasses are sufficiently ripe, this 
triply grounded sign may make your gorge rise as your body interprets the biochemical 
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significance of the smell.  The experience of the retch reflex sediments in your bodily memory as 
an integral part of this sign process, to be provoked again, whether fully or faintly, in later 
experiences of carcass-smell.  You then bring to future encounters with any of the objects of this 
sign – animal death, the Jallād or the Dalit (privileged caste discernment of distinctions among 
Dalits being generally poor), or the memory of carcass-smell – an ensemble of associations 
soldered together as much in the viscera as in the mind.  Caste is part of your embodied 




 The shift was supposed to be over but still it dragged on.  Bachhanu, Vijay Bajpayi and I were still 
crammed in the cab of the municipal truck, shuddering and jittering over a dirt road in the afternoon 
heat.  It was past time for us to return to the Nagar Nigam and hand over the vehicle to the second shift, 
but there remained one outstanding work order – a complaint that Anup, sitting in the Control Room, 
had called in over Vijay’s cell phone minutes before the official end of the shift.  To take up the order 
meant doing extra labor for no extra pay; not to do it meant risking disapprobation from the clerk and, 
potentially, his superiors.  Bachhanu said flatly that we should drive straight back to the Nagar Nigam.  
Vijay wheedlingly urged his companion to do the last job, arguing that he might get another hundred out 
of it from the complainant, and further suggesting – much to his own amusement – that if they kept 
working they would be given a holiday: “Kyoṅ, Bachhanu, āj double duty, phir ek din chhuṭṭī!” (double 
shift today, holiday tomorrow!) 
 Bachhanu never assented, but Vijay drove to the site of the last work order anyway.  It was a 
shopping complex on Faizabad Road, a major highway.  The complainant, a fast-talking, crisply dressed 
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store owner, met us on the road and led us to a low concrete shelf next to the stairs leading down to the 
basement floor of the shopping complex, where his store was located.  There lay a long tall dog whose 
diseased, sunken pink flesh, dotted with pustules, stretched between sparse patches of white fur.  This 
one smelled different from the others: it gave off the sickening odor not of decomposition but of open 
sores, of pus.  Someone had put a few old roṭīs next to the dog’s mouth; these were covered in ants. 
But the dog was breathing.  At first glance it appeared quite dead, but as we stood beholding it 
we perceived the faint, slow rising and falling of its rib cage. 
“Ham zindā kutte ko nahīṅ uṭhāte,” said Dulare.  I don’t dispose of living dogs.  Vijay backed him 
up, citing municipal policy.  The store owner briefly argued that the dog was close enough to dead to be 
treated as such, but then took out his wallet and gave Bachhanu a hundred rupee note.  A 
polypropylene strap and some packing material were quickly procured and Bachhanu employed his 
usual technique, but as he lifted the nearly dead dog by its limb the creature snapped to consciousness 
and kicked and squirmed with what vigor remained in it.  As Bachhanu closed the packaging material 
over the dog like a washerman’s bundle and lifted it into the bed of the truck, a shrill whimper emerged. 
We drove to the Kukreil crossing a short distance away, the place where carcasses are unloaded 
into the river.  Bachhanu looked back at the truck bed and said, “Khaṛā ho gayā mātā chod.”  The 
mother fucker stood up.  And indeed, the dog had actually risen and was standing on all four legs in the 
bed of the truck.  Bachhanu and Vijay briefly debated what to do.  Then Bachhanu got out of the truck, 
climbed onto the bed, again bundled the dog into the packaging material, and dragged it out of the truck 
and onto the shoulder of the bridge near its retaining wall.  There it remained as it landed, upside down, 
all tangled up in cardboard and string, next to a pile of sandbags.  There it would probably remain 
tomorrow, or the next day, when the Control Room would get another call about it.  The dog made no 















Autonomy and Alterity: the Cult of Lal Beg in Colonial India, c. 1880-1920 
 
 In her extraordinary study of the Partition of India and Pakistan, Urvashi Butalia describes an 
interview she had with a Dalit woman – a “sweeper” of a Punjab village whom she calls Maya – whose 
recollections of 1947 trouble Butalia in unexpected ways.  In the interview Maya mirthfully describes 
how, when Muslims and Hindus alternately fled her childhood village as rumors swirled as to whether it 
would be assigned to India or Pakistan, she and other girls of her caste looted the homes of whichever 
community departed, stealing food, utensils and textiles and later selling them for profit.  It is not so 
much the pilferage that Butalia finds startling about Maya’s account, nor even the laughter with which 
Maya related it.  Rather, what upsets the oral historian’s expectations are Maya’s social categories.  
“[L]ike all Hindus,” Butalia (1998:298–300) writes, “somewhere deep down inside me I had assumed 
that Harijans (Dalits), Gandhi’s supposed ‘children of God’, relegated to the fringes of society, were part 
of the Hindu community, part of ‘us’.  Yet, […] Maya was quite clear that they did not see themselves as 
Hindus or Christians (or indeed anyone else).”  
 Similarly, in her ethnography of sanitation labor castes in Benares, Mary Searle-Chatterjee 
explains that she began fieldwork under the impression that the subjects of her study were Hindus.  “My 
Sweepers,” she writes, “were clearly neither Muslim nor Christian, so I was puzzled when I heard them 
talking about ‘Hindus’ as if they were people other than themselves, for example, ‘the people who live 
across the road’.”  Searle-Chatterjee (1981:188–89) then asked her interlocutors ‘Who are Hindus?’  
“Their reply astounded me.  ‘Hindus’, they said, ‘are Brahmans and Thakurs.’”  
 What Butalia and Searle-Chatterjee disclose in these passages is the subtle regnancy of an article 
of sociological commonsense and the disjunction of this commonsense from the perspective of those it 
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purports to identify.  They reveal as an assumption the idea that “sweepers” and other Dalits, insofar as 
they are not formal converts to Buddhism, Islam or Christianity, belong in a taxonomical sense to the 
Hindu community and should therefore see themselves as Hindus.  This assumption follows logically 
from the most basic lessons that students across the globe learn about Indian society; to be educated in 
the world today, whether in Tokyo or Chicago or Johannesburg or Delhi, is to know that Hindu society 
has or had a caste system that classed some people “untouchable,” that therefore “untouchables” 
belong to Hindu society, that therefore “untouchables” are Hindus.  As Butalia and Searle-Chatterjee’s 
examples make plain, this constitutes commonsense among the educated in urban India and in the 
academy as well.  While scholarship in recent decades has taken note of Dalit critiques of Hinduism and 
conversions to Buddhism and Christianity in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the modernity of 
these developments has shielded the assumption we are discussing from serious questioning.  That is, 
with some exceptions,21 the idea that “untouchables” may have historically nurtured autonomous 
traditions distinct from those of Hindu society, if entertained at all, is generally regarded as a child of 
modernity – a product of missionary fantasies, colonial divide and rule policies, or the Marxist biases of 
anthropologists – freeing us from having to test our assumption that before Ambedkar (or Thass, or 
Phule, or Achhutanand), “untouchables” saw themselves as Hindus, and Hindus, in turn, saw them as 
such. 
 Setting aside its global reach and secure lodging in institutions where authorative narratives of 
Indian history and society are generated, this commonsense has teeth.  In 1950, the government of 
newly independent India issued the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, an executive act that defined 
who would and who would not be recognized by the state as having suffered the effects of 
untouchability, and thus who would and who would not be entitled, as a means of redress, to 
                                                          
21 The exceptions are of two sorts: historians of Indian secularism whose work I will discuss two paragraphs below, 
and scholars of Dalit social history whose work reaches into the pre-enumerative era (Prashad 2000; 
Juergensmeyer 2009; Searle-Chatterjee 2008), but whose findings on this subject appear to have gone unheard. 
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preferential treatment in various sectors of public life.  On the conferral or denial of recognition as 
Scheduled Caste hinge things like reserved posts in higher education, government employment, and 
political office; eligibility for government loans, grants, scholarships, vocational training, and housing; 
entitlements to free school uniforms and textbooks; access to food subsidies.  The 1950 Order specified 
that “[N]o person who professes a religion different from the Hindu religion shall be deemed to be a 
member of a Scheduled Caste.”  The article of commonsense that we are discussing is inscribed in the 
law of the land. 
In this and the next two chapters – Part 2 of the dissertation – I attempt to chart the career of 
this sociological assumption: its awkward colonial beginnings, propagation by Hindu nationalists, 
induction into mainstream nationalism and installation in the edifice of postcolonial law.  An 
ethnographic history of the sanitation labor castes from the 1880s to the present enables us to track the 
progress of the idea (of the essentially and transhistorically Hindu untouchable) and to gauge the effects 
of its diffusion on everyday life and social relations.  There are historians who have begun to point out 
the political nature and far-reaching consequences of the late colonial categorical identification of the 
untouchable population as Hindu.  Recent studies demonstrate that this identification was the outcome 
of decades of political contestation, that it brought into being the Hindu majority that scholarship so 
often misperceives as timeless, and that the struggle over this categorizing move was a principle arena 
in which the nationalist discourse of tolerance was forged (Zavos 2000; Dalmia 2007; Tejani 2007; 
Adcock 2014).  All of this is a welcome beginning to the project of historicizing the article of 
commonsense to which Butalia and Searle-Chatterjee direct our attention.  I mean to advance this 
project, laying for it new foundations in the specific history of the sanitation labor castes, and bringing 
ethnographic methods to bear on the question of how this commonsense structures lives.  
 But what of the obverse of this commonsense, the social ontology put forward by Butalia’s Maya 
and Searle-Chatterjee’s Benares sweepers?  What is its history?  If chapters IV and V focus on the rise of 
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the idea of the transhistorically Hindu untouchable, this chapter seeks to examine what came before.  
Butalia and Searle-Chatterjee make clear that their interlocutors do not assert their alterity from Hindus 
on Ambedkarite grounds, or by reference to the ideology of organized anti-caste political movements of 
the twentieth century – movements which, in north India at least, were largely led by Chamars and in 
which the sanitation labor castes scarcely participated.22  Rather, theirs is an older sense of otherness, 
one that predates the wrenching late colonial politics of enumerated communities (Kaviraj 1992), one 
with a genealogy quite distinct from – which is not to say opposed to – that of Ambedkarite Dalit 
politics.23  What are the sources of this stealthily perduring social ontology, and what is its content?  If 
there is a tradition of religious autonomy among the sanitation labor castes, then how does it imagine 
the religious landscape of South Asia, and in what terms does it posit difference from Hindus, Muslims 
and others? 
 I propose to address these questions in the pages that follow by considering accounts of the 
religious life of the sanitation labor castes from the late colonial period – accounts of “conversion,” of 
“syncretism,” and of a religious formation that the British often called “the cult of Lal Beg.”  The myths, 
rites, and liturgical songs of this community, which at the turn of the twentieth century was largely 
coextensive with the most populous sanitation labor caste of South Asia (the Chuhra/Bhangi, see 
Chapter I), give utterance to a religious subjectivity self-consciously distinct from and at times 
agonistically opposed to that of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs.  The social imagination enunciated in the 
oral texts of the Lal Begi tradition, while entirely at odds with the sociological commonsense with which 
we now live – again, that the sanitation labor castes (and unconverted Dalits generally) must, perforce, 
                                                          
22 In Punjab the Ad Dharm did attract Chuhras in some numbers for a time, but remained overwhelmingly a 
Chamar movement.  The Adi Hindu Sabha in UP failed to mobilize sanitation labor caste support of any note  
(Prashad 2000; Juergensmeyer 2009; Rawat 2011).   
23 Nor is this to say that their trajectories must remain distinct.  Bhagwan Das argued for – and modeled – a 
convergence of the autonomous Dalit politics advocated by Ambedkar, on the one hand, and traditions of cultural 
autonomy particular to the sanitation labor castes (which he labeled “Lal Begi religion”), on the other.  The recent 
writings and mobilizations of Darshan Ratn Ravan, though in some respects very different from those of Bhagwan 
Das, speak to the growing popularity of this convergence (Das 1981b; 1996; 2004; Ravan 2010). 
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be Hindus – did not contradict the prevailing commonsense of the period.  That is, before the rise of 
enumerative politics, the religious autonomy that the sanitation labor castes articulated in their liturgy 
was generally accepted by the Hindus and Muslims among whom – or more accurately, apart from 
whom – they lived.  Before the stakes of constituting a numerical majority became vivid to a mass 
population in the initial decades of the twentieth century, ordinary Hindus and Muslims had as little 
interest in imagining the sanitation labor castes as co-religionists as the latter had the former. 
 To trace the contours of this earlier (and slyly persisting) social ontology is to begin to restore to 
the historiographic record the self-representations of the sanitation labor castes.  It is, by the same 
token, to assist in the collective project of easing South Asian studies out of an impasse of the 
imagination, a conceptual cul-de-sac that has been acknowledged but not escaped.  This is what Peter 
Gottschalk (2013:18, 183) calls “the bifurcation paradigm,” a scholarly inheritance from the imperial 
epistemic order, a habit of viewing Hinduism and Islam as “mutually exclusive categories of social 
belonging that bifurcated nearly every societal and cultural dimension of India,” categories, I would add, 
that are seen as exhausting the spectrum of religious possibility in South Asia.24  Our subjection to this 
“tyranny of labels,” as Romila Thapar (1996) calls it, distorts our interpretations of historical materials by 
the backward projection of twentieth-century commonsense.  We reflexively gloss the Yavana and 
Turuska of medieval texts as “Muslim,” for instance, a procedure “methodologically invalid and 
historically inaccurate” that invites modern conceptions to obscure the often quite different meanings 
of the earlier terms (Thapar 1996:7).  Equally problematic is the tendency to label subaltern groups of 
the precolonial and colonial periods “Hindu” by default, universalizing the late colonial premise that 
                                                          
24 This is not to say that Sikhs, Jains, Buddhists and so on are denied a place in historical accounts, but that their 
distinctiveness tends to be effaced under the pressure of the binary model; Buddhism and Jainism become 
“heterodoxies” of “Hinduism”; Sikhism becomes either a product of Hindu-Muslim “syncretism” or an “outgrowth” 
of bhakti (thus conceptually encompassed under “Hinduism”).  From the eleventh century onward, at least, the 
story of South Asian religions continues to be treated as a dualistic drama.  
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those who do not claim to be Muslim must be Hindu, and burying the self- and other-perceptions of 
such groups under a categorical scheme foreign to their experience.  
The problem is widely admitted; but in the absence of an alternative conceptual model of the 
socio-religious landscape of South Asia, the bifurcation paradigm continues to undergird scholarly 
accounts.  To attend to the specifics of the Lal Begi tradition is to draw attention to precisely such an 
alternative paradigm in the historical-ethnographic record.  The social ontology of the Lal Begis evokes 
not a bifurcated but a trifurcated or indeed multipolar religious landscape – a landscape, moreover, 
hewn into vertical as well as horizontal divisions.  Attention to how the sanitation labor castes in the 
colonial period perceived their others, and how their others perceived them, may provide a constructive 
model with which to dislodge the binary thinking that has so long dominated the historical imagination, 
to advance “beyond Hindu and Muslim” (Gottschalk 2000). 
The chapter will proceed as follows.  First I will situate the present enquiry vis-à-vis debates 
among anthropologists and historians on the question of untouchable autonomy.  Second, I will discuss 
the two master tropes under which the religious life of the sanitation labor castes has been subsumed in 
previous accounts: conversion and syncretism.  These I consider in some detail, drawing out implications 
from accounts of these sorts that historiography has missed, and also establishing the analytical 
limitations of these tropes and proposing ways of rethinking their objects.  I will then consider what a 
range of materials from 1880 to 1920 has to say about, first, how Muslims and Hindus perceived the 
sanitation labor castes in terms of religious community, and second, how the latter perceived the 
former.  I present Lal Begi representations of self and other contained in liturgical songs and in stories.  
Having excavated elements of an earlier sociological commonsense, the chapter concludes by briefly 






 The question of subaltern social ontologies has long interested anthropologists and historians of 
South Asia.  For years, pursuing a problematic laid out by Max Weber,25 anthropologists debated 
whether “untouchable” communities held views of caste society that were distinct from those of 
“touchables” or not – whether, that is, the “view from the bottom” differed from “the view from the 
middle” or the “view from the top” (Moffatt 1979:3).  With the forceful exception of Michael Moffatt, 
most anthropologists who worked among Dalits emphasized disjunction over similitude in the relations 
between the categorical schemes of Dalits and dominant castes; arguments were made for varying 
degrees of autonomy of Dalit social thought.26  The debate, however, focused on Dalit ideas and 
practices regarding caste hierarchy; the question of autonomy in the religious domain was, for the most 
part, simply not posed.27 
 Historians, often in a more Marxian frame, have also taken up the theme of the autonomy of 
Dalit social thought.  Here the prevailing concern has been to describe the content of the “oppositional 
consciousness” of subaltern groups in (primarily colonial) history, and to understand how this 
consciousness relates to the ideologies of the dominant.  Some of these accounts – notably those of 
Ranajit Guha (2009:chap. 11) on the cult of Rahu and Partha Chatterjee (1993:chap. 9) on the Balarami 
sect in Bengal – come close to acknowledging that the agonistic alterity that obtained between Dalit and 
dominant caste in these contexts was understood in religious terms by its participants.  Other accounts, 
                                                          
25 Weber’s contention that “[t]he most complete formal solution of the problem of theodicy is the special 
achievement of the Indian doctrine of karma” invited a discussion as to whether “untouchables” subscribed to this 
theodicy – whether, that is, the completeness of the “solution” was merely conceptual or socially substantive  
(Weber 1963:145).  From that narrow question the debate expanded in several directions. 
26 Signal contributions to this debate were made by Pauline Kolenda (1964), Gerald Berreman (1967), Owen Lynch 
(1969), Joan Mencher (1974), Bernard Cohn (1987), Mary Searle-Chatterjee (1981), and Ravidra Khare (1984).  
27 The exceptions here are Searle-Chatterjee, with whose anecdote of religious difference we began, and Khare, 




like Saurabh Dube’s (1998) of the Satnamis of Chattisgarh, provide powerful evidence of Dalit religious 
autonomy, but then insist on analyzing it within the framework of “marginal” Hinduism.28  This, I would 
argue, reveals the shadow cast by the “tyranny of labels” over historiographic imagination.  When our 
underlying conception of the Hindu community remains the modern one – the one, that is, in which 
everyone in India who does not profess Islam or another “world religion” is Hindu – then, indeed, 
irrespective of the content of Satnami (or Balarami, etc.) discourses and practices, these communities 
can only be interpreted as Hindu sects, whether qualified as “deviant” (as the historiography of Bengal 
labels such groups), “marginal,” or “folk.”  I am suggesting that this classificatory move, fixing 
“untouchable” religions inside the house of Hinduism, owes more to twentieth century developments 
than it realizes, and would have appeared outrageous to more than a few members of such subaltern 
religious communities in the colonial period – such as those Satnamis who, well before Ambedkar 
appeared on the scene, objected to being recorded as Hindus in the colonial census (Gait 1913:114). 
 A different aspect of the conceptual underpinnings of the historiography of subaltern 
consciousness in South Asia has attracted more notice: the concept, in this literature, of subaltern 
autonomy.  In a much-quoted critique of such studies, Rosalind O’Hanlon (1988:191) suggests that “[a]t 
the very moment of this assault upon western historicism, the classic figure of western humanism – the 
self-originating, self-determining individual, who is at once a subject in his possession of a sovereign 
consciousness whose defining quality is reason, and an agent in his power of freedom – is readmitted 
through the back door in the figure of the subaltern himself, as he is restored to history in the 
reconstructions of the Subaltern project.”  Leaving aside studies that have taken the general category of 
subaltern as their subject, it should be noted that examinations of specifically “untouchable” 
movements or structures in colonial history have tended, on the contrary, to emphasize the non-
                                                          
28 A similar tension is present in Sekhar Bandopadhyay’s discussion of the Matua sect among the Namasudras of 
Bengal (1997:chap. 2). 
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sovereign, composite character of “untouchable” consciousness even as they correctly insist that their 
historical subjects do exhibit reason and agency (Guha 2009:chap. 11; Chatterjee 1993:chap. 9; 
Bandyopadhyay 1997:chap. 2; Prakash 1991; Dube 1998; Prashad 2000; Rawat 2011).  Since I am arguing 
that Lal Begis practiced an autonomous subaltern religion, I should make explicit that the autonomy I am 
invoking need not conjure the bloated figure of O’Hanlon’s critique; autonomy here does not require 
the self-originating sovereign subject to bear it.  What I mean by the autonomy of the Lal Begi tradition 
is simply that its adherents perceived it to be separate and distinct from other religions; they 
understood the Lal Begi community to be their own, in contrast to the communities of others: Hindus, 
Muslims, and Sikhs.  This is very far from saying that the tradition had no concepts, myths or practices in 
common with the other religious communities – an unlikely proposition in any case.  Nor is it to 
surreptitiously cast the Lal Begis in a familiar heroic narrative of bourgeois self-realization. 
 
Conversion 
 The religious history of the sanitation labor castes has generally been plotted into one of two 
narratives: conversion or syncretism.  In this section I will consider sources on conversion.  The purpose 
is threefold.  First, some of these accounts, especially of the sanitation labor castes taking on Sikh and 
Muslim pahchān (“embracing Sikhism and Islam,” as the sources would have it), have never been 
considered in the secondary literature.  I think it is important to bring these sources to light, even where 
they do not directly advance the argument; a religious history of the sanitation labor castes would be 
remiss to pass them over in silence.  Second, there is an aspect of the experience of sanitation labor 
caste converts in the colonial period, observed in all three of the communities receiving converts (Sikhs, 
Muslims, Christians), that has gone largely unremarked even in the relatively substantial literature on 
Chuhra conversion to Christianity.  This is the persistence of a distinctive pahchān, the continued 
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(nominative, ritual) marking of sanitation labor caste converts as a category whose belonging to the 
religious community remains in some sense incomplete or at a remove.  To understand how pahchān 
operates in the mutually implicated domains of religious and caste belonging, we must attend to such 
markings.  Third, it is necessary to flag one way in which the concept of conversion itself misleads: how 
the framework it conjures renders epiphenomenal aspects of the phenomenon that may be, in fact, 
rather more at the heart of things.  
 The Punjab Report of the Census of 1911, authored by Harikrishan Kaul, announced that: 
The Hindus have lost 158,806 Chuhras, due partly to real conversion to Christianity or 
Islam and partly to misclassification.  There can be no doubt about a large number of 
Chuhras having been converted to Christianity… and there have also been numerous 
conversions to Musallis (a Chuhra converted to Islam is usually called Musalli); but the 
abnormal rise of 252,158, i.e. about 439 per cent. in the number of Musallis, would 
indicate [that many enumerators failed to adhere to the policy of returning Chuhras as 
Hindu by default] (Kaul 1911: 100). 
 
In the census reports of the period under consideration (i.e., those of 1881, 1891, 1901 and 1911), 
passages like this are typical.  Administrators struggled to account for the vast numbers of the sanitation 
labor castes, especially the Chuhra/Bhangi, that appeared to simply switch religions from one decade to 
the next.  For instance, the official population of Sikh Chuhras shrank by 75% between 1891 and 1901 in 
Punjab, only to more than double in the subsequent decade, while the Muslim Bhangi population 
quadrupled in UP between 1891 and 1901, and then more than quadrupled in Punjab between 1901 and 
1911 (Rose 1902:113; Burn 1902:258; Kaul 1911:100).  These improbable swings were generated to no 
small extent by shifts in census policy over time, such as the modification of the official definition of a 
Sikh in 1891 and again in 1911 (Rose 1902:124; Gait 1913:119; Jones 1981), as well as by disjunctions 
between census policy and what enumerators were willing to record, a point to which we will return. 
Quite aside from confusion originating in the census project itself, however, the volatility was also 
attributed to the widely observed fact that the sweeper castes in this period were adopting on a mass 
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scale Islam and Christianity, and to a lesser extent Sikhism.  As we will see, the conversion trope cloaks 
these developments in a deceptive familiarity.  At the same, the label “conversion movements” does 
fairly convey much of what was going on: movements because they were indeed popular and cohesive 
in time and space, conversion because they entailed a decisive shift in stated and perceived religious 
status, generally solemnized by formal, if simple, ritual acts.  If the retention, more or less surreptitious, 
of some of the traditional practices of the preceding religion characterized these movements, it was 
hardly an exception to the global history of conversion.  It must be emphasized, though, that these 
conversions – as we will cautiously call them, for now merely flagging our reservations – were not 
conversions from Hinduism, as Hindu nationalists would later assert with breathtaking success, but 
rather conversions from the community’s autonomous tradition, i.e., from the cult of Lal Beg.  This will 
become clearer when we discuss examples of Christian converts. 
 Let me briefly sketch what we know of sanitation labor caste conversion movements in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, starting with Sikhism, then Islam and Christianity.  Constantly 
debated in the decades under consideration was the question of who was and who was not a Sikh, and 
whether a Sikh was simultaneously a Hindu (Oberoi 1997).  To observe that the boundaries of the Sikh 
community were in flux, though, is not to say that distinctions were not made.  In the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century, members of the Chuhra/Bhangi caste who adopted Sikh traditions were 
known as Mazhabis, Mazhabi Sikhs, or Rangretas (Ibbetson 1970:290–96).  Oral traditions suggest that 
conversions to Sikhism by this caste began no later than the period of the tenth guru (Guru Gobind 
Singh, d. 1708), who is said to have publicly honored one such Chuhra Sikh (or in some versions, two 
brothers) for stealing the decapitated head of the ninth guru from Aurangzeb’s guards in Delhi and 
delivering it to Gobind Singh in Anandpur (Weitbrecht 1886:736; Greeven 1894:35–36; Sharma 
1928:20).  In our period, Greeven (1894:52) describes conversions as commonplace. 
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The ceremony, by which a sweeper at Benares becomes a Sikh, is simplicity itself.  The 
technical expression, in use among the scavengers, is, “to assume the motto of Nanak 
Shah” (Nanak Shah ka mantra lena). 
 
He goes on to describe a rite in which a candidate is prayed over by a sponsor, feasts his caste fellows, 
and is initiated with a secret mantra into the Sikh community (Greeven 1894:52–54).  Strickler (1926), 
writing from Punjab, remarks that those Chuhras who are “formally made followers of the Sikh religion 
[do so] by “pahul”,29 or baptism.”  The degree to which the converts, as a group, observed Sikh 
orthopraxy – even as the latter was constantly evolving – apparently varied.  Many “wear the “kes” or 
long hair done up in a top-knot, together with other insignia of the Sikh religion, such as the iron 
bracelet, comb, etc., prescribed by the Sikh Gurus,” writes one commentator (ibid.), while others insist 
that, “Mazhabi Sikhs, or converts from the Chuhra or sweeper caste… do not wear the kes and have no 
scruples about smoking” (Gait 1913:119; Greeven 1894:54).  It is worth noting that the preponderance 
of sweepers who profess themselves to be Sikhs in an 1894 account from Benares, and the 
characterization of the religious teachers of the sweepers of Poona as “Nanakpanthi beggars” indicates 
that the engagement with the Sikh tradition was not restricted to regions in which Sikhs constituted a 
local dominant caste (Greeven 1894:38; Campbell 1885:437).   
 Formal conversion to Islam by members of the sanitation labor castes in this period is mostly 
evidenced in Punjab, particularly western Punjab, whereas accounts of decidedly Muslim sweeper castes 
in eastern UP, Bihar and Bengal attest to earlier periods of conversion in those regions.30  Chuhras who 
embraced Islam in Punjab became known by the titles Musalli, Kutana, or Dindar; their percentage of 
the overall Chuhra population grew from 20 in 1891 to 22 in 1901 and 31 in 1911 (Ibbetson 1970:8; 
                                                          
29 Pahul is a Sikh initiation rite dating to times of Guru Nanak, the tradition’s founder.  Baptism is a suggestive 
parallel, but hardly a translation of Pahul.  See Mann (2004:23–28). 
30 Here I am speaking of those castes that now largely go by the name Muslim Halalkhor or Sheikh Halalkhor but 
previously were known as Sekra or (Muslim) Hela (see glossary in Chapter I). 
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Weitbrecht 1886:763–64; Rose 1902:113; Strickler 1926).  As for the procedures by which this increase 
took place, Weitbrecht (1886:763–64), an Anglican missionary, reports simply that:  
A Chuhra observes the Ramazan fast and the time of prayer in the hopes of reception as 
a Muslim.  If successful, he is admitted on condition of renouncing scavenging and the 
eating of carrion. 
  
Chaina Mall, a correspondent in the Panjab Notes and Queries, elaborates on “the ceremony of 
initiation” for “converts to Muhammadanism belonging to the Mehtar caste”: 
He is made to repeat the Muhammadan creed (Kalima) five times after bathing and 
dressing in new clothes.  He… then says Toba (Repentance) in a clear firm voice and 
vows never to return to his old faith three times before a Maulavi and other witnesses.  
After this the Maulavi drinks from a vessel…of which the convert drinks also, and is 
then… pronounced a Musalman.  If he be at all literate he calls himself a Nau Musallim 
(Mall 1886). 
 
Whether Muslims actively sought sanitation labor caste converts is an open question.  Negative 
evidence makes one thing clear: no major Muslim body or institution systematically approached the 
sanitation labor castes for proselytization.  Christian and Hindu missionaries – specifically Presbyterians, 
Methodists, and the Arya Samaj31 – took great professional interest in their competitors in the spiritual 
and social reform field, yet none speaks of organized Muslim activity on behalf of the sweepers.  The 
Muslim organization most thoroughly embroiled in the polemics wars with Christian missionaries and 
the Samaj that so characterized late colonial Punjab, and which might therefore be expected to have 
entered the competition for sweeper caste converts, was the Ahmadiyya.  Indeed, there is evidence that 
the Ahmadiyya supported some depressed class causes and even published a pamphlet advising 
untouchables not to be duped by the Arya Samaj (Juergensmeyer 2009:28, 40).  But these critical 
interventions do not appear to have included conversion efforts, and as we will see, Mirza Ghulam 
                                                          
31 Not contemporaneously – as we will see, the Presbyterians and Methodists enjoyed several decades of intimacy 
with the Chuhras before the Arya Samaj took up dharm prachār (“spreading religion”) among them in the 1920s.  
Nonetheless, in neither period do we hear of organized or institutional Muslim proselytizing among the sweepers. 
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Ahmad, founder of the Ahmadiyya, vigorously denounced the suggestion that sweepers were among his 
followers in terms that suggested antipathy to the caste as a whole. 
 More extensively documented in this period was the large scale conversion – the “mass 
movement” as it came to be called in missionary circles – of sanitation labor castes to Christianity in 
Punjab and western UP.  In western UP the movement began in 1859 with Mazhabi Sikhs adopting 
Christianity, followed in the 1880s and 1890s by their Lal Begi caste fellows.  There the Methodist 
missions played a primary role (Burn 1902:68; Alter 1986:166–212; Webster 1992a:38).  In Punjab 1873 
is remembered as the inaugural moment and the Presbyterian missions predominated, though all 
denominations were ultimately affected.32  In both regions sweeper caste converts rapidly outstripped 
all other groups to become the overwhelming majority of the Christian population.  By 1900, in western 
UP, “the terms “Christian” and “Sweeper” became in many places synonymous” (Messmore 1903:265).  
By 1931 in Punjab roughly one quarter of all Chuhras had converted to Christianity (Webster 1992a:38), 
especially in the west, such that in post-partition Pakistan, as well, “sweeper” and “Christian” would 
become, in popular usage, interchangeable (Streefland 1979; O’Brien 2012). 
 Chuhra mass conversions figure significantly in scholarly accounts of Indian Christianity (e.g., 
Webster 1992b; Cox 2002; Bauman and Young 2014).  One important aspect of these movements that 
the secondary literature rightly emphasizes is that by all accounts they were inaugurated by the 
sanitation labor castes themselves; it was they who first approached the missionaries, rather than the 
other way around.33  Indeed the first wave of sweeper caste individuals and families seeking baptism 
                                                          
32 The American United Presbyterian Mission at Sialkot received the first Chuhras seeking conversion in 1873; in 
1882-83 their Church of Scotland colleagues and rivals, also based in Sialkot, baptized a family of Chuhras, though 
it was not until 1886 that several hundred began converting each year at that mission.  1886 was also the year in 
which the Anglican mission in Batala was approached for the first time by hundreds of Chuhras.  By then the 
movement was observed in the districts of Sialkot, Gujrat, Gujranwala, Gurdaspur, Lahore, and Amritsar (Gordon 
1886; Weitbrecht 1886; Youngson 1896; Gait 1913:136).  
33 “It cannot be said that missionaries have generally begun by devoting their attention to this class,” writes 
Weitbrecht (1886:746), a first-hand observer of the mass movement in Punjab, “on the contrary, the itinerant 
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took the missionaries by surprise, and led, as their numbers grew, to a change in policy from 
proselytizing the privileged castes to managing the spiritual and material needs of the dispossessed 
(Gordon 1886:421–32; Weitbrecht 1886:763–66; Alter 1986:178; Webster 1992a:38; Wiser 2000:chap. 
4).  But there is another, related aspect of the movements that historiography has not fully 
acknowledged, an aspect relating to the pahchān of the converts.  There was a common perception at 
the time, both within and without church circles, that a mission admitting “the very lowest castes… has 
to be satisfied with a lower standard of appreciation of the tenets of Christianity” (Burn 1902:68; cf. 
Messmore 1903:264–65; Alter 1986:199, 205).  To combat this estimation, “mass movement Christians,” 
as the subaltern converts were euphemistically called, were generally made to undergo special tests of 
knowledge and sincerity before baptism, or after baptism but before admittance to communion 
(Weitbrecht 1886:765; Griswold n.d.).  In several major denominations, the admission of mass 
movement Christians to the Eucharist was simply indefinitely deferred, thus creating a relatively 
permanent subclass of Christians unfit for the Lord’s Supper.34 
The marking of Chuhra converts as less than complete members of the Christian community was 
not only a ritual matter but a nominative one.  Not unlike sanitation labor caste converts to Islam (who, 
as we have seen, were called Musalli, Kutana, or Dindar) and Sikhism (who were then called Mazhabi or 
Rangreta), the new Christians, too, were hailed by other members of the religious community they had 
joined with a name that indexed their belonging to a distinct and subordinate category (“mass 
movement Christians,” “village Christians”).  Among the relatively small community of native Christians, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
preacher has usually passed by the tatti [segregated Chuhra hamlet] on his visit to a village.  But these people have 
come to hear, as we should say, by chance.”  
34 This innovation, practiced in India by missions that did not indefinitely defer admission to communion “at 
home,” is the subject of Hervey DeWitt Griswold’s informative pamphlet, Admission of Village Christians to the 
Lord’s Supper (not dated, though internal evidence suggests it was written in 1916).  An American Presbyterian 
missionary operating in Lahore and Saharanpur between 1890 and 1926, Griswold (n.d.:4–5) is unambiguous 
regarding the prevalence of the practice: “As regards villagers belonging to the depressed classes, their admission 
after baptism to the communion is practically always deferred; and is deferred much too long, judging from the 
statistics of the American Presbyterian Missions in Punjab and North India.” 
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some (in Amritsar, for instance) opposed Chuhras joining the church, others “found it very difficult at 
first” but later reconciled themselves to it, while still others embraced the change in the Christian 
community’s composition (Weitbrecht 1886:766; Gordon 1886:429).  As we have seen, “village 
Christians” generally remained unauthorized to partake in communion.  Though a growing majority of 
the Indian church, they bore the double marks – ritual and nominative – of marginality vis-à-vis the 
wider Christian community.35 
One contributing factor to this marginalization, at least from the perspective of missionaries, 
was that Chuhra Christians were, more than privileged caste converts, reluctant to abandon their 
ancestral religious practices (Messmore 1903:264–65).  Destruction of the shrine of Lal Beg became, in 
many cases, the ultimate demonstration of fidelity to the new faith.  “When all the Chuhras of a place 
become Christians, then with some fear and trembling the shrine is destroyed” (Griswold 1934:231).  Yet 
many converts resisted taking this dramatic step, and even for those who did, the matter rarely ended 
there.  “A group of sweepers may on baptism destroy the than [shrine]… but that does not prove that all 
idolatrous practices will cease” (Griswold n.d.); reports continued to emerge “that images and shrines of 
the Lalguru are still resorted to in secret” (Burn 1902:99; Alter 1986:202).  That the worship of Lal Beg 
proved the most difficult practice for new Christians to give up and the ongoing locus of tension with 
missionaries should help illuminate the spuriousness of the Hindu nationalist claim that these were 
conversions from Hinduism. 
 The last point I will make regarding conversion relates to the trope itself.  The sources make 
clear that for many sanitation labor caste converts, religious transformation accompanied acts of social 
and economic assertion.  These included, notably, efforts to abandon the occupation of scavenging – the 
removal of human excrement (“night soil”) from privies – as well as attempts to obtain land and access 
                                                          
35 Consider the telling choice of words in the following comment by one missionary: “it was a mistake to suppose 
that there are no barriers in the way of sweepers becoming real Christians”(Messmore 1903:264). 
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to education.  “His occupations change somewhat with his religion,” noted Ibbetson (1970:293) of “the 
Chuhra” in Punjab in 1881.  He “refuses to touch night soil and becomes a Musalli or a Kutana” (ibid.).  
Likewise Mazhabis “after conversion continue to perform only the less offensive parts of their traditional 
duties” (Baines 1912:83).  The Gazetteer of Gurdaspur District (1892:66) notes that when local Chuhras 
converted to Christianity, “the converts were unwilling to continue to perform their customary village 
service [i.e., scavenging], and the villagers refused to give the customary due.”36  The link between 
conversion and acts of occupational rebellion was sufficiently widely understood that landlords often 
took measures to prevent intercourse between their dependents and missionaries in the area, or to 
punish those who converted.  Mazhabi converts to Christianity were thrown off their tiny plots of land in 
Moradabad and Bijnor Districts in UP, for instance (Alter 1986:183).  In a village near Batala in Punjab, 
locally dominant Muslim Rajputs intimidated the Chuhra population, which had been seeking Christian 
instruction from an Anglican mission, and thwarted an effort to open a school for them (Weitbrecht 
1886:765–66). 
The apprehensions of the landlords were well founded: in approaching the Christian institutions, 
the sanitation labor castes were indeed attempting to improve their economic position, decrease their 
dependency on local dominant castes, and gain a foothold in the alternative patronage system of 
missionary networks.  The missionary archive is peppered with examples of untouchable converts or 
even mere inquirers persuading missionaries to grant them rent-free or reduced-rent land, or to settle 
new jungle tracts (see, e.g., Youngson 1896:196; Alter 1986:184).  Education was another persistent 
demand of new and would-be converts.  Sanitation labor caste delegations frequently requested that 
missionaries establish village schools for their children or arrange the admission of their children in 
                                                          
36 This strike, clearly an act of sanitation labor caste initiative, was brought to a halt by the missionaries, many of 
whom were ambivalent or antipathetic to disruptions in the social and economic order.  The gazetteer account 
continues: “This state of things threatened to produce awkward complications, but, thanks to the energetic action 
of the Missionaries of all sects, who at once pointed out the unreasonableness of their position to the converts, 
the danger was averted and no further complaints have occurred” (Gurdaspur Gazetteer 1892:66). 
98 
 
religious or government schools in the towns (Weitbrecht 1886:765; Gordon 1886:430; Wiser 2000:39–
58; Alter 1986:178).  The missions often obliged these demands, but faced fierce opposition from 
dominant castes. 
 Thus, when Chuhras formally embraced Islam, Sikhism and Christianity in the late colonial 
period, they simultaneously effected changes in the local political economy of caste: they accessed 
education, obtained land for cultivation, and, above all, refused any longer to perform the most 
degrading aspect of sanitation labor, the removal of human excrement.  This put missionaries in an 
awkward position, since in their discourse these actions could be interpreted as signs of material 
motives in those seeking baptism.  The framework of conversion predisposed the missionaries to debate 
their charges’ motives and to find them either “worldly” or “spiritual” or some combination of the two.  
But as C.S. Adcock (2014) has recently pointed out, this framing of the problem does not appear to 
reflect the perspective of the converts.  A close reading of the sources suggests that sanitation labor 
caste converts saw occupational change and educational assertion as fused with, rather than in tension 
with or a possible betrayal of, baptism (or Pahul, or reciting the Kalima).  In order to highlight that 
subaltern acts of staking political and economic claims were inseparable from the ritual act of entering 
the fold of the new religion, Adcock (2014:chap. 2) proposes the term “ritual-political assertion” as an 
alternative to “conversion” – an analytically felicitous move. 
 
Polypraxy 
 The other trope under which sanitation labor caste religion has been subsumed in the literature 
is syncretism.  Consider the following excerpt from the 1885 Gazetteer of Poona’s entry for “Halalkhor”:  
They are known as Halalkhors or all-eaters, Bhangis […] and Mhetars [sic] or princes.  
They are also called Lal Begis or the followers of Lal Beg, their religious head or guru. […]  
In religion they are half Musalmans and half Hindus, going to mosques and repeating 
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prayers and at the same time having as family deities Khoriyal of Gujarat, Khandoba of 
Jejuri, Khajapir, Baba Makdumba, and the goddesses Kalsar and Ghochati.37  They pay 
equal respect to Musalman saints and to Hindu gods and offer them fowls whose throat 
has been cut by a Musalman […] They keep both Hindu and Musalman fasts and festivals 
[…] Their religious teachers or gurus are either men of their own caste or belong to the 
school of Nanakpanthi [i.e. Sikh] beggars (Campbell 1885:437). 
 
If colonial epistemology regarded such ensembles of religious practice as admixtures of Hinduism and 
Islam, much subsequent scholarship, adopting the same perspective, has called this phenomenon 
syncretism.  In the study of South Asia, the concept has been justly faulted for positing unity and 
“purity” to the Hindu and Islamic traditions from which syncretic groups or movements allegedly borrow 
or inherit elements, when in fact all traditions are synthetic mixtures (Stewart and Ernst 2003).  To this 
criticism I would add that a teleology of failure is embedded in the term.  Since the concept of 
syncretism emerged in the context of a seventeenth century attempt, in the midst of the European wars 
of religion, to theologically reconcile Protestant sects with each other and with the Catholic church, it 
carries with it the whiff of a doomed project.  This is problematic insofar as it erases the contingency of 
history, painting phenomena such as the Lal Begi tradition as failures-in-the-making, treating the 
bifurcation paradigm as the necessary telos of South Asian history. 
 I would propose the term polypraxy as a more accurate, if admittedly inelegant, description of 
many, though surely not all, of the phenomena usually classed as syncretic.  Heteropraxy will not do, 
since the Greek prefix hetero – “the other of two” – would reinforce our bondage to binary thinking.  
Poly, on the other hand, directs our thinking to the multiplicity of modes of religious praxis that was and 
is actually available to historical actors in South Asia, rather than to the false paradigm of two monoliths.  
And because its terminological cousins orthodoxy and orthopraxy are rarely left unqualified – we usually 
                                                          
37 A combination of Muslim saints, and local, non-brahminical heroes and goddesses.  Khoriyal – divinized woman 
of the Chāran caste, associated with crocodiles, worshipped in parts of Gujarat and Maharashtra.  Khandoba – 
martial folk deity, popular among peasant and Dalit castes as well as Muslims, associated with termite mounds and 
Bhairav, worshipped in much of Maharashtra.  Khajapir – Khwaja Khizr, figure of Islamic mythology associated with 
water and immortality.  Baba Makdumba – Baba Makhdūm, fifteenth century Sufi buried in Mahim, Maharashtra.  
Kalsar and Ghochati I have not been able to identify. 
100 
 
hear of brahminical orthodoxy, Sunni orthopraxy and the like – polypraxy may also, as a matter of 
linguistic habit, demand of its users a higher level of precision and specificity than syncretism, which 
generally stands alone.  
I would suggest, then, that the religious polypraxy of the sanitation labor castes at the turn of 
the twentieth century should be understood not as a (familiar) token of the (known) type “syncretism,” 
but rather as a specific configuration of practices whose relationship to other patterns of religiously 
plural behavior remains to be established.  Two modes of sanitation caste polypraxy are discernible in 
the sources.  The first, which I would call mimetic, varied in content from region to region, depending on 
what caste or community dominated locally.  The second, a pattern of orientation to Muslim pirs and 
chthonic goddesses, held across regions.  
The distinguishing feature of the first mode was the imitation, by sanitation labor castes, of the 
religious practices of the locally dominant caste or community.  “The Chuhras are chameleon-like in 
their copying of the externals of other faiths,” wrote the American Presbyterian Hervey DeWitt Griswold 
(1934:227) of the people among whom he had spent thirty years in Punjab and western UP.  “Those 
serving Moslem landlords gradually adopt Moslem customs; those serving Sikh landlords, Sikh customs” 
(ibid.).  According to another observer:  
In Hindu villages their worship approximates that seen at Hindu shrines.  In villages 
owned and inhabited by Muhammedans, the Chuhras dress, and cut their hair, like 
Muhammedans… In Sikh communities even those not formally made followers of the 
Sikh religion by “pahul”, or baptism, often wear the “kes” or long hair done up in a top-
knot, together with other insignia of the Sikh religion, such as the iron bracelet, comb, 
etc., prescribed by the Sikh Gurus.  Those Chuhras who live among a mixed population 
often present to the onlooker a bewildering variety of customs.  They may claim to 
follow all religions, as did the Athenians of Paul’s day, and often they take part in the 
feasts and other observances of several religious sects (Strickler 1926). 
 
The variations in practice generated by the mimetic mode of sanitation labor caste polypraxy could be 
quite local, as I learned firsthand in the course of my fieldwork.  An elderly man born in Sitapur district 
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explained to me that in his village, where the landlords are brahmin, his father and grandfather all 
maintained a choti (a hair braid traditionally worn by brahmins), had Hindu names, and cremated their 
dead; upon marriage with a woman (of the 583 clan) from the adjacent district of Bara Banki, where 
Muslim landlords predominate, he was startled to find that his in-laws had Muslim names, buried their 
dead, and some even wore skullcaps.   
 In the rich and growing literature on what I am calling religious polypraxy in South Asia, a 
number of explanatory paradigms have been put forward.  In some, the popular classes pursue 
efficacious means for combating illness or misfortunate wherever they can find them; polypractitioners 
in this model are canny consumers in a “shared spiritual economy” (Bellamy 2011; Flueckiger 2006).  
Another promising theory is that alterity itself operates as a conduit for sacred power (Bellamy 2011; 
Taneja 2013).  Less helpful is an older paradigm that portray subalterns as a wide-eyed and gullible lot 
innately attracted to miracle-workers and spectacle-makers of whatever religious persuasion (Temple 
1884; or in a more muted form, Eaton 1982:347; Lawrence 1984:114, 119).  
 What I am describing as the mimetic mode of sanitation labor caste polypraxy cannot be 
adequately accounted for by these explanatory frames.  Rather, what we are dealing with here had 
primarily to do with the dependency born of jajmani relations, that is, the reliance of the sanitation 
labor castes on local landholding castes for livelihood and patronage.  The more aged of my 
interlocutors frequently invoked an aphorism to describe this significant aspect of their ancestors’ 
religious practice: jaisā rājā vaisī prajā – as the king, so the people.  The operative social theory is that 
mimesis is normative to conditions of dependency.  This recasts polypraxy as a kind of politic 
dissembling, though the concept here, at least so far as the aphorism and its use-in-context is 
concerned, does not necessarily imply the moral charge of hypocrisy that often lies latent in the concept 
of dissembling in Christian contexts.  Mimetic polypraxy of the kind we are considering is not far from 
taqiyya, the Shi’a doctrine of tactical dissimulation.  Taking note of the sanitation labor caste pattern of 
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imitating the practices of local landlords, Dominique-Sila Khan (2004) hypothesizes that the Lal Begis 
descend from Nizari Ismaili Shi’a whose use of this signature survival tactic was only too successful.  I 
have found no positive evidence to support this claim; Khan is quite right, though, to perceive Lal Begi 
polypraxy as of a kind with taqiyya. 
The second mode of religious polypraxy engaged in by the sanitation labor castes, however, 
stands outside the logic of jaisā rājā vaisī prajā.  A careful reading of late colonial sources alongside 
more recent oral histories reveals a pattern in the religiously plural practice of the sanitation labor 
castes across South Asia that appears not to derive straightforwardly from local power relations.   
Generally speaking, the sanitation labor castes in this period celebrated Muslim and Hindu festivals and 
observed Muslim and Hindu fasts.  A loose network of peripatetic mendicants – bhagats or gurus – who 
were themselves members of the Chuhra/Bhangi caste, and who were sometimes either formally Sikh 
(udāsī, nānakpanthī) or versed in Sikh traditions, linked the sweeper castes spread across South Asia and 
in many places provided religious instruction and ritual leadership.38  Worship generally involved animal 
sacrifice, often with Muslims performing the role of sacrificer.  Aside from Lal Beg, objects of worship 
tended to be not figures of the brahminical pantheon, but rather: 1) Muslim pirs, 2) local goddesses, 
often associated with the earth, and 3) local heroes, often religiously ambiguous (Both Zahir Pir and 
Khandoba, for instance, are considered to be Muslim by some, Hindu by others).  To the extent that 
some local objects of sweeper caste worship were identified also with the brahminical pantheon (as 
avatars, local manifestations, etc.), it was deities associated with subalternity and tantra – Kali and 
Bhairav – who provided the link (Strickler 1926:chap. 2; Griswold 1934:212). 
Oral histories from Awadh paint a similar picture: my eldest informants spoke of their parents 
and grandparents, who had been alive between 1880 and 1920, fasting for Ramadan, mourning during 
                                                          
38 The primary informant of Husen and Greeven’s landmark study in Benares was precisely one such Sikh guru, 
Baba Gopal Das.  See also Griswold (1934:212–13). 
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Muharram, and lighting oil lamps on Diwali.  They respected the religious leadership of bhagats (holy 
men, exorcists) of their own caste who spoke in an idiom inflected by Sikh tradition and traveled, at 
times, to Punjab and western UP.  Those generations were devotees of Zahir Pir, Ghazi Miyan, the 
chthonic goddesses Mari Mata and Purvi Mata (Dead Mother and Eastern Mother), the local Sufi pir 
Waris Ali Shah, and other Muslim pirs of Bara Banki and Lucknow. 
This particular constellation of religious polypraxy – participation in Muslim and Hindu festivals, 
acknowledgement of Sikh spiritual leadership, and worship of earth goddesses, Muslim pirs and local 
heroes – appears to hold for most of the sanitation labor castes across South Asia at the turn of the 
twentieth century.  Imitation of locally dominant castes colored many aspects of sanitation labor caste 
religious practice, but not all.  Alongside, or underneath, the adoption of the traditions of their 
overlords, the sanitation labor castes retained this configuration of religious preference.  Thus, even in 
the “fully Hindu” home of my interlocutor from Sitapur, whose parents and grandparents served 
brahmin jajmans, Zahir Pir and Lal Beg were honored.  And at the home of his in-laws in Bara Banki, 
employed by Muslim landlords, the goddesses Mari Mata and Purvi Mata were by no means abandoned 
in the prevailing Islamic environment. 
 
The Cult of Lal Beg 
We are now in a position to consider colonial accounts of what the British called the cult of Lal 
Beg, “Shahism,” or simply the religion of the sweepers.  In their songs and stories, members of this 
religious community referred to themselves as Lal Begis or Shahis (the former was extremely 
widespread, the latter prevailed in parts of Punjab) and to their community as a “black caste” (kālī zāt) 
as well as a qaum or ummat – Islamicate terms for nation, tribe, or religious community.  In this 
community the sanitation labor castes constituted both priesthood and laity; it had no known members 
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outside the sanitation labor castes, and its prophet, though known to other communities, was not 
revered by them.  
But who was Lal Beg?  Having briefly considered the tradition’s axial figure, we will turn to the 
question of how his followers perceived, and were perceived by, Hindus and Muslims.  
The question of the identity of Lal Beg excited considerable debate in the late nineteenth 
century.  Richard Temple, editor of the Panjab Notes and Queries, threw down something of a gauntlet 
when he declared that “Lal Beg, owing to the ignorance of the scavenger classes, is the most obscure of 
all Indian objects of veneration” (Ibbetson 1883).  Altaf Husen and Richard Greeven, friends in the civil 
service in Benares who “were both nettled at the jealous mystery with which scavengers have hitherto 
guarded their secrets,” met Temple’s challenge “by taking the trouble of seeing the ceremonies for 
ourselves, and having them explained by the sweeper-priests” (Greeven 1894:i–ii).  This exercise 
produced no straightforward explanation, but Husen and Greeven proposed that Lal Beg might be “no 
other than the sweeper’s garbled version of Ghazi Miyan,” the eleventh century Ghaznavid prince 
buried at Bahraich in UP (ibid.).  Denzil Ibbetson (1883) theorized that Lal Beg could be “a misreading by 
Persian-writing Munshis for Bal Mik… which written in a fast-moving hand would appear to be similar.”39  
Temple, for his part, speculated that the name was properly “Lal Bekh (bhikshu), the red (or saffron 
clothed) monk” (ibid.).  This position was endorsed later by Bhagwan Das (1981b), who further 
suggested that Lal Beg was a Buddhist monk, and the shrines built in his memory were originally 
miniature stupas.  In his Farhang-e Asafiya, Sayyid Ahmad Dehlawi (1898:165) drew yet another 
conclusion, that “obviously [zāhiran]” the historical Lal Beg was an educated Mughal of Ghazni who, 
either due to a contrarian disposition [zidd] or love of a woman [ishq], became a sweeper “and for the 
sake of his dignity and honor made himself famous as their prophet.” 
                                                          
39 Bal Mik: ک ال �بی گ :Lal Beg بب بی  الل بب
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Attempts such as these to locate Lal Beg as an individual in history are ongoing.  Within the Lal 
Begi community, the question was more theological than historical.  In the liturgy, songs and stories 
circulating among the sanitation labor castes in the late colonial period, Lal Beg was a nabi or 
paighambar (prophet), pir and guru, created by God (Allah) out of light (nūr) and contained in an egg 
(baiza) before the creation of angels and mankind; he shared the conditions of the sweepers in earthly 
life and ensured their passage to paradise in the next.  His birth was miraculous: he emerged from a pot, 
a great Sufi’s cloak, a hair of Allah’s beard, a drop of Shiva’s semen, or was born of a barren Mughal 
woman blessed by a saint.  He was suckled by a hare.  Clad in red and given to visions and intoxicants, 
Lal Beg swept the steps of heaven with a golden broom, conquered Kabul, drove camels in Kashmir, ate 
bread baked by Fatima, won praise from ‘Ali, rescued the sweepers from the wrath of a king, and will 
intercede for his people at the day of judgment. 
Closely associated with Lal Beg in the oral traditions are two other names: Bala Shah (or Shah 
Bala, Bala Shah Nuri) and Bal Mik (sometimes Bal Nek, Bal Rikh, Valmik).  The relationship between the 
three varies from one oral text to the next and virtually any generalization one can offer is contradicted 
somewhere in the corpus.  That said, in most of the extant oral traditions, Bala Shah is simply another 
name for Lal Beg – they are one and the same.40  It is for this reason that the terms Shahi – follower of 
Bala Shah – and Lal Begi are functional equivalents.  Bal Mik, on the other hand, while he is occasionally 
conflated with Bala Shah/Lal Beg, is more often a distinct personage.  The majority of stories cast Bal 
Mik as the saint or magician of Ghazni who brings about Lal Beg’s miraculous birth, whether out of his 
own loneliness and desire for a son, or at the request of a barren woman or a sheikh of Multan.  If Bal 
                                                          
40 John O’Brien (2012:171), with whom I agree on several other points, here takes the opposite position that it is 
Bal Mik for whom Bala Shah is a double, the latter being an Islamicized title for the former.  Negative evidence, it is 
true, supports this contention for quite a few of the extant songs – Bal Mik and Bala Shah rarely appear in the 
same text.  But the positive evidence that the tradition saw Lal Beg and Bala Shah as the same person is much 
stronger: the liturgical songs collected by Husen and Greeven clearly use the titles Lal Beg and Bala Shah 
interchangeably, and another version of the Lal Beg legend has God himself giving Lal Beg the title of Shah Bala 
(Delmerick 1884).  
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Mik has a narrative double, it is the prophet Ilias (Elijah), who performs the same fatherly function vis-à-
vis Lal Beg.  After Lal Beg’s advent in the world, he and Bal Mik travel with their followers to Kabul, 
Kashmir, Kashi and Thanesar, where they have various adventures.   
The British administrator-folklorists who collected many of the Lal Begi oral traditions in the late 
colonial period were quick to infer that Bal Mik must be Rishi Valmiki, author of the Sanskrit Ramayana, 
an idea later seized upon by the Arya Samaj as a means of supplying the sanitation labor castes a Hindu 
genealogy (see Chapter IV).  It is important to note, however, that this idea has little basis in the oral 
traditions themselves: they simply do not contain references to the Ramayana, its composition, or any 
of the narrative tropes associated with the Rishi Valmiki that emerges from the brahminical epic 
tradition.  The later, post-epic, bhakti trope of Valmiki as a reformed highway brigand does appear in 
one collection of Lal Begi oral traditions, though in it Guru Nanak, rather than brahminical sages, brings 
about Bal Mik’s change of heart.  What colonial commentators found irresistible was largely external to 
the content of the Lal Begi tradition: the apparent similarity of the names (Bal Mik and Valmiki) and the 
popular tradition of Rishi Valmiki’s mean origins – even though these origins, when specified, were with 
the Bhil tribe of Rajputana, and not with the sweeper castes.  The British assertion of the identity of the 
Ghazni saint with the brahminical poet was a supposition of the same order as their identification of Lal 
Beg with Ghazi Miyan or a Buddhist monk – it was speculation.  The break between the oral traditions 
they recorded and the conclusions they subsequently drew is marked in their writing.  Greeven 
(1894:67), for example, after transcribing and translating a wealth of Lal Begi songs and stories, discards 
the exegesis of his informants in order to conclude that, “Absurd as it may appear, Balmik is none less 
than Valmiki, the author of the Ramayana.” 
The Lal Begi pantheon had other distinctive figures, as well, aside from Lal Beg (Bala Shah) and 
Bal Mik.  Heroines like Bibi Dhiani (Lal Beg’s sister) and Jastri the swine herd (Bal Mik’s daughter whose 
pit of mud cures leprosy), and lineage founders like Khwaja Jhaumpra, Kalak Das, and Jiwan Mehtar, 
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populated the songs and stories of the oral tradition.  This is not the place to recount their tales,41 but 
the original, non-derivative and developed nature of Lal Begi mythology should be noted.  
 
Axes of Alterity 
 How, then, did Hindus and Muslims of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
perceive the sanitation labor castes in terms of religious community?  Was it commonsense, in the 
1890s, that this subset of “untouchables” were Hindus?  There is not space here for a comprehensive or 
systematic treatment of this question; instead, what I will do here is furnish a few suggestive examples, 
examples that gesture to a commonsense prior to the one with which we currently live. 
 We might begin with the general observations of colonial administrators and ethnographers.  
Charged with implementing the imperial government’s decision to categorize “untouchables” as Hindu 
by default in the decennial censuses and other technologies of colonial knowledge,42 many 
administrators remarked on the policy’s chafing disjunction from the picture of society that privileged 
castes painted.  Census commissioner E.A. Gait, for instance, wrote in 1910 that “It is obviously absurd 
to enter without comment as Hindus persons who do not worship the Hindu gods and are not admitted 
to Hindu temples, and who are not regarded by others and do not themselves profess to be Hindus” 
(Dalmia 2007:14).43  Regarding the sanitation labor castes in particular, Denzil Ibbetson (1970:268) 
noted that in spite of the Chuhras’ general practice of adopting the outward observances of local 
                                                          
41 As part of a separate project I plan to examine these figures and their stories in detail.  John O’Brien (2012) 
analyzes some of the lesser known stories of the Lal Begi tradition. 
42 Vasudha Dalmia (2007:14–15) is certainly correct to identify this as one of the most consequential administrative 
decisions to be taken in South Asia in the modern period. 
43 Or, as the same administrator noted three years later: “The category of Hindu includes not only many who do 
not enjoy the ministrations of the Brahmans, nor worship in the ordinary temples, but also sweepers and other low 
castes, whom many Hindu enumerators in Northern India hesitated to describe as Hindus, and some who did not 
so class themselves, and even a few, such as certain Satnami Chamars in the Central Provinces, who actually 
objected to being so classed” (Gait 1913:114). 
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dominant castes – despite, in particular, their taking up burial when being employed by Muslims and 
cremation when serving Hindus – they were nonetheless “not recognised by their masters as either 
Hindu or Musalman.”  When Altaf Husen and Richard Greeven interviewed sweepers of Benares in the 
early 1880s, some of their respondents professed to be Muslim, while others claimed to be both Hindu 
and Sikh.  “These pretentions are, however, equally rejected by Hindus, who exclude them from 
temples, and by Mussulmans, who exclude them from mosques.” (Greeven 1894:7–8, 38). 
 Given the degree to which Lal Begi mythology engaged with and appropriated Islamic figures, 
themes and concepts, and the fact that Lal Begis in this period normatively bore “Muslim” names (see   
Chapter V; also, Shyamlal 1984:30), it might be asked whether Muslims took Lal Begis to be brothers in 
the faith.  Some colonial administrators assumed as much: the census commissioner for the North-
Western Provinces and Oudh in 1901 considered the Lal Begis to be the third largest sect among 
Muslims, after Sunnis and Shias (Burn 1902:96).  Again, no systematic enquiry is possible here, but two 
examples hint at a range of ideas current at the time.  In his Ab-e Hayat (Water of Life), published in 
1880, the Urdu literary historian Muhammad Husain Azad relates an anecdote from the life of the Delhi 
poet Shah Nasir (d. 1829-30) intended to illustrate the liberal quality of the poet’s piety.44  In his 
peregrinations, whenever Shah Nasir came across a niche (tāq, mokhā) before which a garland of 
flowers was arranged, he would stop and reverently recite the fātiḥa, to which the orthodox among his 
apprentices objected.  Azad explains that once, 
It even came to this that an apprentice knew [the place] and said, “Teacher!  I know that 
opposite this is the home of a Halalkhor and this is the Lal Beg niche (tāq) that he built!”  
At that point Shah Nasir chuckled and said, “Well, I have recited the word of God.  Its 
blessing cannot just vanish into the air.  Where there is a place for it, it will settle.  My 
good deed has not been in vain” (Azad 1907:394). 
 
                                                          
44 “Un kā mazhab sunnat jama’at thā magar us mai kuchh tashaddud na thā” (Azad 1907:394). 
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Here the Lal Beg shrine, an alarming sign of idolatry (shirk) to the orthodox apprentice, provides a site 
for Azad to have his broad-minded poet exhibit his liberality.  Yet his remarks clearly register religious 
difference – Shah Nasir concedes that a Lal Beg shrine is not an appropriate place to utter the fātiḥa, 
and by implication that the Halalkhor/Lal Begi who maintains the shrine is not a fellow Muslim. 
 A less generous averment of the exteriority of the sanitation labor castes from the brotherhood 
of Islam comes from Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, founder of the Ahmadiyya sect.  When the Punjab Census 
Report of 1901 suggested that Ahmad had a particular following among the sweepers, Ahmad 
vehemently denied association with that “criminal nation [jurāim pesha qaum]” and “most degenerate 
class of people,” representing them not merely in terms of class contempt but also as a category apart 
from Muslims, even “low Muslims of inferior morals [adna darje ke musalmān aur razīl safāt].”45 
What of Hindu perspectives?  A group of Hindus for whom clear evidence is available is 
government servants involved in the decennial censuses.  Many were provoked when the colonial state 
put them into the same category as the sweepers.  As the author of the report of the Census of 1881 
noted in uncharitable terms: 
[M]any more of the bigoted high caste Hindoos employed as census enumerators or 
supervisors objected to record such low persons as of the Hindoo religion.  This was 
illustrated by numerous instances brought to my notice of such persons having been 
recorded as of the Dher, Mang or Chandal religion by mere repetition of their caste in 
the column for religion […] probably they were not even asked [what their religion was]. 
                                                          
45 I am drawing here both from Ahmad’s Urdu exposition on the subject in his Malfuzāt, Volume 3 (n.d.:49), as well 
as from his English treatment of it in the Ahmadiyya mouthpiece Review of Religions (1904:83).  The passages 
clearly represent Ahmad translating himself (though it is unclear whether the Urdu or the English came first), but 
his self-translation is loose, and there are emphases worth retaining in each version.  For example, the English 
“class of people” evokes a rather anemic sense of social cohesion compared to the Urdu “qaum” – usually 
translated as “nation” – and it seems to me significant that he describes the Chuhras as a “qaum.”  What is 
“sweeper” in Ahmad’s English is “Chuhra” in his Urdu.  For context, here is more of Ahmad’s English passage: “my 
principles and doctrines which I have been preaching since the very beginning are morally so sublime and 
spiritually so exalted that they are not suited to, and accepted by, even Muhammadans of a low type and bad 
morals, to say nothing of the sweepers… my followers actually include in their number Raises, Jagirdars, 




(Report on the Census of British India Taken on the 17th February 1881, vol.1 1883:17) 
 
The refusal of Hindu census workers to classify “untouchables,” and particularly the sanitation labor 
castes, as Hindus persisted for the next three decades.  In 1891, enumerators demonstrated a “marked 
disinclination to apply the term Hindu to members of the lower and impure castes, such as sweepers 
and village menials” (Baines, J.A. 1893:158).  The following decade, the superintendent of census 
operations in Punjab noted that, “Hindu enumerators have the greatest objection to returning [the 
Chuhra] as a Hindu by religion, and so he is often either entered as a Chuhra or as a Mussalman” (Rose 
1902:113).  In 1911 as well it was remarked, for north India generally, that Hindu census workers were 
loath to identify members of the sanitation labor castes as their co-religionists (Gait 1913:115). 
 When we reverse the question, asking how the sanitation labor castes perceived Hindus and 
Muslims as religious communities, it becomes evident that the sentiment of otherness we have 
encountered thus far was to no small extent reciprocated.  Liturgical songs of the Lal Begi tradition 
transcribed in the late colonial period have as one remarkable feature usages of the terms Hindu and 
Muslim as contrastive both from each other and from the Lal Begi self.  Some of these usages relate to 
the shrines of Lal Beg, which are affirmed as distinct from the religious architecture of other 
communities.  One of the songs performed at the annual feast of Lal Beg in Benares and transcribed by 
Husen and Greeven, for instance, contains the line “The Hindu has his temple, the Muslim his mosque, 
but I give to you this altar of mud” (Hindu ka dehra, Mussulman ki masjid; main sewun teri kachchhi 
marhei) (Greeven 1894:43, 48).46  
Another song, transcribed in Punjab, presents a similar sentiment: “As Hindus revere the Ganga, 
as Muslims have their Mecca, so the Shahis adore your name and build your shrines in every village” 
(Jon Hindu Ganga nu parsann/ Jon Makka Mussalmanan/ Shahi nam tere nu nun mannan/ Pind pind 
                                                          
46  At this point in the song, the speaker is ‘Ali and his addressee is Lal Beg. 
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than banavan) (Youngson 1906:343).47  In these verses, the Lal Beg shrine is contrasted with its 
correlates in the religious communities of others.  It appears to function as an indexical sign of the 
religious autonomy of the Lal Begi community. 
Another source points to different grounds for the Lal Begi assertion of religious distinction.  
John Youngson, a Scottish missionary stationed in Punjab from the 1880s to the 1900s, describes an 
incident he witnessed in a village in western Punjab when a Chuhra intervened in a debate over 
conversion between Muslims and a Christian missionary.  Problems of translation and paraphrasing no 
doubt haunt Youngson’s account of the Chuhra’s speech; he does not supply the vernacular in which the 
speech was presumably spoken.  Even so, for a Chuhra in rural Punjab in 1906 to have conveyed even 
the general thrust of this passage is striking. 
Our religion is the best of all.  Did you ever see a clean village where there were no 
Chuhras?  What sort of a place would Heaven be without us?  The Chuhra is better than 
the Hindu, at any rate.  I will prove it.  If a Hindu’s cow dies during the night the Hindu 
that tied her up the evening before is excommunicated, and must wash his sins away in 
the Ganges.  He goes on foot, with the cow’s tail round his neck, and he begs as he goes.  
Arrived at the Ganges he is beaten by Chuhras with a shoe seven times, more or less 
severely, according to the amount of money he gives, while they cry, ‘Gao hatya!’ (Cow 
murder!).  Now when the beating with Chuhras’ shoes takes away sin, it is 
demonstrated that the Chuhras’ religion is the better, for the Hindus’ religion could not 
do it (Youngson 1896:226–28). 
 
The custom described here is one of a number of historically attested practices animated by the 
principle of the ambiguity of the sacred, or the intimacy of purity and defilement, in which sanitation 
labor castes were called to play a role.  Exploiting the ambiguity of the custom, the Chuhra speaker, as 
Youngson represents him at least, uses it to argue for the superiority of his religion to that of the Hindus 
in the latter’s own terms of salvation – sin and purification.  
                                                          
47 Youngson’s own translation is this: “The Ganges Hindus fear, and Muslims make their weary pilgrimage to Mecca 
far, but thee the Shahis love and build to thee unnumbered shrines o’er all the crowded land.” 
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 Some of the clearest assertions of Lal Begi difference from other religious communities are 
soteriological in nature.  There are a number of stories and songs that imply, more or less explicitly, that 
Hindu, Sikh and Muslim paths to salvation are false or inferior to that made possible through Lal Beg.  
For believers, Lal Beg was the principal mediator between God48 and humanity, whose intercession 
secured entrance to heaven.  Karma makes no appearance here.  The question of Muhammad’s place in 
Lal Begi theology is ambiguous; in some songs he appears in catalogs of the praiseworthy agents of God 
(along with Fatima and Israfil) in an unambiguously positive light.  Yet, while the question of the finality 
of Muhammad’s prophethood is not explicitly raised, the implication that his message has been 
superseded by that of Lal Beg is difficult to escape.  Thus, in 1880s Benares, Husen and Greeven (1894:8) 
report the following “common anecdote”: “a Lalbegi, when asked whether Mussulmans could obtain 
salvation, replied: – “I never heard of it, but perhaps they might slip in behind Lalbeg.”” 
If the Lal Begi path of salvation was superior to that of Islam – even as it was rooted in an Islamic 
vocabulary and conception of the divine – it was likewise preferable to the Sikh path.  In Punjab around 
1920, a Chuhra informant explained to Herbert Strickler (1926:chap. 3) that: “If any follower of Bala 
Shah (a Shahi) shall repeat the Muhammedan creed, he is to be counted an unbeliever; if Baba Nanak’s, 
he is to be cast off.  But all that profess the creed of Bala shall go straight to heaven (dargahe).” 
On the salvific bankruptcy of other religions Lal Begi tradition is at times more forceful still.  In a 
song transcribed in Sialkot District, a Lal Begi ancestor petitions God: 
Hindus forbid my approach 
Muslims refuse to bless my dead 
Listen, O God 
                                                          
48 In the corpus of liturgical songs transcribed in the colonial period – a rich, if delimited, archive – Allah or Alif 
Allah are the most frequently used words for God, but Khuda, Rabb, and Akal Purakh are also present. 
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I want to form my own nation [ummat]49 
 
God assures the sufferer, by means of a letter delivered by Lal Beg, that: 
On the Day of Judgment [qayamat] 
Only you will be blessed […] 
The partisans of Ram and Rahim 
Will be scattered 
When the sun sinks to a length-and-a-quarter 
I will send them to Hell [dozakh] 
To you I will show Paradise [bihisht]  
Which I have built beyond 
Into this Paradise [bihisht]  
Your nation [ummat] will swiftly enter50 
 
Here the Lal Begi tradition enunciates a soteriological claim neither ambiguous nor inchoate – as the 
axioms of subaltern religions are often represented to be – but all too clear: on the Day of Judgment, it 
is the long-suffering Lal Begis, beloved of God, who will attain paradise, while their earthly oppressors, 
here specified as Hindus and Muslims, will suffer in hell.     
 
Stories 
 The legends of Lal Beg and Bal Mik contain references to religious differences separating the 
sanitation labor castes from Muslims and Hindus.  In one story, for instance, Mehtar Ilias (Elijah), who is 
demoted from prophet to sweeper for coughing saliva onto other saints, is told by a great Sufi that his 
worship of Lal Beg is religiously wrong, but that Lal Beg will nonetheless intercede for him (Temple 
1884b).  This suggests a state of affairs in which both Muslims and Lal Begis recognize the difference 
                                                          
49 This is my translation.  Youngson’s transliteration of the original oral text is:  
Mainun Hindu na nere aun denge/ Mussalman na parhnge janaza/ Tu sun Khuda raja/ Main ummat rakhna 
chahunan. 
50 Again my translation, of the following:  
Roz Qiyamat waqt de/ Tainun milegi vadiai […]/ Ram te Rahim kian/ Chhap chhap jana/ Sava neze te din avega/ 
Haoe dozakh pana/ Par bihisht banake/ Samne vikhana/ Ummat teri bhajjke/Bihishti var jana. 
 (Youngson 1906:350–51) 
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between their religious practices, even as a degree of kinship is admitted.  In this respect the great Sufi’s 
position is not unlike that of the poet Shah Nasir in the passage of Ab-e Hayat discussed above.   
In most of the stories, though, it is not the religious standing of the Lal Begis per se that is 
foregrounded; rather, their religious alterity from Hindus and Muslims appears as one element of their 
overall status in society, and other aspects of this status – Lal Begis as performers of stigmatized yet 
essential labor, as purveyors of radical pollution and the occult power associated with it – animate the 
narrative.  The interventions of Lal Beg and Bal Mik in human affairs are often more concerned with 
social conditions than doctrinal niceties.  It is not that the religious community is irrelevant in these 
legends, but rather that it constitutes only one facet of the separateness and vulnerability of the 
sanitation labor castes vis-à-vis the rest of society.  Here I will relate just two tales collected in the late 
colonial period: stories which suggest the flavor of the Lal Begi oral corpus and which show Lal Beg and 
Bal Mik as the tradition itself saw them – not as standard-bearers of Islam or Hinduism, as they would be 
painted in later periods, but as antinomian saints who deployed their powers to protect their people 
from oppression and improve their worldly conditions. 
In the beginning Walmik [Bal Mik]51 went to Ghazni Fort and did penance there.  A 
barren Mughal woman came to visit him and ask him for a son, and promised that if one 
were given her she would dedicate him to his service.  In short, by the intercession of 
Walmik she gave birth in due time to a son, and called him Lal Beg.  When he grew up 
she took him and dedicated him to Walmik, according to her promise.  Walmik 
afterwards took him to Benares (Kasi).  The 96 karors (960 millions) of devatas (godlings 
that inhabit Benares) had turned the sweepers (chandal) out of the home of the 
devatas, and placed them in Chandalgarh, which is 7 kos from Benares and across the 
Ganges.  When Walmik was in Benares he saw that in the mornings when the sweepers 
came from Chandalgarh to sweep the city, they used to sound drums (dhol bajate) 
before entering it, and that the inhabitants, who were really devatas, used to hide 
themselves in their houses to avoid seeing them.  When they had finished sweeping 
they again sounded drums, and then the people came out of their houses and went on 
with their business.  When Walmik saw this he would not hide himself, and asked the 
people why they avoided seeing the sweepers.  The people answered “because they are 
sweepers, it is unlawful for us to look upon them.”  Walmik out of pity gave up his life 
                                                          
51 Brackets indicate notes I have inserted, whereas parentheses indicate remarks of Richard Temple, who collected 
and published this oral tradition in 1884. 
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for them (chola chhor dia).  When he died blood and matter oozed from his body, so 
that no Hindu could touch it.  So one of the inhabitants of Benares went to Chandalgarh 
to call a sweeper, and saw them all there.  The sweepers came into Benares and threw 
the body of Walmik into the Ganges.  But the Hindus found the body lying in the same 
condition in another house, and called the sweepers again.  Again the sweepers threw 
the body into the Ganges and went home.  A third time the body was found in a house 
in Benares and the people were astonished, and calling the sweepers, saw all their 
faces.  Afterwards Walmik appeared in a dream to an inhabitant of Benares, and told 
him that as long as the people refused to see the sweepers his body would not leave the 
city.  Ever since then the people have not hidden themselves from the sweepers.  The 
sweepers took the body from the city for the last time, and Walmik told them to take it 
to Chandalgarh.  And it is said that when the body reached Chandalgarh all the mat huts 
of the sweepers turned into houses of gold (Temple 1884c). 
 
Here we find Bal Mik and Lal Beg traveling from Ghazni to Kashi, the epicenter of brahminism, where the 
population is divided quite starkly between devatas (“gods”) – interchangeable with “Hindus,” clearly 
the twice-born – and Chandals, who are precisely sweepers and removers of corpses.  This is a 
remarkable attestation to the continuity, in the social memory of the sanitation labor castes, of modern 
untouchability with the brahminical tradition of contempt for the Chandal.  Spatial segregation (the 
requisite condition for the prohibition of touch) is augmented by a visibility taboo (the prohibition 
against seeing the Chandal) which is rendered practical by the aural sign of approaching pollution: 
drumming.  The entire sensory surround is mobilized in the effort to sequester the Hindu from his 
loathed other.  Disquieted, the senior of the two saints intervenes, in what sounds a great deal like a 
corpse removers’ strike dressed in miraculous attire, with the result that the Hindus of Benares are 
compelled to give up the visibility taboo – to see the faces of the sweepers.  As in the Hegelian parable, 
the master here is forced to recognize his bondsman in an agonistic, potentially deadly struggle.  Bal 
Mik, like his opponents, enrolls the senses in his campaign: he causes the visual, tactile and olfactory 
signs of death to proliferate in the holy city, choking the streets of Benares with pollution until its “gods” 
accept their involvement in and shared responsibility for the impurities of human existence. 
 That Bal Mik as an oozing corpse cuts a different sort of narrative figure than the Rishi Valmiki of 
the epic tradition (the versifying sage and brahminically orthodox host to Sita, with an impeccable 
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Bhargava genealogy) or the Valmiki of the bhakti tradition (the Bhil highway brigand turned devotee of 
Ram) is perhaps obvious, but bears pointing out, given later developments. 
 If the above tale conjures struggles over the conditions of stigmatized labor in a brahminical 
milieu, other stories sketch the situation of sweepers in the employ of Muslim kings. 
Jiwan [an ancestor of the Lal Begis] had entered the service of King Sikandar at 
Delhi, where, by the offices of a scavenger, he became as wealthy as devout.  Yet 
neither his riches nor his devotion could procure him offspring.  One day there arrived 
from Garh Gajani [Ghazni] a red-gowned friar, by name Lalbeg [Lal Beg], who, after 
wandering for three days round the city without speaking of eating, suddenly tarried 
before Jiwan’s doorstep and demanded a supper. 
“Knowest thou,” asked Jiwan in amazement, “that I am a scavenger?  No man 
receiveth food from my hands.” 
“What,” said the friar, “hath not God created thee?” 
“What avails it that God creates when man avoids?” 
“I will follow God rather than man,” replied Lalbeg and shared the scavenger’s 
supper. 
“Name they desire,” he said, on departing; “verily it shall be granted; for well 
hast thou entertained me.” 
Jiwan clasped the knees of Lalbeg and prayed for children. 
“Seven sons,” replied the friar, “shall thou beget.  These shalt thou vow to my 
service, after me they shall be called Lalbegis.” 
In fulfillment of this prophecy, Jiwan became the father of seven sons, whom he 
devoted to the friar’s service.  One day King Sikandar, for same service in hunting, 
rewarded Jiwan with a charger, which he at once offered to Lal Beg, saying: “Ride, 
master.” 
“A brave charger, truly,” grunted Lal Beg, who was half-mad with the hemp-
drug.  “I’ll make a meal of him.” 
The dutiful Jiwan, though sick at heart, had the charger slaughtered by the 
King’s Qazi, who received one leg as his perquisite.  The remainder of the carcass, 
except the hide and skeleton, feasted the friar for a fortnight [in other versions it is not 
Lal Beg who eats the horse, but Jiwan’s own caste fellows, the sweepers of Delhi].  
Meanwhile backbiters, headed by the Qazi, who hated Jiwan as an upstart, carried the 
story to King Sikandar, saying, “To glut a crazy friar this muck-raker hath slaughtered the 
king’s charger.”  The King ordered Jiwan to appear before him.  He did not deny the 
charge, adding only; “I sinned in obedience to the holy friar!” 
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“What!” said the King, “is a friar greater than I?  Produce my charger by sunset, 
or by the beard of the Prophet!  I’ll set thee adrift in a scuttled cock-boat, both thee and 
thy sons and thy holy friar.” 
Jiwan fell weeping at the feet of Lal Beg, who comforted him, and offered a 
prayer over hide and skeleton.  Straightaway the charger leapt to life: but to the general 
discomfiture, hobbled away on three legs instead of four. 
“Of course,” said the saint, “I forgot that the fourth leg is with the King’s Qazi.” 
So Jiwan returned with the charger into the presence of King Sikandar, who was 
amazed.  “Where is the fourth leg?” he asked. 
“Sire,” replied the sweeper, “the Qazi, who now accuses me, slaughtered the 
King’s charger.  The fourth leg is in his house.  The crazy friar hath patched together a 
horse.  Let the Qazi, with all his learning, hook on but a leg.”  
The Qazi’s house was searched by the King’s order, and the missing shank 
discovered.  He was, of course, unable to attach it to the charger, and was therefore 
scourged in disgrace from the King’s presence (Greeven 1894:33–34).52 
 
Here, again, the social conditions of untouchability – spatial segregation, non-commensality, 
dependence on often capricious overlords – loom large in the narrative.  It is remarkable that Jiwan is 
described as achieving relative good fortune as a royal sanitation worker – he becomes “wealthy” and 
sufficiently favored by the king that he receives gifts and incurs the jealousy of the qazi.  This proves 
ephemeral, yet even short-lived prosperity and royal favor suggest a situation quite different from that 
of the abject Chandals of Kashi, who live in “mat huts” and are not even looked at by their employers.  
Whether this is indicative of a generalizable difference in the relations of sanitation workers with Hindu 
and Muslim jajmans is difficult to say, though oral histories from Awadh would support such a thesis.  In 
any case, Lal Beg here, like Bal Mik in the previous story, rejects the normative values of caste society 
                                                          
52 Or consider another version recorded in roughly the same period: “The king of Delhi lost a valuable horse, and 
the sweepers were ordered to bury it, but as the animal was very fat, they proceeded to cut it up for themselves, 
giving one leg to the king’s priest.  They took the meat home and proceeded to cook it, but being short of salt, they 
sent an old woman to buy some.  She went to the salt merchant’s shop and pressed him to serve her at once, “If 
you do not hurry,” said she, “a thousand rupees’ worth of meat will be ruined.”  He informed the king, who, 
suspecting the state of the case, ordered the sweepers to produce the horse.  They were in dismay at the order, 
but they laid what was left of the animal on a mound sacred to Lal Beg, and prayed to him to save them, 
whereupon the horse stood up, but only on three legs.  So they went to the king and confessed how they had 




and ensures the sweepers’ welfare through miraculous intervention (the gift of sons, resurrecting the 
horse). 
There is a great deal more that could be said regarding the tale of the three-legged horse of 
Delhi and the rotting corpse of Kashi.  For present purposes, they should help conjure the world of Lal 
Begi oral tradition and the place of the religious community in it.  The sense of constituting a distinct 
qaum – nation, community, or people – pervades the songs, stories, and liturgy of the Lal Begis.53  The 
stigma attached to the community’s traditional domains of labor, and the ambiguous power that flows 
from a state of radical pollution, are prevailing themes.  Religious difference is explicitly part of the 
broader cleavage that the oral tradition depicts between its narrative “selves” and “others” – even if it is 
not the central feature of this cleavage.   
 
The Colonial Denial of Alterity 
 The findings of this chapter illuminate conditions that obtained between 1880 and 1920 that 
subsequently underwent dramatic transformation.  Two points in particular warrant reiteration in this 
regard, for developments in the following decades – the subject of the next two chapters – effectively 
erased them from the historical record.  First, as my description of the cult of Lal Beg has sought to 
demonstrate, the sanitation labor castes in this period constituted an autonomous religious community, 
with a distinctive pantheon, liturgy, and system of salvation, whose relations with the “recognized 
religions” were characterized by a mixture of mutually acknowledged difference, secrecy, and tactical 
dissimulation.  Second, at the turn of the twentieth century, the idea that the sanitation labor castes 
were Hindus – that they were co-religionists and members of the same moral community as brahmins 
and banias – directly contradicted popular sociological commonsense.  British census policy declared it 
                                                          




so, but, with few exceptions, neither the sanitation labor castes, nor the Hindus, nor even census 
officials themselves saw this as an accurate representation of social reality. 
 Allow me to conclude with a few observations on the rupture that British categorical policy 
introduced into the politics of pahchān.  Wedded to a policy of subsuming subaltern religions under the 
“recognized religions,” the colonial regime, despite the thoughtful criticism of more than a few of its 
own administrators, declared the sanitation labor castes – excepting members who had formally broken 
from the ancestral religion by conversion – to be Hindu.  
This decision was historically unprecedented.  Mughal administration had taken a different 
approach: in terms of legal subjectivity, all non-Muslims living in Mughal domains were, theoretically at 
least, zimmis.  This made the non-Muslim untouchable part of the same, broad, “religious” category of 
legal subject as the brahmin, the Parsi, the Jew and the Jain; the state, however, did not categorize 
these as co-religionists with one another, but merely as non-Muslims.  Mughal law did, in practice, 
recognize distinctions of caste and rank among its subjects; corporal punishment, for example, was 
generally reserved for the “lower orders” and not inflicted on men of high station (Singha 2000:10–
11).54  But these distinctions had no necessary connection with religious affiliation.  Thus, for the Mughal 
state, the only salient question was whether a sweeper had embraced Islam or not; otherwise, the 
religion of the sanitation labor castes had no bearing on their status in the eyes of the state. 
 Other native polities, guided by brahminical principles, legally constituted the sanitation labor 
castes as a category religiously separate from the Hindus.  In the Maratha Empire of the eighteenth 
century, for example, the Peshwa issued government orders enforcing the exteriority of “Atishudra” 
(untouchable) castes to Hindu space and ritual: segregation from villages, exclusion from temples, and 
                                                          
54 British policy followed suit for the first few decades of Company rule.  In the Benares Zamindari, for instance, 
brahmins found guilty of murder were exempted from capital punishment until 1817, even as subordinate caste 
perpetrators of the same crime went to the gallows (Singha 2000:101–03). 
120 
 
denial of brahmins’ services (Fukuzawa 1991:105–07).  The Rajput kingdom of Marwar was more 
explicit.  In the late eighteenth century the Marwar crown, in an order specifying religious duties and 
prohibitions, categorically divided its subjects into two types: Hindus (hinduvan) and untouchables 
(achhep).  The latter category consisted of leatherworking castes, nomadic pastoral groups, Muslims 
(turak), and the sanitation labor castes (halalkhor) (Cherian forthcoming).  Not only were the sweepers 
not Hindu, they were the antipode of the Hindu: the order made clear that what actions the state 
required of its Hindu subjects were precisely those that it forbade its untouchable subjects (ibid.).  
Though the legislation did not explicitly cite dharmaśāstra, it faithfully preserved the sociological vision 
of the dharmaśāstra tradition, and more broadly, the brahminical tradition. 
 In positing that the sanitation labor castes were Hindu, then, the colonial administration broke 
from the precedents set by some of the polities that immediately preceded it (and, in Marwar’s case, 
continued to co-exist alongside it).55  The departure from the brahminical discursive tradition that this 
new regime of recognition represented is difficult to overstate.  If the twice-born male is the normative 
subject – the self – of the brahminical tradition, the Chandal is its ideal-typical opposite, its other par 
excellence.  It is important to recall here that the Chandal, in brahminical texts from the fourth century 
C.E. onward, is precisely a remover of filth: a sweeper or scavenger (Aktor 2010:44–45).  The axis of 
alterity separating this figure of loathing from the twice-born male is so foundational to the brahminical 
tradition that other self-other dichotomies are assimilated to it.  In this respect the Marwar crown’s 
categorization of Muslims as a subset of untouchables is not surprising; centuries earlier, Medhatithi, 
commenting on the Manusmriti, had explained that mlechhas were to be regarded as Chandals 
(ibid.:53).  The Chandal, thus, was no obscure or minor figure for the discursive tradition that, in the 
colonial period, was beginning to call itself Hinduism.  The remover of filth was this tradition’s 
                                                          
55 A comparative study of legally enforceable schema according to which subjects are categorized – what I am 
calling regimes of recognition – across different South Asian polities in history remains a scholarly desideratum.  
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paradigmatic other, its archetype of alterity.  It is this fact that needs to be borne in mind when we 
consider the import of the British decision to categorize the sanitation labor castes as Hindu.  This was 
not just a fudging of boundaries, it was the wholesale contradiction of the brahminical tradition’s most 





Making “Untouchables” Hindu: Congress, the Arya Samaj, and the Harijan Sevak Sangh, 1917-1950 
 
1928: 
Arya Samaj tract addressing the sanitation labor castes: “In the census you were returned as Hindu.  You 
people are Hindu, your religion is Hindu, the Veda is your holy book, Balmiki ji is your guru.  So those of 




Gandhi, discussing temple-entry legislation with Ambedkar: “But I must say that you ought not to say 
that you are not a Hindu.  In accepting the Poona Pact you accept the position that you are Hindus.” 
Ambedkar: “I have accepted only the political aspect of it.” 
Gandhi: “You cannot escape the situation that you are Hindus in spite of your statement to the 
contrary.” (Gandhi 2000:vol. 59, Appendix X) 
 
1950: 
Government of Independent India: “[N]o person who professes a religion different from the Hindu 
religion shall be deemed to be a member of a Scheduled Caste.” The Constitution (Scheduled Castes) 
Order, 1950 
 
 In the preceding chapter we saw that the nineteenth century British innovation of categorizing 
the “untouchables” as Hindus contradicted prevailing sociological commonsense.  Hindu census 
enumerators objected to recording the sanitation labor castes as co-religionists, Lal Begis understood 
themselves as a religious community separate from the Hindus, and colonial administrators charged 
with implementing the new policy described it as “absurd.”  How is it, then, that the central premise of 
the new policy attained, by the latter half of the twentieth century, hegemonic status?  When neither 
untouchables nor Hindus saw each other as co-religionists in 1900, how did it come to pass that virtually 
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everyone assumes them to be members of the same religious community a hundred years later?  As we 
have seen, writers and scholars like Urvashi Butalia and Mary Searle-Chatterjee are startled when they 
discover that the Dalits whom they meet in remote corners of Punjab and Benares – who are neither 
Ambedkarites nor converts to any other religion – speak of Hindus as Others.  But when did this become 
a matter of surprise?  How did a notion that apparently remains foreign to some of the very people 
about whom it speaks become a foundational assumption for everyone else?   
 In the epigraphs above, we see the idea in question – “you people are Hindu” – formulated by 
three very different speakers in three highly distinct contexts.  In the first, an Arya Samaj tract targeting 
the sanitation labor castes, the certitude of the utterer of the truth of his utterance is belied, if not by its 
own obsessive repetition, then by its final admission: that its audience, whose Hindu-ness it has so 
passionately argued for, actually circumcises and practices Islamic rites of marriage and death.  This, in 
true missionary spirit, it calls sin.  In the second, Gandhi makes the same assertion – “you are Hindus” – 
but contends with the recalcitrance of his interlocutor in a different way.  Rather than arguing questions 
of substance, Gandhi speaks over Ambedkar, declaring a state of affairs to be true “in spite of your 
statement to the contrary” (emphasis added).  The third formulation retains the indifference to criticism 
of the second, and endows it with the impersonality, inevitability, permanence and force of the official 
discourse of the modern state. 
 In these three utterances lie hints to the answer of our question, the question of the ascendance 
to sociological commonsense of an idea that sparked widespread objection only a generation earlier.   
This chapter charts the career of this idea – the idea that the sanitation labor castes and other 
untouchables are and always have been Hindu in the religious sense of the word, members of the same 
moral community as brahmins and the rest of the twice-born – at the hands of the individuals and 
institutions that most successfully purveyed it in the crucial decades of the 1920s and 1930s.   
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I begin this narrative with 1917, the year that the Indian National Congress passed the 
Depressed Classes resolution, and conclude it with 1950, the year in which the government of 
independent India, in what one scholar has characterized as “legal Hindutva” (Conrad 2007:216), 
restrictively defined the Scheduled Castes as Hindus.  While most of the developments with which this 
chapter is concerned take place in the 1920s and 1930s, I think it is helpful to frame the narrative with 
these bookends – the first formal articulation of a policy toward untouchability by the Congress as a 
nationalist organization, and its definitive word on the subject as the ruling government of a sovereign 
state.  That the Congress provides our frame is intentional: India’s premier nationalist party has played a 
far greater role in transforming state and public discourse on Hinduism and untouchability – in 
generating the new commonsense – than has been recognized.  The same can be said of the Congress’s 
most eminent figure, Gandhi, and his organization the Harijan Sevak Sangh (originally called the All India 
Anti-Untouchability League), founded in 1932.  Very little has been written about this social uplift 
organization, despite its importance as the laboratory in which the Congress developed its social welfare 
policies in the two decades before independence.  The few historians who have taken note of the 
Harijan Sevak Sangh have missed entirely the religious dimension of its activities.  
If Gandhi, the Congress and the Harijan Sevak Sangh propagated the idea that untouchables 
were Hindu, their efforts to no small extent followed a path carved by the Arya Samaj, particularly under 
the leadership of Swami Shraddhanand.  Perhaps best known to historiography as the combative 
champion of shuddhi (śuddhi) and sangathan (sangaṭhan)56, the twin pillars of the Hindu nationalism of 
the 1920s, Shraddhanand was also the architect of the Arya Samaj’s grassroots proselytizing campaigns 
among the untouchables, campaigns that were to prove especially consequential for the sanitation labor 
castes. 
                                                          
56 Shuddhi: the “purification” ceremony by which the Arya Samaj claimed or reclaimed Muslims, Christians and 
untouchables for Hinduism.  Sangathan: a program of defensive Hindu “organization” in order to preserve the 
community from attrition or extinction. 
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This chapter thus charts the efforts of Swami Shraddhanand and his Arya Samaj in the 1920s, 
and Gandhi and his Congress and Harijan Sevak Sangh in the 1930s, to redraw the boundaries of the 
imagined communities they had inherited.  In terms of time period, personalities and institutions, we 
are entering here on some of the most heavily traversed terrain in all of South Asian historiography.  Yet 
for all of the studies of Indian social life in the storied decades of nationalist mobilization, the 
interventions into the religious life of untouchables undertaken by the Harijan Sevak Sangh, as I have 
mentioned, have escaped scholarly notice, and historiography is only beginning to comprehend the 
extent and consequences of subaltern engagement with the Arya Samaj.57  Moreover, the rich scholarly 
literature on Gandhi, the Congress, and the Arya Samaj in this period has not been informed by the 
insight of our previous chapter: that Lal Begis and other untouchable communities, prior to and 
independent of the advent of the politics of communal representation, practiced autonomous religious 
traditions that they understood to be separate from those of the Hindus.  Without this insight, the 
“untouchable uplift” efforts of a broad range of Hindu and nationalist bodies in the early twentieth 
century appear to be a straightforward matter of internal Hindu reform, precisely as Gandhi 
characterized them (a characterization subsequent scholarship has reproduced).  The matter takes on a 
different light when one realizes that the targets of this Hindu reform often had names like Hussein, 
Anwar, Mariam and Nazira, and that their hymns foretold that Allah would cast the Hindus (and 
Muslims) into hell (dozakh; see chapter III).  Taking into account the evidence of the previous chapter, 
then, we are in a position to reevaluate a number of aspects of the received historiography, including 
the seemingly transparent claims of “untouchable uplift.”  
In this chapter I consider both convergences and divergences in the strategies of Gandhi and 
Swami Shraddhanand, and the institutions associated with each, vis-à-vis the untouchables.  Insofar as I 
                                                          
57 Prashad (2000), Rawat (2011), and Adcock (2014) have made significant interventions on this point, 
interventions on which this chapter builds. 
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emphasize divergence – and I do address Gandhi’s rejection of shuddhi, undoubtedly the most decisive 
point of contrast – my narrative will affirm the familiar historiographic binary that opposes Hindu 
nationalism to “mainstream” nationalism.  In other respects, the evidence presented in this chapter will 
undermine that binary, demonstrating the degree to which Gandhi, the Congress and the Harijan Sevak 
Sangh shared with Shraddhanand’s Arya Samaj ideas and strategies for contending with the 
untouchables.  A number of scholars, including Mushirul Hasan (1981), Sandria Frietag (1989), 
Gyanendra Pandey (1990; 2002), and most extensively William Gould (2004), have taken note of the 
institutional overlapping of the Arya Samaj and Congress in these decades.  Following Sumit Sarkar 
(1997), Gould has taken the further step of documenting the common ideological terrain of the Samaj 
and the Congress.58  Insofar as my narrative emphasizes convergence, then, it is a contribution to this 
growing literature that acknowledges Hindu nationalism located not at the fringes, but at the heart of 
the Congress. 
 
The Urgent Duty of Every Lover of the Motherland 
In December 1917, the Indian National Congress passed its first resolution on the question of 
untouchability: 
Resolved that this Congress urges upon the people of India the necessity, justice and 
righteousness of removing all disabilities imposed by custom upon the Depressed 
Classes, the disabilities being of a most vexatious and oppressive character, subjecting 
those classes to considerable hardship and inconvenience (Zaidi 1987:400). 
 
This landmark resolution signaled that the Congress would no longer sidestep the caste question by 
delegating it to the Social Conference or other bodies; the subcontinent’s largest nationalist 
                                                          
58 Adcock’s (2014) work must also be mentioned here; in emphasizing the internal diversity of Arya Samaj ideology 
and practice and its changes over time, it complicates and deepens the comparison between the Arya Samaj and 
“mainstream” nationalism.  
127 
 
organization here formally declared its opposition to untouchability.  Annie Besant was at the time 
president both of the Congress and of the Theosophical Society.  In her presidential address to the 1917 
Congress session, she elaborated on the context which gave rise to the Depressed Classes resolution: 
The submerged classes have also felt the touch of a ray of hope, and are lifting up their 
bowed heads, and claiming, with more definiteness, their place in the Household of the 
Mother.  Movements, created by themselves, or originating in the higher castes, have 
been stirring in them a sense of self-respect.  The Brahmanas, awakening to a sense of 
their long-neglected duty, have done much to help them, and the prospect of their 
future brightens year by year. 
 
Thus far, Besant characterizes the rise of Depressed Class assertion in affirmative terms, as part of a 
broader narrative of “the awakening of the masses” (the subheading under which this part of her speech 
falls).  This development takes on a more sinister aspect, though, as the European enters the picture: 
[T]he higher castes are finding that attempts are being made by official and non-official 
Europeans to stir this class into opposition to Home Rule.  They play upon the contempt 
with which they had been treated, and threaten them with a return of it, if “Brahmana 
Rule”, as they call it, is gained.  Twenty years ago and more, I ventured to urge the 
danger to Hindu Society that was hidden within the neglect of the submerged, and the 
folly of making it profitable for them to embrace Islam or Christianity, which offered 
them a higher social status.  Much has been done since then, but it is only a drop in the 
ocean needed… It is the urgent duty of every lover of the Motherland to draw these, her 
neglected children, into the common home (Zaidi 1979:202–203).59 
 
Here the self-respect movements of the Depressed Classes, manipulated by bureaucrats and 
missionaries, assume significance as “danger.”  What is critical to note in this passage is the 
                                                          
59 Elsewhere in her writing, as Ambedkar and others have noted, Besant elaborated at length her ideas on the 
innate character of these “neglected children” and the best policies to adopt with regard to their uplift.  In a 1909 
article, for instance, Besant opposed the integration of Depressed Class children in schools with privileged caste 
children on the grounds that the bodies of the former “are ill-odorous and foul with the liquor and strong-smelling 
food, out of which for generations they have been built up; it will need some generations of purer food and living 
to make their bodies fit to sit in the close neighbourhood of a school-room with children who have received bodies 
from an ancestry trained in habits of exquisite personal cleanliness, and fed on pure food-stuffs” (quoted in 
Ambedkar 1991:5).  This is a significant testament to the popularity at this time of the idea that smell and caste are 
intimately linked (see Chapter II).  It is also not entirely irrelevant to the discussion at hand, insofar as these are 
ideas Besant held openly when the Congress elected her president, which suggests that they could not have been 
seen as very controversial among the nationalist elite.  The concerns of this chapter, however, lie largely with the 
institutions of Hindu and “mainstream” nationalism, and for this it is more what Besant says in her capacity as 
president of the Congress, on the occasion of the Depressed Classes resolution, that matters. 
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juxtaposition of two distinct phenomena – Depressed Class opposition to the nationalist movement, and 
Depressed Class conversion to Islam and Christianity – in such a way as to suggest that they are 
intimately related, if not identical.  Besant presents religious conversion and opposition to home rule as 
twinned perils, whose inner link is self-evident.  But why is this so?  What logic underwrites Besant’s 
twinning of untouchable conversion and political contrariety? 
 Throughout her presidential address, in keeping with the language of nationalism, Besant speaks 
of “India” as a “Nation,” “Mother,” and “Motherland.”  These terms are used interchangeably, as 
synonyms.  In the passage above, it is precisely “their place in the Household of the Mother” that the 
“submerged classes” are claiming.  That is to say, for Besant and the Congress to and for which she 
speaks, the question at hand is the place of the untouchables in the nation.  This imagined community is 
political; it deserves, and demands, home rule.  It is significant, then, that Besant makes no distinction 
between this entity and “Hindu Society.”  The present danger of untouchable opposition to home rule – 
clearly a problem for the nation – is presented as self-same with the danger to “Hindu Society” about 
which Besant has been warning her colleagues for twenty years.  At most the difference between the 
earlier situation and now is one of accumulation or ripening – today’s political opposition is the fruit of 
earlier neglect.  But the “Household” for which this development represents a danger is the same: it is 
simultaneously the Motherland/Nation and Hindu Society.   
 Reading the passage obversely, that is, from the point of view of the untouchable converts to 
Islam or Christianity that it mentions, one is drawn to the same conclusion.  For if the “higher social 
status” offered by such conversion is “profitable” from a certain point of view (surely that of the convert 
thus elevated), Besant insists that this profit is “folly” for her audience, and implies that such converts 
remain outside the “common home” – for if their joining Islam or Christianity meant inclusion in the 
nation, then why would it remain the “urgent duty of every lover of the Motherland to draw these… into 
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the common home” (emphasis added)?  Muslims and Christians do not appear to find shelter in this 
household. 
 Insofar as it makes no distinction between religious and national community, the social 
imaginary to which Besant gives voice here was by no means atypical of Congress rhetoric of the period, 
or indeed of the language of nationalist politics more broadly (Gould 2004).  What is important to note is 
that it is precisely this fusion of Hindu community and political nation that makes it sensible to speak of 
untouchable political contrariness and conversion to Islam or Christianity in the same breath.  If one is 
imagining a nation that is Hindu, then both forms of Depressed Class assertion appear to be acts of 
rebellion.  As Besant’s presidential speech indicates, it is the danger represented by these acts that 
necessitates the inclusion of untouchables, that propels the “urgent duty” of nationalists to draw in the 
Depressed Classes from their current exteriority.  It is the double threat of the religious and political 
assertion of the untouchables that gives birth to the Depressed Classes resolution of 1917.60 
Significantly, the religious dimensions of Besant’s remarks find no place in the actual resolution.  
The resolution itself exhorts “the people of India” to cease imposing disabilities upon “the Depressed 
Classes”; neither category is qualified by religion.  Nor are the “disabilities” given a religious cast or 
presented as restrictively Hindu.  The old sociological commonsense remained at this point too strong, 
and the enumerative politics of communal representation remained too preliminary, for the assembled 
Congress delegates to pass a resolution casting the Depressed Classes as Hindu, or the problem of 
                                                          
60 Ambedkar arrives at a similar conclusion by a different route.  In What Congress and Gandhi have Done to the 
Untouchables, Ambedkar traces the text of the Depressed Classes resolution to a resolution passed earlier in 1917 
by an autonomous (i.e., non-Congress) Depressed Class organization in Bombay, a resolution that agrees to grant 
Depressed Class support to the Congress-League Scheme (in anticipation of the self-governance reforms 
announced by Montagu) on the condition that the Congress pass a resolution condemning untouchability.  The 
Congress’s resolution of 1917 was thus “a formal fulfilment of a condition which the Depressed Classes had made 
for giving their support to the Congress-League Scheme” (Ambedkar 1991:18).  This was no doubt the case; my 
point is that, in addition to this very precise genealogy, the Congress’s resolution represents a reaction to 
Depressed Class assertion more broadly, and in both the religious and political spheres, as Besant’s address 
indicates.   
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untouchability as uniquely religious.  As we will see, this would change.  In the history of formal, 
Congress-led pronouncements on the untouchability question, the blurring of nation and Hindu 
community that in 1917 found expression only in the accompanying exegesis, would by 1932 and most 
incontrovertibly by 1950, come to occupy the space of the main text. 
 In terms of concrete action toward removing the disabilities imposed by untouchability, the 
Depressed Classes resolution of 1917 was followed by very little movement on the part of the Congress.  
As Ambedkar (1991:18) summarized the situation, “Congressmen… forgot the Resolution the very day 
on which it was passed.  The Resolution was a dead letter.  Nothing came of it.”  It was not until June of 
1922 that the Congress again took up the untouchability issue, this time by constituting a committee “to 
formulate a scheme embodying practical measures to be adopted for bettering the condition of the so-
called untouchables throughout the country” (Shraddhanand 1987a:196).  The committee was explicitly 
linked to the 1917 resolution; its purpose was “to give effect to the resolution about the so-called 
depressed classes,” and it was granted a budget to accomplish this (ibid.).  Who did the All India 
Congress appoint to head this committee?   
Swami Shraddhanand, national level Arya Samaj leader, the driving force and public face of the 
shuddhi campaign. 
 
Shraddhanand, shuddhi, and the Arya Samaj 
Before proceeding with the story of Congress’s short-lived committee of 1922, we would do well 
to spend some time with Swami Shraddhanand and the Arya Samaj over which he presided.  
Shraddhanand assumed this name and the title Swami upon formally taking sannyās in 1917; before 
that he was known by the name Munshiram.  Born in 1857 into a Punjabi Khatri family, Munshiram 
joined the Arya Samaj in the early 1880s in Jullundur, where he lived and practiced law.  In the Samaj he 
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swiftly rose to positions of leadership, steering the more radical of the Punjab Arya Samaj’s two major 
factions (the “Mahatma Party”) through a series of clashes and reconciliations with its rival (the “College 
Party”), associated with Lala Lajpat Rai, in the 1890s and 1900s.  In these conflicts Munshiram’s faction 
sought to increase the Samaj’s institutional support of prachār (preaching, propaganda), favored strict 
vegetarianism over meat-eating, and promoted the education of girls.  Munshiram not only advocated 
prachār, he embodied it.  He undertook extensive dharmyātrās, or preaching tours, and represented the 
Arya Samaj in public debates with sanātanist and other “traditionalist” Hindu organizations.  He founded 
and edited several journals, among them the Arya Samaj mouthpiece Saddharmprachārak, the Arya 
Gazette, and much later the Liberator.  In these and his numerous pamphlets and short books, 
Munshiram condemned the methods by which Islam and Christianity were spread in India, defended the 
Arya Samaj, provided commentary on the works of Dayanand Saraswati, and promoted Vedic education.  
By the 1900s the canvas of Munshiram’s activities extended well beyond Punjab; the Gurukul, or Vedic 
college, that he founded at Kangri (near Haridwar) in the United Provinces, attracted admiring visitors 
that included Gandhi (as early as 1915), C.F. Andrews, and the British Prime Minister Ramsay 
Macdonald.  Munshiram helped create the Arya Samaj’s national-level body, the Sarvadeshik Arya 
Pratinidhi Sabha, and served as its president from 1910 to 1917.  By the mid-1920s he was elected Vice 
President of another national-level organization, the Hindu Mahasabha, led by his friend Pandit Madan 
Mohan Malaviya. 
 Munshiram was also a Congressman.  In 1888 he helped form the Jullundur committee of the 
Indian National Congress, of which he was briefly secretary.  In 1890 he spoke at the Congress meeting 
in Jullundur, and in 1893 he gave a lecture in Amritsar to popularize the Congress cause (Jordens 
1981:25, 39).  In 1899 he attended the Lucknow session of Congress, where he raised funds for his 
Gurukul project.  The most intensive period of his involvement with the Congress, though, followed 
Gandhi’s ascent to nationalist leadership and his own transformation into Swami Shraddhanand.  
132 
 
Between 1919 and 1922 the ochre-robed renunciant, actively recruited by Gandhi, became a prominent 
figure in the Congress, playing leading roles in the Delhi Rowlatt Satyagraha and Amritsar Congress 
session of 1919, before being appointed head of the committee on Depressed Classes relief in 1922, an 
episode to which we will return. 
 It was under the direction of Munshiram/Shraddhanand that shuddhi, the “purification” 
ceremony by which the Arya Samaj inducted non-Hindus into the Hindu fold, grew from a relatively rare 
event involving small numbers of people to a mass campaign and magnet for national controversy 
between 1900 and 1926.  Dayanand Saraswati, founder of the Arya Samaj, had improvised 
“reconversion” ceremonies for a Muslim youth and a Christian youth in the 1870s.  In the last quarter of 
the nineteenth century the Arya Samaj in Punjab, at times in collaboration with a Sikh organization, 
developed procedures for shuddhi and “purified” small numbers of Christians and Muslims, mostly men 
and women who had been born Sikh or Hindu but who converted and later sought to reinstate 
themselves in their community of birth (Graham 1942; Jones 1968; Jordens 1977; Jordens 1981; Sharma 
1985; Adcock 2014).  In what Christian missionaries and the Ahmadiyya (the new Muslim sect led by 
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadian) had effectively shaped into a competitive religious market, shuddhi 
emerged as the Arya Samaj’s answer to baptism and the recitation of the shahāda.61 
 Munshiram and a few others within the Arya Samaj began mooting the idea of admitting 
untouchables in the 1890s, though no formal action was taken.  Early discussions in Samaj publications 
made no secret of either the radical novelty of the idea or its raison d’être: competition with Christian 
missionaries.  As a contributor to the Arya Patrika put it in 1896,  
The admission of the Churas [sic] to the Samaj and their consequent elevation may 
appear the height of absurdity to ignorant minds… but the Vedic religion is for all.  But it 
is confessed that no one has yet thought of turning the direction of the Samaj toward 
                                                          
61 See Jones 1968 for a fine discussion of the increasingly toxic environment of multipolar religious competition in 
late nineteenth century Punjab. 
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these matters.  The very idea of converting such low and downtrodden people seems 
abominable.  We live amongst people who would not tolerate such conduct on our part 
for a moment, and our instinct too treats it with utter repugnance.  Yet the Christians do 
it (quoted in Graham 1942:490). 
 
The practical remoteness of the idea is underscored in another entry in the same journal a year later: 
“For our Upadeshaks [preachers, religious instructors] to compete with Christians, they must give up 
Chhut Chhat [practices of untouchability] and caste restrictions” (quoted in Graham 1942:473).  In the 
1890s, then, the Arya Samaj remained unable to overcome its own “repugnance” at the prospect of 
consorting with the untouchable masses, even as some within its ranks began to acknowledge the 
necessity of such a move to stem the tide of conversions to Christianity.  Ultimately it was initiatives by 
untouchables that goaded the Samaj into action.  
Tens of thousands of the sanitation labor castes in UP and Punjab had by this time converted to 
Christianity in a mass movement they themselves initiated, the missionaries having responded with 
surprise and, initially, ambivalence (see Chapter III).  In a manner not unlike that described by the first 
missionaries who were approached by untouchable groups, a delegation of Sikh Rahtias, frustrated in 
their efforts to elevate their status within the Sikh Sabhas, approached Munshiram in Jullundur in 1899 
to seek admission in the Arya Samaj.  In approaching Munshiram, as opposed to other Arya leaders, the 
Rahtias made a savvy calculation.  Living up to his reputation as a radical, Munshiram supported the 
move.  His fellow Aryas in Jullundur blocked him twice.  A year later, in 1900, he managed to arrange the 
shuddhi of nineteen Rahtias in Lahore; in the ceremony the men’s hair and beards were shorn (Graham 
1942:465, 492–93; Jones 1968:50; Jordens 1981:52; Shraddhanand 1987b:93).  Rancor ensued.  Some of 
the Aryas who took part in the ceremony and ate sweetmeats distributed by the “purified” Rahtias, 
found themselves excommunicated by their Hindu relatives (Graham 1942:492).  Sikhs, too, were 
outraged, and the earlier Sikh-Arya cooperation in shuddhi ended.  “There was even a false rumour in 
the Tribune that the Sikhs had massacred the Jullundur Aryas and that Munshiram was in hospital in a 
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critical condition” (Jordens 1981:52).  From its inaugural moment, shuddhi as a means of rendering 
untouchables Hindu raised the specter of communal violence. 
 As more Rahtias sought Arya Samaj support, more shuddhi ceremonies followed. 62  Within three 
years two other regional untouchable castes, the Ods and the Meghs, approached the Arya Samaj for 
membership.  Unlike the Rahtias, these were not converts to Sikhism, Islam or Christianity.  Neither 
were they Hindus in popular social imagination (see Chapter III).  Their new Arya Samaj patrons 
remained largely enmeshed in the prevailing sociological commonsense; with the exception of 
Munshiram, they had yet to clearly and consistently formulate the idea that untouchables were 
originally Hindu.  In an interview in 1908, for instance, Lala Lajpat Rai distinguished two procedures for 
joining the Arya Samaj: “With Hindus merely signing the declaration of faith is sufficient.  In the case of 
non-Hindus a shuddhi ceremony of a simple kind is obligatory” (quoted in Graham 1942:465).  Since the 
thousands of Ods and Meghs who had joined the Arya Samaj by that time had all done so by means of 
shuddhi, the implication that they were originally “non-Hindus” was inescapable.  
The similarity of the movements of these groups toward the Arya Samaj with those of 
comparably stationed castes toward Christianity and Islam in this period suggests a shared tactical 
orientation.  Just as the sanitation labor castes saw in Christian missionaries conduits to power 
countervailing that of the castes that immediately dominated them, so the Rahtias, Ods and Meghs saw 
in the radical Aryas a network of highly placed men whose support could guarantee access to wells and 
enable admission to schools, men who were willing to defy orthodox Hindus by eating food distributed 
by the new converts in public ceremonies.  The Aryas were well aware that these subaltern groups, as 
the Arya Gazette put it in 1900, “want to join the Arya Samaj simply with a view to give themselves a lift 
in society” (Graham 1942:492).  That is, they understood the demand for shuddhi to be “ritual-political 
                                                          
62 The Rahtias also continued to press their cause among the Sikhs.  In the summer of 1900, Rahtia Sikhs with some 
reformist Sikh supporters attempted to enter the Golden Temple but were arrested.  The management committee 
then issued an edict preventing both Rahtias and their well-wishers from entering the premises (Oberoi 1997:107). 
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assertion” as much as “conversion” (Adcock 2014).  Like the Christian missionaries before them, the 
Aryas answered critics by insisting that the aspiring converts were “sincere believers,” even if a concern 
for material and social improvement also played a role in their seeking shuddhi (Graham 1942:492).   
Within a few years, untouchable participants in shuddhi events grew from dozens to hundreds 
at a time.  As the scale and pace of shuddhi ceremonies strained Arya Samaj resources, the Aryas formed 
a separate All-India Shuddhi Sabha.  According to this organization, in the first decade of the twentieth 
century some three to four thousand Rahtias had undergone shuddhi in Punjab, as had two to three 
thousand Ods, and thirty thousand Meghs (Kaul 1911:149–150). 
 Remembering these early days of shuddhi, Swami Shraddhanand, in his 1919 pamphlet Jāti ke 
Dīnoṅ ko mat Tyāgo, arthāt 7 Karoṛ Dīnon kī Rakshā (Do Not Abandon the Suffering Castes, or the 
Defense of the Wretched Seventy Million) writes that:  
At the very first stage, when untouchable uplift [achhūtoddhār] work began in Punjab 
and when the Rahtiyas were purified in Lahore and granted admission into the Arya 
Samaj, at that time there was tremendous opposition from the Hindu people.  The 
shuddhi of Meghs in Sialkot and of Ods in Multan and Muzaffargarh took place in the 
teeth of fierce resistance (Shraddhanand 1987:93, my translation). 
 
Given what we know from the previous chapter, we expect such a state of affairs.  When the prevailing 
commonsense was that Hindu and untouchable are opposed categories, Hindus could be expected to be 
riled when radical Aryas supported untouchable assertions of the right to access Hindu wells and wear 
the brahminical sacred thread.  This phase of the shuddhi movement garnered little support, and much 
ill-will, from the Hindu community.   
What Shraddhanand says next, however, is key: “But at this time [i.e., the time of writing of the 
pamphlet, 1919], a political wave has transformed the entire situation” (ibid., emphasis added).  That is, 
the conditions/situation (avasthā) that obtained in 1900-1903 underwent dramatic transformations 
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over the next two decades – transformations provoked by political (rājnaitik) events, transformations 
which began to reverse Hindu opposition to the inclusion of untouchables. 
 The political developments that provoked these transformations are well known and have been 
the subject of an extensive literature (of which the most apropos would be Datta 1999; Zavos 2000).  
Here I will only briefly mention the three political developments that Shraddhanand himself emphasizes 
as decisive in making Hindus receptive to his radical proposals.  The first, Shraddhanand identifies in the 
same passage we have been discussing.  The political wave, he explains, is due in part to the 1905 
partition of Bengal.  This imperial act, unprecedented in British India, made vivid to a mass population 
the stakes of being identified as a “minority” or “majority” community.  Another major development, 
related to the first, was the emergence of the idea, first propagated by Colonel U.N. Mukherji but later 
popularized by Shraddhanand himself in his best known work, that Hindus were a “dying race.”  Using 
unsound projections of census data and invoking the language of scientific discourse (race theory, 
statistics), Mukherji advanced the thesis that without serious social reforms, the Muslim population of 
India would continue to multiply while the Hindu population would dwindle and become extinct within 
420 years (Shraddhanand 1926:14–15; Datta 1999:chap. 1).63  The third development was the 
introduction and expansion of institutions of self-governance with popularly elected members, along 
with provisions for communal representation, or separate electorates.  Among the key effects of the 
Indian Councils Act of 1909 and the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1918-19 was the diffusion of the 
idea that numbers mattered politically; that political power rested on questions of demography; that the 
governance of the emerging nation would be a matter of molding or mobilizing numerical majorities. 
 In short, it was the rise of enumerative politics and its correlate, the hardening of all identities 
into enumerative identities (Kaviraj 1992) ranged around a stark Hindu-Muslim binary, that began to 
                                                          
63 As Shraddhanand would later put it in his Hindu Sangathan – Saviour of the Dying Race (1926:14), “within the 
next 420 years the Indo-Aryan race would be wiped off the face of the earth unless steps were taken to save it.”  
His text makes clear that by “Indo-Aryan race” he means precisely “the Hindus.”  
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give Shraddhanand’s message traction.  These were the political conditions necessary, though not 
sufficient, for revolutionizing popular conceptions of the boundaries of the Hindu community.  
Enumerative politics granted Shraddhanand and other Hindu radicals an opening; it gave them, for 
example, a hearing with the sanatanists whose opposition to shuddhi in 1900 had been unanimous.  But 
the immense labor of persuasion remained to be done.  
 By 1907, the initial wave of untouchable-led shuddhi in the Punjab had subsided.  The radical 
Aryas who had welcomed and encouraged the Rahtias, Ods, and Meghs had gained credibility; their 
move had facilitated the Samaj’s first victory of numerical significance in their competition with the 
Christian missions.  Buoyed by this unanticipated success and the Samaj funds that were consequently 
made available for sustaining it, Shraddhanand and his colleagues adopted a different strategy and 
began active proselytizing (prachār) (Graham 1942:495–96).  They expanded the ambit of their 
operations socially and regionally: in the 1910s Arya Samaj activists took up missions among the Dumna 
caste in Punjab, among Basiths in Kashmir, and among Doms in the hill tracts of UP.  Overcoming the 
initial skepticism of their new audience – some groups suspected them of “mercenary motives” – the 
Arya prachāraks ultimately won converts on a scale even larger than that of the previous decade 
(ibid.:496-504).   
 The shuddhi of Muslims and Christians, which continued in UP and Punjab alongside the 
increasingly massive “purification” of untouchables, had long proven an irritant to harmonious relations 
between religious communities at the local level.  The shuddhi of the Depressed Classes, too, disquieted 
Muslim and Sikh observers who perceived in the movement an attempt to consolidate a Hindu 
majority.64  It was in the early 1920s, though, with the Moplah Rebellion and the Malkana controversy, 
that shuddhi erupted on the national scene as one of the primary contributing factors to communal 
                                                          
64 It also continued to provoke many Hindus; an Arya Samaj prachārak preaching to untouchables in Jammu was 
murdered in 1923 by a Rajput mob opposed to his work (Jordens 1981:131).  
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discord and violence between Hindus and Muslims, a status it would continue to hold in the 1930s 
(Freitag 1989:chap. VII; Gooptu 2001:chap. VI; Gould 2004:chap. III; Adcock 2014).  By this time 
Shraddhanand, who had all along promoted shuddhi both in his writing and in his organizational 
leadership, was widely seen as the movement’s public face; whether supporters or critics of shuddhi, 
nationalists in this period spoke of shuddhi and of the Swami in the same breath.  Following the Moplah 
Rebellion of 1921, in which Moplah (Mappila) Muslims not only attacked British personnel and 
institutions but also killed Hindu landlords and forcibly converted some local Hindus to Islam, the Arya 
Samaj sent prachāraks to re-convert the new Muslims to Hinduism.  Shraddhanand championed the 
move and wrote with disgust of the hesitation of some nationalists, especially Congress Muslims, to 
unequivocally condemn the Moplahs (Shraddhanand 1946:150–51; Graham 1942:508–511; Jordens 
1977:152–53).  Then in 1922-23 open competition broke out between the Arya Samaj and Muslim 
groups when a Hindu-leaning subset of the Malkanas, a Muslim Rajput caste in western UP whose 
traditions combined Hindu and Muslim practices, sought shuddhi and unification with Hindu Rajputs.  A 
new Bharatiya Hindu Shuddhi Sabha was formed with Shraddhanand as president; the Swami and his 
team camped in the region and conducted massive shuddhi ceremonies while Muslim organizations in 
Bombay and elsewhere protested (Jordens 1981:131–34).  The ensuing strain on Hindu-Muslim relations 
prompted some of Shraddhanand’s admirers in Congress to urge their colleague to desist; 
Rajagopalachari, for instance, while insisting on the propriety of shuddhi in principle, counseled 
Shraddhanand to postpone his activities until a less sensitive time: “not now” (ibid.:133).  
 The fact that Muslims in the 1920s and 1930s perceived the shuddhi movement – not only the 
shuddhi of the Malkanas and other Muslims but equally of the Depressed Classes – as a threat, as an 
attempt to forge a Hindu majority ranged against a Muslim minority, was no accident.  From his earliest 
writings, Munshiram/Shraddhanand linked the untouchability issue with the question of Hindu-Muslim 
relations.  He did so in two contradictory ways.  First, he posited that Muslims were the source of the 
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problem of untouchability.  This assertion, in its turn, also had two aspects: Muslims were responsible 
first for the origins of untouchability, and secondly, in part, for its present continuation.  The caste 
system, wrote Munshiram in 1891, “is a direct outcome of the advent of Muslim rule in India” (Prashad 
1996:556).  This became a popular thesis on which other Arya Samajists elaborated: the untouchables, 
they said, were the descendants of Hindus who opposed Muslim conquest, resisted conversion, and 
were forced by the new masters to undertake degrading tasks.  As we will see in this and following 
chapters, the idea that the sanitation labor castes in particular were “first created” by a Muslim polity 
would attain respectability in the Harijan Sevak Sangh and become a truism for the first generation of 
Balmikis to be patronized by the Congress.  Shraddhanand also held that Muslims were partly 
responsible for the present continuation of untouchability.  On this point the Swami could actually 
marshal evidence: in his preaching and achhūtodhhār tours he personally observed, and also heard 
untouchable complaints of, Muslims who practiced untouchability in the same ways that Hindus did, 
denying access to wells and so on (Shraddhanand 1946:134).  He also reported – accurately – Muslim 
opposition to the Arya Samaj’s achhūtodhār efforts, though he avoided the question of whether such 
opposition reflected Muslim reaction to the increasingly communalist edge to the Arya Samaj’s efforts in 
addition to “traditional” dominant caste reasons for resisting social change.  Highlighting instances of 
Muslim support for untouchability gave Shraddhanand one means for discrediting Muslim criticism of 
shuddhi and Hindu-led untouchable “uplift”: if the Ahmadiyya and the Muslim League could accuse the 
Arya Samaj of cynical reasons for wooing the Depressed Classes, he could counter that their opposition 
represented nothing but old-fashioned casteism. 
It is important to note that, its political motivations aside, Shraddhanand’s insistence that both 
Muslims and Hindus were accountable for the perpetuation of untouchability was a sound piece of 
sociological analysis.  The historical record supplies ample evidence that traditional caste disabilities 
were routinely enforced by dominant caste Muslims as well as Hindus (and for that matter dominant 
140 
 
caste Sikhs and Christians as well) in this period.  This state of affairs must be borne in mind when we 
consider Gandhi’s strategy of subtracting Muslims (and Sikhs and Christians) from the question 
altogether so as to frame untouchability as an internal concern of the Hindus. 
The second way in which Shraddhanand linked untouchability to Hindu-Muslim relations, which 
in a sense inverted and contradicted the first, was to figure the Muslims as the beneficiaries of 
untouchable discontent.  Throughout the Swami’s writing the Christian missionary looms large as the 
successful mobilizer of untouchable numbers, and thus a formidable opponent for the Arya Samaj.  Over 
time, however, the Muslim came to occupy the same place as the Christian in Shraddhanand’s work, as 
in the following example: “The suppressed classes of South India can no longer bear Hindu tyranny… The 
Christian missionary with his millions is at their door.  Mahommedan Mullahs are appealing for lakhs 
and rushing to the scene.  The Arya Samaj mission alone can save the situation by taking them into the 
bosom of the Vedic church” (Leader, 2 Oct. 1925, quoted in Jordens 1981:161).   Ultimately in the 1920s 
– due, again, to the rise of enumerative politics discussed above – the Muslim supplanted the Christian 
as the primary source of the existential threat Shraddhanand perceived to be imminent.65  Numbers 
here were essential.  “[I]f all untouchable castes become Muslims then the Muslim party will become 
equal to that of the Hindus,” Shraddhanand warned in a pamphlet entitled Hindus Beware! (Hinduo 
Savadhān!)66 (quoted in Jordens 1981:141).  In another pamphlet, Today’s Foremost Problem (Vartamān 
Mukhya Samasyā), the Swami elaborated that in addition to the danger of Muslim growth and Hindu 
diminution, the prospect of the Depressed Classes embracing Islam also raised the specter of 
untouchable self-reliance in the emergent nation: “If all untouchables became Muslims then these will 
become equal to the Hindus, and at the time of independence they will not depend on the Hindus, but 
will be able to stand on their own legs” (ibid.:144). 
                                                          
65 The rhetorical slippage between Christians and Muslims in Hindu nationalist writing of this period was not 
unique to Shraddhanand.  See Datta (1999:Ch 1) for a fine discussion of this point in the work of U.N. Mukherji. 
66 The second edition was retitled Khatare kā Ghanṭā arthāt Muhāmmadi Ṣaḍyaṅtra kā Rahasyabhed (The Warning 
Bell, or, Exposure of the Muhammadan Conspiracy). 
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Two points are essential here.  First, Shraddhanand’s explicit invocation of the “time of 
independence” indicates that his concern with numbers now attaches to a clear vision of the nation qua 
state; this is no longer merely a race for converts in the religious arena, but a campaign of Hindu 
nationalism proper.  We will return to this point in a moment.  Secondly, what emerges here as the 
anxiety underwriting the fear of mass conversion to Islam is the danger that untouchables “will be able 
to stand on their own legs.”  What Shraddhanand considers Today’s Foremost Problem is, at base, the 
autonomy of the Depressed Classes.  This proves one of the most constant refrains in the Swami’s 
writings and speeches on the untouchable question.  He vacillates between depicting the untouchables 
as potentially independent and already independent, but in either case, the possible or realized capacity 
of the Depressed Classes to extend or deny support to whichever institutions or causes they please – be 
it Muslims, the Congress, the British government, non-cooperation or shuddhi – constitutes a cause for 
alarm and a provocation to intervene.  As the Chairman of the Reception Committee of the 1919 Session 
of the Indian National Congress in Amritsar, Shraddhanand (1987:165, my translation) exhorted his 
Congress colleagues to “reflect on how your six and a half crore67 brothers – those pieces of your heart 
that you have sliced off and flung away – how those six and a half crore sons of Mother India can 
become the anchor of the ship of a foreign government.”  In a later interview this dangerous 
contingency was offered as sober reality: “India’s untouchables are the anchor sheets of the British 
Government” (Leader, 21 January 1923, quoted in Jordens 1981:130, emphasis added).  In an open 
letter to the Congress General Secretary in 1922, Shraddhanand wrote that untouchable recalcitrance 
threatened to undermine the boycott of British cloth.  “Members of the [Congress] Working Committee, 
perhaps, do not know that on this side our depressed brethren are leaving off Khadi and taking to 
buying cheap foreign cloth” (Shraddhanand 1946:180).  Contrasting his colleagues’ lack of awareness of 
the activities of the Depressed Classes with his first-hand knowledge of the same, he adds, “I know of 
                                                          
67 6.5 crore is 65 million.   
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cases where the depressed classes are in open revolt against the tyranny of the so-called upper castes 
and unless the above demands [for the removal of caste disabilities] are conceded to them they will 
succumb to the machinations of the bureaucracy” (ibid.:184).68   
In warning his nationalist colleagues of widespread Depressed Class antipathy toward the 
Congress and (qualified) preference for British government, Shraddhanand, like Annie Besant before 
him, was offering an astute and fundamentally correct assessment of the subaltern political scene.69  
Also like Besant, he formulated his hortatory in a way that often conflated the Hindu community with 
the emergent nation-state, and political leaders with “high caste” Hindus.  For example, in Jāti ke Dīnoṅ 
ko mat Tyāgo, Shraddhanand writes of untouchable converts to Christianity that: 
Instead of seeing themselves as a part of the Indian nation [Bhāratīya rāṣṭra kā ek bhāg] 
they dream of entering its halls of governance… If the seven crore untouchable women 
and men of India [Bhāratvarṣ], harried from maltreatment by the twice-born, become 
Christian, then the Home-Rule, Hindu leaders [swarājyavādī sanātandharmī līḍar] will be 
able to do nothing but regret it… So long as we do not understand those shudra 
brothers to be a part of our selves, and so long as they are not treated fairly, the Aryan 
race will remain politically in mortal peril (Shraddhanand 1987:96, my translation). 
 
To be Christian, in this view of the world, is to be separate from the Bhāratīya rāṣṭra – rāṣṭra being a 
concept of nation that is territorial and political, as distinguished from qaum, or nation in the sense of a 
                                                          
68 Shraddhanand had earned his reputation as a man of the grassroots.  His frequent references to Depressed Class 
opposition to Congress and the “so-called upper castes,” as well as to dominant caste Muslims, landlords and the 
police, were grounded in decades of experience engaging with local-level untouchable leadership in rural and 
urban Punjab, UP, and Delhi.  His characterization of the political lay of the land thus holds interest not only for 
what it tells us of his ideological commitments and rhetorical strategies, but also as historical ethnography.  An 
example that stands out in this regard comes in an article Shraddhanand wrote for the Liberator, in which he 
describes meeting with the chaudhuris (local heads of the caste, “big men”) of Delhi Chamars in 1921 and listening 
to their reasons not only for rejecting Congress overtures, but for remaining “against” both the Hindu and Muslim 
“communities”(Shraddhanand 1946:133–34).  Such sketches confirm, again, the picture of untouchable autonomy 
that we glimpsed in the previous chapter, even as they sound strange to ears attuned to a later sociological 
commonsense. 
69 Recent historiography has brought to light that by the early 1920s, most major regional untouchable castes had 
developed organizations that critiqued and opposed the Congress.  In Punjab the Ad Dharm (Juergensmeyer 2009), 
in UP the Adi Hindu Mahasabha (Rawat 2011), in Bengal the Namasudra movement (Bandyopadhyay 1997), in 
Maharashtra the Mahars (Rao 2009), in Chattisgarh the Satnamis (though here one faction was beginning to warm 
to the Congress by the 1920s) (Dube 1998), in Tamil country the Buddhists under Ayothee Thass (Aloysius 1998), 
all posed organized challenges to the nationalist movement, some in alliance with Muslim parties (Namasudras, Ad 
Dharm, both selectively), but all with stated preference for British rule over the Swarajya proposed by Congress. 
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people, tribe, or community.  The new Christians “dream” of joining their British co-religionists in the 
enjoyment of political power – an averment of the ambition that animated conversion – to the 
detriment of the cause of Home Rule, Sanātan Dharm, and the Aryan Race, entities that Shraddhanand 
does not clearly differentiate from one another. 
 Shraddhanand insisted that the danger – already existing yet potentially even greater – of 
Depressed Class autonomy from the Hindus could only be defused if Hindus radically curtailed the 
regime of disabilities they imposed on untouchables.  Further, he maintained that the enervation of this 
autonomy – bringing the untouchables to accept Hindu leadership – equated with the neutralization of 
the Muslim and Christian threat, and was an essential, sine qua non precondition for the manufacture of 
a Hindu nation.  This doctrine – a Hindu nationalist assessment of Indian society and program of action 
to transform it – made increasingly frequent appearances in the writings of Shraddhanand’s later years.  
Perhaps the Swami’s most succinct formulation came just months before his death; in April 1926 he 
wrote that: “The uplift of the untouchables and their assimilation in the Hindu polity is the very plinth on 
which alone the edifice of free India can be constructed” (Jordens 1981:163). 
 Some in the Congress heeded Shraddhanand’s admonitions.  In the midst of the Moplah and 
Malkana controversies, Madan Mohan Malaviya and his Hindu Mahasabha, after years of disagreement 
buried the hatchet with the Arya Samaj in 1923.  Malaviya signed an agreement with Shraddhanand 
endorsing shuddhi and advocating the elimination of some forms of caste discrimination (Jordens 
1981:chap. 6; Gooptu 2001:chap. 6).70  Ghanshyamdas Birla – on whom Lala Lajpat Rai laid his hopes 
“for the future leadership of the Hindus in politics” (quoted in Birla 1953:23) – also extended strong 
support.  Birla was the single largest contributor of funds to the Arya Samaj’s shuddhi efforts (Jordens 
1981:165).  In his correspondence with Gandhi, Birla (1953:5) acknowledged that coercion was 
                                                          
70 It was in this context that Shraddhanand was elected Vice President of the Hindu Mahasabha in 1923.  His 
tenure with the organization was tumultuous, though; he resigned and rejoined several times until his death in 
1926 (Jordens 1981).   
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sometimes involved in the shuddhi campaign that he bankrolled, but found it justifiable: “I do not see 
any harm if the Arya Samajists do a bit of proselytizing by resorting to force and thereby add to the 
number of the Hindus.”71  This position emerged in part from Birla’s admiration of Arya Samaj and Hindu 
Mahasabha militancy, which he found to have the salutary effect of keeping Muslims on the defensive.72  
In 1925-26 Birla contested elections as the Independent Congress candidate in Benares.  Opposing his 
own son Indra, who was leading the campaign for Birla’s rival, Swami Shraddhanand joined Malaviya 
and Lajpat Rai in campaigning for Birla.73  In election speeches Birla stressed that Hindu sangathan was 
“the most important work before the country” and could not be accomplished “without the uplift of the 
depressed classes” (Jordens 1981:165).   
Most of Shraddhanand’s colleagues in the Congress, however, were insufficiently persuaded of 
the Swami’s message.  Shraddhanand found many of his Congress associates to be either active 
defenders of untouchability as conventionally practiced, or moderates prepared to speak, but not act, 
against the institution (Shraddhanand 1946:121, 133–38, 147–48, 179–88).  This brings us back to the 
moment with which we began our discussion of Shraddhanand and the Arya Samaj: 1922, when the 
Swami was appointed head of the All India Congress Committee’s special committee “to give effect to 
the resolution about the so-called depressed classes.” 
 The committee dissolved within a year.  Shraddhanand, nominated by the AICC as the 
committee’s head, resigned one month after the meeting in which the committee was constituted.  AICC 
                                                          
71 “We also find that those Hindus who converted to Islam two hundred years ago are now as bigoted Muslims as 
those originally hailing from Arabia or Iran, though at the time of their conversion they must have felt strongly 
against their converters.  This proves that shuddhi ensured by force can ultimately lead to the establishment of 
harmonious relations between the Hindus and the neo-converts” (Birla 1953:4–5).  Note that in Birla’s formulation 
here all Indian Muslims – whether descendants of converts or descendants of migrants – are “bigoted,” and a 
comparable situation among Hindus is seen as desirable. 
72 “Now that the Hindu Mahasabha and the Aryasamaj have exhorted people to wield the sword, the Muslims are a 
little bit afraid of attacking them.  I know this intensifies the quarrel now, but I am not sure that this would not be 
the last of the quarrels”(Birla 1953:4).  See also ibid.:24, 270. 
73 Malaviya, Birla and their colleagues were seen as stoking communal sentiment in the 1925-26 election; Motilal 




leaders, he alleged, sabotaged his efforts by denying the committee sufficient funds, part of what he 
saw as a long pattern of Congress duplicity and prevarication on the caste question (ibid.:179-88).  The 
AICC secretary admitted at the Congress session in Gaya later that year that the committee had taken no 
action because “no substitute for Swami Shraddhananda can be found;” a year later, the funds allotted 
to the committee remained to be spent (ibid.:188).  Thus the Congress’s second milestone in formally 
taking up the problem of untouchability ended much as the first had: the committee of 1922, like the 
Depressed Classes Resolution of 1917, proved a “dead letter.” 
 Shraddhanand’s pessimism regarding Congress’s commitment to addressing untouchability 
would continue to prove largely well-founded for another ten years.  Only in 1932, with the granting of 
the communal award to the Depressed Classes, did the existential crisis of which Shraddhanand had so 
passionately spoken become, for most members of Congress, a palpable reality.  The Swami (and for 
that matter Annie Besant) had perceived the unpopularity of the Congress among the Depressed Classes 
well ahead of most nationalists.  His chiding of Gandhi for not prioritizing untouchability removal – and 
being consequently “heckled” by politically well-informed untouchables on his tour of Madras 
Presidency in 192074 – would sound prophetic in 1932.  Indeed, as we will see, aspects of both 
Shraddhanand’s analysis of the subaltern scene and program for restructuring it would come to be 
adopted, in practice, by the Congress and the Harijan Sevak Sangh in the 1930s.  This would transpire 
even as Gandhi selectively repudiated the methods of the Arya Samaj and set out to achieve the same 
goal – the integration of the untouchables into the emergent nation as Hindus – by alternate means. 
                                                          
74 “Even Mahatma Gandhi had not realized its importance [the importance of the removal of untouchability] and 
was taken up with his resolution of non-violent Non-cooperation… While touring in the Madras Presidency he was 
heckled by the so-called Panchama Untouchables of the South with questions about their position on the 
attainment of the national right of self-determination.” (Shraddhanand 1946:121). 
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 Before turning to this development, though, we need to consider briefly the Arya Samaj’s 
campaign among the sanitation labor castes, arguably the apotheosis of Shraddhanand’s radical vision, 
though he did not live to see it come to fruition. 
 
The Arya Samaj and the Sanitation Labor Castes  
 We have seen that the sanitation labor castes figured in Arya Samaj debates as the limit case of 
the radicalism of Shraddhanand and his supporters as early as the 1890s.75  As it happened, it was 
smaller, regional castes – the Rahtias, Meghs and Ods, and later the Dumnas and Basiths – that supplied 
the radicals with their initial proving ground.  Yet for a number of reasons – their great numbers, trans-
regional demographic spread, and intensive engagement with Islam and Christianity – the sanitation 
labor castes posed for the Arya Samaj both a challenge and a prize that could not be ignored.  In the 
1920s,76 responding to Shraddhanand’s call for volunteers to take up prachār among the Chuhras, a 
team of Arya Samaj activists – including a UP brahmin named Ami Chand Sharma and one Sadhu 
Yodharam (or Yodhnath) – launched a mission to the sanitation labor castes in Lahore and Delhi (Sharma 
1928:7–10; Das 1981b:34–38; Sharma 1995:137–141; Prashad 2000:91–92).  Their efforts met with 
skepticism until Sharma participated in a sanitation workers’ strike and was jailed along with the striking 
workers.  After this he gained a more sympathetic audience (Prashad 2000:91–92).  
Sharma composed a tract entitled Śrī Bālmīkī Prakāś; he explicitly intended it to function as a 
sacred text to be recited and revered by the sanitation labor castes.77  Part didactic polemic and part 
                                                          
75 Again: “The admission of the Churas [sic] to the Samaj and their consequent elevation may appear the height of 
absurdity to ignorant minds… and our instinct too treats it with utter repugnance.  Yet the Christians do it.” 
(quoted in Graham 1942:490) 
76 See following footnote. 
77 The dating of Śrī Bālmīkī Prakāś, and of this phase of the Arya Samaj’s involvement with the sanitation labor 
castes in Delhi and Lahore, remains unresolved.  Prashad (2000:90–91), following the chronology his Balmiki 
interlocutors shared with him in interviews in Delhi in the early 1990s, dates Ami Chand Sharma’s entrance on the 
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collection of hymns (bhajanmālā) – the latter composed by Sharma’s colleague Sadhu Yodharam – the 
text illustrates with sometimes startling transparency Arya Samaj strategies for persuading the 
sanitation labor castes to reconstruct themselves as Hindu, even as it supplies evidence of the informed 
skepticism with which this campaign was met.  Śrī Bālmīkī Prakāś went through at least three editions 
and found its way into innumerable sanitation labor caste homes; it became “the staple tract of the 
Balmiki community” (Prashad 2000:92).  Even where the tract itself did not travel, its central premise 
and many of its key ideas circulated and took hold.  In Lucknow, for example, unlike Delhi, Jullundur and 
Lahore, copies of Śrī Bālmīkī Prakāś are not to be found in sanitation labor caste homes today, yet the 
centerpiece of its argument, unheard of in Lucknow before the 1940s, is now known to virtually every 
member of the community, as we will see in the following chapters.78 
Here I will briefly explicate the major premise of the tract and illustrate three points: 1. That the 
religious alterity of its audience from the Hindus, even while strenuously denied, asserts itself in the text 
as already existing, potentially on the rise, and dangerous; 2. That ideologically the tract seeks to retain 
the ontological, moral difference between the twice-born and the untouchable even as it extends an 
offer of communal confraternity; and 3. That the text combines dialogical engagement – the attempt to 
persuade – with the monological assertion of nominative power.79 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
scene to the early 1930s and the tract to 1936.  Rama Sharma (1995:137), who cites no source, proposes that Ami 
Chand Sharma began his work in 1910 and published the tract in 1912.  O’Brien (2012:190, ff135) thinks the first 
edition of Śrī Bālmīkī Prakāś could be as early as 1908, but has seen editions dated 1922 and 1928.  Evidence 
internal to the text suggests that it was composed in 1928.   
78 One channel by which this transmission took place was a network of sadhus belonging to the Chuhra caste who 
trace their lineage to one Khakshah Baba, said to be a contemporary of Ami Chand Sharma.  This community of 
sadhus, who maintain ashrams from Haryana and Delhi in the west to Sitapur in central UP in the east, 
incorporated large portions of Śrī Bālmīkī Prakāś, without citing it, in its own devotional literature (e.g., Bauhat 
1996). 
79 The reader is referred to Vijay Prashad’s (2000:92–99) excellent analysis of the tract, with which I am in 
agreement, though my emphases here are somewhat different.  Rama Sharma (1995:137–141) provides an 
uncritical summary of the text.  John O’Brien (2012:190–92) briefly treats it as well, highlighting the same points 




The central premise of Śrī Bālmīkī Prakāś is that the sanitation labor castes are the descendants 
of the disciples of Rishi Valmiki, author of the Sanskrit Ramayana, and that they are therefore Hindu and 
have been so since ancient times.  That genealogy stands at the center is no accident; Sharma evidently 
sought for his text to displace, even while tapping into the sacral power of, the kursīnāmas, or 
genealogical songs that featured prominently in Lal Begi liturgy and lore.80  After an introduction, 
Sharma begins the narrative of Śrī Bālmīkī Prakāś with a scene in which an apparently twice-born 
devotee of Ram – a Ram Sevak – is singing a bhajan about Balmiki.81 
As he was singing the above song, a Balmikiya82 who was passing by heard Balmiki ji’s 
name and stood nearby.  He folded his hands and began to entreat the devotee, 
“Maharaj!  The bhajan you are singing is to which Balmiki ji?” 
The Ram Sevak replied, “What, brother, have there been many Balmiki jis?” 
Balmikiya: “I am not learned, but I have heard that in the Bhaktamāl two Balmikis’ 
stories are told.  The people of the Granth Sahib [i.e., Sikhs] say there were seven 
Balmikis.  Why, is this untrue?” 
Ram Sevak: “In the Bhaktamāl the two stories of Balmiki do not prove that there were 
two Balmikis, because the names of the mother and father of either Balmiki are not 
mentioned.  Actually they are two stories about the same Balmiki.  And the matter of 
the Granth is pure gossip” (Sharma 1928:11). 
 
Sharma takes us immediately to the heart of the matter: the problem of linking the Rishi Valmiki of 
Hindu tradition with the Balmik of Lal Begi oral tradition.  Hearing the privileged caste Hindu sing a 
bhajan to the former – an unlikely scenario, Valmiki never having been a popular object of devotion in 
                                                          
80 The guru lineage (guru praṇālī) and genealogy (vanshāvalī) of Balmiki on page 29 of Śrī Bālmīkī Prakāś 
structurally mirror the Lal Begi kursīnāmas documented in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (see, 
e.g., Temple 1884; Greeven 1894; Youngson 1906).   
81 On the spelling of the Rishi’s name, the text vacillates between Valmiki and Balmiki with no apparent significance 
attached to either.  The translations offered here are my own. 
82 “Follower of Balmiki”: Small numbers of Punjabi Chuhras were identified as Balmiki or Balmikiya as early as the 
1901 census, which names “Lal Begi and Balmiki” as a sect of Sikhs numbering less than 3,000 persons, mostly in 
Ludhiana and Ferozepore districts (the total number of Muslim, Hindu and Sikh Chuhras in Punjab in 1901 was 
officially 1,255,679) (Rose 1902:183–84).  Given the variability of naming practices within the caste this is not 
surprising – as we noted in the last chapter, the Lal Begi liturgy supplied several names for self-reference, including 
Lal Begi and Bala Shahi or simply Shahi.  Balmiki seems to have been, at this point, another such epithet grounded 
in the Lal Begi oral tradition (in which Balmik plays a significant role), but far less widespread than Shahi or Lal Begi.  




South Asia until after the events with which this chapter is concerned – the untouchable protagonist of 
the narrative asks the first in a long series of questions.  While deprecating his own knowledge, he quite 
rightly points out that Indic traditions are populated by multiple Balmikis; he cites Sikh traditions and the 
Bhaktamāl as cases in point.83  To this pluralist and historical-critical observation the Ram Sevak 
counters a singularist interpretation: Sikh texts are false, and the two Balmikis of the Bhaktamāl refer to 
the same person (the latter assertion is comprised of two steps: 1. The two Balmiki stories could refer to 
the same figure, and 2. They are the same figure).84  Without attempting to re-interpret the many facets 
of the Balmik of Lal Begi oral tradition – swineherd, magician of Ghazni, foster father of Lal Beg, oozing 
corpse of Kashi – Sharma’s Ram Sevak contends that all Balmikis are one: Rishi Valmiki.  This sweeping 
move makes possible the conclusion toward which the text hurtles some twelve pages later:  
Balmikiya: “Maharaj!  From everything you have said this has become obvious that we, 
too, are Hindus and our guru is eminently worthy.” 
Ram Sevak: “What doubt is there in this?  You people are Hindu.  At the last census a 
pandit of Kashi delivered this opinion [vyavasthā] that [you] people are Hindu.  In the 
census you were returned as Hindu.  You people are Hindu, your religion is Hindu, the 
Veda is your holy book, Balmiki ji is your guru.  So those of you who circumcise, marry 
and bury by Muslim rites, are perpetrating a great sin” (Sharma 1928:23). 
 
Sharma uses redundancy to hammer home the heart of his message.  If his unsubtlety here renders the 
overall intention of the tract transparent, it also illustrates our first point, namely, that the text makes 
visible the alterity of the sanitation labor castes from the Hindus even in the midst of forceful assertions 
of their belonging.  Here, the admission that some Balmikiyas/Lal Begis circumcise, marry by nikāh, take 
out Muslim-style funeral processions (janāza) and bury their dead, serves this function.  Elsewhere in 
                                                          
83 By Bhaktamāl the untouchable of Sharma’s narrative refers, strictly speaking, not to Nābhādās’s text of that 
name (c 1600), but to the commentarial tradition that attaches to it, specifically, to the commentaries of Priyādās 
(c 1700) and perhaps even Rūpkala (1909).  Priyādās’s account speaks of “both” (ubhai) Balmikis, and relates two 
distinct tales, one of the Rishi who composed the Ramayana, and the other of the Swapach (dog eater, a category 
related to the Chandal in brahminical literature) who attended the Pandav brothers’ sacrifice at Krishna’s request.  
Rūpkala goes further, giving the two Balmikis separate entries in his table of contents: one for “Maharishi 
Balmikiji” and the other for “the other (dūsre) Balmikiji” (Nābhā 1962:147–158). 
84 Manjula Sahdev (1986, 1997) and Julie Leslie (2003) have discussed the multiplicity of Valmikis in Indic tradition.  
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the tract the Ram Sevak bewails the fact that so many of the Balmikis/Lal Begis have become Christian 
and Muslim and that his listeners accept food from Muslims.  The Balmikiya, for his part, demonstrates a 
deep familiarity with specific Christian and Sikh texts while he appears to be learning about his putative 
Hindu-ness for the first time.85  In this way the tract confesses, contra its own conclusion, that in 
practice its intended audience stands at some distance from the Hindu community.  Moreover this 
distance threatens to increase.  In the introduction of Śrī Bālmīkī Prakāś, Sharma (1928:7–10)(speaking 
as himself, rather than through the Ram Sevak) hectors the sanitation labor castes not to follow the 
charismatic depressed class leader Swami Achhutanand, making explicit his fear that their already 
existing otherness from the Hindus may assume a more organized and politically engaged form.  Like 
Swami Shraddhanand, Ami Chand Sharma perceived the current of untouchable politics, and sought to 
intervene before it was too late. 
 Our second point is that the terms of communal inclusion offered to the sanitation labor castes 
in Śrī Bālmīkī Prakāś preserve, rather than reject, the fundamentals of brahminical caste ideology.  The 
issue is forced on Sharma by his own ingenious device: if his untouchable interlocutors enjoy a 
genealogical link with Rishi Valmiki, then how can the latter’s impeccable brahmin pedigree, amply 
attested in the Sanskrit sources,86 be maintained?  To stand by the veracity of the Sanskrit Ramayana – 
i.e., to hold that Valmiki was a Bhargava brahmin – and at the same time to assert the Chuhras’ descent 
from Valmiki, would amount to claiming that India’s sweeping and scavenging castes were, in fact, 
brahmins.87  Sharma (1928:19–20) offers an alternative solution: 
                                                          
85 “Maharaj!  In the Christian book by the name of Satmat Nirupan, it is written than Balmiki ji lived with Shri 
Ramchandar ji and wrote down whatever he saw; is this true?” “When and why did we make Balmiki ji our guru?” 
“If we are Hindu then why do Hindus not touch us?” “Maharaj… I am extremely grateful to you for your kindness, 
but then this question rises in my mind: why was all of this not known before today?” (Sharma 1928:14, 20, 21, 31) 
86 See Leslie 2003. 
87 Such a strategy was not entirely inconceivable: Priyādās, Anantādās, and other privileged caste hagiographers of 
the Chamar poet-saint Ravidās construed him as a brahmin in a former birth who was degraded on account of 
infractions of purity rules, yet retained a kind of essential brahminhood.  This trope (discussed in Hawley and 
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Balmikiya: “Maharaj!  Pray do tell: is Balmiki ji our guru by descent or our guru by 
discipleship?” 
Ram Sevak: “Shri Balmiki ji is not your people’s guru by descent, rather he is a guru who 
gives you teachings.” 
Balmikiya: “From whom are we people descended?”  
Ram Sevak: “Regarding your ancestry, it is written in the Ośanaś Smriti that: 
Brahmanya śūdra sansargāta jātah chānḍālamuchyate.  Meaning the offspring of the 
union of a brahman woman and a shudra man is a mehtar; and further in this very 
scripture it is written that your people’s work is sweeping [jhāṛū denā] and removing 
excrement [mal uṭhānā].  Therefore you are Hindu.” 
 
The deft insertion of discipleship into the tract’s central genealogical premise enables Sharma to 
overcome the logical impasse, to have it both ways.  If the ancestors of the sanitation labor castes were 
Valmiki’s disciples, then the genealogical imperative can be satisfied (the guru lineage being a respected 
category of genealogy) even as the ontological chasm between the brahmin and the Chandal is 
reaffirmed.  Lest there be any confusion on this point, the Ram Sevak invokes shastric authority for the 
moral propriety of the social abjection and stigmatized labor attached to the sanitation labor castes.  
Two pages later the Ram Sevak instructs the Balmikiya that his untouchability is the consequence of his 
ancestors’ bad deeds (bure karm), and that if he reforms his behavior the Hindus will cease practicing 
untouchability with him (Sharma 1928:21).   
These passages carry considerable interest for what they reveal about the contradictions 
inherent in the Arya Samaj’s wooing of the untouchables.  In the introduction to Śrī Bālmīkī Prakāś Ami 
Chand Sharma addresses his untouchable audience as “my Balmikiya brothers.”  Likewise in the tract’s 
staged dialogue, the twice-born Ram Sevak address the Balmikiya as brother.88  Yet when the Ram Sevak 
approvingly cites dharmaśāstra as justification for present-day untouchability, it becomes clear that the 
brotherhood imagined here is of a peculiar, circumscribed sort, a brotherhood in which kinship and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Juergensmeyer 2004; Burchett 2009) was revived in the early twentieth century both by Hindu nationalists eager 
to woo Chamars as Hindus, as well as by Chamar writers. 
88 The Balmikiya, for his part, consistently addresses the Ram Sevak as “Maharaj” (“king,” “venerable sir”). 
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parity are repudiated while hierarchy and ontological difference are affirmed.  A similar tension runs 
through Swami Shraddhanand’s writing on the untouchable question.  In Hindu Sangathan (1926:135–
36), the Swami advocates the abolition of untouchability and the subsuming of all untouchables within 
the shudra varna.  He further insists that all Hindus should eat food prepared and served by “decent” 
shudras – a radical vision of Hindu society that he took concrete steps to realize by presiding over 
shuddhi functions in which Aryas consumed food served by their new brethren from untouchable and 
Muslim backgrounds.  Yet Shraddhanand also contradicts this vision.  In his pamphlet Āchār Anāchār aur 
Chhūt-Chhāt, for example, he maintains the correctness of Swami Dayanand in bracketing the 
untouchable from the otherwise general rule that commensality restrictions should be based on 
conduct, rather than birth.  Approvingly quoting Dayanand, Shraddhanand (1987b:154, my translation) 
explains that the prohibition against eating food prepared by untouchables, “is because the Chandal’s 
body is filled with foul smell at the atomic level [cāndāl kā śarir durgandh ke parmānuoṅ se bharā hotā 
hai] which is not the case with brahmins and other varnas.  Therefore eat food prepared by the hand of 
brahmins and such excellent varnas, but not food prepared by the hand of Chandals and other low 
castes: Bhangi, Chamar, etc.”89  Passages like these in Shraddhanad’s oeuvre and Śrī Bālmīkī Prakāś 
illuminate the degree to which brahminical caste ideology pervaded the efforts even of Arya Samaj 
radicals best known as critics of that ideology. 
In the above passage from Śrī Bālmīkī Prakāś, after schooling his untouchable interlocutor that 
his origins lay in miscegenation and that the shastras authorized his people’s confinement to the labor 
of “sweeping and removing excrement,” the Ram Sevak draws a somewhat startling conclusion: 
“Therefore you are Hindu.”  This is an example of our third and final point regarding the tract, that its 
                                                          
89 An alternative translation could be “because the Chandal’s body is filled with atoms of foul smell.”  
Shraddhanand is quoting Chapter 10 of Swami Dayanand’s Satyārth Prakāś.  The Arya Samaj’s own English 
translation of Satyārth Prakāś softens the overt caste contempt of the original by removing the Chandal: “the 
bodies of the extremely degraded men and women that are simply laden with dirt and other foul matter” 
(Saraswati 1994:324–35).  Compare with Annie Besant’s remarks on untouchable smells earlier in this chapter and 
the discussion of caste and smell in Chapter II.   
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effort to persuade an audience through dialogue is punctuated by monological assertions of nominative 
power.  That is to say, Sharma periodically abandons the conceit of reasoned debate between a Hindu 
and an untouchable to invoke authority that obviates the consent of the latter in determining his own 
pahchān.  These assertions are monological insofar as they elicit and receive no reply: they 
authoritatively declare, they brook no dissent.  The conclusion is always the same – “you are Hindu” – 
but the authorities invoked are various.  The shastras are several times marshalled in this fashion.  And 
as we have seen, “a pandit of Kashi” and the decennial census of the British colonial administration are 
invoked side by side as legitimate arbiters of the Hindu-ness of the untouchable.90  This is a telling 
juxtaposition.  The pandit and the British bureaucrat, empowered by two very distinct structures of 
authority, nonetheless exercise in common the power to name objects within these structures – with or 
without the consent of the named.  Sharma would have his audience acquiesce to the fiat of both.   
There is one other authority, a recent claimant to nominative power over the untouchables, that 
Śrī Bālmīkī Prakāś invokes:  
Ram Sevak: “Now Congress, too, has taken the decision that the burden of 
untouchability should be removed.  Toward this end real work is going on.  From all of 
these things you can understand that untouchability toward you people will go away, if 
you people will cease doing bad deeds” (Sharma 1928:23). 
 
Sharma clearly sees the Congress as an ally in his enterprise.  He goes so far as to deploy Gandhian 
nomenclature at the end of the tract, when the Ram Sevak tells the Balmikiya that everyone who reads 
Śrī Bālmīkī Prakāś should spread the message to “every single Harijan”(Sharma 1928:32, emphasis 
added).  Unlike Shraddhanand, who in his last years bitterly denounced the Congress’s failure to take up 
untouchable uplift, Sharma framed Congress efforts as a welcome complement to his own missionary 
(dharm prachārak) labors, a view that the 1930s would vindicate.  
                                                          
90 “At the last census a pandit of Kashi delivered this opinion [vyavasthā] that [you] people are Hindu.  In the 
census you were returned as Hindu.” (Sharma 1928:23) 
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 The Arya Samaj’s dharm prachār efforts among the sanitation labor castes began to bear fruit by 
the end of the 1920s.  In 1930, over six thousand members of the sanitation labor castes underwent 
shuddhi in Lahore, followed by another 1,530 three years later (Sharma 1985:70).  In Delhi the early 
1930s saw the first cremations within the caste (which had previously buried) and the replacement of 
Lal Beg shrines with Valmiki temples (Sharma 1995:141; Prashad 2000:chap. 4).  In Jodhpur in the same 
years members the caste, in response to Arya Samaj efforts, banned beef-eating and replaced “their 
Muslim names like Akbur, Jamal, Multan, Data Deen, Aladeen, etc., by names like Jagdish Kumar, 
Ganesh Ram, Ram Chandra, and likewise” (Shyamlal 1984:29–30).  Reverberations of the Valmiki 
movement – the embrace of the central message of Śrī Bālmīkī Prakāś and the adoption of the Arya 
Samaj’s program of “untouchable uplift” by the sanitation labor castes – were soon felt in cities and 
cantonments across the subcontinent, from Karachi to Calcutta and deep into the Deccan.91   
 
The Poona Pact.  Hindus “in spite of themselves.” 
 If the first formal measures taken by the Congress to address the caste question in 1917 and 
1922 each proved a “dead letter,” the communal award of 1932 jolted the Congress to life.  A result of 
Ambedkar’s canny leadership of the Depressed Classes and engagement with the colonial administration 
under Ramsay MacDonald, the communal award fulfilled Swami Shraddhanand’s predictions of an 
organized, popular, all-India assertion of untouchable autonomy from Congress and Hindu society, 
blessed by the British.  The government’s granting of a limited double vote92 to the Depressed Classes 
                                                          
91 Its trajectory varied, however, from region to region.  As we will see in the next chapter, the rise of Valmiki in 
Lucknow followed a distinctive path, and produced a distinctive politics, compared to Delhi or Meerut. 
92 The term “separate electorates” almost universally applied here (following Gandhi’s usage) is highly misleading.  
Separate electorates were indeed granted to Muslims in the communal award of 1932 – Muslims could not vote or 
be a candidate in a “general” constituency, but did both in exclusively Muslim constituencies.  The Depressed 
Classes, in contradistinction, remained part of the same “general” electorate as the Hindus, where they could vote 
and stand election.  But in addition to this, for a limited period of twenty years, the Depressed Classes were 
assigned, in some designated areas where their percentage of the population was high, special constituencies in 
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provoked a surge of nationalist engagement with the untouchability problem unprecedented in scale 
and intensity.  A temple entry bill and an untouchability abolition bill were introduced in the 
legislature.93  Gandhi undertook two highly publicized fasts94 and a nine-month, fund-raising, all-India 
“Harijan tour.”95  Gandhi and his Congress colleagues inaugurated and generated the content for three 
weekly journals devoted to the untouchability problem (the English Harijan, Hindi Harijan Sevak and 
Gujarati Harijan Bandu, with overlapping but not identical content), which replaced Young India as 
Gandhi’s mouthpiece.  “Untouchable uplift” leapt in importance in nationalist discourse; from the 
margins it became one of the Congress’s central preoccupations.  And within a month of the 
announcement of the communal award (and only days after the signing of the Poona Pact), Gandhi and 
his Congress colleagues created a new organization, the All-India Anti-Untouchability League, later 
renamed the Harijan Sevak Sangh. 
 A great deal has been written about the events of August and September, 1932: the 
announcement of the terms of the communal award, Gandhi’s fast-unto-death in Yeravada Jail in 
opposition to the award’s “separate electorate” for Depressed Classes, and the Poona Pact by which 
Gandhi and Ambedkar arrived at a compromise of sorts to bring the fast to an end.  This is not the place 
to rehearse these happenings, vital though they were in catalyzing nationalist activity on the 
untouchability question.96  What has been missed by many observers, though, is that the Poona Pact 
marked a major milestone in the discursive framing of untouchability as a problem internal to Hindu 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
which only the Depressed Classes could vote (text of the Communal Award of 1932, printed in Ambedkar 1991:80–
82).  The arrangement is thus more accurately described as a limited double vote than “separate electorates.” 
93 Proposed by Ranga Iyer and Dr. P. Subbarayan. 
94 These were the “fast unto death” of September 20-26, 1923, which induced the Poona Pact, and another of May 
8-29, 1933 “to make it clear that the movement [against untouchability] is purely religious and to be prosecuted by 
religious rectitude” (Gandhi quoted in Verma 1971:59).  
95 From November 8, 1933 to July 31, 1934. 
96 Of the many accounts of the Poona Pact and the events leading up to it, Ambedkar’s (1989:329–362) remains 
the most helpful (and is recommended here for the reader new to the subject) insofar as he presents his own 
position after allowing the other major actors speak for themselves.  That is, Ambedkar’s account reproduces 
without editing the correspondence of Gandhi and MacDonald regarding the communal award and the fast, as well 
as the relevant portions of the text of the communal award and the Poona Pact. 
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society, and its correlate, the discursive framing of untouchables as Hindus.97  The Poona Pact, that is, 
played no small role in the production of the new sociological commonsense.  As we have seen, the old 
commonsense of untouchable alterity from the Hindus remained alive and well in the 1920s, as 
Shraddhanand observed in the Chamar bastīs of Delhi and as Śrī Bālmīkī Prakāś revealed even in denial.  
Even among elite nationalists, the categorical schema of colonial sociology had not fully taken hold.  As 
late as 1923, from a Congress platform, a nationalist leader of the stature of Mohammad Ali could 
propose that Hindus and Muslims divide the untouchables amongst themselves – the notion that the 
latter were in some way already or essentially Hindu did not yet prevail.  Yet in 1932, when elaborating 
his reasons for undertaking the fast-unto-death, Gandhi (2000:vols. 57, p.40) claimed that the 
Depressed Classes “are part of an indivisible family” with the Hindus, and painted the temporary 
provision for exclusive Depressed Class constituencies as a “separation” of two classes of Hindus.  This 
portrayal of things, while still at variance from the popular social imaginary, gave Gandhi considerable 
purchase over the sociological discourse of the British administration, enabling him to depict the 
communal award as a cynical application of the policy of “divide and rule.”98  Adopting wholesale the 
British classification of untouchables as Hindus made it possible for Gandhi to cast the “separate 
electorate” as an imperialist stratagem99 – an attempt to divide the very house of Hinduism that the 
colonizers had postulated to exist – and thereby to delegitimize Ambedkar’s insistence that it 
constituted a Depressed Class safeguard against the tyranny of the majority. 
                                                          
97 A recent, welcome exception is C.S. Adcock (2014:14), who notes that “the premise, now enshrined in the 
Constitution of India and in much common-sense understanding, that Untouchables are Hindu by religion… was 
put in place with the agreement between Gandhi and Ambedkar in 1932.”  
98 Gandhi’s critique of the communal award on these grounds was no doubt, to a certain extent, apposite; the 
British administration did understand communal electorates as advantageous to hindering nationalist opposition 
to imperial rule, and favored this policy at least partly for that reason.  Yet to frame the issue in this way was to 
wilfully ignore the will and organization of the Depressed Classes and Ambedkar in bringing the communal award 
about. 
99 From Gandhi’s public letter to Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald on 9 September, 1932: “In the establishment 
of separate electorate at all for the Depressed Classes I sense the injection of poison that is calculated to destroy 
Hinduism” (Gandhi 2000:vols. 57, p.8). 
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 Even as he advanced the idea of the untouchable’s essential, timeless belonging to Hinduism, 
Gandhi struggled to find the language with which to reconcile this idea with history and the present.  In 
one of his statements to the press before his fast-unto-death, he wrote: “There is a subtle something – 
quite indefinable – in Hinduism which keeps them [the Depressed Classes] in it even in spite of 
themselves” (Gandhi 2000:vols. 57, p.40).  A few months later, when discussing Ranga Iyer’s proposed 
temple entry legislation with Ambedkar in February 1933, Gandhi used strikingly similar language: 
Gandhi: But I must say that you ought not to say that you are not a Hindu.  In accepting 
the Poona Pact you accept the position that you are Hindus. 
Ambedkar: I have accepted only the political aspect of it. 
Gandhi: You cannot escape the situation that you are Hindus in spite of your statement 
to the contrary. (Gandhi 2000:vol. 59, Appendix X)100 
 
These peculiar formulations – that untouchables are Hindus “in spite of themselves” and Ambedkar is 
Hindu “in spite of [his] statement to the contrary” – measure the tenuousness of Gandhi’s position on 
the issue and the logical awkwardness involved in maintaining it.  They also provide a glimpse into 
Gandhi’s mode of engagement with Depressed Class interlocutors, which, I will argue in a moment, is an 
integral aspect of his overall approach to the problem of untouchability.  To get there, though, we must 
briefly consider the birth of the organization through which Gandhi sought to bring about the social 
transformation for which he said he was prepared to die. 
 According to its own historians, the Harijan Sevak Sangh was founded precisely in response to 
Gandhi’s fast-unto-death against the “separate electorate” for Depressed Classes in the communal 
award of 1932 (Nehru 1940:6–7; Verma 1971:ii).  Originally named the All-India Anti-Untouchability 
League, its founding charter was a three-point resolution issued by a “public meeting of Hindus,”101 
                                                          
100 It was after this meeting that Gandhi wrote to Rajagopalacharia that “I had, what must be described in one way 
as a very unsatisfactory interview with Dr. A.  He is irreconcilable” (quoted in Birla 1953:83). 




presided over by Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, in Bombay on 30 September, four days after the 
termination of Gandhi’s fast.  After felicitating Gandhi on “the happy termination of his fast” and 
assuring him “that an awakening of conscience has been seen in the Hindu community during the last 
few days on the question of untouchability,” the resolution continues: 
This public meeting of Hindus resolves that an All India Anti-Untouchability League, with 
its headquarters in Delhi and branches in different provincial centres, be established for 
the purpose of carrying on propaganda against the observation of untouchability, and 
that for this purpose the following steps should be immediately taken: (a) All public 
wells, dharamshalas, roads, schools, crematoriums, burning ghats, etc., be declared 
open to the Depressed Classes. (b) All public temples be opened to members of the 
Depressed Classes.  Provided that no compulsion or force shall be used with regard to 
(a) and (b), but peaceful persuasion will be adopted as the only means. 
 
Who did this “public meeting of Hindus,” with Gandhi’s blessing, nominate as the president of the new 
Anti-Untouchability League? 
 Ghanshaymdas Birla, financier of and apologist for the Arya Samaj’s shuddhi campaign.  Birla 
accepted the presidency and held the position for the next 27 years until resigning in 1959.  As we will 
see, Birla’s sympathies with the Arya Samaj and particularly its shuddhi program would leave its impress 
on the new organization.  At the same time, Gandhi’s explicit repudiation of shuddhi and castigation of 
the Arya Samaj ensured that the Harijan Sevak Sangh would have to chart a path to untouchable uplift 
different from that of Swami Shraddhanand. 
 Long an admirer and friend of Shraddhanand, Gandhi famously distanced himself from the 
Swami, precisely over their differences vis-à-vis shuddhi, in an article in Young India in 1925.  
Unfortunately, he believes in the possibility of bringing every Muslim into the Aryan 
fold, just as perhaps most Mussalmans think that every non-Muslim will some day 
become a convert to Islam.  Shraddhanandji is intrepid and brave…. But he is hasty and 




Gandhi continued to maintain that shuddhi constituted a form of coercion and therefore could not be 
endorsed.  As Adcock demonstrates, Gandhi’s critique of shuddhi provided the grounds for his 
construction of tolerance as an opposed ideal.  My concern here is less with the ideal of tolerance that 
Gandhi espoused in contradistinction to the coercion of shuddhi, and more with the strategy he 
employed specifically to address the problem of the religious identity of the untouchables – which, after 
all, was one of the problems for which shuddhi offered nationalists a solution.   
Gandhi’s strategy, and its contrast with shuddhi, comes into clear relief in his correspondence 
with Birla.  Birla repeatedly – both before and after assuming leadership of the Harijan Sevak Sangh – 
raised the question of the legitimacy of shuddhi in his letters to Gandhi.  While Birla each time expressed 
his support for shuddhi, Gandhi each time cautioned him against it.  When Birla asked Gandhi for 
permission for the Sangh to directly provide funds to the Arya Samaj for “reconversions” of Doms in 
Benares (as Birla was already doing in his personal capacity), Gandhi replied decisively in the negative: 
“However desirable therefore the return of the Doms to Hinduism may be, I am quite clear that its 
encouragement by the Society is outside the scope laid down at its very foundation.”  But there was 
more to Gandhi’s position than his objection to shuddhi; he also proposed an alternative method for 
achieving the “indivisible family” of Hinduism.  In one of their more illuminating exchanges on the 
subject, after his public distancing from Shraddhanand but before the Poona Pact and the birth of the 
Harijan Sevak Sangh, Gandhi wrote Birla in 1927:  
I have been doing some serious and deep thinking on the subject of conversion.  The 
methods adopted in conversion can hardly be treated as sanctioned by religion…  Our 
movement should be directed against conversion to Christianity or Islam.  That requires 
a fundamental change in our outlook.  Once we accept that certain methods employed 
in conversion are blameworthy, we should not follow them ourselves…  By furthering 
the shuddhi movement we only add to the filth and at the same time prevent the 




Thus far we see both convergences and divergences between Gandhi’s and Shraddhanand’s approaches.  
With the Swami, Gandhi feels that conversion to Christianity and Islam must be blocked; the field must 
be cleared for “the followers of Hinduism” alone to enact their “spontaneous urge for reform” on 
untouchables.  But whereas Shraddhanand adopts the sometimes coercive methods of religious rivals, 
Gandhi will insist on consistency.  If Christian and Muslim proselytization is “blameworthy” and 
productive of “filth” (a striking concept to apply to the context of untouchable conversions to any 
religion), then Hindu proselytization cannot be the answer.  Instead,   
It is unnecessary to convert those who changed their religion through compulsion or out 
of ignorance.  Such people are, in fact, Hindus – the only thing that remains to be done is 
for Hinduism to be more catholic in its outlook (ibid.:33, emphasis added). 
 
Conversion is unnecessary.  Insofar as the untouchables’ current religious situation is a product of their 
ignorance or vulnerability to compulsion, it is simply not valid.  Irrespective of whether they circumcise, 
attend mass, give their children Christian of Muslim names, or consider themselves Lal Begis or Ad 
Dharmis, “such people are, in fact, Hindus.”  This being the case, the unsavory business of securing the 
untouchables’ assent to a particular religious identification can be dispensed with altogether.  All that is 
needed is for this act of renaming – this assertion of nominative power over a population that cannot 
speak for itself – to be framed as a moral good, as Hindu catholicity.  
 To trace the moves that Gandhi makes in these reflections – (1) bypassing the problem of 
untouchable consent by (2) figuring untouchables as stripped of agency (qua victims of ignorance, 
compulsion), in order (3) to cast the untouchables, in an assertion of nominative power grounded in 
Gandhi’s moral authority, as willing Hindus in a reforming Hinduism – is to identify what would become 
the dominant representational strategy of the Harijan Sevak Sangh and the Congress vis-à-vis the 




Gandhi and his “Harijan Sceptics” 
For the most part, Gandhi did not spell out the strategy outlined above so much as live it by 
example.  His mode of engagement with articulate members of the Depressed Classes in the pages of 
Harijan illustrate this. 
 Repeatedly in the 1930s and 1940s, Gandhi was confronted by Depressed Class individuals and 
organizations that questioned and criticized his and the Harijan Sevak Sangh’s ideology and methods.  In 
1934 a HSS worker in Punjab wrote Gandhi asking how he should deal with Ad Dharmis, members of the 
popular Depressed Class movement that maintained a very clear position on its religious autonomy from 
Hinduism, Sikhism and Islam.  Just three years before, in 1931, hundreds of thousands of Ad Dharmis, in 
spite of intimidation, boycott, rape and other forms of violence from Sikhs and Hindus bent on stopping 
them, returned themselves as a separate religion in the decennial census (Juergensmeyer 2009:chap. 7).  
The Harijan Sevak asked Gandhi “how to meet or counteract” the propaganda of the Ad Dharmis, “who 
wean [Harijans] away from Hindu society.”  Gandhi counseled that “Adi-Dharmis [sic] are themselves 
Hindus… They will return to the fold when they see that untouchability has been entirely removed” 
(Gandhi 1934d, emphasis added).  Dismissing in a word the lucidly formulated and fiercely defended 
self-definition of the Ad Dharm, Gandhi declared this organized, mass demonstration of Depressed Class 
will to be precisely what it said it was not.  
On the southern portion of his nine-month “Harijan tour” of 1933-34, Gandhi (1934a:8) wrote 
that he was “flooded with communications” from untouchable correspondents who objected to his 
insistence that eradicating untouchability could and should be done in the name of Hinduism.  In a 
speech addressing Depressed Class critics at Palluruthi in January 1934, printed in Harijan a week later 
under the heading “To Harijan Sceptics,” Gandhi wrote:   
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You have advised me not to conduct this campaign in the name of Hindu religion.  I am 
very sorry I cannot endorse your advice.  It is wholly wrong to say or even think that this 
movement is conducted in order to consolidate Hindu religion or consolidate anything... 
I have not come to help those who feel their strength… I know infinitely more than you 
do what Harijans are, where they live, what their number is and to what condition they 
have been reduced.  You can speak of this place, possibly of the whole of Cochin, 
possibly of Cochin and Travancore, still more possibly of Malabar.  But I claim to be able 
to speak of Harijans from the North, to the South, the East and the West of India, and I 
know their abject position.  My only business is, if it is at all possible, to lift those who 
are in the mire (Gandhi 1934b). 
 
Gandhi begins with a clear statement of the disagreement, followed by a denial of the charge that his 
untouchable uplift program has the same aims as that of the Arya Samaj and the Hindu Mahasabha – 
Hindu “consolidation,” Shraddhanand’s sangathan.  Later in the speech, he turns to the question of 
representation.  Anticipating by decades “creamy layer” arguments against statutory reservations, 
Gandhi here paints his interlocutors as a privileged subset of the Depressed Classes, as “those who feel 
their strength,” and who are, perforce, alienated from their caste fellows.  Undercutting their claim to 
representation both on this basis and on the grounds of their being parochial, Gandhi asserts his own 
capacity to represent untouchables on the strength of his knowledge.  Gandhi’s “I know” operates on 
two registers, one national-enumerative (“I know where they live, what their number is” in “the North, 
to the South, the East and the West of India”), and the other ontological (“I know…what Harijans are”).  
We glimpse here a powerful act of pahchān: a performance of recognition-conferring knowledge, a form 
of knowledge that simultaneously inhabits brahminical and modern-governmental structures of power. 
 Gandhi’s assertion of knowledge superior to that of his Depressed Class interlocutors, as part of 
a claim to represent the untouchables better than they can represent themselves (whether to figure 
them as Hindus or for other purposes), is a tactic familiar to readers of Ambedkar, against whom Gandhi 
deployed it often.  But it is in Gandhi’s engagements with the sanitation labor castes that this tactic 
combines most forcefully with the exercise of nominative power to reveal the foundations of both in 
brahminical ontology.  In his message to “Harijan Sceptics,” Gandhi’s knowledge of “what Harijans are” 
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remains suggestive: he knows “their abject position,” he knows that they are “in the mire.”  His oft-
repeated claim to be a Harijan by choice rests on his voluntary exposure to the conditions in which they 
live, and his capacity for sympathy.  When he turns his attention to the sanitation labor castes, however, 
his knowledge claims become very precise and the basis of his representative claims shifts.  “Let me tell 
you with due respect that you can’t represent the Bhangis,” said Gandhi to a Hindu of unspecified caste 
at a temple in Delhi.  “I am a Bhangi by choice.  I have removed night-soil” (2000:vols. 94, pp.218–19, 
emphasis added).  “I myself did a Bhangi’s duty continually for nearly one and-a-half years,” Gandhi 
wrote a friend in 1932, “I used to do it dressed like an ordinary labourer.  In the Ashram it is done with 
the dhoti tucked in” (2000:vols. 58, p.48).  In these and many other instances,102 Gandhi grounds his 
claim to speak for the sanitation labor castes in his own having performed the labor of disposing of 
human excrement, which he calls the “Bhangi’s duty.”  As many critics have noted, this move valorizes a 
labor practice generally performed under coercive conditions and widely experienced as dehumanizing.  
But it is much more than that.  Gandhi’s embrace of night-soil removal as the grounds of his own 
legitimacy in representing the sanitation labor castes fixes the “Bhangi” in a brahminical universe, one in 
which castes are constituted by their labor, in which night-soil is a matter of Bhangi being.  For the 
Bhangi to be the remover of excrement is moral and good in this view: the ontological fusion of caste 
and occupation, and the assignation of this particular labor to this particular caste is to be prescribed.  In 
his 1936 article “The Ideal Bhangi,” Gandhi wrote: 
My ideal Bhangi would know the quality of night-soil and urine.  He would keep a close 
watch on these and give a timely warning to the individual concerned.  Thus he will give 
a timely notice of the results of his examination of the excreta… Such an ideal Bhangi, 
while deriving his livelihood from his occupation, would approach it only as a sacred 
duty.  In other words he would not dream of amassing wealth out of it.  He would 
consider himself responsible for the proper removal and disposal of all the dirt and 
night-soil within the area which he serves and regard the maintenance of healthy and 
                                                          
102 To give just one more example, Gandhi told sanitation volunteers in a speech in 1938, “I am an expert Bhangi.  I 




sanitary condition within the same as the summum bonum of his existence (Gandhi 
1936b). 
 
Like the Chandal of dharmaśāstra, Gandhi’s Bhangi fulfills his prescribed function – the removal of dirt 
and night-soil – in a sacred division of labor, and does not amass wealth in the process. 
While perhaps obvious, it nonetheless bears pointing out that this was by no means the only 
way to imagine the sanitation labor castes, their labor, and their relation to the rest of society in the 
1930s and 1940s.  Gandhi’s vivid projection of the brahminical imagination onto this category of 
twentieth century persons was not a foregone conclusion.  They could as readily have been plotted into 
a “universal” narrative of modern urban sanitation as “sweepers” or simply “workers,” categories with 
very different ramifications than “Bhangi.”  Gandhi was aware of this possibility.103  When confronted 
with it, as he was by the Bombay sanitation workers’ strike of 1946, he took pains to shift the discourse 
from one of “sweeper’s grievances” to one of “the duties of Bhangis” – to ease modern concepts back 
into a brahminical frame (Gandhi 1946a; 1946b; 1946c).   
Another social imaginary, overlapping with but nonetheless distinct from the brahminical Bhangi 
or the urban-modern sweeper, animated the Arabic- and Persian-derived names applied to the 
sanitation labor castes.  The terms Halalkhor and Mehtar, both in circulation since Mughal times, 
remained in widespread usage in the early twentieth century (see Chapter I).  More a designator of 
occupation than of caste (unlike Bhangi, which denoted both simultaneously), these titles appear to 
have been much preferred over “Bhangi” by the sanitation labor castes themselves in this period, 
perhaps on account of the affirmation of the dignity of labor embedded, albeit faintly, in their Islamicate 
etymology.104  On numerous occasions, in person and in correspondence, members of the sanitation 
                                                          
103 As is evidenced in his thoughts on the comparative conditions of sanitation workers in Europe and elsewhere 
(e.g. Gandhi 2000:vols. 58, p.48). 
104 “Halalkhor” means one who earns his living honestly; “Mehtar” originally meant “elder brother” or “prince.”  
See Chapter I. 
165 
 
labor castes objected to Gandhi’s use of the term “Bhangi” on account of its general use as a degrading 
term of abuse.  Several correspondents, as well as the residents of the sweeper colony in Delhi with 
whom Gandhi briefly resided, asked him to use “Mehtar” in place of the offensive term.  “I tried to make 
them understand,” he wrote in Harijan, “that it mattered little as to which of the current words was 
used for the same occupation” (Gandhi 1946b:1).  Yet the retention of “Bhangi” seemed to matter a 
good deal to Gandhi; he continued to use it consistently, going so far as to propose changing the name 
of his journal from Harijan to Bhangi (Gandhi 2000:vols. 91, p.174).  The only alternative denotation for 
the sanitation labor castes that Gandhi did countenance was, unsurprisingly, “Valmiki.”105 
 Gandhi’s exertion of nominative power over the sanitation labor castes thus buttressed his 
broader effort to confine the Depressed Classes to the theater of Hinduism.  Dismissing the sanitation 
labor castes’ designations for themselves, whether as workers or Mehtars, Gandhi cast them as Bhangis 
on a brahminical, and therefore Hindu, stage.  Attempts to reframe the concerns of the sanitation labor 
castes in terms of citizenship and political representation met with a similar fate.  In July 1946, Gandhi 
published his correspondence with a self-described Mehtar on the pages of Harijan.  The 
correspondent’s letter expressed concern about untouchable, and particularly sanitation labor caste, 
representation in the upcoming Constituent Assembly.  
It is believed that Scheduled Castes are also to be represented (adequately?).  But is 
there any proposal from you or from Congress to elect adequate or at least some 
members from the Mehetar106 Community?  Who, I am sure will discharge their duty of 
citizenship and pick up their legitimate share in the future constitution of Free India. 
You might say you have been and will do everything for us, but I wish to say ‘let us be 
with you when everything for us is to be done.  Let us be represented democratically.’ 
 
After reproducing the full text of the letter, Gandhi replied:  
                                                          
105 The few references to Valmiki (qua caste title) in Gandhi’s Collected Works come, as we might expect, only after 
the mid-1930s, by which time the Valmiki movement had begun to gain traction.  In 1946 Gandhi (2000:vols. 72, 
pp.289–90) informs the audience of Harijan: “Readers must know that Valmiki is another word for bhangi.” 
106 Mehetar is an alternative spelling of Mehtar. 
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I have reproduced the foregoing in order to show what havoc dangerous knowledge of 
English has produced in our society.  This is a specimen not of English English nor yet of 
Indian English.  It is bookish English which the writer probably half understands.  I 
suggest to him that if he had written to me in the national language Hindustani or in his 
provincial language, it would not have evoked an unfavourable response from me. 
The writer has paid me a left-handed compliment and that perhaps in order to teach me 
how to express my love for the bhangi, otherwise known as mehetar.  The writer is a 
discontented graduate, setting no example or a bad example to bhangis.  He has 
isolated himself from them, though he professes to represent them. 
He will certainly become my teacher if he will be a graduate in the art of being a good 
bhangi.  I very much fear that he does no scavenging himself, he does not know what 
scientific scavenging is.  If he became an expert in the art, his services would be wanted 
by all the cities of India.  When bhangis really rise from the slumber of ages, they will 
successfully sweep the Augean stables everywhere and India will be a pattern of 
cleanliness and there will be in India no plague and other diseases which are the 
descendants of filth and dirt. 
In the place where I am living in Bombay,107 my room and the adjoining lavatory are 
fairly clean, but I am in the midst of suffocating dirt.  I have had no time to examine the 
tenements in front of me.  They are as crowded and as dirty as the ones in the quarters 
where I was living in New Delhi.  Had my graduate fellow bhangi been an expert in the 
art, I would, without a doubt, have requisitioned his services as my guide and helper. 
As it is, not only have I no use for him, I have to risk his displeasure by telling him that he 
should not think of the Constituent Assembly or other assemblies.  Let those go to them 
who are wanted there.  Instead of getting rid of the wretched caste mentality, he argues 
that any Harijan is not good enough for the purpose but preference should be given to 
the mehetar caste.  I suggest to him that it is a harmful method, doing no good to 
anybody (Gandhi 2000:vols. 91, pp.241–243). 
 
The several themes that we have been tracing in Gandhi’s mode of engagement with Depressed Class 
interlocutors here are woven together: A member of the Depressed Classes is told that he cannot 
represent his community on account of being educated.  A man who identifies himself as Mehtar, an 
occupational category redolent of an Islamicate historical context, is renamed Bhangi, a caste name 
resonant with brahminical Hindu connotations.  A question about the representational rights of 
disadvantaged citizens is met by an invitation to sweep the tenements of Bombay.  And a demonstration 
                                                          
107 For the days of this Bombay visit, Gandhi was residing in a house in “the Bhangi quarter,” Vallabbhai Patel 
having made arrangements for the same at Gandhi’s request.  He spent part of the previous month (June 1946) 




of political knowledge elicits not only a counter-assertion of superior knowledge, as we by now expect, 
but also in this case the contention that, qua “Bhangis,” the sanitation labor castes have no business 
writing in English, taking interest in democratic politics, or involving themselves in anything but the 
fulfilment of their (Hindu) caste dharma.  If Gandhi’s reply to the Mehtar correspondent is not 
representative of his engagements with Depressed Class critics in its tone, it does illustrate, albeit in an 
unusually hostile manner, patterns in the substance of these engagements.  
 
The Strategy Assumes Institutional Form 
 The pages of Harijan thus supply evidence for how Gandhi publicly exemplified his methods for 
dealing with the recalcitrant among his would-be objects of uplift.  Institutionally, the problem of 
Depressed Class critics of Gandhian untouchable uplift required a formal solution.  At the first, ad-hoc 
meeting of the All-India Anti-Untouchability League in October 1932, it was decided that Ambedkar and 
two other Depressed Class leaders (M.C. Rajah and R. Srinivasan) should be included on the central 
board.  All three resigned from the body within a few months, Ambedkar on account of his proposals to 
the board being not even acknowledged (Ambedkar 1991:133–141).  The lack of Depressed Class 
representation in an organization dedicated to Depressed Class uplift was discussed in the annual 
meetings in 1933 and 1934.  Gandhi, in response to concern expressed by some members as to the non-
democratic nature of the constitution he proposed, replied: 
I have come to the conclusion that in an organisation like ours, there is no room for 
election, democracy or anything of that sort.  Ours is a different kind of institution.  It is 
not a people’s organisation in the ordinary sense.  We handle money as self-appointed 
trustees, using it solely for the benefit of the Harijans, and in such a way that it finds its 
way directly into their pockets.  Ours is an organisation formed with a view of doing our 




Constructing the Harijan Sevak Sangh as an organization of savarn Hindus discharging a moral debt 
obviated the question of untouchable representation; the burden of leadership would have to fall on 
penitent Hindus.  This freed the organizers from having to countenance Depressed Class criticism 
regarding the prioritization of temple entry and the framing of untouchable uplift as a religious and 
particularly Hindu enterprise.  In the same stroke it reified that very framing: how could untouchability 
be anything but a Hindu problem when the All-India organization designed to solve it was precisely an 
organization of caste Hindus?  
 Accordingly, the Harijan Sevak Sangh, constituted by a “public meeting of the Hindus,” adopted 
an organizational structure in which all positions were appointed, from the president downward.108  In 
his capacity as president of the central board, Birla solicited Gandhi’s approval for each appointment 
that he made (Birla 1953:96, 103).  In terms of organizational structure, the Harijan Sevak Sangh was, as 
Birla (1953:104) put it, a “restrained autocracy.”  After the resignation of Ambedkar and his Depressed 
Class colleagues shortly after the first formal meeting of the board, there were no Depressed Class 
members of the central board; they were simply not appointed.  Even at the regional and local level, the 
Harijan Sevak Sangh rarely included Depressed Class individuals in decision-making positions, a policy 
Gandhi explicitly defended.  “The reader is aware that I have dissuaded Harijans from pressing for 
representation on Harijan Boards [i.e. local branches of the Harijan Sevak Sangh], for the very simple 
and complete reason that these boards are meant to be composed of savarna Hindus who regard 
untouchability as a sin and who would do reparation to Harijans for past wrongs done to them” (Gandhi 
1934c).109  
                                                          
108 The only exception to the rule of appointment was the president of the central board, who, though originally 
appointed at the inaugural meeting in September 1932, had to be elected again every three years (Constitution of 
the Harijan Sevak Sangh in Verma 1971:233).  Birla, nominated president at the inaugural meeting, remained 
president for 27 years, when he voluntarily resigned. 
109 This article, entitled “How They Should Act,” goes on to advise untouchables to form “Advisory Committees of 
Harijans” that would assist the Harijan Sevak Sangh; these advisory committees would “watch the proceedings of 
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The Harijan Sevak Sangh institutionally embodied Gandhi’s mode of rendering untouchables 
Hindu: bypassing the difficulties of securing Depressed Class consent by figuring them as objects of, 
rather than subjects of or partners in, reform, the field was cleared for Gandhi and his league of penitent 
Hindus to frame what had been a question of rights and representation in the emergent nation as a 
problem internal to the house of Hinduism, a problem on which only Hindus – indeed, only savarna 
Hindus – could speak.  
 
Persuasion and Nomination 
 What I have sought to emphasize thus far in this discussion of Gandhi is the difference between 
his approach to untouchable inclusion in Hinduism and that of Swami Shraddhanand and his Arya Samaj.  
Both saw Hinduism as in mortal peril, a peril from which it could only be rescued by the removal of 
untouchability and the inclusion of untouchables in the Hindu fold.  Both saw untouchable conversion to 
Islam and Christianity as a problem that should be fought against.  But while for Shraddhanand the 
threat of the “dying race” had a good deal to do with numbers, with quantity, Gandhi insisted that his 
concern lay only with quality of Hinduism, that he wanted to strengthen the religion not by increasing its 
size but by purifying it of sin.  Gandhi rejected shuddhi on several grounds, including its overt 
entanglement with the race for numbers and with communal tension, and, as Adcock (2014) has 
discussed in great detail, its alleged attitude of intolerance toward other religions. 
It has been my argument that there is another fault line that separates the two approaches, and 
that this can be traced by examining Shraddhanand’s (and the Arya Samaj’s) and Gandhi’s respective 
modes of engagement with Depressed Class interlocutors.  The shuddhi that Swami Shraddhanand 
advocated and practiced was, among other things, an aggressive effort to persuade the Depressed 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Harijan Boards… advise Harijan Boards of their existence and show their preparedness to help the latter… [and] 
endeavor to be considerate… But the question of asserting themselves does not arise just yet” (Gandhi 1934c). 
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Classes to reconceive their relation to society and identify themselves as Hindus.  While the allegations 
of coercion that pursued the shuddhi movement no doubt had some basis, the evidence of Śrī Bālmīkī 
Prakāś and Ami Chand Sharma’s acceptance among the sanitation labor castes makes clear that 
persuasion was a central component of the Arya Samaj campaign among them, and a reason (among 
others) for the campaign’s success.  However unequal, the Arya Samaj dharmprachārak and his 
Depressed Class interlocutors were engaged in a dialogue, a dialogue in which the concerns and 
objections of the latter shaped the ongoing efforts of the former. 
Gandhi, on the other hand, found the effort to persuade the Depressed Classes of their 
belonging to Hinduism unnecessary.  If there was to be dialogue, it would be among savarn Hindus, the 
only proper actors in what could only be a Hindu drama of sin and expiation.  The Depressed Classes 
themselves were too brutalized by deprivation to articulate or, indeed, to perceive their own needs.110  
This mute and morally rudderless condition being the very definition of “what Harijans are,” educated 
untouchables, and even assertive mass movements like the Ad Dharm, could be removed from the 
picture.  Nomination without persuasion, then, was the centerpiece of Gandhi’s approach.  His remark 
to Ambedkar in fact addressed all of the Depressed Classes: “You cannot escape the situation that you 
are Hindus in spite of your statement to the contrary.” 
 The contrast between the two approaches, however, should not be overdrawn.  In practice, 
neither was the Arya Samaj averse to sometimes calling the Depressed Classes Hindu without their 
consent, nor were Gandhians entirely aloof from aggressive efforts to persuade untouchables to identify 
as Hindu.  We have seen in Śrī Bālmīkī Prakāś that Ami Chand Sharma resorted, at times, to monological 
declarations that the sanitation labor castes are Hindu irrespective of their own thoughts on the matter, 
citing shastras, the census and a pandit of Kashi as authorities.  And as we will see in the next, 
                                                          
110 “[T]he vast mass of Harijans have been rendered so completely helpless that they have no power of resisting 
injustice, even if they wanted to”(Gandhi 1934c). 
171 
 
penultimate section of this chapter, the Harijan Sevak Sangh adopted some practices that were difficult 
to distinguish from those of the Arya Samaj. 
 
The Harijan Sevak Sangh as a Hindu Missionary Organization 
 The Harijan Sevak Sangh has received scant treatment in the historiography of the 1930s and 
1940s.  This lacuna cannot be attributed to the obscurity of the organization’s leadership, which 
included not only Gandhi and Birla but Rameshwari Nehru, Dr. Bidhan Chandra Roy, Amritlal Thakkar 
(Thakkar Baba), N.R. Malkani, and other prominent members of the Congress.111  Nor was the 
organization insignificant in the funds it channeled, the property it owned, the network of schools and 
hostels that it operated, or in its intimate interrelation with the Congress ministries of 1937-39 and the 
Social Welfare Ministry of independent India.  Most importantly from the point of view of this study, the 
Harijan Sevak Sangh had no small impact as a model for and agent of the integration of the Depressed 
Classes into the political and educational structures of the emergent nation. 
 The few descriptions of the organization that do appear in studies of the period take note of two 
of its major endeavors: providing educational opportunities for untouchables and spreading propaganda 
against untouchability among Hindus.  Christophe Jaffrelot’s (2005:70) summary is representative112:  
The League, which was renamed the Harijan Sevak Sangh (Association for Serving 
Harijans), focused its activities – thanks to Birla’s funds – on helping Untouchables in a 
paternalistic manner: it aimed to help their social advancement, notably in the field of 
                                                          
111 Nehru was editor of Strī Darpan, founder and president of the All India Women’s Conference, and marital 
cousin of Jawaharlal Nehru; Roy was the second chief minister and “architect” of West Bengal; Thakkar was a 
renowned social worker and member of the Constituent Assembly until his death in 1950; Malkani was Member of 
Parliament 1952-1962. 
112 Gyanendra Pandey’s (2002:57) treatment is similar: “The Sangh’s activities covered a fairly broad social and 
economic field.  It aimed to secure for Harijans the civic rights enjoyed by other Hindus.  It worked for their 
educational advancement, instituting scholarships and helping to open new preparatory schools, hostels and 
homes for Harijan children.  Attempts were also made to employ Harijans in the offices and welfare centres of the 
Sangh and in newly established industrial homes.”  
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education, while promoting a change of heart among the upper castes. 
 
Characterizations such as these are largely correct: the organization did devote much of its energy and 
resources to education (acquiring, building, and managing schools and residential hostels for Depressed 
Class students, as well as establishing and distributing scholarships for them), and to anti-untouchability 
propaganda targeting Hindu audiences (organizing and funding speeches, conferences, and publications 
like Harijan).  These are also the priorities of the Sangh as laid out in its constitution.113 
 Yet descriptions such as these fail to note another major facet of the organization’s operations, a 
facet revealed not in the formal statements of its constitution but in the periodic reports of regional 
branches of the Sangh published in Harijan, in the Sangh’s annual reports, and in other Sangh literature.  
These sources testify to the high priority the Harijan Sevak Sangh gave to the inculcation of Hindu 
religious teachings, and the eradication of “non-Hindu” practices, among the Depressed Classes.  
Consider this unexceptional extract from the reports of regional HSS branches: 
TAMILNAD REPORT FOR JUNE AND JULY, 1934. 
Religious Matters.  (i) One Mariamman temple was opened at Kallikudi, in Madura 
district, for the exclusive use of Harijans, and three temples are being built at Vellore, 
Kavanur and Arcot, in the North Arcot district.  
(ii) A bhajan mutt has also been built at Arni in North Arcot district and opened on 14-7-
34.  
(iii) Bhajan parties are held every Sunday at Cuddalore in South Arcot district and in Arni 
in North Arcot district.  A bhajan party started from Madura and visited all the taluqs, 
carrying on religious propaganda among Harijans.  Ten meetings were held during the 
period under report.  Various items of propaganda were carried on with the help of the 
Ramakrishna Mutt in North Arcot district (Gopalaswami 1934:239). 
 
The report goes on to detail local Sangh activities under seven further subheadings: Educational, 
Economical, Sanitation, Abstinence, General, Propaganda, and Relief.  Reports prepared by other 
                                                          
113 Point 3 of the constitution reads: “In furtherance of its object the Harijan Sevak Sangh will seek to establish 
contact with caste-Hindus throughout India and show them that untouchability, as it is practiced in Hindu society, 
is repugnant to the fundamental principles of Hinduism and to the best instinct of humanity and it will also serve 
Harijans so as to promote their moral, social and material welfare” (Verma 1971:232). 
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regional HSS secretaries are organized differently; some, for instance, subsume religious activities under 
the category “Propaganda.”  A report from the Central Provinces puts “Religious” after “Education”: 
MAHAKOSHAL (C.P. HINDI) REPORT FOR JUNE AND JULY 34. 
Education: The Harijan Ashram at Burhagar (Jubbulpore), where five Harijan boys are 
being trained in handicrafts as well as in the 3 R’s, is working satisfactorily… 
Religious: Ten kathas were held and two havans performed in Harijan quarters.  On 
rathyatra day, Harijan bhajan parties were also invited and their procession followed 
the rath.  Mahaprasad was also distributed, which both Harijans and caste-Hindus took 
without distinction… The Sangh loses no opportunity of taking Pandits and Mahants to 
Harijan quarters and giving discourses on religious subjects.  Mahant Laxmi Narayan Das 
– a well-known orthodox Mahant of Raipore – paid a visit to the Harijan quarters in 
Jubbulpore and distributed prizes to them (Singh 1934). 
 
Reports such as these suggest a few of the methods by which the Harijan Sevak Sangh disseminated 
Hindu religious instruction and encouraged Hindu religious activity among the Depressed Classes.  
Among these were building Hindu temples for untouchable use,114 encouraging “mixed” Hindu-and-
Harijan observance of Hindu festivals, and the introduction of Vedic rites like the havan (suggesting Arya 
Samaj influence).  In Madurai and throughout Tamil country the HSS dazzled untouchable audiences 
with a Petromax-powered magic lantern show featuring “Puranic” slides accompanied by explication 
(Madura Harijan Sevak Sangh Work 1936).  Throughout India HSS “prachāraks” preached the Ramayana, 
Mahabharata, and Puranas.  
The most ubiquitous approach was the teaching and circulation of Hindu devotional songs – 
bhajans and kirtans.  “There were sankirtan and bhajan parties organized in many localities of Orissa, 
both towns and villages, particularly in Ganjam, Puri and Balasore Districts,” notes a typical report, 
adding enigmatically that “the Harijans organized separate kirtan parties of their own and joined Caste 
Hindu kirtans during epidemics” (Utkal Report (for 1934-35) 1936:75).  In Mysore the HSS “published 
                                                          
114 The question of temple building holds interest for a number of reasons, one being that, in the face of Depressed 
Class criticism of Sangh priorities, Gandhi repeatedly and categorically denied that Sangh funds were used for 
building temples, while the periodic reports of regional HSS boards at times contradicted this, and the Sangh’s 
General Secretary Thakkar, famously scrupulous in his accounting, at times mentions temple construction as 
among the planned and budgeted activities of the Sangh. 
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5,000 copies of Harijana Bhajanavali in Kanarese, being selections from Saint Purandaradas.  The Harijan 
school masters were particularly taught these songs” (Ramchandra 1933).  Like other aspects of 
“untouchable uplift,” Bhajan sessions were painstakingly quantified, as in this monthly report from 
Rajputana: “7 bhajan kirtans were held in Harijan mohallas.  8 kathas from religious scriptures were 
recited to Harijan gatherings” (Sharma 1934).  Wherever the Sangh went – from Karachi to Cuttack and 
from Ajmer to Alleppey – the anthems of Hindu devotionalism resounded.  Teaching and circulating 
bhajans as a means of imparting religious knowledge was not only the initiative of local HSS activists; it 
was promoted at every level of the organization.  In her account of The Harijan Movement, Rameshwari 
Nehru (1940:9) – a member of the Sangh’s Central Board from the beginning and its President (after 
Birla) from 1959 to 1965 – elaborated that “Harikirtans and Katha recitals (the reading of the sacred 
books)” were key to the “cultural side” of the Sangh’s activity.  In a conversation with M.C. Rajah 
specifically on bhajans as a vehicle for “intensive religious propaganda among Harijans,” Gandhi praised 
both southern and northern provincial HSS leaders for their promotion of bhajans (Desai 1936a:50).  
Moreover, in the pages of Harijan Gandhi (1933b) exhorted Hindu students to spend their school 
vacations among Harijans, “reading to them simple stories from the Ramayan and the Mahabharat” and 
“teaching them simple bhajans,” in addition to cleaning the Harijans’ quarters, bathing their children, 
giving them lessons in hygiene and providing them medical aid. 
Alongside teaching Hinduism, the Sangh also devoted resources to convincing the Depressed 
Classes to give up “un-Hindu practices.”  Propaganda, Gandhi (1933b:4, emphasis added) explained in an 
article directed at Depressed Class critics, meant “holding Harijan conferences and the like for the 
purpose of telling the Harijans what is being done by the caste-Hindus and what is expected of Harijans 
in the way of internal reform, such as observance of the laws of sanitation and giving up carrion-eating 
and other un-Hindu practices.”  Gandhi did not go on to enumerate what other un-Hindu practices he 
had in mind, and in the columns of Harijan he scrupulously avoided mentioning several of the practices 
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that Arya Samajist activists among the Depressed Classes, like Ami Chand Sharma and Swami 
Shraddhanand, described and deplored: circumcision, Islamic marriage and death rituals, giving children 
Muslim and Christian names, the rites of Lal Beg, and so on.  To discuss these would be to invite Muslim 
criticism of the Sangh’s efforts as communally motivated.  It would also be to draw attention to a 
fundamental flaw in the premise on which the Sangh’s efforts were hung, the idea that untouchables 
were already Hindu.  Instead, Gandhi and his colleagues restricted their discussion to practices unlikely 
to attract attention on communal grounds: the consumption of liquor and carrion. 
In much HSS literature, abandoning liquor and carrion appears to be a self-evident good, a 
matter of hygiene and health, a desideratum for the Depressed Classes not contingent on a particular 
religious or communal position.  Depressed Class organizations largely held this view as well; Ambedkar, 
for example, exhorted his caste fellows to give up drink and carrion not on the grounds that these were 
un-Hindu practices, but because their effects were deleterious.  The efforts of the Harijan Sevak Sangh 
on this front featured a slippage between this apparently religiously neutral reason and specifically 
Hindu reasons.  Neither Depressed Class nor Hindu reformists of this time disputed the damage caused 
by heavy alcohol consumption or the desirability of curbing it.  But Gandhi (2000:vols. 62, p.186) also 
recognized the significance of liquor in the religious life of the Depressed Classes: “I know that alcohol is 
used even in their rituals.”  He knew, for example, that among “Harijans of Mysore,” liquor routinely 
played a role in ritual animal sacrifice before deities (Gandhi 1946d).  Then, as now (see chapter VII), 
Dalit religion frequently involved oblations of alcohol to subaltern gods.  For Gandhi this untouchable 
tradition constituted an “evil that has been handed down through the ages” that must “be wiped out of 
existence” (ibid.).  Similarly, Gandhi (1933a) understood carrion-eating in religious terms: “the eating of 
carrion is a most filthy habit, regarded as one of the heinous sins in Hindu Scriptures, and it is essential 
that at this hour of self-purification our Harijan brethren should be helped to get rid of this habit.”  Yet 
the abhorrence of carrion-eating that elites in this period often couched in the language of hygiene, 
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upon scrutiny, amounted to nothing but the religious or communal objection against beef-eating.  As 
Swami Shraddhanand (1946:134) had astutely pointed out to Gandhi in 1921, the discourse of hygiene 
was disingenuously applied to this context, since untouchables, in the ordinary course of things, 
consumed the flesh of cattle immediately upon the latter’s death.  In practice the difference between 
the meat of slaughtered and naturally expired kine was fine indeed.  And in fact, Gandhi’s own 
comments and the reportage of HSS secretaries confirms that the overt goal of eradicating carrion-
eating frequently was conflated with the goal of eradicating beef-eating, and ultimately meat-eating 
altogether.  Thus in the last analysis, beef “being forbidden in Hinduism… carrion and beef eating must 
be given up” (Gandhi 2000:vol. 57, p. 413).  The Sangh took up the cause of radically transforming the 
dietary practices of the Depressed Classes with zeal, resulting in reports like this from Bengal:   
ABSTINENCE: – As a result of propaganda work, 450 Harijans of Bolpur, in the district of 
Birbhum, have given up drinking habits and 1,275 Muchis (Chamar) have taken a vow 
not to take beef.  In the Midnapur town, the Mehtars brought flesh of a dead horse to 
eat; but at the endeavour of the district committee [of the HSS] they gave it up.  As a 
result of propaganda work, in almost all the districts the Harijans are giving up eating 
flesh of dead animals and, in many places, drinking (Roy 1933). 
  
The Lal Begi oral tradition, as we have seen, gives sanction, perhaps even sacrality, to the idea of a 
communal feast on horse flesh (see Chapter III).  That the Bengal HSS prevails upon the Mehtars of 
Midnapur to desist from this tradition suggests the kinds of shifts being brought about by Gandhian 
“untouchable uplift,” shifts inadequately represented by the rubric of carrion and liquor.  
In its efforts to spread Hindu teachings and discourage un-Hindu practice among the Depressed 
Classes, the Harijan Sevak Sangh often collaborated with other Hindu reformist organizations and 
individuals.  Not infrequently in the pages of Harijan, Gandhi and his colleagues published letters from 
individuals unaffiliated with the HSS yet engaged in “untouchable uplift.”  For example, Gandhi lauded 
the work of a group of Hindu “sisters” who lived among “bhangis” in Orissa and who, by their own 
account, “give instructions in the three R’s to the girls, teach them bhajans and read to them simple 
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religious books.  We distribute medicines amongst the ailing inhabitants, clean their quarters, report 
their special difficulties to the Committee, and we put before the womenfolk the desirability of 
refraining from eating beef or carrion” (Gandhi 2000:vol. 60, p. 145).  Elsewhere the HSS coordinated 
activities and combined resources with like-minded organizations.  We have seen that the Tamilnad HSS 
took assistance from the Ramakrishna Mission in the dissemination of religious propaganda 
(Gopalaswami 1934:239).  The Bengal HSS coordinated movements with activists of the local Hindu Sava 
(Roy 1933:2).  In UP, the HSS appears to have worked together at times with Malaviya’s Hindu 
Mahasabha (Verma 1971:142).  In parts of north India, the HSS not only worked alongside but shared 
personnel with the Arya Samaj (Sundar 1933:7; Desai 1936b:57).  For instance, during his stay with the 
HSS colony in Delhi overseen by N.R. Malkani, Gandhi discovered that “many of [the Harijan Sevaks] 
belonged to the Arya Samaj” and claimed allegiance to Swami Shraddhanand (Desai 1936b:57).115 
At times, the Harijan Sevak Sangh’s efforts to promote Hinduism among the Depressed Classes 
went beyond the dissemination of religious teaching and dissuasion from “un-Hindu” practice, and took 
on more clearly the rhetorical forms and practices of the Arya Samaj’s and the Hindu Mahasabha’s 
campaigns to win the untouchables for Hinduism.  A summary of the Sangh’s annual report for 1936, 
documenting activities in the months following Ambedkar’s decisive announcement that he would not 
die a Hindu,116 reflects a ramping up of the organization’s efforts in the religious domain:  
All branches of the Sangh devoted attention to the religious education of Harijans.  
Reading of the Ramayana, Mahabharata, Geeta and other religious books was 
undertaken at nearly 1300 centres run by the Sangh.  More than one thousand bhajan 
parties were organised in Kerala on the temple-entry question.  In Mysore State, 40 
bhajan mandirs were built and 19 were under construction.  Vedic rites were introduced 
in the marriage customs of Harijans so as to make them simple and give them a really 
                                                          
115 “On the last day of our stay in the Colony Gandhiji met a number of Harijan sevaks working in Delhi and its 
neighbourhood.  Many of them belonged to the Arya Samaj and said, “We received our inspiration from Swami 
Shraddhanandji.”  “Not only you,” said Gandhiji, “but many of us received inspiration from the noble life of the late 
Swamiji” (Desai 1936b:57). 




religious character.  Harijan children were given opportunity to attend caste-Hindu 
marriages.  At Allahabad and elsewhere, the Diksha Sanskar was held (Verma 1971:142). 
 
The first several entries indicate a mere acceleration in the Sangh’s usual activities, but with the mention 
of the “Diksha Sanskar” (dīkṣā saṃskār) the Sangh enters a new terrain.  Dīkṣā saṃskār was Madan 
Mohan Malaviya’s variant on shuddhi; it was, at the time, the Mahasabha’s means of ritually formalizing 
the Hindu identity of untouchables.   
In the same year Birla and Rameshwari Nehru, representing the Sangh, made tours of 
Travancore, where the regional HSS secretary voiced distress over mass conversions of Ezhavas to 
Christianity (Desai 1936c).  In her speeches Nehru repeatedly admonished Ezhava women to “remain 
loyal to Hinduism and help to purify it,” and to prevent their men from converting to Christianity (Desai 
1936d:121–22).  In her choice of words she borrowed directly from Gandhi, who in the months following 
Ambedkar’s announcement repeatedly invoked Harijan “loyalty” to Hinduism.  For example: 
It speaks volumes for their loyalty or for the innate virtue of Hinduism that millions of 
Harijans have clung to it in spite of the inhumanities to which in the name of that very 
faith they have been subjected.  This wonderful loyalty of Harijans and their 
unexampled patience render it imperative for every Savarna Hindu to see that Harijans 
receive the same treatment that every other Hindu does (Gandhi 1936a). 
 
More than Nehru and others in the HSS leadership, Gandhi was careful not to decry Depressed Class 
conversion to Christianity or Islam.  Nonetheless, it would be difficult to interpret his praise of Harijan 
“loyalty” to Hinduism, often (as in the above passage) expressly in the context of Ambedkar’s “threat” to 
convert, as not containing an appeal to Harijans to “remain” Hindu.  Nehru, Birla and the Sangh’s 
regional activists made the appeal explicitly.  The struggle was not confined to Travancore or the 
immediate aftermath of Ambedkar’s “bombshell.”  In 1944, after the Sangh provided legal support to 
members of the Depressed Classes fighting criminal cases against caste Hindus in Punjab, the regional 
report notes with pleasure that “about 365 Harijan converts rejoined Hinduism” (Thakkar 1946:35). 
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Gandhi’s criticism of the vexed competition for Depressed Class religious allegiance notwithstanding, his 
Harijan Sevak Sangh was a combatant in that very arena.  
 William Gould has demonstrated that Muslim observers and British administrators perceived 
Gandhi’s and the Congress’s involvement in untouchable uplift from 1932 onward as reminiscent of the 
aggressive shuddhi campaigns of the 1920s.  Gandhian efforts “created a direct link with the Arya Samaj 
in the minds of officials and Muslims”; Harijan uplift campaigns “resembled movements of conversion 
more than simple campaigns for social reform” (Gould 2004:113–14).  As I have tried to demonstrate, 
this was not merely a matter of perception or resemblance.  If the labors of the Harijan Sevak Sangh 
“resembled” the Hinduizing efforts of the Arya Samaj or the Hindu Mahasabha, this was because (1) at 
times they took the same form – “reconversion,” diksha sanskar – or were taken up conjointly with the 
latter bodies; (2) many HSS activists belonged to or were open supporters of the Arya Samaj (from rank 
and file Harijan Sevaks to Birla); and most importantly, (3) despite differences in approach, the HSS was 
ultimately bringing about the same radical transformation that the Samaj and the Mahasabha sought to 
realize: fundamentally redrawing the borders of Hindu society to encompass its erstwhile others, 
redefining the unruly religious traditions of the untouchables as Hindu. 
 
Synthesis and Habit 
 The Sangh carried on the legacy of the Arya Samaj and Swami Shraddhanand in other ways as 
well.  In 1925 Shraddhanand had wired Gandhi the following: “Kindly propose that every Hindu member 
of the All-India Congress Committee who can afford should engage at least one servant from among the 
untouchables for personal service, those not conforming to this rule to vacate office” (Jordens 
1981:147).  This model of untouchable “integration” appealed to Gandhi; he lauded Shraddhand’s idea 
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at an anti-untouchability rally in UP later in the year (Gandhi 2000:vols. 33, p.125).117  The proposal 
ultimately gained traction not in the Congress itself, but in the bye-laws under the constitution of the 
Harijan Sevak Sangh: 
No one shall be a member of any Board, unless he or she performs some definite 
service, e.g. having a Harijan in his or her house as a member of the family, or at least as 
a domestic servant, or is teaching a Harijan or Harijans or is paying a regular visit to 
Harijan quarters and cleaning them, or if he or she is a doctor, treating Harijan patients 
free of charge, etc. (Verma 1971:239). 
 
Though it was created six years after his death, the Harijan Sevak Sangh bore the impress of Swami 
Shraddhanand in this and many other ways.  HSS leaders like Birla, Rameshwari Nehru and N.R. Malkani 
waxed eloquent on the Arya Samaj’s and Shraddhanand’s foundational contribution to the untouchable 
uplift movement;118 unlike Gandhi, they did not qualify their admiration with criticism of the Samaj’s 
aggressive methods or openly communalist rhetoric.    
Like the Arya Samaj, the HSS sought to retain central tenets of brahminical orthodoxy regarding 
the untouchables even as it rejected others.  HSS literature held to the idea that “a man is born as an 
untouchable because of the sins that he committed in past lives” and that he should strive in this life to 
“get over these sins and expiate himself” (Verma 1971:3); on his Harijan tour Gandhi spoke not only of 
the external dirtiness of Harijans but also of his hopes that “the Harijans would also clean their inner-self 
with Ram Nam” (ibid.:100).  We have seen that Arya Samaj activists like Ami Chand Sharma, far from 
criticizing the brahminical shastric tradition for the regime of disabilities it unambiguously imposes on 
untouchables, cited shastras as legitimate sources of religious and social authority.  Likewise HSS leaders 
like Rameshwari Nehru (1940:4–5) denied the responsibility of the brahminical tradition in creating 
untouchability and invoked the shastras as authoritative statements on human equality.  Others, like 
                                                          
117 The Leader of 21 October 1925 noted that in his Sitapur speech: “He [Gandhi] also endorsed Swami 
Shraddhanand’s suggestions that as a practical measure to remove untouchability each high-caste Hindu family 
should keep a person belonging to some so-called untouchable class.”(Gandhi 2000:vols. 33, p.125) 
118 See, e.g., Nehru 1940:6; Malkani 1965:132. 
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N.R. Malkani, went further.  Malkani – a close associate of Birla in the operations of the Delhi HSS from 
the early 1930s, Vice President of the Sangh in the 1960s, Member of Parliament from 1952-1962 and 
Chairman of two parliamentary committees on the conditions of Indian sanitation workers – not only 
exonerated the brahminical tradition but, precisely in the tradition of Swami Shraddhanand, laid the 
plight of the sanitation labor castes at the feet of the Muslims.  “The Bhangi,” he wrote, “is essentially a 
recent product of urban life, first created as an occupation by Moslems and later, in British rule, made 
into a hereditary caste” (Malkani 1965:137).  Here and repeatedly in his writing, Malkani (ibid.:10, 25-26, 
137) advanced the specious claim that “the Muslim built the latrine” in India, that the enclosed toilet 
“has never been brought in as a part of our Hindu houses,” and thus that Muslims are responsible for 
the origins of the sanitation labor castes and of the most despised facet of their occupation.  Though 
Malkani adduces no evidence and does not address textual and archaeological evidence of manual 
scavenging prior to the “Muslim period,” scholarship in Hindi and English continues to cite Malkani as an 
authority on this point (see, e.g., Shyamlal [1997:24, 38], Valmiki [2008]). 
If this demonstrates how a Hindu nationalist canard, and more generally Shraddhanand’s 
aggressive approach to untouchable integration, thrived and gained respectability in the Harijan Sevak 
Sangh, another aspect of Malkani’s writing illustrates the Sangh’s characteristic fusion of Arya Samajist 
and Gandhian methods.  Malkani, like Ami Chand Sharma before him, had years of experience working 
among the sanitation labor castes, and knew well the degree to which their religious life reflected a 
profound engagement with Islam.  He presented this ethnographic datum in a manner that brought 
together the representational practices of Sharma (i.e., to acknowledge the Muslim practices of 
untouchables yet deny their significance) and of Gandhi (i.e., to declare them Hindu Bhangis irrespective 
of, indeed “in spite of,” what they call themselves).  For example:  
Some Bhangis of Panjab are known as ‘Baleshahis’ who are followers of the great 
Moslem disciple of Guru Nanak.  Others call themselves ‘Lal Begis’ i.e. followers of a 
Moslem Pir of that name.  A few are followers of another Moslem Pir known as MIRA 
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and offer him worship in the Moslem way and even adopt Moslem personal names.  But 
in spite of these Moslem appellations or even modes of worship, all the Bhangis are and 
have remained as staunch Hindus throughout the vicissitudes that Hinduism 
experienced during Moslem rule (Malkani 1965:131). 
 
When Malkani wrote this, he was as a retired legislator and respected social worker in independent 
India.  His contentions – unlike those of Shraddhanand and Ami Chand Sharma before him – were not 
met by skepticism, repudiation and allegations of communalist intent.  On the contrary, Malkani was 
able to assert the transtemporal, “staunch” Hindu identity of the sanitation labor castes from a position 
wrapped in the moral authority of Gandhi’s legacy and backed by the bureaucratic authority of the 
postcolonial state.  When a handful of radical Aryas in 1900 acted on the premise that untouchables 
could be co-religionists with Hindus, they were condemned and excommunicated from their castes by 
fellow Hindus.  Fifty years later, this premise had become the law of a popular government.  The 
Congress administration in 1950 issued a Presidential Order, the “Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order 
of 1950,” that defined who would and who would not be recognized by the state as having suffered the 
disabilities of untouchability.  It declared that “[N]o person who professes a religion different from the 
Hindu religion shall be deemed to be a member of a Scheduled Caste.”119  If, as I have argued, Gandhi’s 
signal approach to untouchable integration in the nation as Hindus hinged on a monological assertion of 
nominative power over a population defined as mute, then the Presidential Order of 1950 was its 
apotheosis.  
N.R. Malkani brings this chapter to a fitting close.  His decades of work in the Harijan Sevak 
Sangh and his intimate association with Birla and Gandhi laid the groundwork for his career as a 
Congressman and authority on the sanitation labor castes in the India of the 1950s and 1960s.  In many 
ways he embodied the synthesis of Arya Samajist and Gandhian approaches to “untouchable uplift” that 
the Sangh practiced.  This confluence of aggressive and aloof, persuasive and nominative approaches to 
                                                          
119 Years later Sikhs (1956) and Buddhists (1990) were added to the ranks of the recognized.  
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achieving an “indivisible family” of Hinduism became institutional habit for the Sangh.  Malkani and men 
like him, Gandhian Congressmen who bridged the second and third quarters of the twentieth century, 
helped inculcate this habit in the Congress at large, in the institutions of the independent state, and in 
the first generation of sanitation labor caste politicians to be patronized by the Congress.  As we will see, 
the collaboration of the Arya Samaj and the Congress that this chapter has charted continued in the 
aftermath of independence.  The following chapter will chart the history of this collaborative Hinduizing 





Hinduization and its Discontents: Lucknow, 1947-2011 
 
 In 1947, the sanitation labor castes of Lucknow neither referred to themselves as Balmiki nor 
were referred to by others as such.  As Lalta Prasad,120 born in 1923, put it, “In my childhood we were all 
Lal Begis.  When I was eight, ten, twelve years old, there was not even mention of the name Valmiki.”  
The Lal Begis of Lucknow and nearby districts121 had, in 1947, predominantly Muslim names: female 
names like Rukhsana, Nazira, and Allah Rakhi; male names like Nabbu, Ramzanu, and Anwar.  They did 
not enter Hindu temples and only a few entered mosques; religious life centered on the home, the Lal 
Beg shrine, and Sufi shrines like Dewa Sharif (where the 583 panchayat regularly met) and the tomb of 
Zohra Bibi in Rudauli (where Lal Begis served a ritual function in the annual festival [Nevill 1904:53–54]).  
Brahmins played no role, and Muslims a major role, in Lal Begi ritual life: officiating at burials, rendering 
halal the sacrifice to Lal Beg, and reciting the fātiḥa at nuptials and innumerable domestic ritual 
occasions.  Meat, cooked in rounded cauldrons (deg) provided by Muslim patrons, was invariably served 
at Lal Begi weddings.  Among Lal Begi women the Ramadan fast was widely observed; women and men 
both carried replicas of Karbala (tāziya) in the city’s renowned Muharram processions.  
 A little over sixty years later, in 2011-12, I met not a single person in Lucknow who referred to 
himself or herself as Lal Begi – at least not initially, and not in mixed company.  Most men and many 
women in the community called themselves Balmiki (or Valmiki); Balmiki was also the prevailing term 
used by others to denote the sanitation labor castes.  Hindu names predominated: female names like 
Shanti, Sunita and Asha; male names like Ganesh, Vinod, and Ram Kumar.  Entering, and performing 
                                                          
120 This was his real name.  See footnote 1.    
121 Primarily Bara Banki and the rural parts of Lucknow district, but also Bahraich, Gonda, and parts of Sitapur and 
Faizabad.  This is the heartland of the “583s,” the qabila (tribe) or regional unit of the Chuhra/Bhangi caste that 
predominates among the sanitation labor castes in Awadh (see Chapter I). 
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worship in, the city’s Hindu temples, while far from a central religious practice in the community, was 
now commonplace enough; and now each of the larger Balmiki neighborhoods had its own Rishi Valmiki 
temple.  Brahmins, in 2012, officiated at more than a few weddings and other ritual occasions (see 
Chapter VI).  Cremation was on the rise.  At wedding feasts vegetarian preparations had begun to 
outstrip biryani and mutton curry; the “Muslim” deg had vanished altogether, replaced by the flat-
bottomed bhagaunā, a “Hindu” cooking vessel.  No one fasted for Ramadan anymore; as one great-
grandmother told me, the era of keeping roza had passed: “Ab zamāna badal gayā, bhaiya.  Zamāna 
nahīṅ hai voh.” 
 How did all this transpire?  How did a people who, at the moment of the emergence of 
independent India, understood themselves to be neither Muslim nor Hindu but more intimately linked 
with the former, come to radically restructure their intimate, communitarian, and public practices, to 
resignify as Hindu the very fabric of everyday community life?  Who advocated these ruptures and 
innovations, on what grounds, and through what media?  What resistance did the Hinduizing effort 
meet, from what quarters, and by what operations was it overcome?  This chapter narrows from the all-
India scale of the previous two chapters to consider how the developments discussed therein played out 
in the city of Lucknow.  In Chapter III we sketched the contours of the religious tradition of the sanitation 
labor castes across northern South Asia, and its alterity from that of the Hindus, at the turn of the 
twentieth century.  Chapter IV retained that breadth of scale to examine how nationalists sought to 
deny that alterity in representation, and transform those autonomous traditions in practice, in the 
interests of securing the Depressed Classes for the Hindu community in the 1920s and 1930s.  This 
chapter shifts from a macro- to a micro-register to provide an account of how these interventionist 
efforts took shape in Lucknow, the capital city of the most populous state in postcolonial India. 
 The actors in this account are primarily members of the sanitation labor castes.  The previous 
chapter emphasized the labors of privileged caste individuals and their organizations in replotting the 
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coordinates of Indian society.  While the narrative of this chapter is not without similar figures – Govind 
Ballabh Pant, for example, and privileged caste leaders of the Lucknow Arya Samaj – what is stressed 
here is the passing of the leadership of the Hinduizing project into the hands of members of the Dalit122 
community itself.  As we will see, the Congress and the Arya Samaj continue to loom large in the 
narrative; what changes is that these organizations by the 1950s have drawn individuals from the 
sanitation labor castes into their ranks – the Congress and the Samaj now have a Balmiki “face.”  This 
chapter thus addresses the concern raised by Rawat (2011) and Adcock (2014) that previous scholarship 
figured Dalits as passive objects of Hindu reform, whereas much Arya Samaj activism was, in fact, 
prompted by Dalit initiative and Dalits, having become members of the Arya Samaj, played a role in 
shaping the organization and its agenda.  These are valid critiques of the dominant historiography; they 
apply to writing on the Congress as well.  The purpose of this chapter, however, is not to unearth and 
valorize Dalit agency but to account for the Hinduization of the sanitation labor castes of Lucknow in a 
way that faithfully reflects the available sources; and in such an account the limits within which Dalit 
Congressmen and Arya Samajists found their efforts constrained are no less significant than the agentive 
capacity their organizational positions afforded them. 
 One question that haunts this study and others like it is why particular Dalit groups, under 
particular historical conditions, embrace or appear to embrace a politics that valorizes brahminical 
ideology, when the ontological inferiority of Dalits is an axiom of that very ideology (Bandyopadhyay 
1997; Dube 1998; Prashad 2000; Narayana 2009; Rawat 2011).  In Vijay Prashad’s (2000:x) formulation, 
this is the problem of “the counter-intuitive alliance between activist dalits (at some level committed to 
end the order that enforces dalithood) and the forces of Hindutva (which are committed to the defence 
of that very order).”  Citing allegations of Balmiki participation in the anti-Sikh pogrom in Delhi in 1984, 
                                                          
122 I will use the term “Dalit” in this chapter – unlike in the previous two chapters – since it deals with the second 
half of the twentieth century, the period when the term rose from relative obscurity to relative ubiquity in public 
discourse.  For a discussion of nomenclature see Chapter I. 
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and subsequently in smaller-scale skirmishes with Muslims in Delhi and parts of UP, Prashad (ibid:ix-xi) 
draws attention to the stakes of Dalit enrollment in the politics of Hindu majoritarianism, and frames his 
important study with the question of how this “alliance” came about.123  The question has acquired an 
even sharper sense of urgency in the period following the 2002 pogrom in Gujarat, an instance of 
orchestrated violence against Muslims in which Dalits were widely reported to participate.  
 I must emphasize two points of divergence that separate this study from others that engage this 
problematic.  Both pertain to analytical framing, while one also relates to the nature of the case being 
studied.  What frames this study is not, as it is for others, the presentist concern of how Dalits have been 
drawn into Hindu nationalist mobilizations since the 1980s.  This is a question of great consequence on 
which significant work is being done.  Yet all too often the analysis of this phenomenon is hampered by 
its traffic in the terms of the regnant sociological commonsense, which misapprehends as primordial 
social facts the identifications of a modern regime of recognition.  In these terms the problem is one of 
how a set of “low caste” Hindus is drawn into Hindu nationalist projects; a matter not of conversion but 
of politicization or radicalization.  Our study, in contrast, by tracing the history of the premise that Dalits 
were originally or essentially Hindu, demonstrates that the enrollment of Dalits in Hindu nationalist 
projects was concurrent and co-dependent with the promulgation of this premise among the Dalit 
population from the 1920s onward.  In other words, for Dalits, becoming Hindu was from the beginning 
a matter of becoming Hindu nationalist; these were the very terms on which inclusion in the nation was 
extended. 
 The second point of divergence has to do both with the nature of the Lucknow case and the way 
it is to be analyzed.  In Lucknow and its hinterland, unlike in the examples Prashad cites and in Gujarat, 
                                                          
123 Pauline Kolenda (2003:chap. 14) calls into question Prashad’s sources on Balmiki participation in anti-Sikh and 
anti-Muslim violence, concluding that Prashad’s account is “misleading and exaggerated.”  This may be so, but it is 
a matter of scale; that some Balmiki youth participated in some of the violence is not disputed, and the historical 
problematic that such participation poses remains to be addressed.  
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attempts to enlist members of the sanitation labor castes in the commission of acts of Hindu 
majoritarian violence have failed.  Despite the region’s being a focus of concerted Hindu nationalist 
mobilizations around the Babri Masjid, the Balmikis of Awadh – Ayodhya’s backyard – have declined the 
invitation to take arms against Muslims.  To point this out is not to predict that this state of affairs will 
remain in place.  Nor is it to suggest that the stakes of Hindu nationalist efforts to mobilize Dalits are 
lower in Awadh than in other places.  The stakes are the same: life and death, pahchān, the form and 
content of social relations.  What is often missed in studies of communal relations, as Laura Ring (2006) 
has pointed out, is that peace between groups is a product of constant social labor, an accomplishment 
that warrants analysis as much as the accomplishment of violence.  To explain why the sanitation labor 
castes in Awadh have resisted aspects of a Hindu majoritarian program – notably violence against 
religious minorities – even while embracing others, is at least as crucial as to explain why some of their 
caste fellows in other regions have done the opposite.  I do not formulate such an explanation in this 
chapter or the next two, though elements of a theory lie scattered in the material.  I will return to the 
question in the Conclusion.  
 
Cantonment and City 
 Those who remember, though they differ on other matters, agree on this: it was not by just any 
route that Rishi Valmiki, and with him the prospect of Hindu pahchān, arrived in Lucknow city in 1947.  
He came to the city by way of the cantonment.  Kanhaiya Lal was his vehicle. 
The sanitation labor castes of Lucknow have long had two divisions, shaharwāle and kanṭwāle, 
those of the city and those of the cantonment. 124  This bifurcated condition stretches back, as so much 
                                                          
124 This is simplifying the matter somewhat for exposition.  In fact there is a third division formed by a separate 
caste, the Dhanuks, who predominate in parts of south-central UP and also have a presence in Punjab.  Dhanuks in 
Lucknow constitute a significant part of the city (not cantonment) sanitation labor force.  The two divisions with 
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does in Lucknow, to the revolt of 1857.  In the years following the insurrection the colonial state not 
only razed to the ground two fifths of the old city of Lucknow but relocated and expanded its military 
installation to an immense campus just southeast of the city.  The new cantonment, though spatially 
proximate, was segregated from the city in myriad ways, including administratively (Oldenburg 2010:33, 
48–55).  In domains like sanitation, the parallel administrations of city and cantonment recruited 
differently: the former locally, following nawabi precedent, and the latter through networks of mobile 
military service labor that extended, web-like, from cantonment to cantonment, often bypassing whole 
regions in between.  This late nineteenth century configuration has remained, at least insofar as the 
distribution of sanitation laborers is concerned, largely undisturbed for the subsequent century and a 
half. 
The shaharwāle, then, understand themselves as locals – the locality being the region of Awadh, 
i.e., Lucknow and its hinterland.  They are people with deep roots in the Awadh countryside, speakers of 
Awadhi, people whose earlier generations worked for the nawabs and the landed gentry.  Virtually every 
shaharwāle family has kin, or used to, in the villages of the adjacent districts of Bara Banki and Sitapur.  
To a great degree the shaharwāle are co-extensive with the pāñch sau tirāsī (the five hundred eighty-
threes or 583s – see Chapter I), the name of the caste’s dominant regional panchayat.125  Marriages are 
local:  wedding processions rarely travel beyond Bara Banki, and often remain within Lucknow itself.     
The cantonment faction, on the other hand, has been mobile since at least colonial times.  The 
marriage processions of the kanṭwāle trace the vectors of old labor migrations: they journey to Kanpur, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
which I am concerned here, though, are within the Chuhra/Bhangi caste, the caste now overwhelmingly known as 
Balmiki.  Constraints of space prevent me here from taking up the highly relevant case of the parallel Hinduizing 
movement among the Dhanuks, which revolves around the figure of Supach Sudarshan, iconographically almost 
indistinguishable from Rishi Valmiki.  See Chapter I. 
125 Panchayat here denotes a unit of caste self-governance.  Much smaller regional panchayats historically live on 
the borders of the territorial domain of the 583s (bounded by the Gomti and the Gaghra, Mahmoudabad and 
Faizabad) and not infrequently intermarry with the 583s: the bārā ghar (twelve houses), the bayāsī (eighty-two), 
the hazāra (thousand).  But the 583s constitute the overwhelming majority of the shaharwāle. 
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Kolkata, Delhi, Meerut, Amritsar, Sagar, Jaipur.  Rarely do they marry their caste fellows in the city; 
indeed, something of the aloofness of British cantonment culture lingers on in the hint of hauteur with 
which some kanṭwāle regard their city counterparts, the coolness of cosmopolitans toward rustic 
cousins.126  Those kanṭwāle who are not employed in cleaning the cantonment often find employment 
in the railways, strengthening their links to a transregional caste network.  News travels along this 
network, as do holy men, ideas, and rumors. 
It comes as no surprise, then, that the person universally credited with inaugurating the Valmiki 
movement in Lucknow was a man not of the city but of the cantonment.  This was Kanhaiya Lal, known 
to history if not to his parents as Kanhaiya Lal Balmiki.127  Like most kanṭwāle families, Kanhaiya Lal’s had 
migrated from elsewhere; his parents came from Bareilly.  Despite almost all schools in the 1920s being 
closed to Depressed Class children, Kanhaiya Lal’s parents managed to arrange for tutors to instruct him 
in Urdu and Hindi.  He did some sanitation work as a child but primarily worked as a khānsāma (cook) 
and manager in the cantonment mess; some say he also cooked in English homes.  In his free time he 
earned a reputation as a formidable pahalwān (wrestler), lāṭhībāz (cudgel fighter), and boxer (having 
learned the sport from British soldiers).  He was also known for his charisma and striking appearance.  
Fair-complexioned and well over six feet tall, he was said to have inherited the features of his mother, 
who, according to family lore, looked like a Pathan. 
                                                          
126 There is, of course, a kind of irony in the shaharwāle – literally “city people” – being characterized as rustics in 
this binary.  Yet the characterization is widespread and accepted by more than a few shaharwāle as well.  This 
state of affairs owes much to British colonial policy, which, both wittingly and unwittingly, enervated and 
marginalized the foundations of nawabi cosmopolitanism, reducing Lucknow from a cultural fountainhead to a 
relative backwater (on which see Oldenburg 2010).  It also has to do with more recent labor migrations: a majority 
of the shaharwāle have migrated to the city from rural Awadh in the post-independence period, so that the “city 
people” are in fact closer – temporally, culturally – to the countryside than their cantonment counterparts, who 
have not lived in villages for generations. 
127 The Kanhaiya Lal Balmiki of our narrative should not be confused with Kanhaiya Lal Balmiki of Bulandshahr, UP, 
who was a Member of Parliament (Lok Sabha) from 1952 to 1962.  The two Kanhaiya Lals shared a great deal in 
common besides their name – both were Arya Samajists and Congressmen, part of the first generation of Balmiki 
politicians in UP.  They were also friends.  The Bulandshahr Kanhaiya Lal visited our protagonist at his home in 
Lucknow cantonment on several occasions; members of their respective families ultimately intermarried. 
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Kanhaiya Lal often told his grandchildren a story from his early teenage years: he had 
accompanied his father to the edge of a field where an all-night Ramayan recitation was taking place.  It 
was the first time Kanhaiya Lal had heard the epic.  Rapt in the performance, Kanhaiya Lal closed his 
eyes, imagining himself to be in the court of Ram itself.  His father, thinking him asleep, shouted for him 
to wake up.  After this experience Kanhaiya Lal resolved to learn the Ramayan himself.  Over about 
twelve years of self-guided study he memorized the entire epic and began to perform recitations of his 
own.  His voice impressed listeners and he began to be invited to sing portions of the Ramayan at Hindu 
gatherings – not in temples, for his caste was no secret, but at outdoor venues like the one at which he 
was initially inspired.  It was his Ramayan performances that brought him to the attention of the 
Lucknow cantonment’s Arya Samaj. 
As Kanhaiya Lal’s daughter put it: “They were all baniyas there [at the Arya Samaj].  Slowly, 
slowly, slowly, slowly, he began to join them…  The meaning of Arya Samaj was – caste (jāt pāt) does not 
matter here.”  Kanhaiya Lal formally joined the Arya Samaj.  He donned the sacred thread, attended 
Samaj meetings regularly, and introduced vegetarianism and Vedic ritual at home.  He was Lucknow’s 
first Arya Samajist from the sanitation labor castes. 
Kanhaiya Lal also kept company with peripatetic sadhus from his caste, including those of the 
lineage of Khakshah Baba, said to have been one of the Arya Samajist Ami Chand Sharma’s interlocutors 
(see Chapter IV).  Khakshah Baba died and was buried not far from Lucknow in Sitapur District.  While 
the relationship of this order of sadhus to the Arya Samaj is complex, one element of the complexity is 
the brotherhood’s reproduction in its own devotional literature of extensive passages of Sharma’s Śrī 
Bālmīkī Prakāś, without acknowledgement of the source (e.g., Bauhat 1996).  It is unclear whether 
Kanhaiya Lal first encountered the message of Rishi Valmiki’s link to the sanitation labor castes from the 
privileged caste Arya Samajists of Lucknow cantonment or from the sadhus of Khakshah Baba’s lineage 
who, going to or coming from their founding figure’s ashram in Sitapur, brought news to the 
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cantonment of the Valmiki movement flourishing in Delhi, Punjab, and other points west.  In either case, 
the two contexts reinforced one another.  Kanhaiya Lal began to compose songs – bhajans – in praise of 
Valmiki, verses that highlighted the sanitation labor castes’ newfound origins at the heart of Hindu 
tradition.  One verse that people still remember is this:  
Lal Begi nām chhoṛo, riṣiyoṅ kī santān ho 
(Abandon the name Lal Begi, you are the descendants of sages128) 
It was a call to repudiate Islamicate associations (emblemized by the Lal Begi title) and embrace the 
narrative of a lofty Hindu genealogy – a pithy condensation of the central message of Śrī Bālmīkī Prakāś.  
Yet, while adopting the Arya Samajist narrative, Kanhaiya Lal’s verses also subverted it on a key point: 
the sanitation labor castes here were not the descendants of Rishi Valmiki’s “untouchable” disciples, as 
Sharma would have it, but rather descendants by blood.  This deft reworking of the message bore the 
implication that either Valmiki was a Chuhṛā or the sanitation labor castes were brahmins, either of 
which potentially presented a problem for brahminical ideology. 
At independence Kanhaiya Lal’s acquaintances in the Arya Samaj recommended him for a 
government job in the new government’s Madh Nishedh Vibhag (Abstinence Department) as a 
prachārak (propagandist, preacher).129  It was no small thing, as a Dalit, to secure a government job in a 
sector unrelated to sanitation labor in 1947; Arya Samaj support undoubtedly strengthened Kanhaiya 
Lal’s case a great deal.  In the Abstinence Department, Kanhaiya Lal’s circle expanded swiftly in two 
directions: on the one hand, he met and grew close with some of the leading lights of the Congress, 
including Ghanshyamdas Birla, Govind Ballabh Pant (then Chief Minister of the United Provinces, soon to 
be Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh) and Chandra Bhanu Gupta (who would be UP’s Chief Minister thrice 
                                                          
128 Or “Abandon the name Lal Begi, be the descendants of sages.”  I am grateful to Frances Pritchett for pointing 
out this potential meaning. 
129 For uses of the term prachārak in Arya Samaj and Harijan Sevak Sangh contexts see Chapter IV. 
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in the 1960s).  On the other, his work – spreading propaganda against drink among the poor of Lucknow 
– led him to the bastīs of the shaharwāle, the 583s, his caste-fellows in the city.  Kanhaiya Lal went from 
neighborhood to neighborhood, convening caste meetings at which he persuaded his brethren to take 
vows against the consumption of liquor and to constitute committees to enforce these vows.  Alongside 
this message of abstinence – his official work – he also advocated a turn to Hinduism.  As one of his 
earliest shaharwāle admirers recalled: “The Arya Samaj people told him [Kanhaiya Lal], ‘These people 
will all become Muslim, so you go and persuade them that they are Hindu and that they should remain 
Hindu.’  So he came to our neighborhoods, held meetings, explained to us that we were Hindu.”130 
He quickly developed a following among a set of young shaharwāle men.  Govind Prasad, one of 
a triumvirate of shaharwāle reformers that would work closely with Kanhaiya Lal in the decades to 
come, described his mentor’s appeal as grounded in a new ethic of self-respect, manifest in his proud 
bearing and manner of speech.  “[Kanhaiya Lal] lived among the English.  Let’s say a policeman, a mere 
constable, shouts to my father, ‘Come here!’  Well my father would fold his hands and with fear and 
trembling stammer, ‘Master, tell me.’  But this Kanhaiya Lal, when even a high level police officer spoke 
to him he would coolly reply, ‘Yes what is it?’  It makes a difference when you’re accustomed to dealing 
with [military] officers every day.”  The revolutionary comportment that Kanhaiya Lal modeled – his 
path-breaking hexis131 – combined with his extraordinary message to win him both admirers and 
enemies.  On the one hand, a group of kanṭwāle elders convened a panchayat that briefly 
excommunicated the upstart reformer.  On the other, he galvanized a group of shaharwāle youth into 
vigorous reformist activity.  For Govind Prasad and others, “He became our leader [netā].” 
                                                          
130 This was Lalta Prasad, in an interview on 3 March 2012.  “Arya Samaj ke logon ne inse kahā, ki ye sab Musalmān 
ho jāenge, āp jo haiṅ inko samjhāie, ki tum Hindu ho, Hindu raho.  To ham logoṅ ke yahān āte the, meeting karte 
the, aur samjhāte the, ki āp log Hindu ho.” 
131 For a discussion of “Harijan hexis” – the habits of bodily carriage that Govind Prasad describes his father as 
having – see William Sax (2009:26).  For a discussion of the importance given to reforming such habits of 
comportment in the project of fashioning a “Dalit habitus,” see Anupama Rao (2009:50–68).  For a discussion of 
the importance of the thought of Pierre Bourdieu (for whom hexis, from Greek, and habitus, from Latin, are key 
concepts) to the study of caste and untouchability, see the work of Maria Joseph Mahalingam. 
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In 1950 Kanhaiya Lal organized Lucknow’s first Valmiki Jayanti – the celebration of Valmiki’s 
birth.  It was held in October in a field in the cantonment near the sanitation labor caste quarters where 
he lived.  Govind Ballabh Pant, the Chief Minister of UP, attended and addressed the gathering as its 
chief guest.  In 1952 independent India’s first elections were held; at Pant’s prompting, the Congress 
fielded Kanhaiya Lal as its candidate for the UP state assembly from the reserved constituency of Pihani 
in Hardoi District.  He won the election, becoming one of the first Balmiki Members of the Legislative 
Assembly (MLA).  He continued to stand for election from Pihani and to win for five consecutive terms, 
until 1974.  In 1956, Kanhaiya Lal built Lucknow’s first Valmiki temple, in Baṛī Lāl Kurti in the 
cantonment.  Ghanshyamdas Birla provided him the funds for the temple, as a plaque therein 
memorializes.  This established a precedent.  Over the next fifty years, another ten Valmiki temples and 
statues would be erected in the city, almost all funded by (and often publicly inaugurated by) privileged 
caste Hindu politicians of the Congress and, later, the BJP: mayors, cabinet ministers, governors, and 
even a prime minister.132  
 
On Being a Congress Harijan 
 At the inaugural Valmiki Jayanti in 1950, Kanhaiya Lal’s political mentor and patron Govind 
Ballabh Pant delivered a speech addressing the sanitation labor castes assembled in the cantonment 
field.  Lalta Prasad, another of the triumvirate of shaharwāle reformists recruited by Kanhaiyya Lal, was 
present for the occasion.  Sixty years after the event, he recalled Pant’s speech to me in this way: 
                                                          
132 Former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee paid for the land on which the Nirala Nagar Valmiki temple was 
erected and laid the foundation stone for the Valmiki temple at the entrance of the KGMC servants’ quarters.  
Other figures who have supplied funds and/or inaugurated Valmiki temples and statues in Lucknow include former 
UP Chief Ministers Kalyan Singh and Ram Prakash Gupta, former UP cabinet minister and Member of Parliament 
Lalji Tandon, Mayor Dinesh Sharma, and former UP governors Motilal Vora and Suraj Bhan.  Bhan, unlike the 
others, was Dalit. 
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Pant ji said, “Look, you people should not abandon sanitation work.”  Pant ji said this, 
these words at least I remember.  Also, “You people, a lot of the young generation go 
about saying ‘leave this work, leave this work of sanitation.’  But if you leave this work 
you won’t be able to make such swift progress, other work won’t immediately be 
available… You all are Balmikis.  But you people don’t revere Valmiki ji honorably.  You 
people get intoxicated.  Stop doing this.  It’s true, isn’t it?  You should study.  Valmiki ji 
was a learned man.  You people, too, should become learned if you’re going to write 
‘Balmiki’ [as your title].  Study at least enough that you can educate others, and stop 
getting intoxicated, and give up gambling, and don’t tell lies…”  Pant ji spoke very well. 
 
While this speech is not included in Pant’s fifteen-volume Selected Works, Lalta Prasad’s recollection of 
its contents is entirely consistent with Pant’s public remarks on Harijan matters on other occasions,133 
and echoes a speech that Pant gave at a “Harijan welfare worker’s camp” (very likely a Harijan Sevak 
Sangh event) north of Lucknow three months earlier, in July 1950.  There he said: 
An agitation promoting a class war for uplift of Harijans is not in the interest of Harijans 
and I am glad that Harijans have chosen the way shown by Mahatma Gandhi for their 
uplift… I do not like the idea of Harijans giving up their indigenous professions and 
vocations.  While they should not be compelled by anyone to do a particular job, it 
would not be in the interest of their economic well-being if they tried to give up their 
indigenous professions.  It is also necessary for Harijans to receive higher education so 
that they may possess qualifications for higher services and professions… But education 
should not result in an aversion for manual labour (Pant 2000:vols. 13, pp.322–23). 
 
More than Gandhi, Pant stressed the value of “Harijans” obtaining education, and made clear that he 
wanted to see some of them attain high posts in government administration.  Pant also embraced – 
rhetorically at least – the official criminalization of the practice of untouchability,134 whereas Gandhi 
warned that such measures would arrest the genuine reform of Hindu society.  With these two 
                                                          
133 See, for example, his remarks to the UP Legislative Assembly on 6 March 1953, reported in Pant (2000:vols. 14, 
pp.309–311).  
134 Pant in the UP Legislative Assembly in 1953: “Kanhaiyalalji has referred to the discrimination to which Harijans 
are subjected in society, such as Brahmins refusing to accept food served by them, tailors and barbers refusing 
their services to them and so on.  I think the members [of the Legislative Assembly] know that all this is a 
cognizable offence under the law and anyone found guilty of it is liable to be punished.  I want officials to keep a 
watch on such tendencies and to check them and take legal action against offenders” (Pant 2000:vols. 14, pp.309–
311).  The editor of the Collected Works takes the “Kanhaiyalalji” mentioned by Pant here to be the Kanhaiya Lal 
Balmiki of Bulandshahr; I think this is probably incorrect, since the latter in 1953 was a sitting Member of 
Parliament in Delhi, whereas “our” Kanhaiya Lal was serving in the UP Legislative Assembly in Lucknow, where 
these proceedings took place.    
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exceptions, Pant’s hortatory faithfully replicated Gandhi’s: untouchables must not agitate for rights (in 
either an Ambedkarite or Leftist vein) but cooperate with Congress reformers dedicated to their “uplift.”  
They should continue performing their ancestral professions of manual labor while undertaking moral 
reform within the community – giving up gambling, liquor and “lying.”  Consistent with Gandhi’s advice 
to “Harijan correspondents” and the habits that the Harijan Sevak Sangh sought to cultivate in the 
recipients of its beneficence (see Chapter IV), Pant prescribed to his untouchable Congress dependents a 
program of political obedience, labor quiescence, and internal reform. 
 This was the program that Kanhaiya Lal, as Pant’s protégé – and more broadly, as a Congress 
Harijan – was invited to undertake.  Inhabiting the role of a Harijan leader in the party of Mahatma 
Gandhi afforded privileged access to the power of the state, even as it meant adopting the vocabulary, 
and operating within the constraints of, a Gandhian social imaginary.  There was, however, another 
opening in the horizon of possibilities that the first generation of Congress Balmikis found stretching 
before them.  As the previous chapter has demonstrated, the Congress in UP inherited not only Gandhi’s 
approach to the untouchability question but also that of Swami Shraddhanand and the Arya Samaj.  This 
double inheritance was not only a matter of the Samaj and the Congress in UP overlapping extensively in 
personnel and programmatic activity (Gould 2004).  Nor was it only a matter of widespread anti-Muslim 
sentiment of the Arya Samaj variety that followed Partition and the normalization of discrimination 
against Muslims in UP over which Pant presided (Hasan 2007).  In addition to these factors, what 
decisively shaped Congress Balmiki politics in the years after independence was the Hindu nationalist 
strategy – articulated by Swami Shraddhanand, popularized by the Arya Samaj, and eased into Congress 
respectability by Birla, N.R. Malkani and the Harijan Sevak Sangh – of framing the plight of the sanitation 
labor castes (and untouchables generally) as a product of Muslim dominance, and thus of militant 
Hinduization as a means of untouchable liberation.  The receptivity of a large swath of the Congress 
establishment in UP to this formula after 1947 meant that Congress Balmikis could expand the scope of 
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their activities beyond the limited domain prescribed by Gandhian ideology precisely insofar as this 
expansion adopted this framework.  That is, the Gandhian demand that Harijans restrict themselves to 
internal reform could be circumvented, and the more ambitious effort to reform the casteism of the 
dominant could be undertaken, so long as the dominant could be identified as Muslim.  As we will see, 
this afforded Congress Balmikis considerably greater room to maneuver in the effort to eliminate public 
forms of untouchability than the strictly Gandhian program did, even as it committed them to a 
communalist politics.  The requirements of political obedience and labor quiescence, meanwhile, 
remained firm. 
 An early indication of how Kanhaiya Lal would negotiate this space is found in an article he 
wrote, published in Utthān (“Uplift”) on 25 December, 1950.  Entitled “The Mehtar Caste’s Misfortune 
and Helplessness” (Mehtar Jāti kā Durbhāgya tathā uskī Vivaśtā), the article catalogs a number of 
atrocities – abductions, threats, a rape and a murder – perpetrated on women and men of the sanitation 
labor castes in 1950, and appeals, in the name of the nation, for an end to untouchability.  Kanhaiya Lal’s 
language both conforms to and departs from Gandhian orthodoxy.  On the one hand he refuses 
Gandhi’s nomenclature for the sanitation labor castes, preferring, as did so many of Gandhi’s 
interlocutors from these castes, Mehtar over Bhangi (see Chapter IV).  On the other hand, in Gandhian 
fashion, he frames the article as an effort to melt the hearts of the opponents of social reform – “I hope 
that this will also have an effect on the cruel and selfish hearts of our country” – and deploys the 
language of penance (prāyaśchit) – “if a solution is not quickly found to the problems of the Mehtar 
caste it will be a great mistake of the people of this nation, for which they will have to undergo great 
penance.”  Kanhaiya Lal also draws a comparison between the inclusion of the Mehtar in the nation and 
the inclusion of untouchables in the Hindu community of bhakti narratives: “Remember that in the same 
way that in the Dwapar Yug the Pandava’s sacrifice was incomplete until our Swapach Maharaj (Guru 
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Balmiki) was served food,135 so likewise the work of building this nation [rāṣṭra] cannot be complete 
without our uplift [utthān].”  In his embrace of the bhakti paradigm for untouchable inclusion in the 
nation, Kanhaiya Lal mobilizes what is perhaps the hallmark trope of Gandhi’s Harijan, a trope much 
deployed by Hindu nationalists and “mainstream” nationalists alike. 
 Kanhaiya Lal does not stop, though, with appeals to the nation’s conscience intoned in the key 
of bhakti.  He also reports his own efforts, and those of his caste fellows, to actively combat atrocities of 
a certain sort: those perpetrated by Muslims.  While he describes some of the perpetrators of caste 
crimes against Mehtars simply as “gunḍe” (thugs, rowdies) without specifying their religion, he 
characterizes others as “musalmān gunḍe” (Muslim thugs) or simply as Muslims.  The anonymous crimes 
are left to the conscience of the nation, but the atrocities committed by Muslims – specifically, their 
harassment and sexual exploitation of Mehtar women – provoke Kanhaiya Lal and some of his caste 
fellows to fight back: to extract their women from Muslim homes and to organize scavengers’ strikes 
against private Muslim employers (though not against the municipality).  We will have more to say 
about the controversy over Muslim men and Mehtar women later.  Here, the point is that Kanhaiya Lal, 
in his 1950 article, makes use of both modes of public engagement available to a UP Congress Harijan in 
this period: appeals for compassion in the idiom of bhakti, and calls for solidary action against predatory 
Muslims. 
 Kanhaiya Lal died in 2004, just a few years before I undertook this research, and a subsequent 
flood in his daughter’s house destroyed the contents of the chest in which she had kept his 
correspondence and other documents, including his compositions in praise of Valmiki and the 
handwritten journals he had maintained for decades.  The 1950 article was one of very few documents 
to survive.  Kanhaiya Lal had a close colleague, however, Narain Din Balmiki, who worked alongside 
                                                          
135 This story is found in Priyadas’s commentary on Nabhadas’s Bhaktamāl; it is also present in Ami Chand 
Sharma’s Śrī Bālmīkī Prakāś. 
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Kanhaiya Lal in reforming the sanitation labor castes of Lucknow, who shared with his kanṭwāle friend 
the patronage of Birla and Pant, and whose correspondence with these and other Congress luminaries 
remains intact and preserved by his family.  Alongside Kanhaiya Lal, Narain Din served as a Congress 
MLA from 1952 to 1957, and from 1957 to 1962 represented Shahjahanpur as a Member of Parliament.  
A brief consideration of Narain Din’s correspondence will shed further light on the environment in which 
Narain Din and Kanhaiya Lal were empowered and constrained to operate as the first generation of 
Balmikis in Congress. 
 Narain Din hailed from the Hela136 colony of a village in Allahabad District; like his father and 
grandfather he worked aboard steamships in the Bay of Bengal.  In Rangoon he joined nationalist 
politics; upon Rangoon’s evacuation in World War II, he returned to Allahabad and developed strong ties 
with the Tandon and Nehru family.  In the sanitation workers’ strike of 1946137 Narain Din mediated 
between sanitation workers and the provincial Congress administration, earning him the favor of Pant.  
He began living in Lucknow in 1952 upon becoming an MLA; in 1957 he brought his family as well.  He 
founded the Hind Sweepers’ Sevak Samaj (HSSS), an all-India organization that received eighty percent 
of its operating costs as grants-in-aid from the national government, and whose official patrons were 
Pant and, upon Pant’s death, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri.  Through the HSSS, Narain Din opened 
and operated schools and vocational training centers for the sanitation labor castes and other Dalits; his 
efforts were particularly directed at helping youth enter occupations other than sanitation.  Coretta 
Scott King, during her 1959 visit to India with her husband, participated in an HSSS function at Narain 
Din’s invitation. 
                                                          
136 The Hela caste is another of the sanitation labor castes, separate from the Chuhra/Bhangi to which Kanhaiya Lal 
and the shaharwāle belonged, but very similarly placed in terms of social structure, and recognized as part of a 
shared caste cluster in Lal Begi oral traditions.  The regions in which Helas live in great numbers are southern and 
eastern UP; roughly speaking, the Hela “zone of habitation” begins where the Chuhra/Bhangi zone ends.  See 
Chapter I. 
137 Related to the strike that occasioned Gandhi’s controversial series of articles on the subject of “Sweepers’ 
Strike[s]” in Harijan, discussed in the previous chapter. 
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 A great deal of Narain Din’s correspondence with Congress leaders relates to the activities of his 
Hind Sweepers’ Sevak Samaj.  The letters make clear that Narain Din sought at every opportunity to 
make use of his access to powerful individuals and institutions to draw attention to the untouchability 
issue and to bring concrete benefits to the sanitation labor castes through his organization.  The replies 
he received consistently congratulate him on his efforts: in a 1965 letter Zakir Husain, for example, 
writes to convey “my best wishes for the success of the Camp organized by Hind Sweepers’ Sevak Samaj 
on the occasion of Kumbh-Mela at Allahabad.”  In a 1962 letter Ghanshyamdas Birla encourages Narain 
Din’s Samaj by enclosing a check.  Govind Ballabh Pant, serving at the time as India’s Home Minister, 
writes a Hindi missive dated August 1957 that felicitates his protégé and illustrates several of the 
themes we have been tracing: the nomenclature and emotional tone that Gandhi modeled, as well as 
the non-agitational path the Congress expected its Harijans to follow.  “I am pleased to learn,” Pant 
writes, “that the Hind Sweepers’ Sevak Samaj in its function gave pride of place to a peaceful, 
constructive program [śāntimay rachnātmak progrām].  I hope that this program will prove especially 
beneficial for our Bhangi brothers’ becoming self-reliant, and will find great encouragement.  Yours 
affectionately [sasneh], G. B. Pant” (emphasis added).   
 Yet when it comes to the specific requests that Narain Din makes of Congress leaders, his 
correspondence reveals a long series of rebuffs and disappointments.  The Food and Agriculture 
Minister cannot help the Sweepers’ Sevak Samaj establish a piggery in Allahabad (an attempt, on 
Gandhian lines, to make a traditional caste occupation profitable in a changing economy).  Prime 
Minister Nehru regrets that there are no funds at his disposal to take up Narain Din’s proposals for the 
improvement of sanitation workers’ conditions.  The Minister for Education can do nothing about 
“alleged hardships of parents of Scheduled Caste candidates in getting admission to their wards in Delhi 
schools.”  When Narain Din approaches Minister of Defense Krishna Menon about leasing or selling a 
plot of unused military land in Shahjahanpur for cultivation by Samaj members seeking to leave 
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sanitation work, Menon feels “sure that you will appreciate that it is not possible.”  Prime Minister 
Morarji Desai, in a 1978 letter that captures the tone and substance of almost three decades of such 
correspondence, writes: “There have been attempts to eliminate the obnoxiousness from the work that 
[sweepers and scavengers] have been doing.  I would suggest that your Samaj should create a sense of 
awareness among them so that they look for alternative employment and not depend on what is 
considered hereditary work.  With good wishes, Morarji Desai.”  Always affectionate, always 
encouraging, Congress leaders meet Narain Din’s practical proposals for sanitation labor caste uplift 
with a familiar refrain: leave aside structural inequality, focus on internal reform.  
While the assistance Congress leaders extended to Narain Din and Kanhaiya Lal’s efforts to 
benefit the sanitation labor castes appears to have been meager, it was nonetheless costly.  Pant, as 
Chief Minister of UP and later as Union Home Minister, took firm action against strikes by various 
sectors of labor, and expected his political dependents to play their part.  Thus the following letter in the 
wake of the five-day central government employees’ strike of 1960:  
My dear Narain Din,  
I have received your letter of 29 July.  I was glad to know from it that you contacted P. & 
T. [Posts and Telegraphs] employees before the strike and took an active part in 
dissuading them from taking part in it.  The strike presented a grave threat to the 
orderly life of the country, and I fully appreciate your efforts and the efforts of those 
whose names you have mentioned.   
Yours sincerely,  
G. B. Pant 
 
On the question of labor strikes by sanitation workers in particular, Pant was a believer in 
Gandhi’s dictum that “a Bhangi may not give up his work even for a day.”  When sanitation 
workers struck in Calcutta in the 1960s, then, a contingent of Lucknow shaharwāle youth was 
mobilized and sent by rail to Calcutta to replace the striking workers.  A man now in his 
seventies, who was among the teenagers sent to break the Calcutta sweepers’ strike, told me 
that it was Kanhaiya Lal’s men who enlisted them.  
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 Like Kanhaiya Lal, Narain Din advanced the thesis that Muslims were to blame for the abject 
condition of the sanitation labor castes.  In an undated pamphlet entitled Hela-Halalkhor, Narain Din 
attempted for his own caste (known as Halalkhor as well as Hela) what the Arya Samajists had done for 
the caste known as Chuhra or Bhangi in Śrī Bālmīkī Prakāś: to provide the caste a respectable Hindu 
genealogy and distance it from Islam.  Citing a 1925 tract by one Pandit Devdatt Sharma of Ghazipur,138 
Narain Din (n.d.:4) asserts that the Hela caste “is descended from a Kshatriya lineage.  630 years ago, 
Alauddin Khilji put the caste into this revolting occupation [yeh ghriṇit kārya].”  The evidence given is 
that Hela gotra names resemble those of kshatriya gotras.139  The prevalence of the Perso-Arabic title 
Halalkhor does not indicate that the caste migrated from Arab lands, Narain Din reasons.  Rather, “we 
are Indian [Bhāratīya] and our religion is Vedic,” but Muslims proffered a more palatable name than the 
Sanskrit-derived Hela, a term of disrespect [anādar].  Ultimately the tract turns to exhortation: “O Hela-
Halalkhor, awake!  This is not your ancestral profession... The Ramayan is your holy book, take it up!  
The assembly of the solar [kshatriya] lineage is the Hela’s patrimony” (Naraindin n.d.:5).  In rejecting the 
ancestral connection to sanitation labor, Narain Din makes a significant departure from that strand of 
Hindu nationalist overture, like Śrī Bālmīkī Prakāś, that would insist on the modern sweepers’ descent 
from the brahminical Chandal (see Chapter IV).  Yet by making an argument for mistaken identity – that 
the modern sweeper is not a Chandal but a subjugated kshatriya – Narain Din offers no substantive 
                                                          
138 The tract, Patit Prabhākar: Mehtar Jāti kā Itihās, whose author is sometimes given as Devdatt Chaturvedi, has 
become, like Śrī Bālmīkī Prakāś, something of an ur-text for speculative histories of the sanitation labor castes with 
a Hindu nationalist bent.  Amritlal Nagar’s uncritical citation of passages from Patit Prabhākar in the preface of his 
novel Nāchyau Bahut Gopāl (1978) seems to have lent the pamphlet an aura of credibility in the eyes of later 
researchers.  I have not been able to locate a copy of Patit Prabhākar. 
139 That some gotra names of the sanitation labor castes resemble those of Rajput (thus notionally kshatriya) 
gotras is a point observed in colonial ethnography and then seized upon by Arya Samaj and Hindu nationalist 
writers in the 1920s as a means of supplying a militant Hindu genealogy to the sanitation labor castes (Prashad 
1996:556).  Subsequently virtually every Hindi language publication concerned with these castes’ history – from 
Amritlal Nagar’s novel Nāchyau Bahut Gopāl (1978) to Sanjeev Khudshah’s Safāī Kāmgār Samudāy (2005) and 
Omprakash Valmiki’s Safāī Devtā (2008) – as well as some scholarship in English (e.g. Shyamlal 1997) has rehearsed 
this speculative genealogy.  Valmiki, however, points out that gotra names among the sanitation labor castes are 
adopted and altered over time for a variety of reasons, and can hardly be relied upon as evidence of origins, while 
Khudshah further observes that not only Rajput but also Brahmin and a host of other castes’ gotras are found 
among the sanitation labor castes.   
203 
 
critique of brahminical ontology: the principle of the inferiority of the Chandal, and of the essential unity 
of caste and occupation, remains unquestioned.  Like the verses that Kanhaiya Lal composed for his 
caste fellows, Narain Din’s pamphlet makes modifications to the Hindu nationalist formula for 
untouchable integration into the nation, but does not challenge its major premises. 
 As we saw in the previous chapter, Gandhi conceived of the Harijan as a brutalized, abject, and 
childlike figure, capable of exemplary religious devotion while incapable of comprehending or 
articulating his own self-interest.  For Gandhi, Harijan leadership was an oxymoron; the role that 
Harijans were to play in the eradication of untouchability (not to speak of the struggle against empire) 
was auxiliary: the uncomplaining performance of traditional forms of labor, cooperation with penitent 
privileged caste Hindus – the proper agents of change – and internal reform in hygiene, morality, and 
religious practice.  With Ambedkar outmaneuvered (in the Poona Pact) and politically marginalized (in 
subsequent elections), this powerful paradigm proliferated, virtually unchallenged, in the political 
discourse of the Congress of the 1930s and 1940s, and assumed concrete institutional form in the 
organizational structure of the Harijan Sevak Sangh, a body that heavily overlapped with the Congress.  
When Kanhaiya Lal and Narain Din were fielded by the UP Congress to be its Balmiki face in 1952, they 
found themselves interpellated in a Gandhian discourse that, by that time, had achieved normativity in 
the party.  Whether they recognized themselves in this discourse or not, it was on the condition of 
inhabiting it that they were invited to access political power; asked to share the stage of history, they 
were handed a script prepared by Gandhi.  Hailed as Harijans, it was the Harijan paradigm that they had, 





 The coterie that formed around Kanhaiya Lal between 1947 and 1950, when his work as a 
prachārak for the Abstinence Department took him from cantonment to city, centered on three 
shaharwāle youth who would, in the next six decades, exercise an extraordinary influence on the lives of 
their caste fellows in Lucknow.  We have already quoted Govind Prasad, one of the three, on his 
attraction to Kanhaiya Lal’s fearless manner of speech and comportment when he first heard the latter 
speak at a caste meeting near his home in Babu Ganj (north of the Gomti) in December 1947.  Like 
Kanhaiya Lal, Govind Prasad, born in 1926, worked for British soldiers in his youth, washing dishes at a 
military factory and serving as personal assistant to an officer for seven years until the latter’s return to 
England upon Indian independence.  Govind Prasad studied up to eighth standard in a school run by 
Christian missionaries.  Between 1947 and 1953 he did sanitation work in the Provincial Hygiene 
Institute of King George’s Medical College (KGMC), after which he secured employment as a postman, a 
position he held until retirement. 
 We have also heard from Lalta Prasad – it was his recollection of Pant’s Valmiki Jayanti speech 
that we quoted earlier.  Born in 1923, Lalta Prasad studied to eighth standard and worked a variety of 
jobs: he did sanitation at the Provincial Hygiene Institute (where his tenure and Govind Prasad’s 
overlapped), was a laboratory assistant at Isabella Thoburn College, and performed several kinds of 
technical labor in the railways, where eye injuries wrecked his vision.  On account of his austere lifestyle 
and tireless labors as an educator and promoter of literacy within the caste, he is generally known as 
Master Lalta Prasad, and also as “our Gandhi.” 
 The third and youngest member of the shaharwāle reformist group, Achhe Lal, inherited 
Kanhaiya Lal’s political legacy as a Congress Balmiki.  Born in 1932, Achhe Lal in 1950 secured 
employment as one of Lucknow’s sanitary supervisors, becoming the first member of the sanitation 
labor castes to hold a position in the municipality higher than that of sweeper.  He became president of 
the UP Safai Mazdur Sangh (Sanitation Workers’ Union), in which capacity he engaged with several UP 
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administrations and served as a member of state-level and national-level committees on the issues of 
sanitation and scavenging (including the Malkani Committee).  In 1985 the Congress appointed Achhe 
Lal a Member of Parliament (Rajya Sabha), after which he was appointed to the UP Legislative Council 
(Vidhan Sabha). 
 All three spent their youth in the city but nurtured deep roots in the villages of Bara Banki.  By 
the early 1950s, each of them held government jobs other than sanitation worker (postman, railway 
technician, sanitary supervisor), setting them apart from their parents’ generation (many of whom 
applied their labor to the rural economy, or, if urban, worked in sanitation) and from most of their peers 
(most of whom did public or private sanitation work in the city).  As a group they were better educated 
than the majority of their caste fellows, and through Kanhaiya Lal (and to an extent Narain Din as well) 
they became better politically connected.  Yet unlike Kanhaiya Lal or Narain Din, who would always 
remain outsiders to the shaharwāle, these three were 583s, the paradigmatic shaharwāle, members of 
the dominant clan in Awadh of the dominant sanitation labor caste of South Asia.  Their parents and 
siblings had Muslim names (Lalta Prasad, in fact, adopted this name when he abandoned the 
“musalmānā” name his parents gave him at birth), revered Lal Beg, and held caste meetings in a Sufi 
dargah.  They could appeal to their brethren in a way that their mentors, though caste-fellows in a broad 
sense, could not. 
 By 1950, Govind Prasad, Lalta Prasad and Achhe Lal began to accompany Kanhaiya Lal on his 
rounds in the bastīs of the sanitation labor castes of Lucknow and its environs.  They convened meetings 
where they performed Kanhaiya Lal’s bhajans (Kanhaiya Lal played the harmonium and they all sang) 
and pressed their caste fellows to reform.  Their exhortations and remonstrances addressed a whole 
range of aspects of community life.  One Munnu, who witnessed some of these performances in his 
childhood in KGMC servants’ quarters, recalled to me the quartet’s message in this way:  
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Munnu: “Abandon all of these bad habits.  Our guru is Valmiki ji.  Adopt him [unko apnā 
lo].  You people should not go for conversion [dharmparivartan].  Be Hindus, become 
Hindus, remain Hindus.” 
Joel: Wait, was it “become Hindus” or “remain Hindus”? 
Munnu: “Become.” 
Joel: Become? 
Munnu: “Become.”  Yes.  “And if you become Hindu then you will get benefits.  From 
the government you will get this, you will get that.”  The government certainly took care 
of them!  Made them MLAs and MLCs140… They also talked about Gandhi, “Gandhi did 
this, Gandhi did that.”  There was a lot about Gandhi and Valmiki… “Quit these dirty 
habits, study, educate your children, quit drinking liquor, don’t do bad things,” they said 
all this… “Don’t convert to Islam, caste brothers!  Don’t do all this, don’t keep Muslim 
names, otherwise you won’t get reservations, you won’t get any government benefits,” 
this is what they said.  “It’s government policy.” 
 
As we will see, this conjoining of abstinence, education, Hinduization, Gandhi, and government benefit, 
and the contrasting of this assemblage with liquor, bad habits, conversion and Islam, was indeed 
characteristic of the reformist message.  There were other elements as well – regarding women’s 
sexuality, debt, biers, meat, history and Lal Beg – that the reformists articulated in new configurations, 
plotting them into a powerful evaluative scheme.  To this constellation of normative ideas – to this 
ideology – both reformists and some of their listeners gave the name Vālmīkiyat, i.e., Valmikism.  Lalta 
Prasad called it Hinduat, or Hinduism.141 
 In the following sections we will consider how some of the key elements of Vālmīkiyat were 
propagated, as remembered by both its advocates and their audiences.  Each in turn, we will look at 
women’s sexuality, Lal Begi ritual, naming-education (a pair the interdependence of whose members is 
crucial), and wedding fare, as, arguably, the four objects of reform toward which the reformists devoted 
                                                          
140 Member of Legislative Council, or Vidhan Parishad.  Of the reformist quartet, Kanhaiya Lal was an MLA and 
Achhe Lal was (after being MP) an MLC.  
141 “Hindutva” – a word formed by attaching the Sanskrit suffix –tva to Hindu, is better known as a vernacular term 
intended to approximate “Hindu-ness” or “Hinduism.”  By forming an abstract noun not by way of Sanskrit but 
rather in the Persian-Urdu fashion (with the suffix –iyat or –it), Lalta Prasad (and others) may well be reflecting an 
Awadhi regional linguistic habit.  Or they may, perhaps, be maintaining distance from the militantly Hindu 
nationalist project that the term “Hindutva” has come to represent.    
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their most strenuous efforts, and in which they faced notable resistance.  Though at first glance these 
may appear (with the exception of Lal Begi ritual) to lie outside the religious field, their centrality to the 
project of becoming Hindu will become apparent.  I should emphasize that in some of my interlocutors’ 
accounts of the spread of Vālmīkiyat it is biers (as a sign of changes in funerary ritual), or abstinence 
(from liquor), or other elements of the reformist project, that assume greater importance.  I have tried, 
in prioritizing for discussion the elements that I have, to fairly represent the themes that most of my 
interlocutors, whatever their relationship to the reformist project, stressed in their narratives – while 
also acknowledging the limitations of such an effort. 
  
Ishqbāzī: the Cohabitation Controversy 
 From 1948 to the early 1950s, a controversy raged among the Lal Begis of Lucknow as the 
reformists – Kanhaiya Lal, the shaharwāle trio, and a few other men – objected to the cohabitation of 
some women of their caste with Muslim men and sought, with Arya Samaj support, to marry the women 
instead to their caste fellows.  We have already seen that Kanhaiya Lal raised this issue in his 1950 
article in Utthān.  In what follows we will try to piece together this striking episode in the establishment 
of Vālmīkiyat using his article and the recollections of other reformists, considering as well the silences 
that these accounts produce. 
In terms of caste and class, the structural position of women of the sanitation labor castes – at 
least those whose labor included cleaning private homes – put them into a particular relation with 
privileged caste men, one of economic dependence and a degree of informality and access that was rare 
between men and women unrelated by kinship.  The sexual politics of this relation might be said to be 
overdetermined, which is not to say that they were not complex and variable.  Certainly the privileged 
caste male gaze – Hindu, Muslim or otherwise – beheld the Mehtarani as a sexually charged figure, a 
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sign that called forth interpretants of desire; confirmation of this can be found in a perusal of 
representations of sanitation labor caste women in Hindi and Urdu literature and film.142  In a more 
empirical vein, the sociology of downward caste mobility provides evidence that relations between 
domestic sanitation workers and their employers more than occasionally – which is not to say frequently 
– took the form of cohabitation and marriage: a leading cause of what Shyamlal (1997) calls 
aspraśyīkaraṇ (“untouchabilization,” “becoming untouchable”).  In Lucknow as elsewhere, it was not 
unheard of for a woman of the sanitation labor castes to take up residence with her employer.  Where 
the employer was Muslim, such cohabitation could, in some cases, lead to a quiet absorption of the 
woman into her employer’s family and community.  Or it could constitute a scandal for the woman’s 
caste, and warrant a convening of the caste panchayat.  In those cases, though, the range of 
interventions that sanitation labor caste panchayats undertook differed from those of dominant caste 
panchayats for similar infractions.  The former, for instance, could and sometimes did admit the 
privileged caste man – the “offender” – into the caste, on the condition that he marry the woman with 
whom he had relations.143  Where offenders refused marriage, fines were levied against them, or labor 
services refused them; the women ordinarily went on to marry within the caste.  That is to say, among 
the sanitation labor castes, the sexual breach of caste boundaries necessitated neither violent 
retribution nor the physical or social death of the woman. 
In his 1950 article, Kanhaiya Lal wrote the following:  
Having toured most of the cities, towns, and villages of Uttar Pradesh, I have inspected 
the worrisome and pitiful condition of my caste.  In several districts of the province 
women of my caste have been ruined [pathbraṣṭ] by Muslim rowdies [musalmān 
guṇḍe].  If I were to go into all of it, the topic would get out of hand.  In Lucknow and 
Bara Banki alone, in the last six months, overcoming great difficulties we have obtained 
[barāmad kiyā] the following women of our caste from Muslims’ homes: [here five 
                                                          
142 For example, Ahmed Ali’s Twilight in Delhi (1940), Amritlal Nagar’s Nachyo Bahut Gopal (1978), Renu’s Ek 
Akahānī kā Supātra (1984), and the film Delhi 6 (2009). 
143 There were also formalized rites for admission to the caste.  See, among others, Crooke (1890:38), Greeven 
(1894:50–52), and Shyamlal (1997). 
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women are named in a numbered list].  In addition to these, there are more women of 
our caste who have been induced by Muslim rowdies to run away and live with them.  
These, too, we are planning to reclaim [punaḥ prāpt karne kā vichār kar rahe haiṅ], 
though this work is not free of danger. 
 
This portion of the article takes on the character of a crime report: the talk of “inspection” (avalokan), 
the numbered list of names, the peculiarly police-work phrasing of “obtaining” women (the compound 
verb barāmad karnā suggests the seizure of contraband), and the identification of the offenders as 
guṇḍe, a category of criminal.  This is not accidental; in the events that Kanhaiya Lal is here summarizing, 
the police were indeed involved, and the reformists had formulated their language accordingly.  The 
account also resonates with one of the master tropes of Indian public discourse in the years following 
1947: the kidnapping of Hindu (and Sikh) women by Muslims during Partition, and the effort by the state 
to “reclaim” such women from their captors in Pakistan (Datta 1999; Das 2006).  Consistent with the 
terms of the state discourse of kidnapping and rescue, Kanhaiya Lal’s phrasing firmly grounds agency in 
men, not women.  All of the relevant verbs – ruin, induce to run away, find, reclaim – have men as their 
subjects and women as their objects. 
 The vocabulary and framing shift somewhat when we turn to the account of Lalta Prasad, the 
member of the shaharwāle triumvirate best known for his work as an educator.  It was from Lalta Prasad 
that I first heard of the cohabitation controversy.  We had been discussing the various changes he and 
his friends had helped bring about in the community when I asked him, for the first time, whether the 
Arya Samaj had supported these efforts.  Later he would tell me a great deal about the Arya Samaj – for 
instance, that he (and Achhe Lal and Govind Prasad) were all, in the 1950s, dues-paying, janeu-wearing 
members of the Samaj – but the first thing that my question prompted him to relate was this:  
Lalta Prasad: There were some girls in our community – I may as well tell you the truth – 
there were some girls who ran off to the Muslims [musalmānoṅ ke yahāṅ bhāg gayī 
thīn].  The Muslims made them run off with them [musalmān bhagā le gaye the]. 
Joel: Did they marry? 
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Lalta Prasad: They just made them run off; I mean, had an affair and made them run off 
[ishqbāzī maiṅ bhagā le gaye].  Now, the Arya Samajists, they were really sore about 
Muslims.  Back then, even now… So we told them how the Muslims had made our girls 
run off, and they, with police help, got our girls out, and brought them to their place and 
kept them, kept them in the Rakṣāmaṇḍal… Then some got married in our caste, and 
some went and married in the Hindu community… [one of the young women] didn’t like 
it around here so we got her married in [a town in western UP] and she settled there. 
 
Lalta Prasad’s account introduces ambiguity regarding the women’s volition: first he says that they ran 
off [bhāg gayī thin], but then that they were made to run off [bhagā le gaye the].  Furthermore his 
glossing of the situation as ishqbāzī – philandering, romancing, having affairs: a term that implies illicit 
but consensual relations – implicates the women’s agency more strongly than Kanhaiya Lal’s portrayal of 
them as “ruined” (pathbraṣṭ kī gayīṅ).   
Lalta Prasad’s narrative also complicates the trope of kidnapping and confinement, for here the 
women appear doubly “kept”: first by Muslims, but then by the Arya Samaj (or the police?) in a 
rakṣāmaṇḍal (“place of safety” – about which more in a moment).  But where did the women want to 
be?  That one “didn’t like it around here” is suggestive; undoubtedly being at the center of a controversy 
of this sort would render everyday community life vexatious.  That her displeasure is, in a sense, 
accommodated by arranging an out-region marriage (a relatively unusual practice among the 583s) is 
noteworthy.  Yet we still know little about the women’s perspective on either their cohabitation or 
marriage among “their own.”144  
It was Govind Prasad, another of the triumvirate, who explained to me about the “place of 
safety” in which the women were “kept.”  This was the Dayānand Rakṣāmaṇḍal, an institution operated 
by the Lucknow Arya Samaj in Rakabganj in the old city for the first decade or so after independence.  
The Arya Samaj used this space to house “Hindu” women whom it had “rescued” from “Muslims,” in 
                                                          
144 Who constitutes “their own” is another question: while the Arya Samaj would have the field neatly divided into 
a Hindu-Muslim binary, Lalta Prasad, even while actively consenting to and advancing this social vision, 
unselfconsciously reproduces the older, and still living, commonsense of Dalit-Hindu alterity when he notes that 
some women married in “our community” (apnā samāj) and others in the “Hindu community” (Hindu samāj). 
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circumstances that were far from clear: servants, domestic sanitation workers, sex workers.  It was, as 
Lalta Prasad later described it to me, “like a jail [jail jaisā].”145 
Of the reformists, Govind Prasad’s account of the controversy was by far the most detailed, and 
also the most conflicted.  Unlike his associates, Govind Prasad, as he reflected on the reform effort 
decades after it transpired, often described it in corrosively critical terms: “I am a deceiver [makkār 
huṅ],” “We did all kinds of dishonest dealings [ye sab beīmānī ham karte the].”  Proud of some of the 
transformations that he and his comrades wrought – above all the revolution in education – he found 
others, in retrospect, poisonous.  His narrative of the struggle over women’s cohabitation with Muslims 
oscillates between critique and defense of the intervention, between sympathy and outrage toward the 
women in question: 
The women of our homes – of our caste – they used to go out into society to labor.  
Some of them went out and stayed.  It’s like this: any woman, if all day every day you’re 
going to forty or fifty houses and cleaning the filth, collecting excrement by hand and 
carrying it away, well – if you live there [instead of working there] then you don’t have 
to do all this.  So would you rather live there or live here? 
So when we started this social reform group, well – what is social reform?  Isn’t this part 
of it?  Isn’t this a part of it that there’s a woman who’s up and become a bībī [lady, 
madam, wife (to her employer)], left two children behind, and she’s sitting there [i.e. 
luxuriating, not working], and her children are here wandering around hungry and 
naked, and none of us have a house worthy of the name? 
So those women whom the Muslims had locked up at their places, we went with the 
police and took them, forcibly dragged them by their hands and feet, and filed a court 
case against them.  But where to keep them?  For the duration of the case, when we 
scarcely have huts to live in ourselves, where should we keep them?  So the Arya Samaj 
kept them in Rakabganj […] where they used to lock up women.  Then we would get a 
boy [of our caste] ready and get them married.  That’s the sort of thing we were doing.  
We didn’t care for our lives!  Brother, death is better than dishonor [beizzatī]. 
 
                                                          
145 Elderly, privileged caste Arya Samajists were alarmed when I asked them about the Rakṣāmaṇḍal in interviews 
at their Rakabganj office and wanted to know where I had heard about it.  Their characterization of the institution 
confirmed Lalta Prasad’s and Govind Prasad’s accounts.  The dubious legality of the Rakṣāmaṇḍal became a 




Govind Prasad then explained that the new marriages were conducted by Arya Samajists on their 
Rakabganj premises according to their rites.  Before the weddings, the Arya Samaj conducted shuddhi 
ceremonies to purify the women after their stay with Muslims.  He then backtracked to the matter of 
the legal proceedings the reformists had initiated against the women.  The lawyer who represented the 
Arya Samaj in its legal affairs, himself a member of the Rakabganj Arya Samaj, handled the cases for the 
reformists free of charge.  In cases where the Muslim man and Mehtar woman were simply living 
together, the reformists won easily enough, separating the couple and marrying the woman off.  But in 
other cases the couples had married.  In one such instance the city magistrate arbitrating the case 
chastised Govind Prasad and his associates: 
[The magistrate said,] “They had a court marriage, according to the law they’re both 
adults… [you] have no right to bring them away.”  He did right by the law.  But we leapt 
up and said, “What is this?”  We made a big scene, [saying,] “We’ll abandon our 
profession, we’ll die, send us to jail!  What law says that a man fighting for his welfare 
should be sent to jail?” 
 
Undeterred by this setback, the young reformers sought to advance their cause by other means.  
According to Govind Prasad, it was a supportive word from Chief Minister Pant himself (secured by 
Kanhaiya Lal) that enabled them to again have the married couple arrested and separated, and this time 
they were able to marry the woman off within the caste.  
When I asked whether the women themselves opposed the reformists, Govind Prasad replied, 
“They didn’t just oppose us.  Inside the court, in front of the magistrate, they took off their shoes and 
hurled them at us.” 
In this account, then, the women appear fully agentive; their cohabitation with Muslim 
employers is an attempt to secure upward class mobility and relief from stigmatized and horrific labor.  
Without disregarding the unequal and coercive dimensions of the cohabiting relation – he maintains 
that the Muslims kept the women “locked up” – Govind Prasad acknowledges a complex social field in 
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which Muslim men represent, for Dalit women, one passage out of caste oppression.  But for the 
purveyors of Vālmīkiyat, this long-standing state of affairs would not do.  The ancien régime excluded 
untouchable men from participation in the patriarchal competition for izzat (honor, shame); what was 
ideologically essential to privileged caste manhood was structurally denied its ontological other.  But in 
the new regime untouchable men were invited to join the game, to aspire to izzat and to adopt its 
ideology of gender.  With its Rakṣāmaṇḍal, the Arya Samaj offered sanitation labor caste men a means 
(ritual and pragmatic) to assert control over their women’s sexuality; indeed, to lay claim to the women 
as theirs, rather than always potentially someone else’s.  But these means were made available, and the 
invitation to accrue izzat extended, only insofar as the Dalit men’s efforts targeted Muslim antagonists 
and could be channeled into communal, rather than caste or class, conflict.  The Rakṣāmaṇḍal did not 
offer its “refuge” to domestic sanitation workers sexually exploited by Hindu employers.  
For the reformers, becoming Hindu was partly accomplished by relocating the women of their 
caste from “Muslim” to “Hindu” spaces.  But this assertion of gendered control was not only bodily and 
spatial; it was also nominative and representational.  The women at the center of the cohabitation 
controversy, like most 583s of that generation, had musalmānā names.  The reformists and their Arya 
Samaj supporters, as part of their intervention, renamed them.  Rukhsana became Rama Devi, Sadiqa 
became Shanti, and so on.146  Not only this, but Kanhaiya Lal, in his 1950 article, published their (new) 
names.  By any measure, to put into print the names of “ruined” women (in a numbered list) was an 
extraordinary act.  This move is noteworthy, I would argue, in three ways.  First, it constitutes a kind of 
performative speech act in Austin’s sense, transforming Lal Begi women into Hindu women by publicly 
naming them as such under felicitous conditions (namely Kanhaiya Lal’s unique authority as an expert 
on his own caste and a trusted Congressman).  Second, it is an assertion of representational power 
schooled in the Gandhian method of nomination without persuasion; irrespective of what Rukhsana 
                                                          
146 These are, of course, pseudonyms.  See footnote 1. 
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may have thought of her name or pahchān, Kanhaiya Lal will represent her in tones agreeable to the 
Hindu reformist imagination: as Rama Devi.  Third, it signals a moment of patriarchal arrival: an 
inaugural performance of the possession of izzat by shaming women.  
 
The Repudiation of Lal Beg  
 We saw in the last chapter that the Arya Samaj, since the 1920s, had sought to alienate 
the sanitation labor castes from one axial figure of their pantheon, Lal Beg, while encouraging 
the identification of another, Balmik, with the Sanskrit poet and brahmin sage Valmiki.  Some 
Arya Samajists, like Ami Chand Sharma, tried to sideline Lal Beg by subordination to Balmik, 
urging that “Lal Beg was simply another disciple of Shri Balmiki ji…[therefore] those [of you] who 
call yourselves Lal Begiyas [Lal Begis] are making a mistake” (Sharma 1928:21).  Others took a 
more aggressive approach, circulating the idea that Lal Beg had actually been a Muslim nawab 
who raped Mehtar women until their men murdered him (and then took to worshipping the site 
of the murder) (Prashad 2000:95–96).  This narrative template for the transcribing of caste 
grievances (here rape by dominant caste men) onto a communal canvas foreshadowed the 
politics we have been discussing, the politics of the Rakśāmaṇḍal. 
 The assault on Lal Beg in Lucknow featured elements of these approaches, but also 
developed its own distinctive trajectory.  The campaign began with Kanhaiya Lal’s verses, 
including the one discussed above:  
Lal Begi nām chhoṛo, rishiyon ki santān ho 
(Abandon the name Lal Begi, you are the descendants of sages) 
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Here Valmiki (the sage referred to) was figured in contrastive opposition to Lal Beg; the reformers held 
that to embrace the idea of descent from Valmiki was, perforce, to abandon allegiance to Lal Beg.  The 
new caste guru would not complement the old, but replace him; the model was not accretive, but 
iconoclastic.  Consequently, while half of the message (“your are the descendants of sages”) was 
intended as a compliment of sorts, a grounds for taking pride, there was no escaping the fact that the 
other half of the message constituted a condemnation of tradition.  In response, shaharwāle in Lucknow 
and Bara Banki composed verses of their own that inverted the attack and ridiculed Valmiki and his 
advocates.  For example: 
Netwā āye, netwā āye, hamkā jhāṇṭ mīki batāran 
(“Leaders”147 have come, “leaders” have come, they’re saying our pubic hairs are 
“mīki”)148 
Quips and slogans aside, arguments were brought to bear on the matter.  The advocates of 
Hinduization developed two contradictory lines of reasoning regarding Lal Beg.  One is perhaps best 
summed up by Lalta Prasad: “Lal Beg, you see, was called a Muslim.  And we people, well, we are Hindu.  
So it behooves us to revere Balmik ji, not to revere Lal Beg ji.  This is what we preached.”  This approach, 
jettisoning the complexities and contradictions of ancestral religion like so much dead weight, 
accommodated a religious field now neatly and agonistically bifurcated into Hindu and Muslim by 
simultaneously resignifying Lal Beg as Muslim (whereas previously he was “ours”) and “we people” as 
Hindu (whereas previously we were neither Hindu nor Muslim).  This line of reasoning found little of 
                                                          
147 The ambivalent term netā (colloquially netwā), meaning “leader” or “politician,” was an appellation that would 
stick to the advocates of Vālmīkiyat as a group; their admirers used the term in its positive sense while their 
detractors laced it with sarcasm. 
148 Mīki is a nonsense word that, conjoined with jhāṇṭ (pubic hair), rhymes with Bālmīki.  The quip thus corrupts 
and parodies the speech of the reformists; the refrain “You all are not Lal Begi, you are Balmiki” becomes “You are 
not Lal Begi, your pubic hair is mīki.”  I heard several versions of this witticism from elderly interlocutors.  
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value in the ancestors and their ways; elders who clung to Lal Beg were figured, in contradistinction to 
the reformers themselves, as uneducated.  Traditional practices were superstition. 
 The other argument was that Lal Beg was not Muslim at all; rather, he was a Hindu deity in 
Muslim guise, a ruse by the ancestors to escape persecution by Muslim overlords.  This idea figures the 
ancestors as adept semioticians, subaltern manipulators of signs for whom dissimulation was a means to 
preserve tradition under oppressive conditions.  Such a premise treats tradition as a domain for 
interpretation sensitive to historical conditions, and thus invites an engagement with the past both 
more generous and more sophisticated than its reduction to superstition.  That said, in its particulars 
this argument, like the other, accepted the idea that the world was transhistorically cleft into a Hindu-
Muslim binary to one or the other of whose elements all social facts could be assigned.  Thus one of the 
key “proofs” offered for Lal Beg’s being “really” Hindu rather than Muslim was that traditional Lal Beg 
shrines featured a red flag – red being a “Hindu” color.  Another was that the propitiation of Lal Beg 
traditionally involved an offering of bhāng (a preparation from the cannabis plant), a “Hindu” rather 
than a “Muslim” libation – again, in a dyadic social imagination.  
 In either case, whether reimagined as Muslim or as crypto-Hindu, Lal Beg was to be dislodged 
from his status as the caste’s preeminent object of reverence as a matter of practice.  Both lines of 
reasoning put forth by the reformers were intended to produce the same effect: the end of the ritual 
reverencing of Lal Beg.  Consider, again, Lalta Prasad: “We boycotted him [Lal Beg].  [We said,] ‘Whoever 
reveres or worships him, or at weddings builds that structure with five laḍḍus, you must desist.’”149 
 As the advocates of Hinduization gained followers, then, the physical destruction of Lal Beg 
shrines began.  These shrines typically consisted of a square mud platform crowned by five domes and 
often indented with niches for oil lamps, and were located just outside of Lal Begi homes (see Chapter 
                                                          
149 “Ham logoṅ ne is kā bahiśkār kiyā.  Ab koī pujā vujā jo karte haiṅ, yā śādiyon maiṅ, voh laḍḍu banā karke pānch, 
yeh samāpt karo.” 
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III).  Phulmati, a woman born around 1950, recalled to me how men in her community who had joined 
the reformist wave demolished some of the shrines in the Bara Banki qasbah where she spent her 
childhood before moving to Lucknow.  “They [the demolishers] said, ‘This belongs to the Muslim 
community.  We are Hindu.  This [shrine] is Muslim.’  With this idea they did it.  They said, ‘These five 
domes have gone over to the Muslims.  It is Muslim religion.’” 
Bande Lal, born in a Bara Banki village in 1933, described to me how he destroyed his family’s 
Lal Beg shrine.  He grew close to the reformist circle in the late 1940s and 1950s and sometimes joined 
Kanhaiya Lal and the shaharwāle triumvirate in the meetings they convened and at Valmiki Jayanti 
functions.  In narrating these times, Bande Lal dwelt on his sister’s wedding, when he announced to his 
family his opposition to the traditional cock sacrifice to Lal Beg. 
Bande Lal: So my mother scolded me, saying “Arre, this is Lal Beg Sahib!  Arre, he must 
be worshipped!  Otherwise something bad will happen.  Let us do this.”  So I said, 
“Whatever needs to be done, I will do.  But this I will not do.”  And I started digging it 
[the Lal Beg shrine] up. 
Joel: Digging it up? 
Bande Lal: Yes, I started digging it up, uprooting it. 
Joel: You removed it? 
Bande Lal: Yes, but then my mother started beating me. 
Joel: Beating you?  Slapping you? 
Bande Lal: (laughing) Slapping, yes.  What to do?  So I backed off.  But when she left the 
village, I threw it into the pond… Mother went off to buy some things in another village, 
and I saw no one was at home, so I dug it up, threw it in the pond, earth and all.  
Afterward my brothers, everyone told me that I shouldn’t have, and [when she 
returned, mother] abused me roundly, called me names, insulted me, but her biggest 
worry was that this fellow has dug it up and thrown it away – god forbid something 




Far from suffering the retributive misfortune – the vengeance of Lal Beg150 – that his mother feared, 
Bande Lal, buoyed by the networks of Arya Samaj and Congress patronage that his friendship with the 
reformists made available, prospered.  First a sweeper at Lucknow University, he got a better job as a 
sweeper in a scientific research institute, and then was promoted to laboratory attendant – still a fourth 
class employee, but free from the stigma of bearing the broom.  His family did not rebuild the shrine. 
Extirpation was only one of the ways in which Lal Beg shrines disappeared as the gospel of 
Valmiki spread; more often, they were not uprooted but simply neglected.  As Lal Begis began to adopt 
Valmīkiyat, many simply ceased to perform the periodic maintenance required to maintain the integrity 
of their shrines.  Slowly, monsoon rains dissolved the domes and niches; erosion rendered the platforms 
indistinguishable from the earth over which they had risen.  
The repudiation of Lal Beg meant not only the abandonment of his shrines but the cessation of 
his rites, notably the cock sacrifice to which he was traditionally entitled (“us kā haq hai”) during 
wedding celebrations and at his annual feast on Jamghaṭ (the day following Diwali).  Consider the 
following conversation, in which members of a family of seven sisters described to me how their 
household Hinduized. 
Zulekha (third sister): Our father [who died in 2000] began to object that we could not 
remain in two things, we would have to go for one – either become Lal Begi or become 
Balmiki.  He started to say that we should all be [the latter]. 
Sanjay (Zulekha’s son): This much was certain: from Lal Begis we developed [develop 
karke] and became Balmikis.  We were Balmikis, we just didn’t know it. [… From the 
time of grandfather’s change of heart] the cock was no longer sacrificed over there at 
the shrine.  We killed it here at home. 
Joel: Any special reason? 
Shyama (sixth sister): Yes, the reason was this, that ever since Valmiki Jayanti started to 
be celebrated here in the neighborhood [muhalle mai], our father from that time found 
out that we people are Balmikis.  And Lal Begis became others.  So he started saying that 
                                                          
150 The phrase is Rudyard Kipling’s.  “The Vengeance of Lal Beg” is the title of one of his short pieces of 
ethnographic fiction, published 3 November 1887 in the Civil and Military Gazette. 
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we are Balmikis, we will remain Balmikis, we will not be Lal Begis.  Since then he ended 
it [the cock sacrifice…]  
Naziran (eldest sister): Father began saying, ‘No, I am Hindu, and why should we have 
the cock killed for Lal Beg?  We will kill it, but just ordinarily [not ritually], we will not 
have it killed [by the sacrificer].  After that we were not allowed to get the cock killed for 
Lal Beg. […] He saw that our Valmiki ji was a Hindu […] ‘When our guru is a Hindu, then 
why should we have a Muslim kill the cock, why should we have him recite [the fātiḥa]?  
We are Hindu, so even if we do eat the cock on Jamghaṭ, we will not get it killed by a 
Muslim.’  This is what he said. 
 
In these accounts, the cock sacrifice in honor of Lal Beg appears to be the primary object of the father’s 
reform; the annual ritual supplies the surface on which his – and the family’s – identitarian 
transformation is to be inscribed.  The words that the daughters and grandson attribute to their late 
forebear illustrate the kind of logical operations and categorical reshuffling that followed acceptance of 
the arguments in support of Valmīkiyat.  The father concedes to tradition on one point: the family will 
continue to feast on the flesh of a cock on Jamghaṭ, along with their caste fellows.  But in the new 
dispensation the flesh will no longer be consecrated by a Muslim officiant who recites Quranic verses; 
slaughtered not in the halal fashion but “ordinarily,” the feast will cease to bear the signs of Islamic 
sacrality.   
The father of the seven sisters was far from alone in forbidding his family to ritually reverence 
Lal Beg.  As the reformers grew in influence, an increasing number of families stopped performing the 
heretofore de rigeur cock sacrifices at weddings and Jamghaṭ.  That the youngest member of the 
conversation quoted above, Sanjay, plotted this change in a discourse of development or progress – 
“from Lal Begis we developed and became Balmikis” – is significant.  In the next section we will see why. 
 
Naming-Education 
 “Originally my name was Muslim.”  
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 This utterance, or a variation on it151, was so frequently given voice in my interviews with 
Lucknow Balmikis born before the 1980s that I learned to expect it.  Many of my interlocutors’ stories of 
renaming resonated with that of Rishi Kumar, a poet, song-writer and retired hospital sanitation worker 
born in the 1940s:  
Rishi Kumar: Originally my name was Muslim.  Hasanu.  That was the name I was given 
at first […] 
Joel: Your parents, sisters, brothers, everyone called you by this name? 
Rishi Kumar: Earlier they called me by this name.  Now everyone knows me as Rishi 
Kumar. 
Joel: Did you change it yourself? 
Rishi Kumar: No no, my name, in truth, changed on account of my studies.  When I was 
studying, that’s when my new name got written [likhā gayā]. 
Joel: Do you remember how it came about? 
Rishi Kumar:  Yes, my father had it written.  My father said, ‘His name is not good.  In the 
future it will cause problems, give him trouble.  In studying, in going other places, it will 
cause him difficulties.’  So he renamed me according to his own thinking.  There was an 
MLA, one Kanhaiya Lal Balmiki.  He had a brother named Rishi Kumar.  I was renamed 
after him. […] My name was changed in 1955.  It was when my name was recorded at 
school.  When admissions happened, the form was filled, at the time of filling the form 
my name was written as Rishi Kumar. 
 
Rishi Kumar was not singled out for this treatment.  His parents changed their names as well: 
My father’s original name was Rahim.  Later, when we came here from the village, he 
took the name Ram Das. […] My mother’s name was Hafiza, but afterward it was 
changed to Ganga […] because it would be difficult for her to go to temples; when she 
would say ‘My name is Hafiza,’ they wouldn’t easily let her enter the temple. 
 
Between the late 1940s and the 1970s, members of the sanitation labor castes in Awadh ceased 
to use musalmānā names, and adopted hinduānā names in their place, in great numbers.  The 
nominative practices of virtually the entire 583 clan transformed in this period.  With regard to his 
mother, Rishi Kumar mentions the “difficulty” (dikkat) of entering Hindu temples bearing an apparently 
Muslim name.  This is relatively rarely cited as a factor in transnomination, though it is worth noting that 
                                                          
151 Such as, “Originally my name was musalmānā,” i.e. in the Muslim style, Islamicate.  
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names did function as one of many signs of Lal Begi alterity from Hindus in the old order.  A more 
common context for adopting hinduānā names was the obtaining of government employment.  In many 
accounts, women and men changed their names precisely when they applied for positions as sanitation 
workers in the municipality, at the university, or in government hospitals.  Rishi Kumar hints at this when 
he remarks that Rahim became Ram Das “when we came here from the village.”  For his parents, as for 
many of the 583s who urbanized in the middle decades of the twentieth century, leaving the village and 
joining government service were simultaneous, almost coterminous, events.  Relatives or caste fellows 
who had migrated to Lucknow earlier and already held government jobs advised them to apply for work 
with hinduānā names.  Having musalmānā names, especially in the years immediately following 
independence and partition, was seen as a liability, a potential source of “difficulty” (dikkat) or “trouble” 
(pareśānī), for fourth class employees in government departments where anti-Muslim sentiment 
sometimes ran unchecked.  Transnomination at the moment of securing government employment was, 
for a period, so widespread that it gave rise to the term “sarvis nām” (service name), the hinduānā name 
used for employment purposes, as distinct from “ghar kā nām” (home name), the often musalmānā 
name used among family and community. 
More than any other, though, it was the context of Rishi Kumar’s own renaming – school 
admission – that prevailed in my interlocutors’ accounts.  The reformists consistently stressed the 
practical value of the adoption of hinduānā names – both given names/forenames and the surname 
Balmiki – in securing admission to government schools and exemption from school fees.  Education, and 
the governmental financial assistance that brought education potentially within reach, were themes 
rarely absent from the appeals the reformists made to their caste fellows.  As Master Lalta Prasad put it, 
their message had as its refrain the following: “Brothers, we people are not Lal Begi but Balmiki.  We 
should write ‘Balmiki’ [as our surname].  And by doing this we will get exemptions from fees, our 
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daughters and sons will get fee exemptions.  If we write ‘Lal Begi’ then they will not get scholarships and 
fee exemptions.”  He then described a particular incident from around 1960:   
I had this friend.  There was a Gītā Vidyālay [a government-supported school in our 
neighborhood, run by prominent local Congressmen].  They had a column on the 
application for admission asking what your religion is.  Isn’t it?  So my friend wrote ‘Lal 
Begi.’  He submitted the forms [foram-voram].  Then [the admissions officer] said ‘Kindly 
pay the full fees.’  My friend replied, ‘Why?’  So [the admissions officer] said, ‘You are 
Lal Begi, Muslim.  Therefore you will have to pay full fees.’  So he came and told me 
about it, and told Govind Prasad, and we advised him, ‘You’ve made a mistake, bring the 
forms to us, we’ll fill out a new one.’  So the second form we filled out, and we wrote 
‘Balmiki’ and in brackets ‘Hindu.’  Meaning Scheduled Caste. […] Then he did not have to 
pay fees.  
  
Awareness of the legal recognition of the category of Scheduled Caste, and of state programs designed 
to address caste-based inequality by creating educational and other opportunities for Scheduled Castes, 
arrived in the bastīs of Lucknow piecemeal in the years after the Constitution took effect.  Lalta Prasad’s 
friend knew that under Congress rule, his caste status should entitle his children to a fee exemption in 
school, yet he remained unaware of the religious exclusions that qualified that entitlement.  Having 
naively identified himself according to his community’s traditional self-description – as Lal Begi by 
religion – he found himself confronted by a regime of recognition that would not brook Dalit autonomy, 
the very regime that authored the dictum, “no person who professes a religion different from the Hindu 
religion shall be deemed to be a member of a Scheduled Caste.”  The admissions officer understood Lal 
Begis to be Muslim, or at least to be more akin to Muslims than to the other recognized religious 
communities, and accordingly declared the family ineligible for financial relief.  Since even modest 
school fees were beyond the means of Lalta Prasad’s friend – as they were for most sanitation labor 
caste families – securing his children’s education meant formally relocating his family vis-à-vis the state’s 
regime of recognition.  It meant becoming – or at least professing to be – Hindu.  
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 Gauhar Lal, born in 1939, a retired government accountant and one of the most highly educated 
of the shaharwāle of his generation, told the following story of his own experience in accessing 
education at a government school in Lucknow: 
Gauhar Lal: I filled out the scholarship form for intermediate [eleventh and twelfth 
standard].  On the form, for religion, for caste I wrote Mehtar.  And I was disqualified for 
scholarship.  I didn’t get it.  They said, ‘This is not allowed.’  So the principal called me 
and said, ‘You’ve written Mehtar as your caste, why didn’t you write Balmiki?’  I said, 
‘What is Balmiki?  I don’t know Balmiki.152’  He said, ‘This has been recognized, from the 
government this has been already recognized, that only Balmikis will obtain 
scholarships.’  So I got a magistrate – an acquaintance – to make out a certificate saying 
‘Now I am Balmiki.’  Understand? 
Joel: This happened when you were in intermediate? 
Gauhar Lal: Yes, I was in intermediate. 
Joel: You were eighteen or so? 
Gauhar Lal: I was eighteen.  So when I got the Balmiki certificate, and again sent the 
form, then I got the scholarship. 
 
Such stories were legion.  Sometimes only the children’s surname or title was changed (from Lal Begi or 
Mehtar to Balmiki), other times the given name was changed as well.  Not infrequently, the parents 
changed their names at the same time, in order to avoid scrutiny by admissions staff, or embarrassment 
to their children, on account of the mixture of musalmānā and hinduānā names in the same family.  
Ratan Lal ‘Sadhu’ (born in 1948), for instance, told me that: 
When I went to school, one of our community leaders153 said to me, ‘Your father’s name 
is Ali.  This will not do, your classmates will laugh at you […] So in place of Ali, write Alok 
Nath.’ […] So then – my father’s real name [aslī nām] is Ali – then for school papers I 
wrote that my father’s name was Alok Nath.  And to this day he’s known as Alok Nath. 
 
From a strictly legal point of view, the advice that the reformists dispensed to their caste fellows was 
based on a falsehood, or rather a half truth.  Balmiki, was, to be sure, recognized as a Scheduled Caste in 
UP (and several other states), according to the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order of 1950.  The 
                                                          
152 What is italicized here marks what Gauhar Lal said in English. 
153 Later Ratan Lal specified that the leader (netā) in question was Govind Prasad. 
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reformists were thus quite right to emphasize the recognition that the title Balmiki promised.  But Lal 
Begi, too, was (and remains) a Scheduled Caste; insofar as the Constitution was concerned, Lal Begis 
were Hindu, belonged on the Schedule and were entitled to the same benefits as every other Scheduled 
Caste.  The much-reiterated contention that identifying oneself as Lal Begi disqualified one from 
Scheduled Caste benefits flatly contradicted the law.   
 Yet in practice, as is demonstrated in Lalta Prasad’s friend’s example and many others like it, the 
reformers’ advice was entirely sound.  School principals and admissions officers clearly were under the 
impression that Lal Begi was not a Scheduled Caste, precisely on account of its truck with Islam.  The 
constitutional regime of recognition being thus mediated through local state actors, the reformers 
counseled nominative Hinduization as a pragmatic means to access education.   
 
The Meat Controversy: A Tale of Two Cauldrons 
 There are degs and there are bhagaunās.  Dictionary entries suggest that the two are similar in 
appearance and identical in function: both are cauldrons, large pots for cooking or boiling over an open 
fire.  Both can be wrought from a variety of metals, though bhagaunās today are usually aluminum 
whereas degs tend to be made of heavier metals like brass and copper.  The only necessary structural 
distinction is that degs are rounded whereas bhagaunās are cylindrical with a flat bottom. 
 But with the penetration into everyday life of the tendency to designate all South Asian 
phenomena according to a binary categorical schema of Hindu and Muslim – that is, with what we might 
call the Partition of Everything – the deg and bhagaunā have become, in the bastīs of Lucknow and the 
villages of Awadh, mutually opposed signs of communal allegiance.154  I was mystified, at first, by how 
                                                          
154 That the deg has come to signify an Islamicate mode of sociability is not entirely without reason: the curvaceous 
cauldron features prominently in the ritual life of Sufi dargahs, and its grandest representatives – enormous brass 
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frequently my interlocutors in Lucknow brought up degs and bhagaunās when describing the 
community’s adoption of Valmīkiyat.  I had assumed that the primary material traces of the Hinduizing 
turn would be physical objects of worship.  This was not altogether wrong; as we have seen, 
Hinduization did involve the destruction and abandonment of Lal Beg shrines as well as the construction 
of Valmiki temples.  What surprised me was that it was cooking vessels, more than shrines, that people 
wanted to talk about. 
 Several months into my stay in Lucknow I began to understand why.  Nuptials and obsequies 
provide arguably the most important, and certainly the most frequent, occasions for caste sociability.  
The feasting of caste fellows that is de rigeur at weddings and death rites takes place, for a majority of 
the community, in the narrow lanes of the bastī itself, or on wasteland immediately adjacent to the 
bastī, or, in the village, on whatever land is vacant in the Mehtar ṭolā.  The relatively recent bourgeois 
practice of renting halls or lawns for weddings remains, for most, economically out of reach.  While most 
members of the community in the city now live in pakkā homes (a revolution that began in the 1960s), 
kitchens are tiny.  Professional catering, also for economic reasons, is unfeasible.  Therefore the 
preparation of the feasts that accompany weddings and deaths generally occurs in the same place as the 
events themselves, starting two or three hours before the meal is to begin but often continuing 
concurrently, and is usually done by male relatives working with cauldrons balanced on bricks over an 
open wood fire.  Around these steaming aromatic vats women and men gather, warming themselves if it 
is winter, helping or heckling the cooks.  The site and process of food preparation, as much as the feast 
itself, creates a sensorially rich nucleus of intimacy on the occasions that constitute the foundations of 
caste sociability. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
structures weighing tons – were donated to such shrines by Mughal emperors for the feeding of the pious and the 
indigent.  But South Asian dargahs have always fed mixed crowds, including Hindus, and there is no necessary 
connection between the particular style of cauldron exemplified by the deg and Islam or Muslims per se.  Even 
more arbitrary is the identification of the bhagaunā as a “Hindu” cooking vessel; this assignation appears to be 
based on nothing but its difference from the loosely Islamicate deg, and thus exemplifies “the Partition of 
Everything.”  For a description and discussion of degs at the shrine of Muinuddin Chishti in Ajmer, see Troll (1989). 
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By all accounts, this arrangement has been in place for a long time: longer than pakka houses, 
longer than migration to the city.  When reformists advocated a change in cauldron, then, they were 
seizing on a material centerpiece of community life enmeshed in a web of affective bonds formed over 
generations.  As we will see, what was in dispute – what was at stake – included not only the kind of 
cooking vessel but what food it would contain, whether or not liquor would be served, and the entire 
form and content of nuptials, obsequies and other life cycle rituals.  In many of my interlocutors’ 
accounts, all of these objects of controversy, all of these bonded threads in the web of affect, 
concentrated in the sign of the deg and the bhagaunā.  
Of the shaharwāle reformers, it was Achhe Lal – the union leader and, eventually, Member of 
Parliament – who led the charge against using degs and serving meat at weddings and other caste 
gatherings.  As he put it to me, 
We raised our voice against it.  About meat, about flesh, we said that it should not be 
made at weddings and such [śādī-vādī].  Because it incurs great expense.  One point was 
that it is expensive, another was that it is just not a good thing.  Some eat [meat], others 
don’t.  So we said, cook vegetarian: pūrī, ālū, kachaurī, make dishes like this.  They’re 
less expensive to make. […] 
In our caste we used degs.  We had to borrow them from Muslims, we had to rent them.  
Muslims used to make every kind of meat in these – buffalo meat was cooked in them, 
cow flesh too.  Well our people used to eat all of this, a lot.  So the group of us, we said, 
‘When you borrow their [Muslims’] vessels, well – they throw everything in there!’  We 
said, ‘Get bhagaunās – there are these aluminum bhagaunās – get them, and prepare 
food in the bhagaunās.’ […] 
Getting back to the deg controversy [deg-wālā māmlā], veg or non-veg [kacchā-pakkā]. 
We said ‘Make kacchā [i.e. vegetarian]!’  We said, ‘These Muslim brothers, when they 
pray namāz, recite the fātiḥa [over the food], do you know what they’re saying?  
Brothers, if you want to recite the fātiḥa, do it yourself!  You already do the cooking and 
pay for the whole thing yourself, so why not also fold your hands and pray whatever it is 
you want to pray?  When Muslims do it, we don’t know in whose name the fātiḥa is 
recited.  
 
Achhe Lal here adduces a number of reasons for the reformers’ campaign against meat and degs: meat 
dishes are costlier to prepare; potentially not all guests eat meat (“Some eat, others don’t”); and degs 
are used by Muslims promiscuously (“they throw everything in there”) and to prepare beef.  
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Importantly, for Achhe Lal the deg/meat controversy also includes the custom of Muslims blessing the 
food served at community functions by reciting the fātiḥa over it.  This practice he impeaches by 
invoking the doctrine that prayers are best uttered by the person for whose benefit the prayers are 
intended and in his own language – a tenet of a semiotic ideology which has been discussed in the 
context of colonial Protestant missions (Keane 2007; Yelle 2013), and which we will examine in Chapter 
VII.  Here it can be briefly noted that Achhe Lal and his colleagues applied this doctrine unevenly: the 
Arabic spoken by Muslims invited to bless food at 583 weddings was rejected for being 
incomprehensible to its sponsors, while the Vedic Sanskrit recited by Arya Samajists at their ritual 
functions – attended and sometimes sponsored by the reformist triumvirate, all of whom joined the 
Arya Samaj but none of whom knew Sanskrit – escaped this criticism. 
 That serving only meat at weddings produced exclusions was a problem that the reformers felt 
acutely.  As Lalta Prasad put it, “We invited everyone to join us and eat.  Muslims would eat, but Hindus 
would not eat, saying ‘Buffalo meat is made in those [degs], and we are Hindu, so how can we eat?’  It 
wounded us deeply that guests would come to our door and leave without eating or drinking.”  A great 
many of the reformists’ caste fellows, until recently, did not perceive this to be a problem at all.  This 
was because in most sanitation labor caste weddings, almost nobody outside the caste, least of all a 
Hindu, was expected or imagined to attend – one’s wedding guests were precisely one’s caste fellows.  
This was, of course, a consequence of social structure; the homogeneity of wedding and funeral 
gatherings was, and to a considerable extent remains, an effect of untouchability.  What was 
exceptional was the situation of the triumvirate and a few of their supporters, who from the 1950s 
onward nurtured friendships with fellow Arya Samajists, Congressmen, and other privileged caste 
Hindus and had occasion to invite such individuals to weddings in their families. 
 The concern that other kinds of meat were cooked in degs was likewise peculiar to the 
reformers.  Achhe Lal admits as much when he notes of beef and buffalo meat that “our people used to 
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eat all of this, a lot.”  That beef and buffalo meat should be negatively valued, and further that one 
should take interest in what is cooked in a vessel at other times, were elements of an ideology of purity 
and pollution that the reformists, channeling the concerns of their Arya Samaj and Congress patrons, 
had to introduce to, and inculcate in, their caste fellows.  Lalta Prasad, in his telling, stressed that these 
ideas were part of a Hinduizing effort: 
What we preached [prachār karte the] was Hinduism [Hinduat].  Meaning: ‘You all are 
Hindu, you should do the circumambulations [a Hindu wedding rite], you should 
celebrate nuptials with Hindu rites and practices [Hindu rasm-rivāj se śādī kareṅ].’  And 
the main issue was this, that we people used the degs of the Muslims, and among the 
Muslims, in degs, the Muslims cook buffalo meat.  So we forbade this, saying ‘They 
make buffalo meat in these; stop using these [degs].  And don’t get Muslims to cook.’ 
 
Govind Prasad, on the other hand, emphasized economic reasons, above all else, for advocating reform 
in wedding fare.  In his account, it was the need to liberate the caste from chronic indebtedness to 
moneylenders that motivated the reformers to promote vegetarian dishes in place of meat. 
 In order to effect the change they desired, the reformists had to create an alternative to the 
degs that Muslim patrons loaned and rented out for sanitation labor caste weddings, funerals and other 
events.  Their first strategy was to rent out bhagaunās from Hindu merchants.  Lalta Prasad recounted 
this venture: 
So we thought, why don’t we approach some Hindus, saying ‘Kindly give us [i.e. rent to 
us] some cooking vessels [bartan].’  Then we’ll use those to cook so that everyone can 
eat.  But the Hindus declined.  They said, ‘You people [tum log] eat meat and such [mās-
vās].’  We approached a number of them – Sonal Chand Aggarwal had vessels, Kashi Lal 
the cloth merchant had some, several people, several Hindus, had vessels for rental.  
But they didn’t give them. 
 
This having failed, the reformists created a bartan samiti – a co-operative society for cooking utensils – 
whose members all contributed funds with which bhagaunās and other cooking implements were 
purchased and made available for any member, or caste fellow for whom a member would vouch, to 
borrow under certain conditions.  Lalta Prasad was voted President of the samiti, Govind Prasad the 
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Secretary.  Their circle, which included the small but growing number of their caste fellows who had 
secured government employment in fields other than sanitation, were the samiti’s early members.  
Within a few years the samiti grew to have one hundred members (at which point membership was 
capped) and amassed sufficient bhagaunās to supply multiple clients on a single date.  Their rates were 
competitive. 
 But while increasing numbers of the shaharwāle made the switch from degs to bhagaunās and 
were persuaded of the benefits of at least some of the changes that the reformists championed, others 
resented the multipronged assault on tradition and drew a line at the attempt to metamorphose 
wedding fare.  Since reformists, by their own and others’ accounts, made weddings their primary 
occasions for the haranguing and entreaty of their caste fellows, it was only to be expected that 
weddings would become the rallying point for resistance to reform.  In the 1950s, a series of quarrels 
between the reformist faction and the traditionalists culminated in a major conflict, triggered by a 
wedding, in which the former brought a suit against the latter and both sides aired their grievances 
before Lucknow’s City Magistrate.  The few people old enough to remember it call it the “Lāl Begī-
Bālmīki muqadma,” the Lal Begi-Balmiki “affair” or “case” (in the legal sense), a name it earned because, 
while its immediate cause was the clash over meat at weddings, it quickly assumed the proportions of a 
referendum on the entire Hinduizing project, a show of strength between the partisans of Lal Beg and 
the apostles of Valmiki, a reckoning over the future of the caste’s identity. 
 Accounts vary as to how, precisely, the conflict erupted, though the basic contours are clear 
enough.  A kinsman of one Amin Chaudhury hosted a wedding.  This kinsman, who had recently come 
under the influence of the reformist group, broke with 583 tradition by neither inviting a Muslim to 
recite the fātiḥa at the wedding feast nor serving meat and liquor.  Amin Chaudhury took issue with his 
kinsman over these innovations and the dispute turned rancorous: in some accounts the reform-minded 
host insulted Amin Chaudhury before the assembled guests, in others Amin Chaudhury and his coterie 
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forced the kinsman to eat meat and drink liquor, and then publicly paraded him drunk in an attempt to 
discredit the Balmiki faction.  Perhaps both occurred.  What is unanimous in participants’ recounting is 
that the fight began over the question of serving meat at weddings.  
Achhe Lal, Lalta Prasad and Govind Prasad were all named as litigants on the side of the reform-
minded kinsman; opposing them were Amin Chaudhury and four or five other caste fellows, all 
somewhat older than the reformist group (and all long deceased by the time of my research).  The 
members of both parties were 583s.  The reformers took the counsel, again free of charge, of the same 
Arya Samajist lawyer who represented them in the cohabitation cases; Amin Chaudhury and his fellows 
had a lawyer remembered by some as Muslim, by others as a Hindu Kayasth.  It was a civil rather than 
criminal suit and was heard and arbitrated by the City Magistrate (or in one account his Deputy). 
Those who remember the Lāl Begī-Bālmīki muqadma recall that each side argued for its 
interpretation of caste identity by reference to ritual practice construed as custom.  Operating under the 
long shadow of colonial anthropology and its techniques of taxonomy, the parties sought to establish an 
essential nature for the caste by reading ritual practice as evidence.  The Arya Samajist lawyer thus 
posed questions like, “Do you consult pandits to determine auspicious wedding dates?” and “By what 
rites are your weddings conducted?” – questions that could have been lifted from enumerator’s manual 
of the 1911 census.  Answers to queries of this sort could not, even in this framework of judgment, 
definitively settle the matter because the caste was genuinely divided, the reformist camp having begun 
to consult pandits and adopt Hindu wedding rites like the seven circumambulations (sāt phere) while the 
traditionalists did not consult pandits and conducted wedding rites in a largely musalmānā fashion.  
Amin Chaudhury’s faction explained to the magistrate that Lal Beg was “our ancestral object of worship 
[purkhayātam pujātru]” to whom a cock sacrifice was customarily due at weddings, upon which the 
caste traditionally feasted on the sacrificed bird.  The reformers acknowledged the practice, but 
rehearsed their objections to it as superstitious and uneconomical.  The decisive blow to the Lal Begi 
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faction came, according to some accounts at least, when the reformists, through their lawyer, revealed 
the content of a prenuptial ritual, Behervānī, that the 583s traditionally conducted clandestinely, “out in 
the jungle” (the literal meaning of Behervānī).  This rite centered on the sacrifice of a piglet.155  In Achhe 
Lal’s recollection, in which the proceedings were imbued with considerable drama, it happened like this: 
So then [our lawyer] said [to Amin Chaudhury], ‘Pray tell me this: in these parts, do you 
people sacrifice swine?  Prior to weddings, in an act of worship known as Behervani, do 
you people not sacrifice piglets?’  And he replied, ‘Yes.’ […] So the magistrate in his 
judgment declared, ‘These people cannot possibly be Muslim!’ 
 
Despite the implication of (Achhe Lal’s recollection of) this declaration by the magistrate, it is not clear 
that Amin Chaudhury and his group were arguing the Lal Begis were Muslims per se.  They evidently 
objected to being classed as Balmiki and Hindu, but whether they asserted a Muslim identity or simply 
presented themselves as Lal Begi is not certain.  The reformists, though, clearly articulated, in a 
discourse comprehensible to the state, a position that the state was already predisposed to support – 
that the sanitation labor castes were Hindu. 
 The magistrate ruled in the reformist group’s favor.  This being a civil case, official consequences 
for Amin Chaudhury and his group were minimally damaging – they may have paid a fine.  The caste as a 
whole did not react swiftly or decisively to the judgment; the conflict over meat and degs continued to 
simmer for decades at 583 weddings and funerals.  But the ruling did demonstrate that the topography 
of pahchān had shifted, that long-standing habits of community self-perception and other-recognition 
were now at odds with power, that Valmiki gave a certain purchase over the new regime that Lal Beg 
and figures like him did not.  The judgment also tilted the landscape of authority within the caste by 
exhibiting the fluency of the purveyors of Hinduization, and the stammering of the older caste 
                                                          
155 The sacrifice of a piglet to a local Dalit goddess is widely attested as a prenuptial ritual observed by the 
Chuhra/Bhangi caste across north India.  In some regions, like western UP, this sacrifice is not concealed and the 
flesh of the sacrificial victim is consumed.  In Awadh, by contrast, the sacrifice is performed secretly and the flesh is 




leadership, in the language of the postcolonial state.  Like a weather vane, the ruling indicated where 
the future of the caste must lie, if it was to prosper in independent India. 
 The members of the defeated party in the Lāl Begī-Bālmīki muqadma had, as I mentioned, all 
died years before I began my research.  With some difficulty, though, I was able to locate the son of one 
of Amin Chaudhury’s fellow litigants, who was ten or twelve years old at the time of the case and 
recounted to me his memories of the controversy and its aftermath.  His account, unsurprisingly, 
inverted major assumptions of the reformists’ narratives.  In his recollection, for example, it was 
vegetarian wedding fare, which required multiple preparations and thus multiple bhagaunās, that was 
economically onerous, whereas the traditional single-dish meat preparation was affordable.  His 
narrative of a series of obsequies provides a glimpse into how the traditionalists sought to retrench their 
increasingly beleaguered position in the years following the muqadma. 
My aunt and uncle said to us, ‘When we die, this is the food we want served, this one 
[Lal Beg] is who we want honored.  When we are not here, you all [of the next 
generation] must make this food.’  That is what they said.  Well, those people objected, 
[saying] ‘Do not prepare meat!’  So when uncle died my aunt called all of us boys – she 
called Lallu, she called me – […] the caste was there in numbers [for the obsequies] and 
she had us make biryani and so forth [meat dishes].  Then these leaders [netā log] made 
a hullabaloo that this was wrong, that we had put poison in the food, all kinds of things, 
and they wrote a report [that] everyone was dying [from the poison].156  So that no one 
would eat this food. 
 
When his aunt died, he and his cousins, in accordance with her wishes, bore her corpse to the burial 
ground on a charpoy (the Lal Begi and musalmānā way), rather than on the disposable bamboo-and-
cloth bier used by Hindus (titki).  The reformers, he said, blocked kinsmen from participating in the 
funeral procession. 
                                                          
156 Govind Prasad, in a separate interview, confirmed that the reformists had indeed spread rumors of poisoning as 
a strategy in the campaign against meat. 
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 When I asked him why the reformers objected to meat and charpoys, he noted yet another 
locus of conflict – pilgrimage to Sufi shrines, a practice important to many 583s and denounced by the 
advocates of Vālmīkiyat – and concluded with a theological reflection: 
I don’t know [why they objected].  Now here I am.  I have always gone to Ajmer and 
such places [Sufi shrines].  I still go.  That is the way we always have done things.  Ram 
and Rahim are one and the same.  What is separate?  So, brother, now I even go to 
those places – to temples – to Bajrang Bali.  He is Ali, after all.  Whether you call Him 
Bajrang Bali or Ali, it’s the same thing.  But those people say, ‘No.  Do only Hindu ritual.’ 
 
His was a mournful narrative, a story of families divided, of death observances vitiated by controversy, 
of community lost.  At only one point in our long conversation did his tone change to one of mirth.  
Having worked his way up from sweeper to clerk over a forty year career at a government research 
institute, he retired some years ago with a pension.  With the initial installment of his pension, he told 
me with a chuckle, he made a trip to Jaipur, purchased for himself a 3500 rupee deg, and brought it 
home.  “I make my daliya and everything in it.  Uṛad dāl doesn’t boil down properly in a bhagaunā.  But 
it cooks nicely in a deg.” 
 
Beyond Internal Reform 
 In this chapter we have tracked the propagation of Vālmīkiyat – an ideology forged in the 
campaign to Hinduize the sanitation labor castes – among the Lal Begis of Lucknow in the middle 
decades of the twentieth century.  We have examined key domains of practice – regarding women’s 
sexuality, Lal Begi ritual, naming and educating children, and wedding and funeral feasts – on which the 
purveyors of Vālmīkiyat concentrated their efforts and confronted resistance.  We have sketched some 
of the decisive contexts in which a Dalit caste seized upon the signs of its alterity from the Hindus and 
wrought them into signs of Hindu belonging; contexts in which a community resignified its shrines, 
cooking vessels, celebrations, diet, women, men, and children. 
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 But it is essential to bear in mind that the dissemination, contestation and normalization of 
Vālmīkiyat within the caste took place concurrently with struggles by the sanitation labor castes to 
improve the conditions of their existence with respect to society at large.  At the same time that 
reformers and traditionalists were clashing over what foods to serve at weddings, the caste as a whole 
was also engaged in a campaign to obtain decent housing, to overcome discrimination in schools, to 
improve dehumanizing labor conditions, and to combat the everyday humiliation of untouchability 
practices in public space.  For the purposes of this study, the struggle to reform society at large, and its 
concurrence with the campaign of internal caste reform, are essential for two reasons.  First, many of 
the individuals who organized sanitation labor caste struggles against entrenched public forms of 
discrimination and exploitation in Lucknow were precisely the leaders of the internal caste reform 
movement.  Their successes in the former domain earned them enormous credit among their caste 
fellows and buttressed their cause in the latter.  Second, at the hands of these leaders and their 
Congress and Arya Samaj patrons, the campaign against casteism took on a communalist hue, giving 
substance to the notion that untouchable liberation lies with militant Hinduization.  Here I will briefly 
elaborate on these points and bring this chapter to a close. 
 We have discussed education in relation to naming practices: for a generation of 583s, 
musalmānā names were dropped and hinduānā names assumed literally at the threshold of the 
institutions of modern education.  What this says about the Dalit experience of postcolonial Indian 
secularism is profound.  At the same time, taking a step back, it must be recognized that the sanitation 
labor castes’ attending school at all, under whatever conditions, constituted a revolutionary break with 
the past.  When Balmiki reformers guided their brethren in the ways of the new regime, advising them 
to change their own and their children’s names in order to smooth the passage through school 
admissions and secure exemptions from prohibitive fees, they helped give rise to the first generation of 
the sanitation labor castes to be formally educated, a tectonic shift in the structure of Indian society and 
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a change of great practical benefit to the individuals and families involved.  When Master Lalta Prasad, 
despite the handicap of near-blindness from eye injuries incurred as a railway worker, provided free, 
evening tutoring sessions to hundreds, perhaps thousands of youth from his caste over a span of 
decades, he contributed to a transformation of lives that earned him goodwill even among those 
wounded by his withering scorn for tradition.   
 Consider housing.  Until the early 1960s, the Lal Begis of Lucknow lived in conditions both 
insecure and insalubrious.  As Govind Prasad put it, “we all lived next to latrines, defecating grounds 
[bampalus-vampalus], along open drains and sewers [nāle-vāle].  Some lived behind the mansions 
[where they worked].  Mostly along drains.  It was filthy.”  Homes were built of mud and whatever 
materials were available.  In the great flood of 1960 the swollen Gomti wiped out two of the largest of 
these precarious Lal Begi settlements (in Huseinabad and Daliganj) and a fire devastated another (in 
Hasanganj).  The reformist group, emboldened by their links to power, organized their caste fellows to 
squat in numbers on a just-completed government housing scheme intended for others (now Paper Mill 
Colony), and then, making good on Achhe Lal’s leverage with municipal government and Kanhaiya Lal’s 
and Narain Din’s standing with then Chief Minister C.B. Gupta, got the arrangement regularized.  Unlike 
the servants’ quarters and sewer-bank shantytowns to which urban Lal Begis had been hitherto 
confined, this settlement had pakkā houses, enclosed toilets, and other amenities.  Following this 
success the reformists orchestrated further canny advances onto government land and housing in other 
parts of the city, gains that translated into relatively secure and dignified living conditions for large 
numbers of their caste fellows between the 1960s and 1980s.  Here again, the partisans of Valmiki 
delivered concrete, meaningful, and desired change, buttressing their status as caste leaders and 
reinforcing the idea that the politics of representation that they modeled, whatever else one might say 
about it, worked. 
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 Until the 1960s in Lucknow (and until the 1990s in parts of the surrounding districts), 
untouchability practices in public space were the norm.  Lal Begis were prevented from taking water 
from public wells or taps themselves; they had, rather, to request ‘touchables’ to pour water, from 
above, into their waiting vessels.  Shopkeepers kept kaṭorīs (small, shallow bowls) of water at their 
counters with which to rinse coins offered by Dalit customers before putting them in the cash box.  And 
so on.  Article 17 of the Constitution, brought into effect in 1950, rendered such practices offenses 
against the law, yet they continued in Lucknow, as in most places, until challenged by politically 
organized Dalits.  In the 1960s, the reformist triumvirate mobilized their caste fellows to stage a series of 
confrontations in Lucknow intended to eliminate two public forms of untouchability that they found 
particularly demeaning: exclusion from chai stalls and the denial of barbers’ services.  Again with the 
counsel of the Arya Samaj lawyer, and now also with the active support of the Congress-appointed City 
Magistrate, the reformers and their coterie in 1965 requested chai from a chai stall proprietor in Chowk, 
and when they were, as usual, denied, they filed a criminal case against him.  After initial setbacks, the 
chai vendor was arrested; eventually a compromise was reached in which he opened his stall to Dalits 
and apologized and the criminal charges were dropped.  The reformers next took action against a chai 
vendor in Aliganj, and this time the threat of arrest sufficed.  Using similar tactics the Balmiki leaders 
approached select Lucknow barbers, who, as a class, refused to shave or cut the hair of men of the 
sanitation labor castes.  In Babuganj an Arya Samajist police inspector beat up a recalcitrant barber.  As 
word of this and the arrest of the chai vendor circulated, the barbers of Lucknow began to comply with 
the law. 
 In mid-twentieth century Lucknow, Hindus and Muslims both normatively practiced 
untouchability with the sanitation labor castes.  Yet there were differences of degree.  As we have seen, 
Muslims rented degs and other cooking utensils to Lal Begis without compunction, and ate when invited 
to Lal Begi weddings, whereas not even the teetotalling, vegetarian, janeu-wearing reformists could 
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persuade Hindus to loan them bhagaunās or eat at their feasts.  Where Hindu chai vendors uniformly 
denied service to the sanitation labor castes, Muslim chai vendors were split: some denied service, 
others offered service, though usually in a separate set of cups than those used for the general public.  
Achhe Lal, who played a leading role in the chai vendor and barber campaigns, held that with regard to 
untouchability practices in Lucknow in the 1960s, “Hindus practiced casteism much more, and Muslims 
did it less. [Hinduoṅ maiṅ to zyāda zāt pāt thī, Musalmānon maiṅ kam thī.]”  That this distinction is 
drawn by Achhe Lal is significant, given his role in deciding which chai vendors and barbers would 
provide the staging ground for the legal confrontations over untouchability.  The chai stalls in Chowk 
and Aliganj that the reformers selected for their action were Muslim owned and operated; the 
proprietor arrested was one Siddiqi.  Likewise it was on Muslim barbers that the reformers brought to 
bear the threat of police action.  The anti-untouchability campaign that Lucknow Balmiki leaders led, 
justifiably confident of local Arya Samaj and Congress support, was waged as though only Muslims 
practiced untouchability. 
 That the reformists correctly assessed the conditions under which they could rely upon Congress 
and Arya Samaj backing in improving their caste’s structural situation is supported by an example of 
what happened when those conditions were not met.  A facet of the reformist movement on which we 
have touched only glancingly was debt.  The advocates of Vālmīkiyat generally promoted economization 
– especially the reduction of expenditure on alcohol and on weddings and other community events – 
and sought to reduce the community’s crippling indebtedness to moneylenders.  While critics accused 
some Balmiki leaders of hypocrisy in this domain, there was one reformer, Shiva Rao, whose 
commitment to the liberation of the sanitation labor castes from debt was, by all accounts, much more 
than rhetorical.  Shiva Rao, a worldly bachelor who hailed from outside UP – some say he came from 
Maharashtra, others from Madhya Pradesh – was an intimate of Kanhaiya Lal (in whose home he lived), 
Narain Din, and the shaharwāle triumvirate.  In addition to participating in many of the reform initiatives 
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we have discussed, Shiva Rao also studied patterns of debt among his caste fellows in Lucknow, 
identified moneylenders whose exploitation of Balmikis could be demonstrated to be illegal, and filed 
cases against them.  Shortly thereafter, in 1966, he was shot and killed by unknown gunmen in Paper 
Mill Colony.  The presumed antagonists in this confrontation over the Balmikis’ standing in society, 
unlike in the untouchability cases or in the cohabitation controversy, were Hindu mahājans.  The 
sanitation labor castes demanded justice, but their leaders were unable, this time, to summon outside 
aid.  Their fellow Arya Samajists declined to assist.  Narain Din (by this time ex-MP) and Kanhaiya Lal (still 
MLA) turned in vain to their Congress benefactors.  The murder of Shiva Rao was left unsolved; no 
arrests were ever made.  
 By the early 1970s, then, the limitations of Harijan politics, as well as its benefits, were manifest 
to the sanitation labor castes of Lucknow.  Twenty years of vigorous reformist activity by the first 
generation of Congress Balmikis had shown what a program of political obedience, labor quiescence and 
internal reform could accomplish, what it could not, and at what price.  The efforts of Kanhaiya Lal, 
Narain Din, the shaharwāle triumvirate and their like-minded comrades reaped the community 
undeniable gains in literacy and education, in housing, and in the curtailing of public forms of 
untouchability.  The means by which these changes were achieved made clear that in postcolonial 
India’s political mainstream – the Congress – untouchable advancement hinged on Hinduization.  As 
Ratan Lal ‘Sadhu’ put it to me, “After Independence, we reaped great benefits from becoming Balmiki.  
The profit that accrued to us upon becoming Hindu [Hindu ban karke hamko jo fāydā milā], well, it was 
myriad: many kinds of [government] benefits and schemes, as well as political gains and economic 
improvement.”  Hinduization, in turn, implied alienation from Muslims – whether in the agonistic mode 
of the chai vendor, barber, and cohabitation cases, which draped the dominant caste-Dalit axis of 
conflict in Muslim-Hindu garb, or in the cool severance of longstanding Dalit-Muslim ties, the quiet 
dismemberment of the economy of degs, fātiḥa reciters, wedding invitations, dargah patronage, and so 
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on.  The first two decades of independence demonstrated that the Hindu nationalist substrate of the 
Congress’s de facto Harijan policy – Shraddhanand’s gift to Congress Balmikis, their means of 
circumventing Gandhi’s insistence on purely internal reform – was at least as resilient as Gandhi’s 
paradigm of the Harijan as a meek and grateful bhakta.  
One implication of all this was that for the generation whose names were changed upon school 
admission – the first generation of Lal Begis, that is, to be taught that they were Hindu – the elements of 
Vālmīkiyat appeared not as jumbled components of a risible ideology, as they had to some of their 
parents, but as a stable constellation of ideas whose validity was confirmed by experience.  That 
vegetarianism went hand in hand with progress, Valmiki with government jobs, and education with 
Hinduism, was for this generation less a contentious assertion than a social fact, reflected in the 
increasingly disparate fortunes of reformist and traditionalist families among the 583s.  Likewise the 
signs Lal Beg, Islam, meat and (in ironic company with Islam) liquor were soldered, first by discursive and 
then by experiential repetition, to the objects backwardness, illiteracy, debt, and the humiliatory past.  
This is why today one often hears things like, “Our family is all educated, none of us eats meat.”  Or, 
about a notorious drunkard, or a Bara Banki rustic who has yet to shed his Awadhi pronunciation, “You 
should ask him about Lal Beg.”  This is why people’s utterance of the musalmānā names of their own 
parents or older siblings is so often accompanied by looks of embarrassment and nervous laughter.  
 
Toward Indeterminacy 
Let me conclude this chapter and this section of the dissertation by suggesting, in the words of 
Govind Prasad, one direction that the third and final section will take.  This will appear to run counter to 
much of what this chapter has argued; I defer to Chapter VII and the Conclusion an assessment of the 
extent to which it actually undermines the processes described here.  As the preceding narrative should 
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have made clear, Govind Prasad played no small role in the Hinduization of the sanitation labor castes of 
Lucknow, in the transformation of Lal Begis into Balmikis, of Anwar and Ayesha into Shankar and Shanti.  
As my account should also have suggested, Govind Prasad, in our many discussions in the last year of his 
life, expressed a profound ambivalence toward the reformist enterprise in which he was so deeply 
involved.  One of his favorite themes, to which he returned again and again, was the history of 
missionary involvement with his community over the centuries.  In his words, “there were three kinds of 
missionaries who approached us [the Lal Begis/Balmikis] – Muslim, Christian, and Hindu.”  He would 
then describe each with sympathy and a touch of critique – compassionate Sufis, concerned British 
Protestants, and – the group he knew best, having been a card-carrying member – the helpful, if 
calculating, Arya Samajists.   
Once, after a discourse on this well-worn theme, Govind Prasad then lowered his voice to a 
gravelly whisper.  “Maze kī bāt yeh hai,” he said, “ki hamne sab ko dhokhā diyā.”   








Valmiki on Parade 
 
Cocks and Liquor 
 I was walking along the main galī (lane) of a Balmiki neighborhood by the northern bank of the 
Gomti when a fifty-year-old woman in a dark colored sari, sitting alone on a charpoy, gave me an 
impassive look, patted the empty space next to her, and said in a tone that would brook no refusal, 
“baiṭho.”  Sit.   
I sat.  Soon we were joined by a woman of comparable age and an older, heavier woman 
wielding a bamboo staff freshly whittled, at one end, to a sharp point.  This spear was soon to be thrust 
into a tightly ringed bundle of dried and split date palm fronds to make a laggā jhāṛū, a long-handled 
broom.  A short distance away sat old Shyam Mehboob in his skullcap, sunning his arthritic knees in 
front of his house.  None of the three women around me wore a bindī, burqā, sindūr, or other 
conventional markers of Hindu or Muslim femininity.  
 We spoke first of labor.  The women told me to try to get them regularized, to convert their 
status in the municipal corporation from contract laborers to permanent employees.  No one in their 
families, they explained, had a permanent position, and only permanent employees enjoyed any kind of 
security.  I told them I had no influence at the municipality, and asked about their grown children, who 
theoretically ought to be providing for them at this stage.  One woman had had eight, six of whom were 
alive.  Do they live here, I asked, or have any moved away?  She laughed at my question. 
 “They’re all in England,” said the woman next to me on the charpoy. 
 “They send her money from there,” added the woman with the bamboo staff. 
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 “Yes,” concluded the first woman, “and my husband lives in Saudi!”  The three cackled at their 
joke.  In fact, all six of the woman’s children live in the bastī, and all are involved in sanitation work. 
 Some young men wandered over and joined the conversation.  It was autumn, a season marked 
by a multitude of Hindu festivals as well as, this year, Muharram.  There were also caste-specific sacred 
events upcoming: Valmiki Jayanti, the commemoration of the birth of Rishi Valmiki, was only two weeks 
away, and shortly thereafter would follow Jamghaṭ, the day on which Lal Beg, historically, has been 
propitiated.  Curious how my interlocutors might rank the importance of the various imminent festivals, 
I asked, “So, are there any tyauhārs [holidays, festivals] coming up?” 
 Immediately one of the young men replied, “Yes, Valmiki Jayanti!” 
 “When is it?” 
 “On the first.” 
 “No, friend,” interjected another young man, “It’s on the eleventh.” 
 “It’s on the first of October,” insisted the first. 
 “It’s on the eleventh,” repeated the second.  “Check your calendar again.” 
 While the young men argued the holiday’s standing vis-à-vis the Gregorian calendar, I turned to 
the women, who had not yet said anything about holidays.  “Diwali is coming,” remarked the mother of 
six.  The three women watched me expectantly, as though they were testing my knowledge of caste 
tradition. 
 “And the following day is… Jamghaṭ, yes?” I asked. 
 The woman with the bamboo staff broke a slight smile.  “Yes.  On that day–” she then switched 
semiotic tracks from speech to gesture, moving her straightened right hand through the air as though it 
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were a knife sawing flesh.  The pantomime lasted several beats and appeared, as far as she was 
concerned, to complete the syntagmatic chain she had begun verbally.  Then she added, “Cocks will be 
cut.  Liquor will flow.” 
 “In every home?” I asked. 
 The mother of six answered, “In every home.  Cocks and liquor.”  
 
The Past in the Present 
In this and the next chapter – which, along with the Conclusion, constitute Part 3 of the 
dissertation – we turn from the history of pahchān politics to their present.  Of course, “the past is never 
dead; it isn’t even past” (Faulkner 1951).  Or, as the north Indian vernacular rightfully has it, the “past” 
(bhūt) and “ghosts” (bhūt) are the same thing.  Memories of the Lāl Begī-Bālmīki muqadma, the forcible 
reclaiming of “Balmiki” women from Muslim men, and the bitter feuds over funerary and nuptial rites 
that roiled the community in the 1950s and 1960s, live on in minds, bodies, acts and utterances in the 
Balmiki bastīs of Lucknow today.  In Part 3 we will explore ethnographically the haunting of the present 
by the past.  We will consider the ways in which a century of struggles over the religious pahchān of the 
sanitation labor castes structures Dalit politics now, and the ways in which this history shapes even 
habits of speech, gesture, and public comportment.  We will examine the fruits of Hinduization, as well 
as the furtive persistence of older ways: what Govind Prasad, at the end of the last chapter, referred to 
when he said, “[W]e deceived every one of them.” 
In the conversation recounted above, the gesticulant middle-aged women and garrulous young 
men discussed with me two ritual events of unique significance to the sanitation labor castes.  Both are 
annual events in which the caste’s axial figure – whether prophet, guru, god, or progenitor, and whose 
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name gives the caste its pahchān – is honored.  Jamghaṭ – the cock sacrifice and feast of Lal Beg – 
honors the old caste prophet Lal Beg; I had read of it in colonial accounts, but did not expect to find it 
still observed when I came to Lucknow in 2011.  Valmiki Jayanti, which, as we saw in Chapter V, began in 
Lucknow in 1950, commemorates the birth (janam) or advent in the world (prakaṭ) of Rishi Valmiki, the 
new guru, god, forebear, and well-spring of sanitation labor caste pahchān.  This I fully expected to see; 
participating in it was a key feature of my research design well before I set out for Lucknow.   
In this and the next chapter I will describe Jamghaṭ and Valmiki Jayanti – the annual rites of the 
old caste prophet and the new caste guru – in some detail.  My effort here is partly documentary: these 
are rituals undergoing change, aspects of Jhamgaṭ may soon cease altogether, and good ethnographies, 
it seems to me, should provide thick enough description to serve as archival material for future 
historians.  At the same time I intend my account to address anthropological and historical questions.  
One set of questions, with which this chapter is primarily concerned, deals with the embodied politics of 
urban space: of public processions as an arena in which political status is spatially inscribed in the city, 
and in which pachchān is performed and contested.  For these questions the Valmiki Jayanti processions 
through the streets of Lucknow are the ethnographic material.  More on this in a moment. 
Another set of questions are introduced in the vignette above.  The gesturing women and 
loquacious young men invoked different actions with respect to the rituals they were anticipating.  
“Check your calendar again,” said the youth – a fitting exhortation for a ritual whose temporal location 
has been debated.  Organizers of Valmiki Jayanti have argued both sides of the question, “Would it be 
more politically efficacious to fix the date according to the Gregorian calendar or the Hindu?”  
Meanwhile “Cocks will be cut, liquor will flow” invokes efficacious action of a different order.  A printed 
calendar on the one hand, blood and intoxicants on the other: these signs of the sacred gesture to the 
distinct semiotic ideologies in which these rituals are implicated, as I will argue in Chapter VII.  There the 
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ethnographic material will be both Valmiki Jayanti (not the public processions but Valmiki Jayanti’s other 
ritual forms) as well as Jamghaṭ. 
 
Publics and Processions in South Asia 
A growing literature on identitarian public processions in South Asia teaches us that publics are 
generated not only by the reflexive circulation of discourse, as Michael Warner (2002) would have it, but 
by the performative enactment of collectivity by bodies mobilized in new ways (Lynch 1981; Freitag 
1989; Gooptu 2001; Beth 2005; Jaoul 2007; Rao 2009).  A theme in this scholarship is the 
reconfiguration of relationships between socially marked bodies and socially marked spaces that certain 
kinds of processions bring about.  With the procession, the question of who belongs in what space at 
which times – and, I would add, with what comportments – is settled neither by tradition nor by 
rational-critical debate, but by unpredictable, effervescent encounters of flesh, blood, passion and will, 
encounters which inevitably attract the discipline of the state but are not entirely determined by it. 
 Two narratives dominate the existing literature: the communalization of the urban poor in the 
Hindu and Muslim religious procession (Freitag 1989; Gooptu 2001) and the politicization of the Dalit 
masses in the Ambedkarite procession (Lynch 1981; Beth 2005; Jaoul 2007; Rao 2009).  In this chapter I 
mean to build upon and complicate these narratives by presenting material that is a little bit of both, 
and yet neither.  The history, especially in the last hundred years, of contestations over urban territory 
in popular processions associated with Holi, Ram Lila, Muharram and Ambedkar Jayanti reverberates in 
the procession I will be describing.  Valmiki Jayanti parades bear a both genealogical and dialogical 
relationship with these preceding forms, and replicate some of their patterns, most notably the 
performative realization of subaltern claims over public space.  Yet the politics of Valmiki Jayanti are also 
distinctive, and their effects set this procession apart.  I will argue that in the differences between 
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Valmiki Jayanti and the processions discussed in the literature, we can measure the distance between 
modes of subaltern politics.  And by looking closely at the mode that has been embraced by the 
sanitation labor castes we can trace the contours of the postcolonial Indian state’s imaginary of the 
Hindu body politic, and compare it with the Hindu social body of everyday urban life. 
Before giving an account of the Valmiki Jayanti processions of 2011, let me briefly rehearse the 
history of Valmiki Jayanti in Lucknow.  In 1950, Kanhaiya Lal Balmiki organized and hosted the first 
Valmiki Jayanti in Lucknow in a field near a sanitation labor colony in the Lucknow cantonment.  The 
Chief Minister of UP, Govind Ballabh Pant, was the chief guest.  From the cantonment the annual 
practice spread to the city, where the shaharwāle triumvirate of Achhe Lal, Govind Prasad and “Master” 
Lalta Prasad organized the event.  Initially it was held in a field at King George’s Medical College (KGMC) 
where many sanitation workers lived, and later in each of the major Lal Begi/Balmiki bastīs in the city.  
Since the late 1990s the various independent Valmiki Jayanti celebrations have come together at the 
Valmiki statue at Parivartan Chowk157 in the center of the city for a single function.  The Nagar Nigam 
(Municipal Corporation) provides the bulk of the funds for Valmiki Jayanti.  Valmiki Jayanti was declared 
a holiday in the 1980s, but it is a restricted – as opposed to gazetted – holiday, which is to say that 
government offices, schools, etc., remain open, but government servants can take the day off work 
without penalty.  The date of Valmiki Jayanti has shifted over the decades; at times it has been a fixed 
date in the month of October, at other times a date fixed vis-à-vis the Indic lunar calendar.  As a state 
holiday, the date of the Jayanti is śarad pūrṇimā, which ordinarily falls in October.  In practice virtually 
no one observes Valmiki Jayanti outside of the sanitation labor castes and, to the limited extent they are 
compelled to, the municipal authorities for whom they work. 
 
                                                          




Valmiki on Parade 
It is śarad pūrṇimā, October 11, 2011.  Valmiki Jayanti begins with a havan ceremony at the 
Valmiki statue in Lal Bagh, attended by the BJP mayor; at a subsequent function at Congress 
headquarters the chief guest fails to show up (see next chapter).  The long afternoon hours, though, are 
filled with the movement through the capillaries and arteries of the city of a dozen processions, one or 
two from each of the major Balmiki bastīs, toward the Valmiki statue at Parivartan Chowk, literally the 
central point of the map of contemporary Lucknow.  At this great traffic circle, where the ancient poet-
sage Rishi Valmiki, seated half-lotus on a concrete plinth, looks across the road to a mid-stride Subhas 
Chandra Bose, the processions will converge in the evening for a collective commemoration of Valmiki in 
spectacle, song and speech. 
 I go to one of the larger Balmiki bastīs, located in the shadow of a British-era beer brewery from 
which it takes its name – Mohan Meakin – to observe preparations.  I approach by the back route, 
through Ashfaqullah Nagar’s maze of alleyways.  In the rear of the bastī there are no signs of a festival 
underway; on the contrary, the lanes seem quite like they are on any other sweltering afternoon – 
largely abandoned for the shade.  The few people I meet in the back of the bastī have no plans to 
participate in the day’s Valmiki Jayanti celebrations.  Saleeman, a sweeper at KGMC nearing retirement, 
is shelling peas with her neighbor Meena.  Gesturing languidly toward the front of the bastī, Saleeman 
tells me that it is “Those people over there [udhar ke log]” who do all the pageants and processions 
[jhāṅkīyāṅ aur julūs]. 
 At the front of the bastī, two jhāṅkīyāṅ (singular jhāṅkī) are being organized.  These jhāṅkīyāṅ 
are processions of horses, chariots, musicians and youth dressed as heroes, villains, gods and goddesses 
of the Hindu pantheon.  This genre of spectacle has both Vaishnava and plebeian roots; the name 
derives from the verb jhāṅknā – to cast a glance, to peep – and historically denoted both Krishnaite 
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pageant and “peep-show” (Platts 2000:401; McGregor 1993:392).  Each jhāṅkī is sponsored by an 
individual or small group, a man or men of the community who solicit contributions from their neighbors 
(who are, ipso facto, their caste-fellows) and also spend their own money.  This year in Mohan Meakin 
the two jhāṅkīyāṅ represent two individuals whose political inclinations diverge: one is a supporter of 
the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP), the other a stalwart of the Congress.  Their 
relationship, however, is not antagonistic, and while preparations for the two jhāṅkīyāṅ are conducted 
separately, their procession from Mohan Meakin to Parivartan Chowk is a joint affair, whose success or 
failure is understood to reflect not on this or that faction but on the bastī as a whole. 
 The jhāṅkī sponsored by the Congress man is running late.  In the dimly lit main room of the 
sponsor’s house a hired make-up artist is painting the faces of bastī children – blue for Ram and 
Lakshman, white for Sita, red for Hanuman – while other children are still being dressed for their roles.  
The jhāṅkī sponsored by the BJP man, meanwhile, is already fully costumed, painted, and armed.  In the 
main room of this sponsor’s home – one of the two air-conditioned rooms in the bastī – I find myself 
face to face with the entire cast of the Ramayan, most bearing weapons: Ram and Lakshman with their 
bows, Siva with his trident, Ganesh with his axe, Ravan with a sword, Hanuman with his club, a retinue 
of lesser monkeys with spears, and Valmiki, Sita, Parvati, Sarasvati, Lav and Kush adorned but unarmed.  
The role players are youth of the bastī, somewhat older than their prepubescent counterparts in the 
Congress jhāṅkī.  One awkward twenty-year-old stands in a corner wearing a spiked helmet and holding 
a tall spear.  I can’t place him iconographically, so I ask and am told that he is Rana Pratap.158  A curious 
addition.  I ask the young man to tell me about Rana Pratap – who he was, when he lived.  He does not 
know.  Ravan asks me to take a snapshot of the whole ensemble, and I oblige.  On the wall of the room, 
just above the heads of this lively Hindu tableau hangs a framed photograph of the dargah of Moinuddin 
                                                          
158 Rana Pratap, a sixteenth century Rajput ruler of Mewar known for his opposition to the Mughals and those 
Rajputs who allied with the Mughals, is a favored symbol of Hindu militancy for some Hindu nationalists. 
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Chishti in Ajmer.  In this community, I am reminded, even BJP men acknowledge the power of Muslim 
shrines. 
 Two brass bands have arrived in the front of the bastī; they are apne log, our people – virtually 
all of the brass bands in Lucknow belong to the Dhanuks, the sanitation labor caste in the region other 
than the Chuhra/Balmiki.  One of the bands, in loose formation in front of the temple, breaks into a 
merry, anarchic march.  While the Congress jhāṅkī scrambles to get ready, the BJP jhāṅkī files out of its 
sponsor’s home and crowds into the temple.  From the front entrance of the bastī a colorful clutch of 
men comes into view – in his bright orange kurta, Dr. Dinesh Sharma, the young brahmin professor of 
commerce who is the mayor of Lucknow (and prominent local BJP leader); around him a circle of the 
bastī’s junior netās dressed in white; and trailing behind them the mayor’s armed guard in khaki and 
media men flashing cameras.  The mayor had to leave his car before entering the bastī as the lanes are 
too narrow.  I stand with a small gathering of women and men spectators in the bastī’s widest spot as 
the netās escort Dr. Sharma to the temple.  He poses for photographs: inclining prayerfully before the 
image of Rishi Valmiki, lifting a coconut for a simple puja at the Shiva lingam, standing with the 
decorated troupe of Ramayan characters.  He departs again with the brass band blaring away all the 
while. 
The BJP jhāṅkī makes its final preparations.  Horses are led before the temple for several of the 
characters to mount.  Ravan, who has no equestrian experience, repeatedly tries and fails to mount his 
steed, to the great amusement of the growing crowd.  The rest of the decorated youth proceed to the 
road between the bastī and the Mohan Meakin brewery and board the chariots awaiting them there.  
Their brass band joins them. 
But the Congress jhāṅkī still is not ready.  Since they both represent the bastī, the two jhāṅkīyāṅ 
cannot depart without each other by general agreement.  Two hours pass.  The musicians bake in their 
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uniforms.  At a samosa vendor’s stall I sip chai and take notes while Rana Pratap, leaning on his spear 
nearby, downs a packet of pān masālā.  Slowly the afternoon heat loses its edge. 
Finally the Congress jhāṅkī is ready.  Mohan Meakin will now display itself before all of Lucknow. 
The procession begins at the entrance of the old brewery and winds through Kashyap Nagar, the 
poor, mixed-caste but mostly Mallah159 neighborhood between Mohan Meakin and the northern bank 
of the Gomti.  Drummers – skilled, energetic Balmiki boys from Mohan Meakin – lead the way, followed 
by brass bands interspersed with the BJP jhāṅkī.  Pairs of horses draw flimsy, gold- and silver-colored 
chariots, bedecked with plastic bouquets, on which sit Mohan Meakin’s youth clad as the cast of the 
Ramayan.  Ravan, now at ease on his mount, rides ahead, enjoying himself, leering at the crowd, waving 
his sword through the air.  The “hermitage” chariot comes next: Sita, her sons Lav and Kush, and their 
host and protector Rishi Valmiki, all unsmiling, ensconced in gilt thrones, flanked by golden lions.  The 
heroes’ chariot – Ram, Lakshman, Hanuman and junior members of the vānar senā160 – follows, and 
after another brass band, the Shaiva chariot – bearing Shiva, Parvati, their son Ganesh, and his consort 
Lakshmi – brings up the rear.  After a short interval the Congress jhāṅkī follows, in similar order, except 
that their caravan also includes a chariot dedicated to the popular twentieth century holy man Shirdi Sai 
Baba – the Congress sponsor’s answer, perhaps, to the BJP jhāṅkī’s equally anachronistic Rana Pratap. 
Both sides of the street are lined with onlookers.  Mallah women watch while waiting for a turn 
to fill their buckets at a water pump.  Middle class homeowners observe from their porches.  On the 
whole the spectators receive the jhāṅkīyāṅ with blank, indifferent expressions.  But everybody watches.  
Further along the way, in a low-rent commercial area of Daliganj, I separate myself from the procession 
                                                          
159 The Mallahs’ “traditional occupations” are fishing and ferrying.  In UP Mallahs are a “Backward Caste,” although 
in Delhi and West Bengal they are Scheduled Caste.  Phoolan Devi of “Bandit Queen” fame belonged to the Mallah 
caste. 
160 The “monkey army” that accompanies Hanuman and Ram in the campaign against Ravan in the Ramayan. 
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and mingle with the onlookers on the side of the street.  With a gesture, I ask the owner of a petty 
goods shop, standing in his shop’s doorway, what the procession is all about. 
“It’s like this,” he tells me, “This is a Jayanti.  Of the guru of these jamādārs.  Balmiki.  He was a 
jamādār.  It’s a government holiday, actually.” 
I ask if he wouldn’t mind sharing his own caste background.  He says he would be happy to, and 
tells me he is Baniya, Gupta.161 
At the intersection with the Daliganj Bridge the procession faces the challenge, without traffic 
signal or police direction, of ascending a steep slope and immediately crossing one river of heavy traffic 
to merge with another.  A middle-aged woman with hennaed hair watches the exertions of the horses, 
the trepidation of the chariot passengers, and the risky, ad hoc efforts of Mohan Meakin men to direct 
traffic.  What is this [yeh kyā hai?], I ask her. 
“A procession [julūs] of the jamādārs162.” 
“For what occasion [kis khushī maiṅ]?” 
“It’s his/their birth [janam hai unkā].” 
“Whose?” 
“The jamādārs’.  It’s their birth-festival day [un kā janam divas hai].” 
The first couple of chariots make it over the slope and through the traffic.  I join three men at a 
pān stall by the bridge and ask them, “What is this?” 
                                                          
161 Baniyas (a broad caste designation) or Guptas (a corresponding caste title) notionally map onto the third of the 
twice-born categories – vaishya – in the classical four-fold varna system. 
162 Another name for “sweepers” (see Chapter I). 
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Without speaking, the first man makes the sweeping-a-broom gesture with his hand.  “Broom-
people [jhāṛū-wāle],” he explains.  “Jamādārs.  They have some baba [old man, saint]… Balmiki.  It’s his 
birth anniversary.” 
“Do you celebrate it?” 
“No, no one else celebrates it, only those people.” 
“Are you Hindu?” 
“No, I’m Muslim.  But this fellow’s Hindu,” he says, motioning to one of his companions. 
I ask the companion: “Are you celebrating Valmiki Jayanti?” 
“No, we don’t celebrate it.”  
Twilight falls as the Mohan Meakin jhāṅkīyāṅ manage, without injury, to merge with the 
tumultuous vehicular, human and animal traffic flowing southward over the Daliganj bridge in 
Lucknow’s rush hour.  No sooner does the Mohan Meakin procession clear the hurdle than bright lights 
and brass ebullience from the direction of Daliganj announce that the jhāṅkī from the Nirala Nagar bastī 
is close behind.  We slow, they accelerate, and soon our jhāṅkīyāṅ and theirs fuse, stretching a full mile 
from start to finish.  The Nirala Nagar jhāṅkī is rather less grand than ours – instead of horse-drawn 
chariots, their costumed youth sit on plastic chairs tied to plywood platforms on the back of bicycle 
rickshaws.  Behind each child stands poster art of the god or hero he or she represents. 
We cross the river and turn westward, following the southern bank of the Gomti past the 
Residency, Chattar Manzil, Globe Park.  Our ranks swell: battered municipal corporation trucks, 
commandeered for the evening, transport women, children and men from the bastīs.  Others come by 
motorcycle, bicycle, foot.  The procession utterly clogs the thoroughfares.  
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When the combined Mohan Meakin-Nirala Nagar jhāṅkīyāṅ arrive at Parivartan Chowk – the 
central, heavily-trafficked roundabout whose spokes radiate toward Hazratganj, Huseinabad, 
Qaiserbagh and Aliganj – the crush is superlative.  Jhāṅkīyāṅ from most of the other Balmiki bastīs of the 
city have already arrived.  On all sides of the roundabout panḍāls163 have been erected, all sponsored by 
associations of Balmiki men whose volunteers distribute leaf-bowls of sweet steaming halwā, rice with 
chhole, ālū-pūrī, or fruit salad.  The city’s non-Balmiki poor throng the panḍāls alongside the Balmikis, 
now in the thousands, as the jhāṅkīyāṅ dissolve into sociable crowds.  Against all odds, Lucknow’s 
vehicular traffic, honking all the way, continues to crawl through this thicket of horses, chariots, 
municipal trucks, child-gods, Ramayan heroes, brass bands, processors, volunteers and the indigent.  
Above, dozens of roadside hoardings and banners strung across the road announce Valmiki Jayanti with 
Hindi text, drawings of Rishi Valmiki, and photos of the sponsors (the same voluntary associations of 
Balmiki men).  Multiple amplification systems – those of the jhāṅkīyāṅ as well as those of the more 
elaborate of the panḍāls – compete for sonic dominance.  In this deafening soundscape the mood is 
cheerful; women and men mingle, socialize, laugh, eat.  For a short time, this major node of the city 
belongs to the Balmikis.  Their spatial, aural, and visual claim over Parivartan Chowk is unmatched. 
Once the last of the jhāṅkīyāṅ arrives – the Huseinabad jhāṅkī, complete with eight camels164 – 
the final program of the evening begins.  This is a kāryakram, or “function,” held in the small “Valmiki 
Park” adjacent to Parivartan Chowk, in which the mayor and members of the Balmiki community honor 
one another and Valmiki and make speeches (see the next chapter).  After about two hours of this the 
crowd melts away – on motorcycles, in shared rickshaws, on foot.  Valmiki Park and the entirety of 
                                                          
163 Temporary, open structures, “stalls” or “booths”, made of bamboo and cloth. 
164 Unique among the Balmiki bastīs of Lucknow, the Huseinabad jhāṅkī has featured camels every year since the 
jhāṅkiyāṅ tradition began.  The primary sponsor of the Huseinabad jhāṅkī took the idea of including camels from 
Lucknow’s famous Muharram processions, which also feature camels (though many more than the Balmiki bastī 
can afford; the Muharram processions also feature elephants).  The sponsor sees the camels as 1) providing some 
of Muharram’s pomp and solemnity to Valmiki Jayanti, and 2) accruing prestige for the Huseinabad bastī relative 
to the other Balmiki bastīs of Lucknow.   
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Parivartan Chowk are devastated with rubbish, mostly trampled, wet, food-soiled bowls of stitched 
leaves and crushed plastic water cups.  My friend Anand, whose mother and uncles all work as municipal 
sweepers, gestures at the expanse of filth and says to me, “Tomorrow morning, who are the people who 
will be cleaning this all up?” 
 
Spatial Strategies 
 I would like to propose that Valmiki Jayanti, taken as a whole, is a performance of what Lisa 
Mitchell (2012) calls “political arrival” – that is, the successful wresting of recognition from the state – of 
the sanitation labor castes.  It is a staging of the inclusion of the erstwhile excluded Balmikis into the 
nation, a ritual re-enactment of the bargain struck by mid-twentieth century sanitation labor caste 
leaders with their Congress and Arya Samaj patrons.  Yet as the foregoing account should also suggest, 
political arrival has its limits, and state recognition does not guarantee recognition by others – 
neighbors, co-religionists, society at large.   
In the jhāṅkī, we encounter a form of performance that draws together a tangle of ritual and 
political antecedents.  One that has attracted scholarly attention in the UP context is the politicized, 
urban Dalit procession of which Ambedkar Jayanti is the paradigmatic case and Ravidas Jayanti and 
Mahaparinirvan Divas (Ambedkar’s death anniversary) are also examples (Lynch 1969; 1981; 2012; Beth 
2005; Jaoul 2007; Lee 2008).  Scholarship has treated these processions primarily as “strategies of 
popular assertion” that target regnant, hierarchical norms in the distribution and use of public space for 
disruption and overthrow (Jaoul 2007:174).  Thus Sarah Beth (2005:400–401), building on Owen Lynch’s 
analysis of the 1978 Ambedkar Jayanti in Agra and the riots that followed, describes such processions as 
a Dalit “infiltration” of the urban territory of the privileged castes, as an “invasion and reclaiming of the 
street” by subalterns asserting their rights as citizens.  Beth helpfully distinguishes three stages, at once 
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spatial and temporal, in the history of Dalit processions – an initial phase, confined to the space of the 
Dalit bastī; a confrontational phase in which Dalits process through privileged caste neighborhoods and 
often face retaliation; and the “civic” phase marked by state recognition and its concomitants: 
legitimate access to central public space, preauthorization of routes, police control and containment of 
various sorts.  In fact the latter two stages are not so neatly distinguishable, as Nicolas Jaoul’s (2007) rich 
account of Dalit processions in Kanpur and its hinterland – where even state-approved processions on 
government land are marked by low level violence, police intimidation, and constant standoffs between 
Dalit activists and local authorities – makes clear.  In any case, what these accounts and my own of 
Ambedkar Jayanti in Kanpur (Lee 2008) collectively argue is that Dalit processions constitute a novel 
assertion of equal rights of access to public space (not as laborers, where they have long had access, but 
as citizens); and that retaliation by the privileged castes signals resentment and resistance to this 
contestation of their spatial dominance. 
Valmiki Jayanti can be understood in these terms.  For Dalits to march en masse through posh 
neighborhoods like Nirala Nagar and to arrest traffic at Parivartan Chowk during Lucknow’s evening rush 
hour is certainly to assert rights through a politics of spatial occupation.  The people of the city are 
indeed compelled to acknowledge – in a manner never seen before the advent of Dalit processions – the 
Balmikis’ legitimate right to access public space as a rights-bearing collective, rather than as sweepers.  
Yet the grounds of the assertion of rights, and the nature of the rights-bearing collective here, are 
distinct from those of the Dalit processions on the Ambedkar Jayanti model.  Whereas in Ambedkar 
Jayanti, demonstrators emphasize their status as Dalits and as citizens – that is to say, as people whose 
structural negativity can be converted into positive political content by democracy and struggle (Rao 
2009) – in Valmiki Jayanti, participants display themselves primarily as Hindus, as people who seek to 
convert their historical stigma into positive religious value.  This brings into relief one of the most crucial, 
and underexplored, differences between Ambedkarite politics and the politics of Congress untouchables 
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– what I have been calling “Harijan politics” – and the difference between their respective relationships 
with the state.  From its inception, Valmiki Jayanti, in presenting the sanitation castes as Hindu bhaktās, 
conformed to the Gandhian paradigm of untouchable inclusion in the nation.  For this reason, Valmiki 
Jayanti has enjoyed state recognition of one degree or another since 1950, whereas Ambedkar Jayanti 
has won state recognition only after bloody struggle.  That is, Ambedkar Jayanti was declared a state 
holiday in UP only after nine Dalits were killed, scores injured, and violence between Dalits on the one 
side and police and privileged castes on the other, reached such a pitch that the army was called in to 
restore order in Agra (Lynch 1981).  The state readily accommodates untouchable mobilization where 
the organizing principle is Hindu identity; when Dalits mobilize on the basis of a shared history of 
oppression, on the other hand, the state regards them with suspicion.   
The Hindu basis of the rights claim asserted by the sanitation castes also explains why Valmiki 
Jayanti in Lucknow elicits none of the hostility that Ambedkar Jayanti processions routinely face from 
the caste Hindu public.  Ambedkar Jayanti, and the autonomous Dalit politics it represents, reminds the 
privileged castes of the slow erosion of their traditional grounds of dominance.  Until the ascendancy of 
the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)165 to power in UP, this kind of procession was the target of assaults by 
bricks and stones (Lynch 1981:1952) and country-made bombs (Jaoul 2007:181); now it is more often 
greeted by subtler signs of dislike (Lee 2008:80).166  In contrast, the spectators of Valmiki Jayanti, as we 
have seen, appear unprovoked by the proceedings.  Bystanders observe with indifference as the 
“broom-people” pass by with their baba Balmiki.  If the Dalit occupation of public space as an 
autonomous collective of rights-bearing citizens threatens caste Hindus, the Dalit occupation of the very 
same public space dressed up as a dependent subset of the Hindu body politic gives no cause for alarm. 
                                                          
165 The BSP is widely seen as a “Dalit party” on account of its Dalit leadership (notably the former UP Chief Minister 
Mayawati), vote base, and promotion of Ambedkar. 
166 The situation in Maharashtra is similar; for accounts of the lethal violence with which Ambedkarite processions 
have been met there, see, among many others, Anupama Rao (2009:chap. 5) and Anand Patwardhan (2012). 
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Perhaps, then, the more apt comparison for the Valmiki Jayanti jhāṅkī is not with Dalit 
processions of the Ambedkar Jayanti type, characteristic of the 1960s to the present, but rather with 
Ramlila and Holi processions of the 1920s and 1930s in which subordinate caste, “touchable” laborers – 
what Nandini Gooptu (2001:192) calls “the shudra labouring poor” – played significant roles for the first 
time.  It was in these decades that a number of innovations, reflecting the vigorous activism of 
nationalist and communalist organizations and the popularization of their messages, were introduced to 
existing Hindu festivals (Freitag 1989; Gooptu 2001:213–234).  Public processions featuring “very large 
crowds of people wielding staffs, flags, swords and other arms… imparting an aura of triumphant and 
aggressive expansionism to Hinduism” were foremost among these innovations, and came to be major 
aspects of Holi and Ramlila (Gooptu 2001:191–192).  The urban shudra poor – Kurmis, Ahirs, Gujjars, 
Khatiks and other traditionally agriculturalist castes recently arrived in the towns of UP – performed in 
these new processions in numbers, attempting to impress and even outdo the Hindu commercial classes 
who were their economic overlords and the processions’ main sponsors (Freitag 1989:231).  “In order to 
assert themselves, and faced with social and economic marginalization as well as overt and growing 
upper-class disdain or prejudices, it became relevant for the shudra poor to claim their own pivotal role 
in the history of Hinduism” (Gooptu 2001:196).  They did this by seizing on a central plank of Arya Samaj 
propaganda – the idea that the debased status of the subordinate castes was the result of Muslim 
oppression following these castes’ militant defense of Hinduism in the age of Islamic expansion – to 
project themselves as protectors of Hindu religion.  Thus, for example, Mallahs in 1924 formed a Khūnī 
Dal (Band of Blood) to defy, at any cost, the court injunction won by Muslims restraining the annual 
Ramlila procession from playing music before an Allahabad mosque (Gooptu 2001:197, 232).  
Certainly the Valmiki Jayanti jhāṅkī shares with the militant processions of the 1920s and 1930s 
basic formal features; like the Ramlila procession in particular, the jhāṅkī is a mobile pageant of armed 
characters from the Ramayan narrative through the streets of the city.  The jhāṅkī also shares the 
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background of Arya Samaji involvement – Kanhaiya Lal Balmiki, institutor of Valmiki Jayanti in Lucknow, 
owed his career to Arya Samaji patrons and belonged to the Samaj himself (see Chapter V) – and, 
consequently, reveals the same formula for communalist mobilization: the vertical expansion of the 
boundaries of the imagined Hindu community in order to maximize a horizontal break with Muslims.  As 
the frontier of Hindu society expanded “downward” over the twentieth century, what was newly 
thinkable in the 1920s for borderline untouchable castes like Mallahs and Khatiks became, by the first 
Valmiki Jayanti in Lucknow in 1950, imaginable even for the decidedly untouchable sanitation castes.  In 
a delicate two-step with organized Hindu nationalism, both the shudra poor and, later, the sanitation 
castes, broadcast claims for status as Hindus with a long and honorable lineage – despite, indeed in the 
face of, a collective lived experience of brahminical contempt. 
Yet this parallel, too, has its limitations.  Unlike the shudra poor, who grounded their claim for 
dignified Hindu status in a mythical kshatriya past, the Balmikis assert a place in the house of Hinduism 
through their putative link with Valmiki.  If the touchable poor were defenders of the faith, the Balmikis 
would be progenitors of the faith, those who sang the story of Ram before Ram was even born (as 
Valmiki is said to have done).  The difference partly reflects the gulf between the traditional occupations 
of the two groups.  In the 1920s and 1930s, agrarian shudras of UP could look back on a history of 
employment, albeit a sporadic one, in the temporary fighting forces of the preceding centuries and as 
armed retainers of local landlords (Gooptu 2001; Kolff 2002); the figure of the lāṭhī-wielding Ahir could 
thus be transposed from the village setting to the urban Holi parade while still resonating with both 
spectator and actor.   
The sanitation labor castes, by contrast, bring to the Valmiki Jayanti jhāṅkī their tradition of 
performance as musicians, especially drummers, in processional rituals, most frequently weddings.  To 
link a tradition of processional musicianship with Rishi Valmiki requires imagination: Valmiki is known as 
poet (kavi) rather than a musician, and the distance between the poet and the musician in brahminical 
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social ontology is vast.  The music of ritual procession is particularly closely tied to untouchable and 
other low status groups, such that to play processional music is almost always to perform one’s own 
stigma (Raheja 1988; Booth 2005).  To escape this quandary – that is, to elide the distinction between 
high-status poet and low-status musician – both Hindu nationalists and Balmikis introduce the term Ram 
batānewālā, the announcer of Ram.  Through this device Valmiki, with his metered verse, and Balmikis, 
with their drums and brass bands, are jostled into the same category. 
Musicians and militants generate different kinds of spectacles.  While the laboring shudra poor 
of the early twentieth century and the sanitation castes of today both performatively enact a Hindu 
pahchān by dressing up as the cast of the Ramayan, their performances resonate differently and 
produce different effects.  In the 1920s and 1930s, the Muslims of UP’s towns correctly perceived, in the 
swelling of the army of Ram by the sword-wielding shudra poor, imminent danger (Gould 2004).  As the 
landlord’s retainers brought their skills with weapons from the village to the urban religious procession, 
they embodied militancy, conveying menace by way of signs whose history was widely recognized.  In 
Valmiki Jayanti, on the other hand, the display of arms by people known to be professional sweepers 
and musicians elicits indifference or amusement – even from the processors themselves.  This is a 
matter not only of the caste’s history but also of equipment and comportment.  The weapons are cheap 
props rented from a costume shop.  The performers, for their part, bear them accordingly, which is to 
say, casually, unseriously.  Ravan, with great buffoonery, waves about an aluminum sword; Ganesh all 
but ignores his plastic axe.  Even a potentially provocative symbol of Hindu virility, the spear-wielding 
Rana Pratap, is played by a slack youth who knows nothing about his role; and he is offset, in the 
subsequent jhāṅkī, by a beatific Sai Baba, who signifies anything but militancy.  For the decorated 
Balmiki youth, the Valmiki Jayanti jhāṅkī is not an occasion for muscular display, but for alternating 
between complacently sitting on their chariots and chatting, goofing off.  
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What militant affects Balmiki men do bring to the jhāṅkī take the form of drumming.  Valmiki 
Jayanti processions halt regularly – precisely as happens in wedding processions (barāts) – for intense, 
dramatic, often virtuosic performances by clusters of men of every age on several types of drums.  As 
demonstrations of physical and musical skill, these percussion sessions are impressive indeed; this is the 
dominant interpretant of the sign among the Balmikis themselves.  But to non-Balmiki spectators, such 
performances read precisely as do other performances of ritual processional music: as enactments of 
the stigma of the performers.167  To drum in the street, with no matter what virtuosity, is to announce 
one’s “untouchability.”  
 
The Fractured Sign Community 
All of this helps to explain why the Valmiki Jayanti jhāṅkī, as a performative enactment of Hindu 
pahchān by its participants, fails even as it succeeds.  If it has two audiences, the state and the non-
Balmiki public, only one, it seems, is persuaded by the performance.  Let us set aside the state for a 
moment.  Where the organizers of Valmiki Jayanti, from Kanhaiya Lal Balmiki in 1950 to the whole class 
of Balmiki netās in 2011, would like the processors to be seen and heard as Hindus, as descendents of 
the poet who discursively produced Ram Raj and in this sense founded Hinduism, what ordinary people 
of Lucknow see and hear are jamādārs and jhāṛū-wāle celebrating their caste-specific baba.  The 
percussive enthusiasm of the announcers of Ram is interpreted not as an honor-worthy attainment of 
devotional prowess but as a reinscription of familiar stigma.  The call for Hindu solidarity implicit in a 
procession of the characters of the Ramayan through the city is met not with Hindu solidarity, but with 
                                                          
167 See Gregory Booth (2005) for an elaboration of this argument and for a rich ethnomusicological account and 
analysis of such performances in the context of wedding processions. 
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categorical affirmation of difference: “No, we don’t celebrate it,” “only those people celebrate it,” it is “a 
procession of the jamādārs.”168   
The contrast here between reaction solicited and reaction achieved can be highlighted by 
comparing the Valmiki Jayanti jhāṅkī with another of its antecedents: the jhāṅkī in Rās Lila performances 
in Vrindavan.  In these popular religious plays based on the stories of Krishna and the gopīs, the term 
jhāṅkī denotes a tableau vivant of divine and quasi-divine characters that punctuates and often 
concludes a performance.  While the actors – who are all young brahmin men – hold their poses, 
audience members come on stage and perform acts of devotion before them, offering flowers, touching 
feet, etc. (Hawley 1981:14–18).  Yet in Valmiki Jayanti, the solicitation of devotional acts by similar 
displays of actors dressed up as iconographically unmistakable divine beings results not in worshipful 
gestures but in cool apathy. 
In Peircian terms, we have in the jhāṅkī a single sign or representamen whose interpretants – 
and, therefore, working backward, objects – depend on the social location of the interpreter.169  For 
Balmiki netās, the object is the Hindu pahchān of their caste, and interpretants include proud 
comportment and anticipation of respectful acts of recognition from caste Hindus.  For non-Balmikis the 
object is stigma, even abjection, and interpretants range from staring to making the sweeping-a-broom 
                                                          
168 Lest it seem that too much of the explanatory burden of my argument rests on the off-hand remarks of four 
arbitrarily selected roadside observers of the jhāṅkī near Daliganj Bridge, I should clarify that I found these 
reactions representative of those of a much wider pool of the “general” (i.e. non-Balmiki) public whose views I 
solicited in the days before, during, and after Valmiki Jayanti.  It is also worth noting that at an extremely similar 
procession of youth decorated as Hindu gods and heroes, also called a jhāṅkī, taken out by Lucknow’s Dhanuk 
community several months later, and featuring, in Valmiki’s place, images of the legendary Dhanuk caste forbear 
Sudarshan, whose iconographic depiction is virtually indistinguishable from Valmiki’s, the explanations offered by 
roadside observers were in the same vein.  A chai vendor: “It’s a Mehtar festival (tyauhār).”  Plastic goods 
shopkeeper: “This is a wedding procession (barāt) of the jamādārs.”  Government beer vendor: “Valmiki Jayanti – a 
Harijan procession.”  Traffic cop: “A festival of those we call the ‘lower castes’ (English term used).”  Of the many 
bystanders whom I canvassed at both Valmiki Jayanti and Sudarshan Jayanti, only one, a tool maker watching the 
latter from a distance in a crowded bazaar, took it to be a festival relevant to Hindus (Shivjī kā julūs) rather than to 
the sanitation castes.  
169 As Kockelman (2006:82–83; 2007:378) observes, the Peircian semiotic object is no concrete thing but a kind of 
projection back from the various interpretants to which a sign gives rise.  
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gesture to educate a passing anthropologist.  For ordinary Balmikis the multiplicity of interpretants – 
among them feelings and comportments of pride, pleasure, boredom and annoyance, to name a few 
that my fellow participants impressed upon me during the event itself – correspond to equally multiple 
objects.170  The point is not that Valmiki Jayanti jhāṅkīyāṅ are polysemic, which of course they are, but 
that the different interpretants of the sign (the poly of the seme) tend to part ways along caste divisions 
and are ideologically at loggerheads.  This is what Vološinov (1973:23) calls the “social multiaccentuality 
of the ideological sign” – the capacity of the sign to incite subtly divergent or even wholly oppositional 
interpretants in different classes of people in a given sign community (users of the same language, for 
instance).  Vološinov reminds us that polysemy, the open-endedness of semiosis, is not simply a matter 
of multiplicity and difference of interpretation, but of hierarchy and conflict of interpretation, since the 
plasma through which signs move is eminently that of class struggle (whatever may be the specific 
content of the classes in question).  What is insufficiently recognized in the South Asian context is that 
channels of semiosis often diverge precisely along caste lines.  Castes are not only endogamous groups, 
occupational categories and so on, but also competing schools of interpretation within the broader sign 
community.  This is one reason that the world looks so different on the two sides of the touchability line.  
As a bid to secure societal recognition of the sanitation labor castes as Hindus, then, the Valmiki 
Jayanti jhāṅkī proves deficient.  The carefully constructed sign, despite its formal congruence with 
antecedents of devotional display that in other contexts routinely elicit acts of Hindu solidarity or even 
reverence, is rent asunder as it leaves the bastī, crossing the line of touchability and entering the 
interpretive community of the public street.  Despite the promises of Hindu nationalists over the 
                                                          
170 This is where Kockelman’s (2006:82–83; 2007:378) helpful description of the semiotic object – as a 
“correspondence-preserving projection” of the ensemble of interpretants to which signs give rise – runs into 
difficulties; for here, unlike in many semiotic situations, interpretants are ranged not on a relatively circumscribed 
slice of a spectrum of behaviors (like the various conventionally acceptable responses to a purring cat), but are 
diametrically opposed.  In situations where two interpretants of the same sign are radically oppositional, it is 
difficult to establish any correspondence between the objects they imply.  Convention, in such cases, is suspended; 
meaning is in dispute; warring parties struggle for possession of the sign.   
264 
 
decades, the assertion-solicitation of pahchān falls on deaf ears.  For the public of the Lucknow street, 
the Dalit remains irremediably other. 
 
The Fruits of Recognition 
On the other hand, as a performance of the political arrival of the sanitation labor castes, and 
more specifically the political pakaṛ – grasp, reach – of Balmiki netās, Valmiki Jayanti is more successful.  
Within the Congress camp, as we will see in the next chapter, the Valmiki Jayanti function/kāryakram 
proves an embarrassing exposure of the low priority the party leadership accords its Balmikis.  But the 
morning havan and kāryakram at Lal Bagh and the evening function at Parivartan Chowk, which we will 
also discuss in the next chapter, succeed by any number of criteria as demonstrations of the political 
acumen and influence of a circle of Balmiki netās.  They command resources of the municipal authority; 
they win from the mayor of the city his time, attention, and specific promises to address specific 
grievances; photographs of their Valmiki Jayanti functions feature in the newspapers the next day, along 
with their names and those of their supporters.  At the evening function at Parivartan Chowk, even as 
the BJP mayor is giving a speech inside the park, local leaders of the rival Samajwadi Party (SP) and 
Congress put in appearances at the panḍāls just outside the park, eager to meet Balmikis, to shake 
hands, to be seen at Valmiki Jayanti.  Valmiki Jayanti dramatizes that Balmikis, if still seen as victims or 
objects of charity in civil society, have become agents in what Partha Chatterjee (2004; 2011) calls 
“political society.”  Balmiki netās know how to get things done.   
To be sure, though, this agency bears the impress of decades of Harijan politics.  If the first 
generation of Congress Balmikis adopted, arguably by necessity, a program of political obedience, labor 
quiescence, and internal reform, the political habits formed in that generation have not entirely 
disappeared.  This is acutely apparent in the case of labor quiescence.  Over the course of Valmiki 
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Jayanti, in the functions at Lal Bagh, at Congress headquarters, and at Parivartan Chowk, demands were 
made of the municipal government: Valmiki Park should be beautified, the electric transformer that 
looms dangerously over the Valmiki statue in Lal Bagh should be relocated, a gate named after Sita’s 
sons Lav and Kush should be erected next to Parivartan Chowk.  But at the end of the day, reflecting on 
all the speeches I had heard, I realized that not a single speaker had mentioned the three municipal 
sanitation workers who died of gas inhalation while cleaning the city’s sewers two days earlier.  On 
matters of life, death, and livelihood – the avoidable death of sanitation workers, the routine disavowal 
of workers who die on the job by the municipal authority, and the privatization of the labor sector in 





At the Shrine of Lal Beg 
 
What are the appropriate conditions for uttering the name of the sacred?  What modes of 
signifying religious belonging are granted legitimacy by the state in postcolonial modernity; on what 
modes does the state frown?  The question of semiotic ideology (Keane 2007) in religion – of systems of 
value regarding proper and improper modes of religious signification – underlies the debate in many 
societies over visual, usually sartorial signs of religious “identity” such as crosses, headscarves, and 
turbans.  In this chapter, I am interested in other dimensions of religious signification, not only optic but 
also sonic and tactile: registers of speech, silence and gesture, marking the sacred with banners or with 
blood.   
 In the last chapter we discussed jhāṅkīyāṅ – the processions through the city of Balmiki youth 
decorated as members of the Hindu pantheon.  In this chapter we turn to the other characteristic forms 
of Valmiki Jayanti in Lucknow – the havan, or fire ritual, and the kāryakram, or function.  After an 
account of these aspects of Valmiki Jayanti, we will then proceed to Jamghaṭ, the annual cock sacrifice 
and feast in honor of Lal Beg that, in 2011, fell just two weeks after Valmiki Jayanti.  The woman I 
described at the beginning of the last chapter had this rite in mind when she told me that “Cocks will be 
cut.  Liquor will flow.”  An account of the cock sacrifice will then lead us to a discussion of Jamghaṭ and 
Valmiki Jayanti that attends to questions of form and semiotic ideology.  Again in the interest of building 





What is a Kāryakram? 
First, though, I should clarify for readers unfamiliar with South Asia what a kāryakram is, as this 
term will play a significant role in the pages to come.  The kāryakram is a form of associational practice, 
at times arguably a ritual form, that is so pervasive in South Asia as to have escaped analytical attention.  
Like its English cousin function – in its meaning as “A public ceremony; a social or festive meeting 
conducted with form and ceremony” (OED) – the kāryakram is a labile form, suitable to a great variety 
of purposes: the school anniversary, the book release, the political party meeting, the NGO seminar.  
Meaning a sequence (kram) of actions (kārya), kāryakram, taken literally, could describe virtually any 
occurrence.  In practice, though, the kāryakram almost always denotes a form constituted by distinctive 
practices (honoring with garlands, speechmaking, applause), spatial arrangements (the division of stage 
and audience), speech registers (formal), technology (microphone, sound equipment), division of labor 
(presider, chief guest, secretary), and procedural norms (order of speakers and so on).  The genealogy of 
the kāryakram is secular; it derives not from religious gatherings but from the associational life of 
bourgeois civil society.  Yet the form has unmoored itself from these origins and leaked into other 
arenas.  As we will see in the following account of Valmiki Jayanti, the kāryakram now readily 
accommodates religious content – in this case, the praise of holy men and shouts of victory to gods.  
Without abandoning its home turf, the form has been exported from secular gatherings to religious, 
from privileged strata to disprivileged, from civil society to political society (Chatterjee 2004; 2011). 
The familiarity – or better, banality – of the kāryakram or function to a scholarly audience may 
help conceal the work that it does, qua form, to the content it mediates, and to the social collectives 
that make use of it.  In what follows, by drawing attention to the kāryakram as a form, I hope to unsettle 
this familiarity and tease out some of the ideological assumptions underlying the form itself. 
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One last point: the kāryakram is Valmiki Jayanti’s oldest form.  In the first Jayanti in 1950, when 
Chief Minister Pant was the Chief Guest, the event took the form of a kāryakram.  The jhāṅkīyāṅ were a 
later development; the havan is a quite a recent addition. 
 
Kāryakram 1: Lal Bagh 
On the morning of Valmiki Jayanti, October 11, 2011, I join about two dozen Balmiki men at a 
fenced-in traffic island in a busy intersection in Lal Bagh in central Lucknow.  At the center sits a statue – 
a somber, bronze Rishi Valmiki, Ramayana manuscript in his lap, his right hand poised to write, erected 
in 1993.  From tree limbs and poles, banners extend in every direction over the intersection announcing 
Valmiki Jayanti with Hindi text, drawings of Rishi Valmiki, and photos of the members of Balmiki 
voluntary associations who have made contributions to the day’s festivities. 
The men who greet me at the base of the statue are members of one such association, 
organized by the charismatic Jiya Lal, a vigorous, white-haired senior netā in the informal politics of the 
municipal sanitation department who sits me down next to him.  While we converse a pandit dressed in 
pure white sets up a rusty metal basin at the base of the statue, neatly stacks kindling in it, and sets it 
aflame to inaugurate a havan, a ceremony in which oblations are poured into a fire.  It is a rite with 
ancient Vedic roots, popularized in the modern period by the Arya Samaj.  Jiya Lal and his comrades 
address the officiant as “panditji” – respected pandit – and touch his feet; he applies tilak – a marking of 
red paste – to their foreheads and mine with his thumb.  Since women and men of the sanitation castes 
often perform the role of ritual specialist themselves, I discreetly enquire about the pandit at work here; 
my immediate neighbor whispers that this pandit is, in fact, a brahmin by birth, hired for the occasion.  It 
is a sign of changed times – until quite recently, few pandits would have been willing to perform these 
services for a Dalit client.  
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The pandit launches into the recitation of Sanskrit prayers, his voice broadcast over the steady 
roar of traffic by electronic amplification.  I strain to follow his Sanskrit until, a few minutes later, he 
wraps up with the Hindi devotional song Om Jai Jagdīś Hare, followed by a clinching sequence of call-
and-response victory cries to Hindu deities and others specific to the occasion.   
Victory be to Lord Vishnu!  (viṣṇu bhagwān kī jai ho!) 
Victory be to Lord Shiva!  (śiva bhagwān kī jai ho!) 
Victory be to Maharishi Valmiki!  (mahāriṣi vālmīki kī jai ho!) 
Victory be to all the Gods and Goddesses!  (sārī devī devtāoṅ kī jai ho!) 
Victory be to Mother India!  (bhārat mātā kī jai ho!) 
Victory be to the Eternal Religion [i.e. Hinduism]!  (sanātan dharm kī jai ho!) 
 
 After distributing prasād of fruit and barfī, collecting his earnings and giving a smiling Namaste 
to the qawwals, the pandit departs.  Taking his place, a middle-aged woman in a crisp pink sari, Jiya Lal’s 
sister Shyama, sits at the base of the Valmiki statue and begins applying tilak to newcomers.  Strictly 
speaking the havan is now finished, but the rapidly growing crowd, which now includes women and 
children in numbers, seems more interested in the havan-related function – kāryakram – that is just 
beginning.  A brass band has arrived; musicians bearing instruments and clad in heavy, bright red, felt 
uniforms stand sweating on the road outside the traffic circle. 
 Standing at a podium, Jiya Lal energetically congratulates his caste fellows for turning out for the 
event.  Other men in his association follow, delivering short, formulaic, felicitation speeches, usually 
concluding with shouts of victory to Valmiki.  The qawwals are invited to perform bhajans, Hindu 
devotional songs.  They oblige.  The four members of the qawwali band profuse the signs of the Muslim 
musician – they wear baggy white kurtas and pajamas with black vests, green scarves, long hennaed 
hair, and beaded necklaces.  Yet like several other prominent qawwali bands in Lucknow, they are all 
Balmikis – the harmonium player and lead qawwal, Pyare Lal, is Jiya Lal’s neighbor in the Balmiki bastī in 
Paper Mill Colony. 
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When a small motorcade pulls up to the park entrance, Jiya Lal seizes the podium to announce 
that the mayor, Dr. Sharma – whom he calls “the messiah [masīhā] of Lucknow,” “our elder brother,” 
and “the savior of the Valmiki community” – has arrived.  Accompanied by his armed escort, the poised 
young mayor of Lucknow emerges and coolly receives several dozen garlands of marigolds from the 
Balmiki men whom Jiya Lal calls in sequence to welcome him – Hari Balmiki, Ramesh Balmiki, and so on, 
the surname ringing like a refrain.  The mayor stops one of the men, whose name Jiya Lal has just 
announced, and asks him to repeat his name.  “Misa Balmiki,” says the man.  The mayor frowns as 
though he still does not understand; “Misa” is certainly not a familiar Hindu name, and sounds possibly 
Christian or Muslim.  It is the only name in the series that is not unambiguously Hindu, and it is the one 
that gives the mayor pause. 
 While the news media films and shoot photographs, the mayor ascends a steel stepladder to the 
top of the Valmiki statue and garlands the ancient sage with more marigolds.  Jiya Lal takes a pragmatic 
swerve in his adulatory introduction and calls on the mayor to fulfill his promise of getting the electric 
transformer that looms over the Valmiki statue removed.  He then calls Sharma to the podium to 
address the gathering. 
 The mayor’s speech begins with the customarily solemn naming of dignitaries present: again, a 
catalog of Balmiki men.  After outlining a number of projects beneficial to sanitation workers that his 
administration plans to implement, he turns to the subject of Rishi Valmiki:  
Regarding the Balmiki community [samāj] I always have some special remarks to make.  
If there had been no Maharishi Valmiki, then who, today, would speak of Lord Ram?  
And if there had been no Ram, Ravan would not have been checked.  And if Ravan had 
not been checked, then vice, atrocity, and egoism [anāchār, atyāchār, ahaṃkār] would 
still pervade the earth.  So if you consider it, if anyone has done the work of eradicating 
vice, atrocity and egoism from the earth, it was Maharishi Valmiki, through the medium 
of that perfect specimen of humanity Ram, who did it… So, whenever I talk about the 
Balmiki community, I say ‘the people of the Balmiki community are the most excellent 
[śreṣṭh] of all!’  If caste is to be analyzed, well, the caste system shouldn’t exist, who 
knows why it was started.  But looking at it from a different angle, in comparison with 
271 
 
other people the Balmiki community is the most excellent. 
 
In support of his assertion the mayor points out that thieves are not be found among the Balmikis, and 
the Balmikis are hard-working.  This has ultimately to do with the fact that “you all are his [Valmiki’s] 
offspring [santān].” 
I am struck by the conformity of the mayor’s message to the major premises of the now eighty-
year-old Arya Samaji tract Śrī Bālmīkī Prakāś (Chapter IV).  The positive valuation of the Chuhra caste 
(“the Balmiki community”) is accomplished precisely on the grounds of their putative genealogical link 
with Rishi Valmiki qua partisan of Ram, the divinity most favored by north Indian Hindu nationalism 
(Fuller 2004).  The qualities of Valmiki himself, when mentioned at all, are an afterthought; his primary 
value is his role in the propagation of the story of Ram.  No sooner is the Balmiki community mentioned 
than Rishi Valmiki enters the discourse, and no sooner is Rishi Valmiki mentioned than Ram – apparently 
the real object of interest – is valorized.  The Chuhras are invited, by way of two rapid substitutions, to 
identify with Ram and his project of “checking” Ravan and “eradicating” vice.  Indeed their social value, 
their being-most-excellent [sab se śreṣṭh honā], rests on this identification with Ram.  
Sharma concludes his speech with hopes that we will all follow on the path laid out by Maharishi 
Valmiki.  There is applause, more garlanding, more photographs, and the brass band erupts into 
ebullient heterophony as the mayor and his armed escort drive away. 
 
Kāryakram 2: Congress Headquarters 
My next stop is the UP state headquarters of the Congress Party, set back among the breezy 
bungalows and leafy gardens of Mall Avenue.  There another Valmiki Jayanti celebration is underway.  
My friend Anand, whose brother-in-law aspires to be the new face of Balmiki youth in the Congress, 
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whisks me into the great white bungalow that houses the headquarters.  In an airy, whitewashed room 
about fifty people – men on the left, women on the right – sit on white cushions on the floor while a 
minor Congress functionary stands at a microphone in the middle.  About two thirds of the people 
present are Balmikis whom I recognize.  The speaker regrets that the intended chief guest of the 
function, Dr. Rita Bahuguna Joshi – president of the UP Congress Committee, professor of history at 
Allahabad University, former mayor of Allahabad and daughter of the late Chief Minister H.N. Bahuguna 
– cannot attend on account of being called suddenly to Jhansi by no less a personage than Rahul Gandhi, 
General Secretary of the Indian National Congress.  Joshi’s absence, the failure of any high functionary 
to put in an appearance, and disappointment at the event’s low turn-out are the themes of this speaker 
and several more who follow him. 
Then one speaker, a portly, bearded, tilaked Congressman addressed by all as “Pandit ji” says 
the following: 
Our elders created the varna system… They explained that the head [khopṛī, literally 
“shell” or “skull”] is the brahmin.  It’s the brahmin.  The arms are the kshatriyas.  The 
stomach is the vaishyas.  And these feet are the shudras… And Valmik, Valmik was called 
a shudra.  So it is they whom I honor first!  It is they whose feet I touch!  If anyone on 
this earth is great, then it is the Balmiki community that is the greatest [agar is dhartī 
par koi baṛā hai, to sab se baṛā Bālmik samāj hai]! 
 
Scattered applause ensues.  Pandit ji continues, saying that everyone, in infancy, helplessly produces 
mal – “dirt,” a common euphemism for excrement – and mothers clean this dirt. 
And this dirt makes the mother and father of every child a Balmiki!  [more clapping]  
They take such care, they clean and remove our filth [gandagī], and they do so swiftly.  
We should honor their commitment.  They are our god [ve hamārā devtā haiṅ]. 
 
I observe in myself a wave of incredulity that these Gandhian rhetorical tropes of the 1930s are actually 
being put forth and applauded in a mixed-caste political gathering in 2011.  The metaphor of the 
scavenger as society’s mother, lovingly removing its excrement and warranting, on those grounds, 
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universal respect, is one Gandhi repeatedly invoked in the first half of the twentieth century (see 
Chapter IV).  But that was the better part of a century ago, before the revolution of citizenship and 
universal franchise, the spread of an Ambedkarite discourse on dignity and human rights, and the rise of 
a Dalit woman to the rank of Chief Minister of UP, not to mention the legal abolition of manual 
scavenging by the Government of India.  Gandhi’s defense of varṇāśramadharma and sacralization of 
scavenging are something of an embarrassment for many admirers of Gandhi today.  I find it difficult to 
believe that these ideas remain valid currency in a forum like this in a political center like Lucknow.  Yet 
the Congressman goes on in this vein, and the applause continues.  The next speaker takes up the 
Balmikis-as-mother trope as well. 
The media arrives, arranges photographs of Balmiki netās and others garlanding a framed poster 
of Rishi Valmiki, and vanishes again.  As the event breaks up a Congresswoman named Yasmin stops 
Anand and me in a corridor to ask me kindly why I am here.  When I explain that I am doing research on 
the history of the Balmiki community, she tells us – or rather, ignoring Anand, she tells me – that though 
her family practiced untouchability with the jamādārs, she vowed to herself, even as a child, that 
someday she would sit with those people and eat with them.  Elaborating on the pandit’s theme, she 
says that in this culture, we touch the feet of those whom we honor.  So if the shudras are the feet of 
society, it is they whom we should touch first, they whom we should honor.  She tells me this with a 
glow in her eyes and emotion in her voice.  She is moved by her own sentiment. 
I do not know whether Yasmin realizes that Anand, at whom she has scarcely glanced and 
whose name she has not asked, is Balmiki.  This, alongside the earnest, passional quality of her delivery, 
and indeed the tenor of the entire proceedings at the Congress headquarters, makes me think of D.R. 
Nagaraj’s insight into “[t]he grandeur, the agony, the moving romanticism of the Gandhian project of 
self-purification. […] In the theatre of history, in a play of such a script, the untouchables would never 
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become heroes of their own right, they are just mirrors for a hero to look at his own existentialist angst 
and despair, maybe even glory” (Nagaraj 1993:17–18). 
 
Kāryakram 3: Valmiki Park 
There is a roughly triangular strip of land between the outer wall of the city’s sports stadium, a 
liquor store, and the road from Parivartan Chowk toward Aliganj, on which stands a statue of Rishi 
Valmiki, installed in 2000.  In 2009 this strip of land was declared “Valmiki Park”.  Here, on a tilted, 
creaking, bamboo-and-plywood stage, after the convergence of all the bastīs’ processions at Parivartan 
Chowk at sundown, the decorated youth of the various jhāṅkīyāṅ assemble into one colorful tableau 
facing their relatives, friends, neighbors and caste-fellows sitting in and milling about a small sea of red 
plastic chairs.  Munnu Balmiki, the union leader, stands on the stage calling prominent members of the 
Lucknow Balmiki community to join him.  An electronic band of Balmiki youth plays a couple of popular 
Hindi film songs.  A girl in high school sings an older, more venerable Hindi film song.  Among the 
dignitaries on stage, the elderly Congressman Ratan Lal ‘Sadhu’ is so moved that he presents the young 
woman with a copy of his self-published, speculative history of Rishi Valmiki and the Balmiki community. 
There are speeches from prominent Balmiki men: felicitations for Valmiki Jayanti, exhortations 
to educate the community’s children.  Even Achhe Lal Balmiki, the octogenarian former Member of 
Parliament who almost never attends public functions or leaves his home (see Chapter V), is present and 
delivers a brief speech.  Tara Balmiki, the social activist, recites a poem of her own composition on 
critical, anti-caste themes that have not been aired at the day’s kāryakrams thus far: 
Nahīṅ chāhie aisī saṅskriti jo hamko majbūr kareṅ 
Narak banāe merī zindagī insānoṅ se dūr kareṅ 
We do not need this culture – this culture that renders us helpless  
That makes my life hell; that separates person from person. 
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An Ambedkarite, Tara Balmiki ordinarily criticizes her caste fellows for embracing Rishi Valmiki and a 
politics of Hindu belonging.  Today, though, she concludes her recitation with a victory cry to Maharishi 
Valmiki. 
 Munnu Balmiki invites the mayor, who has just arrived, to honor the Balmiki youth dressed as 
the cast of the Ramayan.  He obliges, garlanding a young man in Rishi Valmiki costume.  An enormous, 
twenty-kilogram mega-garland is hauled onstage and held over the shoulders of the mayor.  Media 
cameras flash.  Munnu and others compel me to join the mayor under the garland.  The mayor delivers a 
speech.  I am made to deliver a speech.  There are so many speeches that I lose count.  All of it is 
amplified.  As I will learn the next day, the victory cries to Rishi Valmiki were so loud they were heard by 
students at Lucknow University a kilometer away. 
 
Past Habitual or Present Continuous? 
Literally meaning “a dense mass, a crowd, multitude” (Platts 2000:389), Jamghaṭ is a name for 
the day after the primary day of Diwali festivities.  On Jamghaṭ in Lucknow, the explosive sonic surround 
and sulfurous olfactory landscape of the weeks leading up to Diwali continue to prevail – it is another 
day of firecrackers – but the city’s visual appearance is transformed by the widespread tradition, on this 
day more than others, of flying kites.  There is kite-flying, and there are pyrotechnics, in the Balmiki 
bastīs of Lucknow, as there are elsewhere.  But there is also something else.  
At the beginning of the last chapter I spoke of women who told me that blood and liquor would 
flow “in every home” on Jamghaṭ.  A number of people in the community suggested this would be the 
case in the weeks leading up to it.  On the other hand, many people in the community used the past 
habitual tense to refer to the sacrifices of blood and bhāng with which Lal Beg “used to be” propitiated 
on Jamghaṭ.  These accounts usually concluded with “Now all that is finished” or “Now nobody does it.”  
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The community had shed its attachment to unseemly, backward, and musalmānā traditions.  In these 
conversations I was assured that nothing but the pleasures associated with a rare day off work would 
transpire on Jamghaṭ (municipal sweepers work on Diwali, but on the subsequent day they are released 
from duty).   
Thus, even more than usual during fieldwork, I did not know what to expect when the day 
arrived. 
 
The Feast of Lal Beg 
Early in the morning I find the bastī more lively than usual, no doubt largely on account of this 
day being a holiday from municipal work (and many of the university and KGMC workers, as well as 
some of the private workers, have also taken leave for the day).  The Valmiki temple is open but not 
busy.  While I chat with the temple caretaker and his neighbors sitting on the stoop, a young woman 
enters the temple and conducts puja on her own.  Self-service is the typical mode of worship at the 
Valmiki temple; there is no priest or pujari.  I proceed to the back of the bastī.  Children in the galī greet 
me with their usual effusive salutations, but today alongside “Namaste!” and “Salām Elekum!” they add, 
“Happy Diwali!”  Jamghaṭ does not have its own special verbal greeting. 
In the very back of the bastī, just before the high wall separating the Balmiki colony from the 
gardens and bungalows of the owners of the Mohan Meakin brewery, sits the bastī’s only remaining 
outdoor Lal Beg shrine.  A few months ago it was easy to overlook – a small square of raised earth 
abutting the wall of Buggan’s house, one of its five domes missing.  Lately it has been moved and 
improved.  The shrine now sits adjacent to Buggan’s doorway, on a two-tiered, ziggurat-like, square 
platform of concrete, atop which rise the five domes.  The structure is freshly whitewashed.  A plastic 
incense holder sits at the ready on the first tier and nestled between the domes is a necklace of fresh 
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marigolds.  Buggan’s teenage daughters have designed a rangolī of black, red and yellow on the ground 
next to the shrine, but already a few uncareful footsteps have blurred its powdery lines. 
Buggan tells me I’m early.  Born in 1958 and raised in his mother’s village in Bara Banki, Buggan 
came to Lucknow with his parents when they sold their mules and small plot of land to work in the city 
as sweepers (his mother in the municipality, his father in the brewery).  Buggan rebuilt the family shrine 
at their new home in the bastī using earth transported from the village original.  Though Buggan’s family 
maintains the shrine, it is available for everyone in the bastī to use – whether for Jamghaṭ or for the 
propitiation of Lal Beg that remains, Buggan tells me, part of many weddings. 
Not far away sits old Shyam Mehboob, Buggan’s neighbor, the one man in the bastī who still 
routinely wears a skullcap.  His sons invite me into their house for chai to pass the time before the 
sacrifices begin.  Sukhdev, the younger son, offers an interpretation of the five domes of the Lal Beg 
shrine that I have not heard before; he suggests that they represent the five elements (tattvas) of ether, 
wind, fire, earth and water.  “We can speculate that they are thus,” cautioned Rajan, Sukhdev’s more 
circumspect older brother, “but what they are, we do not know.”  
When I return to Buggan’s house half an hour later, I find him in the galī chatting with a man 
who holds a rooster in one hand and a steel plate in the other.  They tell me that the “cutter” 
(kāṭnewālā), the man who will perform the sacrifice, is on his way.  Hubert and Mauss (1964 [1898]) 
designated this figure with the term sacrificer, whereas the person for whose benefit the sacrifice is 
conducted is denoted by sacrifier (in French, sacrificiant).  Most people I have asked do not know the 
name of the sacrificer, but tell me that he is a Muslim who lives somewhere nearby.  Buggan tells me his 
name is Taj; his next door neighbor thinks it is Sarfaraz. 
The cutter is sighted coming down the main galī.  A slim, clean-shaven man in his forties, 
thinning grey hair neatly combed, wearing a blue shirt and pressed trousers, his appearance strikes me 
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as that of a minor bureaucrat on his day off.  Except for the knife in his right hand.  He walks 
energetically, almost jauntily, toward us, exchanges a few brief words with Buggan, and then sets about 
his work.  Doffing his sandals, he takes from Buggan a polythene bag full of dirt, empties the dirt onto 
the concrete left of the shrine and shapes it into a mound with a depression at its center to receive the 
blood.  Ignoring the plastic incense holder, he fills a small clay chai cup with dirt in which he will plant 
the incense sticks to come.  He rolls up his sleeves. 
The first sacrifice is Buggan’s.  Barefoot, Buggan and one of his daughters bring out from their 
house two stainless steel plates – one heaped with garlands of marigolds and a box of incense sticks, the 
other piled with malīdā (shredded roṭī mixed with sugar), sesame sweets, and an oil lamp fashioned out 
of dough – and a steel pitcher (loṭā) full of sweetened water topped by a thick, leafy layer of bhāng.  
These they place before the Lal Beg shrine.  The sacrificer, squatting, empties the box of incense sticks 
and lights the entire bundle.  Buggan returns with a cock and squats next to the sacrificer, who waves 
the bundle of smoking incense over the bird and over the shrine several times.  He then plants the 
incense in the soil-filled cup and places one of the marigold garlands over the cock’s neck.  With Buggan 
keeping the tense bird restrained, the sacrificer touches its beak to the closest of the five domes.  He 
removes the garland.  Then, his lips moving almost soundlessly, the sacrificer mumbles something – 
later he will explain that it is the fātiḥa – and blows a quick burst of air onto the cock’s head. 
Taking the bird from Buggan, the sacrificer pins its feet to the ground with one foot and secures 
its wings with his other knee.  Pulling its head back, he applies the humble kitchen knife to the cock’s 
neck in a sawing motion, holding the bird steady as it shivers and spasms and as its blood, after an initial 
spray against the whitewashed wall, flows into the depression in the pile of earth.  A cup of chai appears 
before my face and I realize that Buggan’s neighbor Ramesh is offering it to me, his arms extended over 
the crowd of women and children sitting around me watching the sacrifice.  I thank him and start 
sipping.  Buggan and the sacrificer remain silent and still as the life drains out of the bird. 
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When the cock is truly dead, the sacrificer wipes the blood from his blade onto the nearest 
dome of the shrine, marking it a deep maroon, and hands the limp feathery mass back to Buggan, who 
takes it into his house.  The next man in the queue steps forward with his plate, pitcher and cock.  The 
procedure begins again. 
By this time a queue of men and boys bearing birds – sacrifiers bearing victims – winds through 
much of the galī.  There are girls, too, helping their fathers and brothers carry plates of malīdā and loṭās 
of bhāng.  At first women are present mostly as onlookers observing from galī-side charpoys and 
balconies, but before long Phulmati, a woman in her fifties, appears with a rooster under her arm.  After 
Phulmati several women join the queue as bearers of sacrificial victims.  Generally only one of the adults 
from a given household comes to perform the sacrifice, frequently accompanied by a child or children, 
who assist.  Excepting the cutter and the victim, whose gender is fixed, the other participant roles in the 
sacrifice appear unstructured by gender: women offer cocks at the shrine in the same manner as men, 
girls and boys alike carry the slaughtered birds away. 
The collective mood in the galī is cheerful, at times raucous.  A cock escapes its captor and runs 
squawking about, prompting general laughter until it is again caught.  In the space immediately 
encircling sacrifier, victim, and cutter, a degree of solemnity prevails; but even here, banalities 
periodically break through.  Seeing a technical difficulty the sacrificer seems to be having, one person 
and then another comments loudly on the bluntness of his blade.  An alternative is produced from a 
nearby household, then another.  Before long four knives lie before the shrine.  The cutter gives each of 
them a try and finally settles on one.  The maroon array on the wall above the shrine grows. 
With few variations, the sacrificer follows the same procedure for each client.  There are, 
however, minor differences in what the latter brings.  Some bring candles rather than incense, and one 
visibly poor man brings neither.  A few people offer sherbet without bhāng.  Malīdā is de rigeur, but 
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other food offerings vary: sugar batāśe, puffed rice, sweets.  Some clients place eleven rupees on the 
corner of the shrine, others twenty-one.  The cutter periodically clears these donations off the shrine 
and puts them in his pocket. 
The consumable offerings are treated as prasād and tabarruk usually are: a fraction is placed 
(malīdā) or spilled (sherbet) on the shrine and the rest is returned to the sacrifier to be distributed to 
the family at home. 
I lose count after about a dozen sacrifices.  It is nearing noon when there is a lull in the traffic.  
The cutter wipes off his original knife, slips on his flip-flops, and starts off for somewhere.  I hasten to 
accompany him.  He tells me, as we stride up the galī, that his name is Muhammad Yaqub, that he is 
Pathan by caste (I do not ask; he volunteers this information), that he has been doing this work for the 
Lal Begis (as he calls them) for several years, and that he would like to invite me to his home in a 
neighboring quarter to discuss it all at leisure after all the cutting business is over.  At this moment we 
bump into the very client to whose house we are rushing; it seems that he has decided, despite his 
earlier arrangement with Yaqub, not to sacrifice at home but at Buggan’s shrine, so with the client and 
his bird we retrace our steps and squat again at the shrine at the rear of the bastī.  More clients arrive 
and it becomes apparent that Yaqub will be occupied here for quite some time still. 
Friends in the servants’ quarters of KGMC have insisted that I spend at least part of Jamghaṭ 
with them, so I take leave of Yaqub, Buggan and his neighbors.  Departing the bastī I see that the rubbish 
depots are now covered by a blanket of bird feathers.  Some residents are busily preparing the sacrificed 
birds for this evening’s feast, while others – women and men – squat in circles gambling on a card game 
called lakṛī (“wood”).  I catch a tempo, cross the river, and quickly reach the edge of the old city’s largest 
drain where KGMC servants’ quarters are located, and where a boy who recognizes me says “Andar ho 
rahā hai!  Jāie.”  It is going on inside!  Proceed. 
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It – and here the vagueness of the referent gives me momentary pause, reminding me of 
something – is indeed going on.  There are two public Lal Beg shrines in this colony, both in the back, far 
from the main road.  The first, which abuts the front wall of a home much like Buggan’s, has already 
seen a good deal of action, judging from the pool of blood at its base and the heaps of marigolds, roses, 
malīdā, batāshe, melted candles, blackened lamps and incense ash covering its five domes.  Many of the 
morning’s sacrifices took place there.  Now, though, activity has shifted to the second shrine, at the base 
of a tree in a wide spot in the galī, where I meet my friend Rishi Kumar, a poet and retired KGMC 
sweeper, who introduces me to the man who performs the sacrifices for this bastī.  Aftab, also known as 
Lallan, squats next to the shrine wearing a checkered lungī, threadbare kurta and very thick spectacles.  
He is seventy or eighty years old, he tells me, and has been serving this function for the neighborhood 
since he was thirteen.  He lives in a part of the old city “that is so interior you will never be able to find 
it,” but has spent most of his working life as a roadside barber (hajām) at the gate of the dargah of Shah 
Meena Shah, a short walk from the bastī.  Clients appear while we are chatting and Aftab resumes his 
work.  His method differs from that of Yaqub; Aftab restricts his labor to handling the bird and cutting its 
throat, while the client is left to herself to waft the incense, garland the cock, light candles and so on.  
He also does not blow on the bird’s head before killing it.  For some clients, Aftab dips his thumb in the 
drained blood of the sacrificial victim and applies it, in the manner of tilak, to the clients’ forehead.  
Though I offer no bird, Aftab spontaneously marks my brow with blood as well.  It is warm and viscous.  
All worked up about the meaning of the ritual,171 I almost start at its tactility.   
Someone in a nearby house begins playing Hindi film music very loudly.  Mahesh Balmiki, an 
Ambedkarite critic of Hinduism and “superstition” of all sorts who lives in the bastī, shows up and greets 
me warmly.  I am surprised to see that he carries a rooster under his arm.  He stands before the shrine, 
prays, gives the cock to Aftab to sacrifice, receives the blood tilak, and returns home with the carcass. 
                                                          
171 Like the “young anthropologist” portrayed in Daniel (2002). 
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Another client, who is either drunk or stoned, complains in slurred speech when a jet of blood 
spurts onto his plate of malīdā and batāśe.  Aftab points out that the client should not have placed the 
plate in the line of fire, as it were.  The client grumblingly departs.  The next sacrifier, a man dressed in 
garments of pure white, silently performs a complete prostration before the shrine.  
The rites take on a somewhat different color in each bastī.  In Babu Ganj, the sacrificer is not an 
outsider to the community, but a Lal Begi/Balmiki man who has formally converted to Islam.  Seeking to 
imbue the rites with pedagogical value for his caste fellows, he recites the fātiḥa over the victim not 
sotto voce, like Yaqub and Aftab, but audibly and clearly.  In Nirala Nagar, sacrifices are performed by a 
team of Muslim musicians – some call them Dafalis, others qawwals – who add their music to the 
proceedings.  Asha, owner and caretaker of the only remaining outdoor Lal Beg shrine in that bastī, tells 
me that only two families sacrificed here in the morning, a dramatic decline from the previous year.  It 
seems that most families in Nirala Nagar now propitiate Lal Beg in the privacy of their homes, while 
some have stopped performing the rites altogether. 
Everywhere, though, the day concludes with a feast.  If blood flows in the morning, bhāng and 
liquor flow in the evening.  Gambling circles grow, as do the sums exchanged.  It is twilight in Mohan 
Meakin when I encounter Kusmi, a widow who verbally adopted me as her son several months into my 
fieldwork, leaning on a motorcycle, talking with her neighbors.  Her eyes pink with inebriation, she claps 
me on the shoulder and tells me to join a card game.  The air is permeated with the aroma of cooking 
meat.  Even reformist families that no longer have truck with Muslim sacrificers continue to eat a special 
meal on this night.   
 
Signifying the Sacred 
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It will be good to recall what Valmiki Jayanti and Jamghaṭ have in common.  Both, again, are 
annual ritual commemorations of the caste prophet, guru or forebear, a figure from whom the caste 
takes (or took) its name and who is (or was) central to the caste’s traditions and representations.  Both 
events attract a great deal of participation within the community; there are those who remain aloof 
from one or the other or both, but larger numbers take part.  Both are also specific to the sanitation 
labor castes – indeed, to a large extent, to the Chuhra caste.  Except for the mayor, a handful of 
politicians, and the urban poor who approach the panḍāls for food, non-Balmikis are not to be seen 
participating in Valmiki Jayanti.  Except for the Muslims who recite the fātiḥa at the shrine of Lal Beg, no 
one but the former Lal Begis is present. 
Yet, as should be clear from the preceding accounts, the two appear in most other respects to 
be utterly dissimilar; their forms, procedures, orientations, and modes of public being suggest that the 
two belong to different class of phenomena.  This, though, is the point.  The new caste guru does not 
simply replace the old caste prophet; rather, he brings with him certain normative assumptions about 
the proper relations between various categories of people, practices, and power.  That is to say, Valmiki 
and Lal Beg are enmeshed in two distinct semiotic ideologies. 
 Webb Keane, from whom I am borrowing the term “semiotic ideology,” arrives at the idea by 
way of prayer.  John Milton in seventeenth century England, and Dutch Calvinist missionaries in the 
nineteenth century East Indies, argued that prayer was something best done with eyes closed and words 
spontaneously uttered; to follow a prepared text was to surrender the agency proper to humans, to be 
in the thrall of rote formalism, to commit idolatry.  This, Keane notes, is a semiotic ideology, a set of 
prescriptions for what signifying practices are proper and good and which are not (Keane 2007).  
Essentially an expansion of the concept of linguistic ideology, a semiotic ideology concerns itself with 
aspects of signification outside of language proper – this, as we will see, is why I find it useful.  This, and 
the recognition, built into the concept, that the terrain of semiosis is not sequestered from ideological 
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conflict, but is rather a theater of class warfare (Vološinov 1973).  As Keane points out, the ideas about 
prayer espoused by Milton in the English civil war and the Calvinist missionaries at the height of Dutch 
colonialism were not without powerful political entailments.  Likewise in our situation.  
Consider the signature forms of Jamghaṭ and Valmiki Jayanti: the cock sacrifice and the 
kāryakram.  The latter, as we have discussed above, is a performance oriented to a public beyond the 
face-to-face gathering of those immediately present.  To use Charles Taylor’s (2007:187–188) terms, it is 
a performance in a topical common space that self-consciously directs itself to a metatopical common 
space.  Through the kāryakram form, distinct micro-publics perform their membership in broader 
publics: civil society, the nation.  The competencies that are required on this proving ground are 
representational.  Thus Jiya Lal’s success is measured in part by how his Valmiki Jayanti kāryakram is 
covered by local televised news.  Thus questions like “How did you like our function?” and “Do you think 
we pulled it off?” proliferate after a kāryakram.   
Such questions are not asked on the occasion of Jamghaṭ.  Of course the sacrifice, as a ritual 
form, is also a kind of performance.  But the audience here is the sacred interlocutor (Lal Beg) and the 
face-to-face community present.  No metatopical common space hovers over the rear of the bastī, 
orienting the representational practices of the actors to its privileged forms.  The cock is not sacrificed 
with an eye to how it will look on camera or what the newspapers will print about it the next day.  What 
is at stake is not representation but – and here I realize I am making an interpretive leap – efficacy.  Lal 
Beg, for those of his people who continue to reverence him, remains an efficacious god, one who 
blessing is necessary for the good life, one whose vengeance is to be feared, one whose right (haq) to 
the fruit of sacrifice must not be denied.  And there are normative assumptions about proper and 
improper ways to relate to this efficacious god. 
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When the boy at the entrance of KGMC servants’ quarters told me that andar ho raha hai – it is 
going on – something tugged at my memory.  Later I realized what it was.  In the days leading up to 
Jamghaṭ, and on the day itself, almost nobody described the central event using a word for “sacrifice.”  
Neither of the obvious choices from the north Indian vernacular, the Sanskrit-derived bali or the Arabic-
derived qurbān, was used by participants to denote the ritual killing of the cock.  Nor was there an 
alternative technical term in circulation.  Instead, like this boy, most people spoke of the rite without 
giving it a name, using the indefinite pronoun or simply abandoning “it” for the ambiguity of a 
subjectless verb.  Others described “it” pragmatically, as murghā chaṛhānā (raising up the cock [i.e. onto 
the shrine]) or murghā kāṭnā (cutting the cock).  But even more than this, people avoided putting the 
ritual act into words at all. 
At the beginning of the last chapter I spoke of a woman with a bamboo staff who signified 
Jamghaṭ to me not by speech but by gesture, by sawing the air with her right hand as though it were a 
sacrificial victim’s neck.  This pantomime was not peculiarly hers; many of her caste fellows deployed 
the same gestural sign.  Indeed, more than any verbal formulation, it was this silent movement of the 
hand that did the work of a word like “bali,” “qurbān,” or “sacrifice” in the days before and after 
Jamghaṭ in the bastīs of Lucknow.  It was as though speech hesitated to enter this particular domain.  
Approaching it, semiosis was compelled to switch tracks.  Here only gesture, with its charged silence, 
was able to signify. 
The word is the preeminent example of that class of signs that Peirce designates as symbols, i.e., 
signs whose capacity to signify objects is determined by convention.  For Saussure all signs are of this 
sort.  The gesture, however, can operate in an unlike fashion.  Some gestures, to be sure, signify on the 
grounds of convention, and thus function quite like words – head nodding would be an example.  
Others, though, signify on different grounds.  To point toward an object is to signify it on the grounds of 
a spatial relation of (relative) contiguity; pointing is thus an indexical sign.  Miming an action – the 
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cutting of a cock’s throat, for instance – signifies that action on the grounds of likeness.  Signs of this sort 
Peirce calls icons.  We see, then, in the marked preference for pantomime over speech in the particular 
domain of the cock sacrifice, a kind of patterned avoidance of the symbolic in favor of the iconic.  This 
could be interpreted as evidence in support of Daniel’s (1984:216) hypothesis that “in South Asia the 
iconic function occupies a place of privilege in the construction of reality.”  I hesitate, though, to map 
onto a civilizational or geographic binary the cleavage in semiotic ideology that I am tracing.  I will return 
to this point in a moment.   
If the semiotic ideology to which the Lal Begi faithful conform on Jamghaṭ holds that it is better 
to mark the sacred with silence and gesture than to speak, the assumptions that undergird Valmiki 
Jayanti lean in a quite different direction.  Participants in the Valmiki Jayanti kāryakram, too, engaged in 
semiotic track-switching, but in their case it was not from speech to gesture, but from ordinary speech 
to speechifying – to the unique oratorical register and vocabulary native to the kāryakram form.  It is 
surely one of the most distinctive features of the kāryakram that it turns ordinary people into orators, 
usually orators with a relatively fixed and stereotyped repertoire.  The form exercised its subtle force on 
me, no less than others, when I was called up to approach the microphone and give a speech.  I found 
myself suddenly voluble; I spoke more and longer than I intended, without meaning to I repeated 
phrases and replicated cadences that had come before and that reappeared in the speech of 
subsequent speakers.  Something similar seemed to happen to Tara Balmiki, the social activist opposed 
to the politics of Valmiki yet who, in the grip of the kāryakram, let forth a “Victory to Rishi Valmiki!” 
In the kāryakram, discourse proliferates.  It is better, in this semiotic ideology, to speak than to 
be silent.  It is proper to utter the name of god, indeed to proclaim it, to publish it on banners and 
announce it over loudspeakers, to inaugurate and conclude speeches with shouts of victory to god.  The 
name of Lal Beg, by contrast, is rarely spoken by those who take him seriously; ambiguous terms like 
“our guru” are preferred.  The idea of printing the name of Lal Beg on a poster is unthinkable.   
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It is not my contention that the semiotic ideologies at play here can be affixed to a religious 
binary like Islam and Hinduism, or even a softer alternative like Islamicate and Indic.  These entities are 
too internally diverse and historically contingent.  One might, for example, argue that the institution of 
the āzān, the Islamic call to prayer, implies a normative judgment that the name of the sacred should be 
broadcast for all to hear; that the soundscape should resound with the name of God.  On the other hand 
the Shi’a doctrine of taqiyya – again, strategic concealment or tactical dissimulation – entails a different 
set of assumptions about religious signification; here the outwardly expressed is devalued, while the 
truly sacred dwells in what is whispered and what is done in secret. 
Nor do I mean to explain the difference as a simple reflection of other analytical binaries 
potentially at hand – premodern and modern, subaltern and dominant – even though there is certainly 
something of each of these at play in what we are discussing.  My purpose, rather, has been to make 
visible a domain of religious signification that often escapes analysis as political, to chart 
ethnographically the contours of two divergent semiotic ideologies in South Asian religious life, and to 







 In Chapter V, I discussed the question posed by Vijay Prashad (2000), Badri Narayan (2009) and 
many others of how organized Hindu nationalism succeeds, in certain contexts, in enlisting Dalits, and in 
particular the sanitation labor castes, in the commission of acts of majoritarian violence targeting 
Muslims and other religious minorities.  Prashad frames his landmark study of sanitation labor caste 
social history with specific instances of Balmiki youth participating in assaults on Muslims and Sikhs in 
Delhi and parts of western UP.  To get at the same problem differently, I have inverted the question: 
why do the sanitation labor castes in Lucknow, Awadh, and indeed most other places decline to be 
mobilized for communalist violence?  How is it that, even while in many ways embracing the Hindu 
majoritarian program of Vālmīkiyat that elsewhere has proven a prelude to Hindutva militancy, the 
sanitation labor castes in Awadh have resisted the invitation to harm erstwhile neighbors, to 
demonstrate their “arrival” in the majority by letting the blood of the minority? 
 Nicolas Jaoul provides one fine answer to this question in his study of a riot that failed to 
happen.  By a careful reconstruction of the attempted mobilization of a riot network in Kanpur and the 
ultimately successful struggle for leadership of an Ambedkarite over a Hindutva faction in the Balmiki 
bastīs of that city, Jaoul (2012) persuasively demonstrates how majoritarian violence can be thwarted by 
the skillful deployment of anti-caste ideology.  
 But there is another answer, one grounded in an older repertoire of practices.  This answer, I 
would suggest, has been with us throughout this inquiry.  It was with us in Lal Colony when the silver-
bearded hospital sweeper, without accepting or denying that Lal Begis are Muslim, waited silently for 
the census enumerator to mark him Hindu and move on.  It was there in the observation of Ambedkar, 
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quoted in the Introduction, that the Balmiki predilection for adopting names “may be likened to the 
process of undergoing protective discolouration” (Ambedkar 1989:419–420).  It was there in our 
discussion of the mimetic mode of religious polypraxy – of adopting the sartorial habits, death rites, and 
other practices of local landlords, of whatever religious community – in the colonial period.  It was there 
when Govind Prasad, reflecting on his lifetime of engagement with the Arya Samaj and his memories of 
earlier Christian and Muslim “missionaries,” told me, “The interesting thing is this, that we deceived 
every one of them.”  
 There stands, at an intersection of roads near one of the Balmiki bastīs of Lucknow, a tall, 
square, concrete platform painted red, atop which rise five copper domes – one in each corner and the 
fifth, slightly taller, in the center.  This is the largest Lal Beg shrine in the city.  Most Lal Beg shrines, as 
the foregoing chapters have intimated, have been demolished, abandoned to dissolve in monsoon rains, 
or concealed in back rooms.  The few that remain, placed far from public streets in the rear of Balmiki 
bastīs, are, as they have been since at least the colonial period, made of mud.  Yet this one stands 
outside the bastī proper, at an intersection in a mixed-caste neighborhood, and is both far larger and 
made of more durable materials than virtually all of its counterparts.  There is a further difference.  On 
this Lal Beg shrine, facing the central dome from one side of the platform, sits a small, white, marble 
representation of Nandi, the bull that serves as the vehicle (vāhana) of the Hindu god Shiva.  As a Hindu 
iconographic norm, Nandi faces Shiva, the latter generally in the form of a lingam, a stylized phallic 
shaft.  Here, Nandi faces the central dome of the Lal Beg shrine’s five copper domes.  With the inclusion 
of the Nandi figurine, the non-Balmiki passerby – or more precisely, anyone unfamiliar with Lal Beg and 
his iconography – is invited to interpret this central dome as a Shiva lingam, and the shrine itself as a 
Shiva shrine.  
In order to consider the implications of this innovation, I would like to relate a story about the 
Mughal emperor Aurangzeb that I sometimes heard during my fieldwork.  Though I heard the story from 
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a number of Balmiki men in different contexts, its content was remarkably consistent from telling to 
telling.  One version was narrated to me by Rishi Kumar, a poet, song-writer and retired sanitation 
worker whom we have met in Chapters V (where he described his and his family’s change of names) and 
VII (when he introduced me to the sacrificer Aftab/Lallan during Jamghaṭ).  It was in fact on Jamghaṭ 
itself, over cups of tea during a lull in the cock sacrifices, that Rishi Kumar told me his version of the tale: 
Our ancestors lived in tribes in the jungles on account of persecution from staunch 
[kaṭṭhar] Hindus… [our ancestors] lived like adivasis, like banjaras, in dwellings in the 
jungle… Then one time when Aurangzeb – what I’m telling you is what I heard from the 
tongues of my elders; my father and grandfather often mentioned this, they would tell 
me when I would sit and listen – Aurangzeb used to kill people for conversion.  Whoever 
did not convert, he would kill them.  Just hearing the word ‘Hindu’ he would murder 
people.  Well, when our ancestors considered that they had already barely survived [the 
aforementioned persecution from Hindus] with their caste and religion, they thought, 
how will we escape this disaster?  So the day that he was to come to their region, these 
people – our ancestors – thought, “Well we certainly can’t fight with Aurangzeb… So 
why don’t we make a fool out of him?  Why don’t we dupe him [kyoṅ nahīṅ is ko bevkūf 
banāyā jae]?  We’ll manage to keep doing what we’ve been doing, and at the same time 
he’ll let us go!  Our caste will survive [hamārī jāt bhī bach jāe].”  So these people 
consulted with each other and decided, “Why don’t we build something that, when 
Aurangzeb sees it, will cause him to let us go?”  And then and there, at the base of a 
tree, they built a little platform and put five domes on it.  Earthen domes… [They also 
planted a red flag and assembled materials for the traditional Lal Begi cock sacrifice.  
Finally Aurangzeb] arrived and asked “What’s going on?”  So they said, “We’re doing 
pūjā.”  “What kind of pūjā?”  They replied, “We’re honoring our pir.”  So he said, “Which 
pir is that?”  So then at that very moment they thought “What can we tell him?  What 
name should we give to this thing we’ve made?”  And they said, spontaneously, “This is 
our Lal Beg.” 
 
Rishi Kumar emphasizes that he is channeling the words of his elders, suggesting the possibility of an 
unbroken chain of oral transmission originating in the time of the story’s action (the latter half of the 
seventeenth century).  In support of this possibility there is, in several of the Lal Begi oral traditions 
collected in the late colonial period, the trope of a Delhi king whose wrath the sanitation labor castes 
narrowly escape.  There is even, in those sources, a scrape with Aurangzeb: it was a Chuhra man or pair 
of brothers who, according to legend, stole from the Delhi fort the severed head of the ninth Sikh guru 
Tegh Bahadur, executed by Aurangzeb, and brought it to Guru Gobind Singh.  
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Yet there is no mention, in the Lal Begi songs and stories transcribed in the colonial period, of 
the central elements of the above story: the threat of conversion and the invention of Lal Beg as a 
means to evade such a threat.  The motif of the angry Delhi king in Lal Begi legend emerges, instead, 
from an act of perceived ingratitude and the violation of a food taboo: King Sikander, pleased with his 
loyal servant Jiwan, bestows on him a fine steed and is piqued when he later discovers that Jiwan and 
his caste fellows have eaten it (see Chapter III).  Even in the story of the rescued guru’s head, Aurangzeb 
is an incidental figure and the question of the hero’s religious affiliation is not raised; primarily it is a tale 
of Lal Begi bravery.  
Rather, Rishi Kumar’s story bears distinct signs of early twentieth century Hindu nationalist 
propaganda; in its choice of Aurangzeb as the villain and in its foregrounding of the trope of forced 
conversion, the story resembles other narratives generated and circulated by the Arya Samaj in the 
1920s and 1930s as part of their effort to woo the Depressed Classes.  That this could be the case and 
that Rishi Kumar’s contention that he heard it from his father and grandfather could be true is possible 
when we consider local family histories: Rishi Kumar’s father and grandfather were, in fact, part of 
Kanhaiya Lal Balmiki’s circle of intimates (Chapter V).172 
Yet the means by which the ancestors contend with Aurangzeb – subterfuge, dissimulation – are 
not to be found in Hindu nationalist propaganda of the early twentieth century.  The genealogies that 
the Arya Samaj promoted among the subaltern castes were militant; present degradation was a 
consequence of the untouchables’ ancestors’ military opposition to Muslim kings, their defiance of 
forced conversion.  Hindu nationalists did not advocate dissembling as a way of contending with 
Muslims.   Moreover, the ancestors in Rishi Kumar’s tale do not carry out their act in the name of the 
Hindu community – who are mentioned only as an earlier wave of oppressors – but in the name of the 
caste community: hamārī jāt bhī bach jāe. 
                                                          
172 Indeed, Rishi Kumar, originally named Hasanu, was re-named after Kanhaiya Lal’s brother (Chapter V). 
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The story thus likely reflects a blend of 1920s Hindu nationalist mythmaking and Lal Begi oral 
tradition.  In any case, whatever its origins, the verve with which the story is told suggests that this 
narrative continues to be a generative site of meaning for the community today.  I would propose that 
this tale be read as a parable of subaltern tactics that speaks as much to the present of the sanitation 
labor castes and their ways of negotiating the politics of pahchān, as it does to the past.  The height of 
the narrative in Rishi Kumar’s telling is the internal dialogue of the ancestors as they prepare for an 
encounter with their overlord – a classic example of a “hidden transcript” (Scott 1985; 1990).  Far from 
the ears of their oppressors, the ancestors improvise a plan – a “tactic,” as Certeau (1984:34–39) would 
have it, as opposed to the more calculated “strategies” of the dominant – that will enable them, for the 
moment, to escape persecution.  They will stage a religious performance that appears to conform to 
that of their rulers while still allowing for the continuation, more or less surreptitious, of the group’s 
autonomous tradition.  The object of worship itself – the five-domed shrine of Lal Beg – is the 
centerpiece of the deception. 
Like a page from a manual of taqiyya – again, the Shi’a doctrine of tactical dissimulation – the 
story valorizes the skillful manipulation of signs as a survival technique.  The ancestors are upheld as 
pragmatic semioticians.  In a game of wits with the emperor, it is they who prove the more nimble 
handlers of the sign-object relation, they who determine what object Aurangzeb will take the shrine-sign 
to represent; they who are able to elicit the interpretant that they want.  They are taken for Muslim and 
left alone.  They manage, that is, to “pass.” 
 The story suggests that in periods and contexts in which the sanitation labor castes lived among 
and were employed by Muslim landlords, the adoption of musalmānā forms and practices was a 
politically astute maneuver, a move that cloaked or drove underground – but did not destroy – the 
autonomous traditions of the community.  But the relevance of the story does not end with the passing 
of the old regime.  
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Now let us return to Lucknow’s only concrete-and-copper Lal Beg shrine, the one to which a 
Nandi figurine has been affixed.  When I asked pedestrians and shopkeepers what they made of it, most 
answered that it was a Mahadev (i.e., Shiva) temple.  Some even – like the poet Shah Nasir almost two 
centuries earlier, who mistook a Lal Beg shrine for a Sufi’s grave (Chapter III) – paused before it to utter 
a prayer.  Passers-by are aided in their misrecognition of the object by the builders’ deft addition of the 
Nandi figurine.  The central dome now invites interpretation as a Shiva lingam (albeit a somewhat 
peculiar one, boxed in as it is by four subsidiary domes).  Of course, within a theology as abundant in 
isomorphisms as Lal Begi theology is, to identify Lal Beg as Shiva is not entirely to misrecognize – Lal Beg 
is Shiva, just as he is Balmik, the Panch Pir, and the jinn at Firoz Shah Kotla in Delhi (Taneja 2013).  As the 
Lal Begi liturgical refrain says: vohī ek, that is the one.  The average passerby, however, dwells not within 
Lal Begi theology but without, and sees atop the concrete platform not the prophet of the sweepers but 
the god of the Hindus.  Members of the Balmiki family who built and maintain the shrine – like the 
ancestors of Rishi Kumar’s story – do not disabuse visiting outsiders of their initial assumption.  Rather 
they facilitate it.  When asked, family members say that it is a shrine of “Lal Mahadev.”  This name 
immediately assures the addressee that the object is indeed a form of Shiva (Mahadev), even as it 
retains the Lal of Lal Beg for the speaker and simultaneously gestures to a more abstract entity, the Red 
God, whose semantic breadth might encompass both.  It is also simply a substitution of the Sanskrit 
Mahadev for the Turkish/Uzbek/Mughal title Beg.  If the genius of the imagined ancestors was to 
improvise a name both faithful to autonomous tradition yet cast in an Islamic idiom to placate Muslim 
overlords, those who repeat the story today are no less adroit in presenting themselves and their guru 
to a postcolonial state that reserves recognition of injustice done only to the Dalit who “professes” to be 
Hindu.  
To “pass” is not to “be.”  To pass is not to commit to a social ontology, but to pretend to.  Those 
who pass maintain a wedge between the act and the thing; they know too well the space between sign 
294 
 
and object.  In their hidden transcripts, they speak not of Hindu and Muslim, but of hinduānā and 
musalmānā (Hindu-like, Muslim-esque).  The repertoire of practices that I am glossing as “passing,” that 
Govind Prasad called “dhokhā” (deception), that Ambedkar called “protective discolouration,” disposes 
its practitioners against the kind of social ontological commitments that majoritarian violence requires. 
I often met with the union leader Munnu Balmiki at his home in one of the larger Balmiki bastīs 
of Lucknow.  He comes from a prominent reformist family; his father was part of the inner circle of the 
shaharwāle triumvirate.  Munnu grew up listening to Kanhaiya Lal’s bhajans in praise of Valmiki and 
diatribes against Lal Beg.  In his union work Munnu carries on aspects of this legacy.  Yet, like so many in 
the community, his manner of taking up Vālmīkiyat, the ideology espoused by his father and his 
associates, resonates with the older repertoire of practices we are discussing.  One day at his house, 
during a particularly long and rich interview, he took me to a room in the back that I had never seen.  His 
elderly mother gave us a piercing look as we entered and I felt like an unwitting intruder.  On the walls 
of the back room were shelves on which were propped framed photograph of the Sufi dargahs Ajmer 
Sharif and Dewa Sharif, chromolithographs of Kali and other goddesses, and posters of the ka’aba at 
Mecca and the tomb of the prophet in Medina.  Beneath all this, in the corner of the room stood a large, 
square, earthen platform crowned by five domes: a Lal Beg shrine.  Before it curled the smoke of 
incense. 
Back in the front room Munnu told me how in his youth he, along with his father and the 
shaharwāle triumvirate, had brought an end to the cock sacrifice and feast of Lal Beg in their home and 
in their bastī.   He explained the various rationales that the reformists had impressed upon them, the 
reasons not to kill a cock, the reasons not to engage Muslim sacrificers.  I asked him if he agreed with 
the reasons. 
“I had to [mānnā hī paṛā].” 
295 
 
The conversation then turned to the Jamghaṭ that had recently occurred (the one described in 
Chapter VII).  I had encountered Munnu briefly that day in the galī in front of his house, where he was 
removing the feathers from a rooster.  Recalling this, he said, “I was plucking it, remember?  Well, we all 
have that for dinner on that night.  Actually, the one you saw, the maulāna cut it.  After reading the 
‘Bismillah.’  It’s an old tradition.  I had to offer the cock.” 
I must have looked perplexed.  Munnu laughed and said it again.  
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